How House Price Dynamics and Credit Constraints affect the Equity Extraction of Senior Homeowners

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How House Price Dynamics and Credit Constraints affect the Equity Extraction of Senior Homeowners Stephanie Moulton, John Glenn College of Public Affairs, The Ohio State University Donald Haurin, Department of Economics, The Ohio State University Samuel Dodini and Maximillian Schmeiser, Federal Reserve Board

Disclaimer: The research reported herein is being performed pursuant to a grant from the MacArthur Foundation as part of the How Housing Matters Research Competition and with funding from The U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development s Office of Policy Development and Research (PD&R). The opinions and conclusions expressed are entirely those of the authors and do not represent the opinions of the MacArthur Foundation or HUD. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve System, or their staffs.

Research Program (2012-2017) 1. Empirical Modeling of Reverse Mortgage Borrower Behavior Take-up of HECMs (and other equity extraction products among seniors) HECM technical default (property tax and insurance default) HECM loan terms, withdrawal behaviors and termination outcomes Equity extraction (including HECMs) and longer term credit outcomes 2. Survey of Counseled Seniors Longer term well-being of HECM borrowers May 2014-July 2015, about 2,000 respondents: (1) current HECM borrowers, (2) terminated HECM borrowers, and (3) seniors who sought counseling but did not get a reverse mortgage. 3. Post Origination Monitoring Pilot RCT design; financial planning and reminders after closing Launched January, 2015

Motivation Home equity is an important part of a senior household s financial portfolio: Approximately 80% of households over the age of 62 own their homes (Poterba et al. 2011) Home equity comprises about half of seniors median net wealth (2013 SCF) Home equity is a significant source of retirement funds for baby boomers (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007; Wolff 2007) Different options to extract equity: Selling and moving Cash-out refinancing, second liens or HELOCs Reverse mortgages- federally insured HECMs

Research Questions What factors are associated with seniors extraction of equity through various channels, including a reverse mortgage? Do neighborhood house price dynamics and credit conditions differentially affect originations by channel? Do homeowners in credit constrained areas respond differentially to an increase in house prices than homeowners in non-constrained areas? Do high minority share neighborhoods respond differently than low minority share neighborhoods? (50+% minority vs 90+% white) Is the share of equity extracted through particular channels differentially associated with foreclosure rates among extractors? Previous studies have generally focused on the broader population and exclude reverse mortgages (Hurst and Stafford 2004; Mian and Sufi 2011; Do 2012; Bhutta and Keys 2014; Duca and Kumar 2014; LaCour-Little et al. 2014). Further, they do not jointly model different channels of equity extraction.

Equity Extraction 0.070 0.060 0.050 0.040 0.030 0.020 0.010 0.000 Mean Equity Extraction Origination Rate using any Channel as a Proportion of the Population 62 and older, by Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Equity Loan Source: Author s calculations from HUD HECM data and the New York Fed s Consumer Credit Panel Data

HECM Share of Originations Equity Extraction by Channel 0.050 0.040 0.030 0.020 0.010 0.000 Mean Equity Extraction Origination Rate as a Proportion of the Population 62 and older, by Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 HELOC Closed-End Second HECM Share Cashout Refinance HECM 0.140 0.120 0.100 0.080 0.060 0.040 0.020 0.000 Source: Author s calculations from HUD HECM data and the New York Fed s Consumer Credit Panel Data

Geographic Variation (U.S.): HELOCs Mean HELOC Origination Rate as a Proportion of the Population 62 and older, 2004-2012 Source: Author s calculations from HUD HECM data and the New York Fed s Consumer Credit Panel Data

Geographic Variation (U.S.): Cash-Out Refinancing Mean Cash-Out Refinancing Origination Rate as a Proportion of the Population 62 and older, 2004-2012 Source: Author s calculations from HUD HECM data and the New York Fed s Consumer Credit Panel Data

Mean HECM Origination Rate as a Proportion of the Population 62 and older, 2004-2012 Geographic Variation (U.S.): HECMs Source: Author s calculations from HUD HECM data and the New York Fed s Consumer Credit Panel Data

Geographic Variation Mean HELOC Origination Rate as a Proportion of the Population 62 and older, 2004-2012 Source: Author s calculations from HUD HECM data and the New York Fed s Consumer Credit Panel Data

Geographic Variation Mean Cash-Out Refinancing Origination Rate as a Proportion of the Population 62 and older, 2004-2012 Source: Author s calculations from HUD HECM data and the New York Fed s Consumer Credit Panel Data

Geographic Variation Mean HECM Origination Rate as a Proportion of the Population 62 and older, 2004-2012 Source: Author s calculations from HUD HECM data and the New York Fed s Consumer Credit Panel Data

House prices & channel of extraction Theoretical Expectations Higher house prices, wealth effect (+ all channels); also relax borrowing constraint, allowing access to products with lower LTV requirements (+ HELOC and HECMs) As house prices are increasing, preserve option to extract again in future periods; not lock into high initial cost product (- HECM) As house prices are decreasing, lock in house values today (+HECM) Credit conditions & channel of extraction Supply side credit availability (+ forward originations) Household credit history, credit standards can create binding constraint (- HELOC) Household liquidity constraints (+ HELOC and HECM) House price*credit constraints Credit constrained borrowers may be more responsive to house price increases; originate through channels with relaxed credit constraints (+ cash out refinancing) Neighborhood demographics (minority share) & channel of extraction Endowment effects, different levels of explanatory factors in minority areas Differential responses to explanatory factors due to financial literacy, experience

Data Sources & Sample Data Sources 1. New York Federal Reserve s Consumer Credit/Equifax Panel (CCP) database, 2004-2012 4 th quarter, 62 or older, +12 million credit profiles Aggregated to ZIP code and year 2. HUD HECM database and actuarial database, 2004-2012 697,772 originations Aggregated to ZIP code and year 3. CoreLogic, ZIP code level data, 2004-2012 House price and HPI for non-distressed sales 4. IRS (SPEC) Tax data, 2004-2012 Elderly tax filing data by ZIP code, median adjusted gross income (AGI) 5. ACS data, ZIP code level demographic indicators, 2005-2010 Data from the 2000 U.S. Census to interpolate values for 2003 and 2004 Sample Limit to ZIP codes within CBSAs with HPI data across all years, and to those with at least 30 CCP records for consumers aged 62 or older in a given year = 5,495 ZIP codes (covers about 45% of the full population) Resulting sample = 39,596 unique ZIP code and year combinations

Empirical Model: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Y zt = β 0 + β 1 HP zt + β 2 CC zt + β 3 X zt + α 1 I Channel,zt + γ m + δ t + u zt Y= (1) HELOC origination rate (2) Cash-out refinancing origination rate (3) Second lien origination rate (4) HECM origination rate Allow error terms of 4 equations to be correlated, common component and random component For each ZIP code z at time t HP = house price dynamics (median repeat sales price, HPI growth rate) CC = credit conditions (credit approval rate, credit utilization rate, credit score, etc.) X = control variables (median AGI, mortgage debt, median age, black, Hispanic, etc.) I = interest rate for extraction channel (averaged over the year within the ZIP code) γ = CBSA fixed effects δ = year fixed effects Alternative specifications include interactions, HP*CC Estimate subsample regressions in ZIP codes with high levels of racial homogeneity

Findings: Overall SUR Estimates, % Population 62 + Equity Extraction Method, 2004-2012 (Select Variables Shown) Values = regression coefficient divided by the mean percentage of originations HELOC Cash-Out Refinance Closed-End Second HECM Variable b/ȳ b/ȳ b/ȳ b/ȳ Median Real Repeat Sales Price (ln) 0.006 *** 0.001 *** -0.001*** 0.001 *** HPI Growth Rate, Positive 0.598 *** 0.408 *** -0.145-2.289*** HPI Growth Rate, Negative -0.018-0.295** 0.168 1.016 *** Credit Approval Ratio (All) 0.734 *** 1.096 *** 0.598 *** 0.144 ** Median Credit Score 0.002 *** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.005** Median Revolving Credit Utilization Rate 1.115 *** -0.145 0.144 0.621 ** Median IRS AGI (Monthly, thousands) 0.070 *** -0.076*** -0.059*** -0.176*** Black (Share of Population) -0.328*** 0.708 *** 0.040 1.305 *** Hispanic (Share of Population) -0.171*** 0.410 *** -0.043 0.075 Year & CBSA Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y R-Squared 0.542 0.239 0.215 0.467 Dependent Variable Mean 0.024 0.008 0.007 0.002 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Findings: House Price Growth*Credit Constraints Credit Constraint Interactions with Positive and Negative HPI Growth Rate Panel A: Credit Score Interactions At mean credit score (784) % Δ HELOC % Δ Cash-Out % Δ Second % Δ HECM % Δ Rate 0.01 Increase in HPI Rate 0.9257 0.2285-0.0763-2.1108 0.493 0.01 Decrease in HPI Rate -0.1375-0.2538 0.2379 0.6427-0.065 One standard deviation (20 points) below the mean credit score (763) 0.01 Increase in HPI Rate 0.2821 0.5881-0.2253-2.3539 0.150 0.01 Decrease in HPI Rate 0.0819-0.3088 0.0110 1.6224 0.063 One standard deviation (20 points) above the mean credit score (803) 0.01 Increase in HPI Rate 1.5331-0.1110 0.0644-1.8814 0.836 0.01 Decrease in HPI Rate -0.3446-0.2020 0.4520-0.2821-0.192

Findings: Geographic Subsample Regressions 0.045 0.04 0.035 0.03 0.025 0.02 0.015 0.01 0.005 0 0.04 Origination Rate as a Proportion of the Population 62 and older, 2004-2012 0.0415 Any Origination 0.0176 HELOC 0.0262 0.0106 0.0083 0.0067 0.007 Cash-out Refinance Closed-End Second All ZIPs >50% Black >90% White 0.0035 HECM 0.0016 HELOC Cash-Out Second HECM Minority Area Difference - + + + Endowment Effect + - - - Behavioral Response + - + +

Findings: Geographic Subsample Regressions SUR Estimates, % Population 62 + Equity Extraction Method, 2004-2012, by Geographic Subsamples HELOC HELOC Cash-Out Cash-Out Refinance Refinance High Minority Low Minority High Minority Low Minority Variable b/ȳ b/ȳ b/ȳ b/ȳ Median Real Repeat Sales Price (ln) 0.004 *** 0.007 *** 0.000 0.000 HPI Growth Rate, Positive 0.020 0.637 *** 0.447 0.041 HPI Growth Rate, Negative -0.111-0.542*** -0.826** 0.091 Credit Approval Ratio (All) 0.790 ** 0.618 *** 1.226 *** 0.630 *** Median Credit Score 0.002 * 0.001-0.001-0.010*** Median Revolving Credit Utilization Rate 0.457 2.000 *** 0.594-1.881*** Median IRS AGI (Monthly) 0.120 ** 0.072 *** -0.120** -0.030* Black (Share of Population) -0.565** 0.342 0.561 ** -0.087 Hispanic (Share of Population) -0.841** 0.086 0.159 0.282 Year & CBSA Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y R-Squared 0.485 0.524 0.408 0.179 Dependent Variable Mean 0.018 0.026 0.011 0.007 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Findings: Geographic Subsample Regressions SUR Estimates, % Population 62 + Equity Extraction Method, 2004-2012, by Geographic Subsamples Closed-End Closed-End Second Second HECM HECM High Minority Low Minority High Minority Low Minority Variable b/ȳ b/ȳ b/ȳ b/ȳ Median Real Repeat Sales Price (ln) 0.000-0.001* 0.002 *** 0.000 *** HPI Growth Rate, Positive -0.478 0.089-3.914*** -2.169*** HPI Growth Rate, Negative -0.260 0.447 ** 0.070 2.594 *** Credit Approval Ratio (All) 0.739 * 0.446 *** 0.343-0.208** Median Credit Score -0.001-0.006*** 0.000 0.003 * Median Revolving Credit Utilization Rate -0.282 0.861 0.250-0.062 Median IRS AGI (Monthly) -0.035-0.047*** -0.326*** -0.189*** Black (Share of Population) Hispanic (Share of Population) Year & CBSA Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y R-Squared 0.296 0.208 0.617 0.517 Dependent Variable Mean 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.002 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Foreclosure Rate Findings: Foreclosure Rates by Extraction Channel 0.120 Foreclosure Rates as of 2013(Q4), by Origination Cohort and Extraction Channel 0.100 0.080 0.060 0.040 0.020 0.000 0.033 0.033 0.027 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.017 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Origination Year Any Extraction HELOC Cash-Out Refinance Closed-End Second HECM

Findings: Foreclosure Rates by Extraction Channel OLS, Proportion of Extractors Foreclosing as of Q42013, By Origination Cohort (Select Years) 2004 2006 2007 2010 Cash-Out Refinancing 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.063*** 0.034*** Closed-End Second 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.001 HECM 0.004 0.014-0.016-0.004 % w/mortgage Past Due 0.079* 0.080** 0.095*** 0.126*** Credit Utilization Rate 0.010** 0.004 0.0197** -0.025*** Credit Score (100s) -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.013*** -0.030*** Credit Approval Ratio -0.018-0.056*** -0.045*** -0.051*** Constant 0.148** 0.290*** 0.148** 0.447*** Observations 4,555 4,646 4,586 2,828 CBSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes R-squared 0.203 0.234 0.231 0.243 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 For 2007 Originations: A 10 percentage point increase in cash-out refinancing is associated with a 19% increase in the foreclosure rate among extractors (0.0063/0.033) A 10 point increase in median credit score is associated with an 4% decrease in the foreclosure rate (0.0013/0.033) If HECMs were replaced by cash-out refinancing, the foreclosure rate could have been 12% higher

Conclusions Significant differences in the determinants of the origination of a home equity extraction loan by channel: Variation in responsiveness to house prices by channel Variation in responsiveness to credit conditions by channel Variation in responsiveness to house prices in credit constrained areas by channel Differences in channel use in high vs. low minority areas is due in part to differences in endowments and differences in behavioral responses. Minority areas less responsive to house price increases and decreases (to originate HELOCs or HECMs) Low-minority areas less likely to use cash-out refinancing or HECMs when credit conditions improve The usage of particular channels in an area is significantly associated with foreclosure rates among extractors. An increase in the share of extractions through cash-out refinancing is associated with significantly higher foreclosure rates While HECMs are originated in similarly credit constrained areas, HECM origination share in an area is not significantly associated with foreclosure

Discussion & Implications As of April 2015 HECM lenders must assess a borrower s ability to pay and follow minimum credit, debit and affordability standards. In a prior paper, we estimate a 6 percent reduction in HECM volume due to the credit portion of the policy, based on the proportion of households who would fail the criteria and be unable to afford an escrow for taxes and insurance. We estimate that the policy could reduce tax and insurance default by as much as 40 percent. Using the characteristics of the households who we estimate would be excluded from HECMs based on the policy, we predict the probability that they would instead obtain another equity extraction loan. We estimate that these excluded households would be very unlikely to have originated a HELOC, but would be more likely to have originated a second lien or cash-out refinance loan instead of a HECM. To the extent that HECM loans have built in protections (e.g., insured against negative equity), these households may turn to more risky alternatives. Moulton, S., D. Haurin and W. Shi. 2015. An Analysis of Default Risk in the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) Program. Journal of Urban Economics

Thank You!

1. Empirical Modeling HECM terminations & default Take-up of HECMs HECM loan terms and withdrawal behaviors Research Program (2012-2016) 2. Survey of Counseled Seniors Longer term well-being of HECM borrowers May 2014-May 2015, about 2,000 respondents: (1) current HECM borrowers, (2) terminated HECM borrowers, and (3) seniors who sought counseling but did not get a reverse mortgage. 3. Post Origination Monitoring Pilot RCT design; financial planning and reminders after closing Launched January, 2015

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables, Full Sample (N=39,596) mean sd min max HELOC Origination Rate 0.0244 0.0209 0.0008 0.2670 Cash-out Refinance Origination Rate 0.0078 0.0079 0 0.1470 Closed-End Second Origination Rate 0.0066 0.0073 0 0.0771 HECM Origination Rate 0.0019 0.0020 0 0.0293 Median Repeat Sales Price (ln) 12.4800 0.5600 10.2800 14.9700 HPI Growth Rate, Positive 0.0460 0.0762 0 0.7840 HPI Growth Rate, Negative 0.0367 0.0568 0 0.5690 HELOC ZIP-level Interest Rate 0.0579 0.0126 0.0200 0.1225 First Mortgage ZIP-level Interest Rate 0.0538 0.0088 0.0250 0.0825 Closed End Second ZIP-level Interest Rate 0.0668 0.0102 0.0206 0.1161 Average HECM MSA-level Interest Rate 0.0561 0.0004 0.0425 0.0657 Credit approval rate (All) 0.6720 0.0836 0.2310 1.0000 Median Credit Score 783.58 20.18 634 820 Median Revolving Credit Utilization Rate 0.0793 0.0478 0.0152 0.5760 Past Due Mortgage Rate 0.0165 0.0198 0 0.2310 Bankruptcy Rate 0.0090 0.0090 0 0.1360 Foreclosure Rate 0.0027 0.0047 0 0.0760 Revolving Debt to Income Ratio (1 yr lag) 0.0204 0.0136 0 0.5670 Share of Population with Mortgage (1 yr lag) 0.3370 0.1090 0.0502 1.0000 Median Mortgage Debt to Median Sales Price (1 yr lag) 0.3720 0.1560 0 2.4420 Median Monthly Mortgage Payment (1 yr lag) 0.8840 0.3380 0.1360 3.5630 Median IRS AGI (Monthly) 3.5520 1.3520 0.4170 8.3330 Median Age of Seniors with Credit Files 72.4600 2.3100 65 84 Black (share of population) 0.0980 0.1460 0 0.9810 Hispanic (share of population) 0.1300 0.1510 0 0.9750

Research Program (2012-2016) Our other papers: Haurin, D., C. Ma, S. Moulton, W. Shi, M. Schmeiser, and J. Seligman. (Forthcoming). Spatial Variation in Reverse Mortgages Usage: House Price Dynamics and Consumer Selection. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. Moulton, S., D. Haurin and W. Shi. 2015. An Analysis of Default Risk in the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) Program. Journal of Urban Economics (forthcoming) Working Papers: (1) Reverse mortgage choice and the influence of counseling; (2) Dynamic model of reverse mortgage outcomes; (3) Seniors accuracy of home valuation

Reverse Mortgage 101 In the U.S, the federally insured Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) comprises 95% of the market. Small, but potentially growing market. Extract equity from the home through a mortgage that does not become due until the last borrower sells the home, moves out permanently, or dies, as long as the borrower meets the obligations of the mortgage note Obligations include living in the home as primary residence, pays property taxes, homeowners insurance, homeowners association dues and assessments, and maintains the home. No payments on the loan are required during the life of the loan. Money borrowed, plus associated interest and fees, are added to the balance due that continues to grow over time (mortgage in reverse ) Line of Credit Tenure or Term (similar to annuity) Lump Sum Distribution Some combination of the above

$ Amount Reverse Mortgage Debt 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 Expected Home Value Lump Sum 1 5 10 15 20 Time (Years) Maximum Claim Amount (home value at closing)= $225,000 Initial Principal Limit = $125,000

$ Amount Reverse Mortgage Debt 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 Expected Home Value Available Credit Line Credit Line or Term/Tenure Payments 1 5 10 15 20 Time (Years) Maximum Claim Amount (home value at closing)= $225,000 Initial Principal Limit = $125,000

Source: CFPB 2012

Source: CFPB 2012

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