Reformulating the Support Ratio to Reflect Asset Income and Transfers (Extended Abstract)

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Date last revised: September 20, 2012 Reformulating the Support Ratio to Reflect Asset Income and Transfers (Extended Abstract) Ronald Lee (Corresponding Author) Departments of Demography and Economics University of California 2232 Piedmont Ave Berkeley, CA 94720 E-mail: rlee@demog.berkeley.edu Andrew Mason Department of Economics University of Hawaii at Manoa, and Population and Health Studies East-West Center 2424 Maile Way, Saunders 542 Honolulu, HI 96821 E-mail: amason@hawaii.edu Key words: support ratio, population aging, macroeconomic, asset income, transfers, public programs Lee s research for this paper was funded by the National Institutes of Health, NIA R37 AG025247. We are grateful to Gretchen Donehower, Ivan Mejia, and members of the NTA network from the 10 countries whose estimates we used. The researchers are identified and more detailed information on the NTA website: www.ntaccounts.org where more information is also available for many countries in working papers. See also Lee and Mason (2011), the recently published book from the NTA project. 1

ABSTRACT Reformulating the Support Ratio to Reflect Asset Income and Transfers : Ronald Lee, Andrew Mason The support ratio is a simple and intuitive indicator of the consequences of population aging, and its changes are interpreted as implying corresponding changes in per capita age adjusted consumption. However, this holds only when net consumers rely on transfers from net producers. If instead they rely on asset income, then support ratio variations have no effect on per capita consumption if the economy is open, and likewise across golden rule economies with different population growth rates. Here we reformulate the support ratio to include both asset income and transfers. In countries in which the elderly are funded heavily by public transfers as in Sweden or Austria, the new measure gives the same result as the old one. In countries like the US or Mexico where old age consumption is funded more heavily out of asset income, the new measures suggest that the effects of population aging will be muted. 2

Introduction The support ratio is a simple and intuitive indicator of the consequences of population aging. It tells us how the number of working age people is changing relative to the numbers of consumers, each weighted by baseline labor income and consumption by age (Cutler et al, 1990). Between 2010 and 2050, the US support ratio will decline by about 12.5% or one eighth. Other things equal, per capita consumption will decline by that amount, or be 12.5% lower than otherwise, e.g. for given growth in labor productivity. The Standard Support Ratio can be misleading But other things equal is an extreme assumption, as we suggest below. An hypothetical illustration: Consider a population of workers and retirees. The workers either save or consume all their labor income, and save most of their asset income. In aggregate, we assume that workers exactly consume their labor income, and savings out of labor income when young are balanced by some consumption of asset income when older. Retirees use asset income and the sale of assets to finance their consumption fully. Now suppose that population aging leads to a doubling of the ratio of older retirees to workers. The standard support ratio drops in this case, indicating that per capita consumption will fall, other things equal. But why should per capita consumption change at all? Workers will still in aggregate exactly consume their labor income, and retirees will exactly consume their assets and asset income. In an open economy, wages and interest rates are determined in international markets. In this case, population aging has no effect whatsoever on the consumption of workers or retirees in this hypothetical illustration, although since their relative numbers change, and levels of consumption might be different in the two age groups, overall per capita consumption (the weighted average for workers and retirees) might either rise or fall. In a closed economy, the capital labor ratio will rise, raising the marginal product of labor and reducing the interest rate. Consequently workers will consume more and retirees will consume less, and overall per capita consumption may rise or fall. In neither the open nor the closed economy does the change in the support ratio tell us anything useful about the consequences of population aging. Comment on the hypothetical illustration: The support ratio emphasizes the role of labor in production, but capital also plays an important role, and asset income also funds consumption. In the US, aggregate consumption is 30% greater than aggregate labor income. In general, aggregate consumption, C, is the sum of labor income, Y l, capital income, ra, dissavings, -S, and aggregate net public and private transfers, T. In general, at each age x consumption equals the sum of labor income, asset income, dissavings, and net public and private transfers. 3

(0.1) c( x) = y ( x) + ra( x) s( x) + τ ( x) l This holds in aggregate, when we weight each age by population size and sum: (0.2) ω ( ) = (, ) ( ) C t l 0 N x t c x dx C = Y + ra S + T In a closed population, T=0, since every transfer given is balanced by a transfer received. However, in an open economy the sum equals net transfers with the rest of the world. For example, in the US many immigrants send remittance income to households in their home countries, and these are counted as negative transfers. Likewise, Social Security benefits paid to recipients in other countries are negative transfers. The expression ra(x) s(x) tells us the extent to which asset income is being used to finance consumption. A person might have a lot of asset income, but save it all. In that case, this expression would be zero. A person might have no asset income, but sell off some stocks or a house, and use that income to pay for consumption in that particular year. In this case, s(x) is negative, and the expression as a whole is positive, indicating that the person financed consumption by dissaving. A person might have no assets at all at the start of the period, and might borrow some money. If the amount borrowed were spent on consumption then s(x) would again be negative, and the expression would be positive. In National Transfer Accounts, this expression is called Asset Based Reallocations or abr(x). An Alternative Measure of Demographic Pressure on Consumption We propose an alternative index of demographic pressure on consumption, call it the generalized support ratio or GSR. Define ABR(t) as the population weighted sum of abr(x), using the population age distribution in year t as weights, and fixed age profiles of yl(x), A(x), and s(x) for a specific base year which will be 2003 for present purposes. Then: (0.3) GSR ( t) ω ω (, ) l ( ) + (, ) ( ) ( ) ω N ( x, t) c( x) dx N x t y x dx N x t ra x s x dx = 0 0 0 As a population ages, the standard support ratio (represented by the first integral in the numerator) declines, since the elderly earn little labor income. However, in the US, the elderly rely heavily on asset income to finance their consumption, at least on average. Net transfers from the working age population, mostly through the public sector in the form of Social Security benefits, Medicare and Medicaid, make up only about 40% or less of funding for consumption. The second integral, therefore, is most likely positive. 4

The figure shows these age profiles, estimated for the US in 2003, following National Transfer Accounts methodology 1 Note that both consumption and asset based reallocations rise strongly with age. 80000 70000 Figure 1. Age profiles of consumption, labor income and asset based reallocations for the US, 2003 Thousands of 2003 US dollars 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 C YL ABR 0-10000 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 Age The General Support ratio can be calculated using the age profiles in Figure 1 combined with standard projections of the population by age. The result is shown in Figure 2. 1 Consumption includes private household expenditures imputed to individual household members, plus inkind government transfers such as Medicare, Medicaid and Public Education and prorated shares of government expenditures that cannot be allocated by age, such as defense or research; labor income includes pre tax wages plus fringe benefits, as well as two thirds of self-employment income. Asset income and savings are imputed to the household head. For more details, see http://www.ntaccounts.org. 5

1.200 Figure 2. Standard support ratio and alternative support ratio reflecting reliance on asset income by age Support Ratio: 2011=100 1.000 0.800 0.600 0.400 0.200 0.000 1950 2000 2050 2100 Date YL/C (YL+ABR)/C Age profiles : US, 2003. Support ratios are indexed to value 1.0 in 2011. Between 2011 and 2050, the standard support ratio drops by 12%. The General Support Ratio, however, drops by only half this amount, or by a bit less than 6%. Over the 39 year period, these translate into annual rates of decline of.33% and.15%. From 2050 to 2100, the Standard Support Ratio declines more than three times as much as the General Support Ratio. The Standard Support Ratio assumes that labor income by age remains the same and that the productivity of labor does not change. Labor productivity includes both labor income and asset income (since it is GDP/labor), but both kinds of income are attributed to labor. The General Support Ratio attributes only the marginal product of labor to individuals by age, and assumes that this age profile does not change. It also assumes that individuals at a given age continue to save in the same way as in the past, and therefore have asset holdings similar to those in the past, and therefore have similar Asset Based Reallocations as in the past. These are strong assumptions, but saying anything substantive about the future usually requires strong assumptions. The GSR provides a kind of benchmark, and we can then ask in what ways it is misleading, whether deviations from the assumptions would raise it or lower it, why deviations would occur, and so on. Here is another way to think about the GSR calculation. Equations (1.1) and (1.2) are identities. We can rewrite them with net transfers τ(x) or T on the left. Here we might think of transfers as a kind of residual that balances the budget items on the right hand side. 6

(0.4) ( x) c( x) s ( x) y ( x) ra( x) τ = + T = C + S Y ra l l In a closed economy T is initially 0, but as the population age distribution changes the items on the right will no longer sum to 0, and to maintain budget balance for the given profiles in (1.4), the transfer profile would have to change. In reality, any of the profiles might change to maintain balance, but it is convenient here to assign T this role. Dividing both sides by C to form a ratio comparable to the Standard Support Ratio, and to express the changed magnitude of transfers as a fraction of C, we have: (0.5) ( ) ( ) T t C t ( Yl ( t) + ra( t) S( t) ) C( t) ( ) = 1 = 1 GSR t In other words, if we calculate the changes in total transfers implied by the net transfer age schedule in (1.1) together with changing population age distribution, divided by total consumption, we get 1-the General Support Ratio. Between 2011 and 2050 the GSR declined by 6%, and equivalently aggregate net transfers relative to total consumption increased by 6%. This is really what we want to know: how much would transfers have to increase to offset the costs of population aging? Or equivalently, how much would consumption at all ages have to decline to bear the costs of population aging? How the General Support Ratio Could be Misleading If the age profile of asset holdings results more from receipt of bequests than from life cycle saving, then the age pattern of asset holdings might change systematically as populations age. Perhaps the rising number of elderly per child would result in increased bequests and more asset accumulation. Or perhaps the smaller number of children would result in a weaker bequest motive, and asset accumulation would decline. Another problem is that we have not considered the public sector. Population aging will exert very serious pressure on public sector programs for the elderly, and it is widely expected that government deficits will mount, raising government debt which is negative wealth. It is not clear what the net effect on national wealth and national asset income will be. One could calculate the General Support Ratio for a nation under different assumptions about program reform, but then the simplicity of the measure would be lost. Comparisons of Standard and General Support Ratios for rich and developing nations Below we present comparisons of Standard Support Ratios and General Support Ratios calculated for ten different rich and developing nations from 1950 to 2050, with the ratios indexed to 1.0 in 2011. In countries with very generous public sector transfer programs, like Sweden and Austria, the trajectories of the two support ratios are virtually identical throughout the century-long period. In countries like Mexico or the US where elderly people rely on asset income to fund their consumption to a considerable extent, the 7

trajectories are quite different. In particular, in the latter countries, the General Support Ratio indicates much less serious consequences of future population aging. 8

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