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1 REMUNERATION POLICY SUPPLEMENT LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC 2015 Remuneration Policy supplement Legal & General Group Plc Within this supplement we set out the full remuneration policy as approved at our 2014 annual general meeting (AGM). This policy remains in place until a new policy is presented and approved by shareholders, which would normally be three years. Accordingly the expectation is that this policy will remain in place until the 2017 AGM. FULL ANNUAL REPORT You can download the annual report from our reporting centre: www.legalandgeneralgroup.com/ annualreport2015 Policies for the following are set out in this supplement: Fixed components:: Base salary Benefits Pension Variable components: Annual variable pay (AVP) Performance share plan (PSP) Other areas: Notes to the policy table Approach to recruitment and termination Services contracts and termination and payment for loss of office

2 REMUNERATION POLICY SUPPLEMENT LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC Base salary ELEMENT POLICY Purpose and link to strategy To help recruit and retain executive directors of the calibre required to develop, lead and deliver the business strategy. Operation The Committee sets base salary taking into consideration: The individual s skills, experience and performance; The scope of the role; Pay and conditions elsewhere in the group; Overall business performance; and External market benchmark data in other FTSE 100 companies and other relevant bespoke groupings of financial and non-financial institutions. Base salaries are normally reviewed annually, with increases effective 1 March. However, the Committee may review them more frequently, for example where there is a material change to a role or its scope. Opportunity Performance conditions Whilst there is no maximum base salary, any increases for executive directors will normally be in line with the range of increases for other UK employees in the wider group. In specific circumstances, the Committee may award increases above this level such as: Where the Committee has set the base salary for a newly appointed executive director with a view to allow the individual to progress into the role over time; or Where, in the Committee s opinion, there has been a significant increase in the size or scope of an executive director s role or responsibilities; or Where there is a significant change in the regulatory environment. Personal performance would be taken into consideration in determining any salary increase. Benefits ELEMENT POLICY Purpose and link to strategy Benefits are provided to executive directors to attract and retain the best talent for the business and to ensure that the total package is competitive in the market. Operation The Committee s policy is to provide executive directors with a market competitive level of benefits, taking into consideration benefits offered to other senior employees in the UK, the individual s circumstances and market practice at similar companies. Benefits provided to executive directors are in line with benefits provided to other senior employees in the UK. Benefits currently provided to executive directors include: a car or car allowance, private medical insurance, life assurance, Group Income Protection, and insured death in service arrangements. These are all in line with our general policy for other UK employees. In line with other Legal & General employees, executive directors can choose to acquire Legal & General products, and are eligible to participate in the company s voluntary benefits which they fund themselves, sometimes through salary sacrifice. They are eligible to participate in the UK all-employee share plans on the same terms as other employees. The two current all-employee share plans are: The savings-related share option scheme (SAYE) The employee share plan Where an executive (new or current) is required to re-locate from, or perform duties outside, their home country in order to take up their position, in line with our mobility policy and practice, additional benefits may be provided, for example: home country benefits such as health care and additional support in relocating such as assistance for housing, school fees, travel home, relocation costs and tax advice. Opportunity In line with other UK employees, there is no maximum level for the benefits as this is dependent on the individual s circumstances and the cost to the company. The maximum opportunity for participation in the current all-employee share plans is in line with other employees and takes into account the prevailing HMRC rules. Relocation/international assignment benefits the level of such benefits would be set taking into account the circumstances of the individual and typical market practice. Performance There are no performance conditions.

3 REMUNERATION POLICY SUPPLEMENT LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC Pension ELEMENT CURRENT POLICY Purpose and link to strategy The policy aims to provide competitive post-retirement benefits and therefore recognise sustained contribution. Operation Pension contributions are set at an appropriate level to attract and retain high performing people. In line with other employees in the UK, executive directors currently participate in either a defined contribution pension plan, a defined benefit pension plan or receive a cash allowance in lieu of pension, or have some combination thereof. The defined benefit pension plan was closed to new joiners in 2001. From 2009, increases in pensionable salary for the defined benefit pension plan for remaining active members have been limited to a maximum of 2.5% each year. For executive directors who took enhanced protection in 2006, a cash allowance was provided in lieu which may be reviewed or amended by the employer. Non-UK national executives may be permitted to participate in home-country pension plans where relevant. Base salary is the only element of pensionable remuneration. At the discretion of the Committee, executive directors may elect to sacrifice all or part of their cash AVP into pension. Opportunity New executive directors receive 15% of base salary into the defined contribution pension plan (they contribute 5%). This contribution level for executive directors is the same as that operated for senior managers in the rest of the UK organisation in the defined contribution pension plan. As for other employees, there is a cash alternative in line with the defined contribution levels for executive directors who have opted out since 2006, or who opt out in the future, for enhanced or fixed protection above the lifetime allowance (as amended from time to time) or for executive directors who exceed the annual allowance limits (as amended from time to time). A cash allowance may also be given in lieu of pension if it is felt appropriate for an executive director from overseas to continue to participate in the local pension plan or for other valid reasons (for example but not limited to religion or other private pension arrangements). All cash allowances are subject to normal payroll deductions. Performance There are no performance conditions.

4 REMUNERATION POLICY SUPPLEMENT LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC Annual variable pay (AVP) ELEMENT POLICY Purpose and link to strategy Incentivise executive directors to achieve specific group and/or divisional, financial, strategic and personal predetermined goals, within the group s risk appetite and taking into consideration the company s culture and values, on an annual basis. The deferred proportion of AVP into shares reinforces retention and enhances alignment with shareholders by encouraging a longer-term focus and risk alignment. Operation Performance targets and weightings are set annually by the Committee to ensure they are appropriately stretching. Performance is normally assessed over a one-year period. AVP out-turns are determined by the Committee after the year end, taking into consideration performance against targets, the underlying performance of the business and individual performance. The Committee may exceptionally adjust the outcome of the AVP calculation if it believes there are underlying circumstances that justify such a change. 50% of any AVP awarded is deferred. Deferred awards are normally awarded in the form of restricted shares or nil-cost options or phantom equivalent if appropriate. However awards may be deferred in other forms dependent upon business or regulatory requirements. Deferred awards will vest after a period set by the Committee. This period will normally be three years. Dividends on future deferred awards made in the form of shares accrue during the deferral period and normally are paid in the form of shares to the executive directors upon vesting. Dividend equivalents may accrue on awards made in other forms. Deferred awards are subject to malus. Clawback provisions also apply (further details are set out later in this supplement on page 8). The Committee may adjust and amend the awards in accordance with the rules, for example where there is a variation in the share capital or to settle the awards in cash in the event this is warranted. Opportunity The maximum award opportunity in respect of any financial year is based on role as follows: For the group chief executive, CFO and CEO LGAS the maximum potential is 150% of base salary. For the CEO LGIM the maximum potential is 175% of base salary. The award opportunity at threshold performance is 0%, with up to 75% of base salary normally payable for target performance for the group chief executive, CFO and CEO LGAS and up to 105% of base salary payable for target performance for the CEO LGIM. Performance Performance measures are selected by the Remuneration Committee on an annual basis to ensure that they are aligned with the Group s strategic priorities and the delivery of sustainable shareholder value. Performance is measured based on an appropriate mix of group and/or divisional financial performance targets as well as strategic (including customer and employee measures) and personal measures. Performance measures are weighted with normally up to 80% based on financial targets. The split between financial, strategic and personal performance measures and the relative weighting of group and divisional performance targets will be kept under review by the Committee on an annual basis.

5 REMUNERATION POLICY SUPPLEMENT LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC Performance share plan (PSP) ELEMENT POLICY Purpose and link to strategy Awards under the PSP are reflective of the Committee s desire that the remuneration of executives should be weighted towards the delivery of sustainable returns to shareholders over the longer term. In addition to deferred awards under the AVP, awards under the PSP enhance alignment with shareholders by focusing executives on the longer-term performance of the business. Operation Award of shares or options which are subject to a performance period of normally no less than three years. Performance is measured post the Group results announcement after the end of the three-year performance period. Subject to performance, awards are normally released in three equal tranches following the third, fourth and fifth anniversaries of the start of the performance period. The Committee retains discretion to lengthen the performance period and holding period for future awards. The Remuneration Committee may also amend the final level of vesting dependent on the underlying performance of the Group. The Committee may only exercise downwards discretion and may not increase the level of vesting. The parameters which the Committee uses in making this assessment will include, but are not limited to, market share, partnerships entered into and maintained, cost constraint, capital management, risk and shareholder perception. Financial performance targets are set annually by the Committee to ensure they are relevant and sufficiently stretching. PSP awards are normally awarded in the form of nil cost options or conditional shares or phantom equivalent where appropriate. However they may be awarded in other forms if the Committee considers it appropriate. Dividends or dividend equivalents accrue in the period following the end of the performance period until vesting and release. These will normally be paid in shares on a reinvested basis. PSP awards are subject to malus and clawback provisions (further details set out later in this supplement on page 7). The Committee may adjust and amend the awards in accordance with the PSP rules, for example where there is a variation in the share capital or to settle the awards in cash in the event that this is warranted. Opportunity The maximum award opportunity under the PSP is 300% of salary. The Remuneration Committee s current intention is that the normal annual award opportunity will be 250% of base salary for all executive directors. 15% of the award normally vests for threshold performance increasing to 100% of the award for maximum performance. Performance Performance measures for the PSP are selected by the Remuneration Committee to be aligned with the Group s long-term strategic priority of delivering sustainable returns to shareholders. The Committee therefore intends to grant awards based on an appropriate mix of earnings, capital efficiency and shareholder return measures. The split between these measures, for each grant, is set annually by the Committee.

6 REMUNERATION POLICY SUPPLEMENT LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC Notes to the policy table AREA COMMENTARY Shareholding guidelines To create alignment with shareholders, the Remuneration Committee also operates a shareholding guideline for executive directors. Deferred share element The deferred share element of the annual variable pay plan and the performance share plan shall be operated in accordance with the rules of the respective plans. Loss of office The Remuneration Committee reserves the right to make any remuneration payments and payments for loss of office notwithstanding that they are not in line with the policy where the terms of the payment were agreed: (i) before the policy came into effect or (ii) at a time when the relevant individual was not a director of the company and the payment was not in consideration for the individual becoming a director of the company (this includes, but is not limited to, awards made to the CEO LGIM under the LGIM long-term incentive plan, which are subject to the achievement of LGIM cumulative profit before tax targets measured over a three-year performance period). Minor amendments The Remuneration Committee will follow any statutory requirements when operating the policy. The Remuneration Committee may make minor amendments to the policy for regulatory or statutory requirements, exchange control or administrative purposes. Legacy arrangements Deferred bonus Existing deferrals will continue to operate in line with the previous policy, where 37.5% of any bonus earned was deferred, and cliff vests after three years. Dividends are paid during the holding period. PSP Awards granted to executive directors under the previous PSP which are currently outstanding are subject to the achievement of relative total shareholder return performance conditions over separate three-year performance periods. The Remuneration Committee only has discretion to adjust downwards the final level of vesting of these awards if it does not consider it to be reflective of the underlying financial performance of the group. Awards under this plan were made as nil cost options and remain exercisable for a period of two years following vesting. Awards made under the share bonus plan (SBP) Awards granted to executive directors under the SBP which are currently outstanding will continue to vest in line with the arrangements made. These include the award made to Mark Zinkula upon his appointment to CEO LGIM and prior to him joining the Board. LGIM LTIP In March 2007 the Committee approved the introduction of a specific long-term incentive plan for LGIM senior executives. In March 2011 and March 2012 Mark Zinkula was granted LGIM LTIP awards as part of his remuneration as CEO LGIMA and CEO LGIM. Under the LGIM LTIP annual awards of notional shares in LGIM are granted to participants. The vesting of these notional shares is subject to the satisfaction of the cumulative growth in PBT over the three-year performance period. The value of the notional LGIM shares is delivered in cash after the end of the three-year performance period. These awards will continue to vest after their respective three-year performance periods and to the extent that the performance conditions are met. No further awards under this plan have been made to Mark since he was appointed as an executive director. In line with our mobility policy and the commitments made to Mark Zinkula on relocation from the US (prior to his appointment to the Board) he remains in certain US benefits and has relocation assistance. He would also receive repatriation assistance in the event of him returning to the US.

7 REMUNERATION POLICY SUPPLEMENT LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC Notes to the policy table AREA COMMENTARY Performance measures and targets The performance conditions for the AVP and the PSP have been chosen by the Committee to align with the Group s strategic priorities and are the key performance indicators in relation to the operation of the business. The following table sets out why the performance measures that are used for the incentive arrangements were chosen: Plan Measure Rationale AVP PSP Financial measures Strategic and personal measure Earnings measures Capital efficiency measures Shareholder return measures To ensure company growth and return to shareholders To safeguard the future of the company by, for instance, focusing on the development of future income streams and to ensure, for example, positive customer outcomes and employee engagement To incentivise growth in earnings To ensure capital is used in a disciplined way and to steadily progress dividends To deliver a good return on equity for shareholders The performance measures for the AVP and the PSP are reviewed and set annually to ensure they remain appropriately stretching and aligned to the business and its strategy. Targets for the AVP are set taking into account internal forecasts of performance, market expectations and prior year performance. The targets for the AVP are set such that on-target normally equates to the levels forecast in the strategic plan for the year in question and maximum is set above that, at a level that is still within the company s risk appetite. The PSP targets are set by the Committee taking into account a number of considerations including: what is felt to be achievable over a sustained period of time; internal forecasts of performance; any guidance provided to the market; market expectations; prior year performance; and the company s agreed risk appetite. Malus/clawback For future awards, the Committee has an agreed policy which applies to deferred annual variable pay awards and long-term incentive awards made to executive directors. The Committee may apply malus (i.e. reduce the number of shares in respect of which an award vests, or delay such vesting, or impose additional vesting conditions) in the event of financial mis-statement, personal misconduct, failure of risk management, reputational damage or other exceptional circumstances identified by the Committee. The Committee may also, in exceptional circumstances, claw-back share awards which have already been released to individuals, if it considers it appropriate to do so having regard to such factors as it deems relevant such as the likelihood of recovery, any loss suffered, and the link between the award and the event. (Clawback will normally only apply within four years of the end of the relevant performance period).

8 REMUNERATION POLICY SUPPLEMENT LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC Approach to recruitment and termination Recruitment remuneration STANDARD PROVISION POLICY AND OTHER PROVISIONS General approach The Committee aims to attract, motivate and retain an executive director with the required expertise to develop and deliver the business strategy, while at the same time ensuring that the remuneration arrangements offered are in the best interests of both the company and its shareholders and paying no more than considered necessary to attract the right calibre of candidate to the role. In determining the appropriate remuneration arrangements on hiring a new executive director, the Committee will take into account all relevant factors including, but not limited to: The individual s skills and relevant experience Internal relativities Local market practice in the jurisdiction from which candidate was recruited Logistics and support if a relocation is required Appropriate market data The individual s existing remuneration package Where possible the Committee endeavours to align the remuneration arrangements of new executive directors with the remuneration outlined in the policy for other executive directors. Any such awards will be within the maximum level of variable remuneration limit set out below. Where an existing internal candidate is made an executive director, the Committee may continue to honour prior commitments made before joining the Board. Maximum variable pay levels The maximum level of annual variable pay and long-term incentives which may be awarded to a new executive director will be in line with the policy table i.e. 475% of base salary. This limit excludes buyout awards. Buy-out of any existing remuneration components or other arrangements The Committee recognises that, as a consequence of regulatory changes around the globe in the financial services sector, long serving executives in the sector are likely to have accrued significant levels of deferred remuneration which may be lost on a transfer of employment. Accordingly, to aid the recruitment of a new executive director, the Committee may make awards to buy-out remuneration arrangements forfeited on leaving a previous employer, taking into consideration relevant factors including, but not limited to: Form of the award Any performance conditions attached to those awards The vesting profile of the awards and likelihood of vesting Relevant regulatory requirements and guidance in place in relation to buy-out awards Buy-out awards will typically reflect the terms and the value of the arrangements forgone. Where possible the Committee will use existing share based plans to effect a buy-out. However, in the event these are not an appropriate vehicle, the Remuneration Committee retains the discretion to use the Listing Rules exemption (LR 9.4.2) for the purpose of making an award to buy-out remuneration terms forfeited on leaving a previous employer. Relocation and mobility Where a new executive director has to relocate to take up the appointment, either within the UK or from overseas, practical and/or financial support may be given in relation to relocation or mobility in line with our internal policies. This may include the cost of any tax that is incurred. For appointments from overseas, home country benefits may continue to apply. Note that relocation and mobility support may also apply to the recruitment of a non-executive director (NED). Shareholder transparency The Committee believes that remuneration arrangements should be as transparent as possible. Therefore the Committee will make every effort to explain the rationale for the recruitment arrangements in the Directors remuneration report following the recruitment of a new executive director. Recruitment of non-executive directors The Committee will normally align the remuneration arrangements for new non-executive directors with those outlined within the policy table.

9 REMUNERATION POLICY SUPPLEMENT LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC Service contracts and termination and payment for loss of office When determining leaving arrangements for an executive director, the Committee takes into account any pre-established agreements, including the provisions of any incentive plans, typical market practice, statutory and contractual obligations, the performance and conduct of the individual and the commercial justification for any payments. The following summarises our policy in relation to executive directors service contracts and payments in the event of loss of office: STANDARD PROVISION POLICY AND OTHER PROVISIONS Notice period and Termination Payments Standard notice policy is: 12 months notice from the company; and 12 months notice from the executive director. Executive directors may be required to work during the notice period or take a period of garden leave or may be provided with pay in lieu of notice if not required to work the full notice period. Payments in lieu of notice: Our policy for new appointments is that termination payments in lieu of notice would consist solely of base salary and the cost of providing benefits for the outstanding notice period and will be subject to deductions for income tax and National Insurance as appropriate. Any statutory requirements will be observed. Our standard practice is to include within executive directors contractual terms mitigation provisions as regards payments in lieu of notice. Expiry date All executive directors are subject to annual re-election. The contracts for our executive directors are rolling service contracts with no expiry date. Treatment of out-standing incentive award Rights to annual variable pay, deferred annual variable pay awards and performance share awards are governed by their respective plan rules. Annual variable pay There is no automatic entitlement to an annual bonus in the year of cessation of employment. However, for a good leaver, the Committee may determine that an executive director will receive a pro-rata bonus in respect of the period of employment during the year of cessation based on an assessment of group and personal performance. Deferred annual variable pay awards (awards made in relation to 2014 onwards) In the event that a participant is a good leaver any outstanding unvested deferred annual variable pay award will normally be released at the normal time. Where it considers it appropriate, for example in the circumstances of terminal illness, the Committee reserves the right to accelerate any payment due. Good leaver circumstances are leaving due to circumstances such as death, disability, ill-health or injury, redundancy, retirement with company agreement, employing company/business ceasing to be part of the group, a transfer of the undertaking in which the participant s employment transfers to a company which is not a member of the group, or other circumstances at the Committee s discretion. For all other leavers outstanding unvested awards lapse. Awards will generally vest early on a takeover of the company, merger or other corporate reorganisation. Alternatively participants may be allowed or required to exchange their awards for new awards. Where an award vests early in these circumstances, the Committee will determine the level of vesting, having regard to the extent to which the performance condition has been satisfied to the date of vesting (subject to downwards discretion based on underlying performance) and to the fact that the award is vesting early. Awards made prior to 2015 Subject to the leaver conditions set out above, where a participant is a good leaver any outstanding unvested deferred annual variable pay award made prior to 2015 will normally be released at the date of cessation of employment. In the event of a change of control, the Committee may allow awards to vest or will determine that awards are exchanged for new awards.

10 REMUNERATION POLICY SUPPLEMENT LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC Service contracts and termination and payment for loss of office continued STANDARD PROVISION POLICY AND OTHER PROVISIONS Treatment of outstanding incentive award PSP (awards made from 2014 onwards) In the event that a participant is a good leaver any outstanding unvested PSP award will normally be pro-rated for service from the start of the performance period to cessation and will vest based on performance to the end of the performance period. Awards will usually be released at the normal time. Where it considers it appropriate, for example in the case of terminal illness, the Committee reserves the right to accelerate any payment due. Good leaver circumstances are leaving due to death, disability, ill-health or injury, redundancy, retirement with company agreement, employing company/business ceasing to be part of the Group, a transfer of the undertaking in which the participant s employment transfers to a company which is not a member of the Group, or any other reason at the discretion of the Committee. For all other leavers outstanding unvested awards lapse. Awards will generally vest early on a takeover of the company, merger or other corporate reorganisation. Alternatively participants may be allowed or required to exchange their awards for new awards. Where an award vests early in these circumstances, the Committee will determine the level of vesting, having regard to the extent to which the performance condition has been satisfied to the date of vesting (subject to downwards discretion based on underlying performance) and to the fact that the award is vesting early. Legacy PSP awards For good leavers, in line with the plan rules, awards made prior to 2014 will be performance tested at the date of leaving and, to the extent that performance conditions are met, the award will vest on a pro-rata basis, based on service within the performance period. Good leaver circumstances are leaving due to death, disability, ill-health, redundancy, retirement with company agreement, employing company/business ceasing to be part of the group, a transfer of the undertaking in which the participant s employment transfers to a company which is not a member of the group, or any other reason at the discretion of the Committee. For all other leavers outstanding unvested awards lapse. In the event of a change of control, PSP awards will vest to the extent that the performance conditions have been satisfied over the shortened performance period and will be time pro-rated in the same way as awards held by good leavers. Legacy LGIM LTIP Award In the event of being a good leaver, the legacy LGIM LTIP awards made to Mark Zinkula prior to him becoming a Board member would be tested at the end of their normal performance periods and, to the extent that performance conditions are met, the awards will vest on a pro-rata basis, based on service within the performance period. Good leaver circumstances are leaving due to death, disability, ill-health, redundancy, retirement with company agreement, employing company/business ceasing to be part of the Group or any other reason at the discretion of the Committee. For all other leavers outstanding awards lapse.