MIT PhD International Trade Lecture 19: Trade and Labor Markets (Theory)

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14.581 MIT PhD International Trade Lecture 19: Trade and Labor Markets (Theory) Dave Donaldson Spring 2011

Today s Plan 1 2 3 4 5 Overview: Use of asignment models to study Trade and Labor Markets. Review of mathematics of log-supermodularity (ie complementarity). Comparative advantage based asignment models. Cross-sectional predictions from these models. Comparative static predictions from these models.

Assignment Models in the Trade Literature Small but rapidly growing literature using assignment models in an international context: Trade: Grossman Maggi (2000), Grossman (2004), Yeaple (2005), Ohnsorge Trefier (2007), Costinot (2009), Costinot Vogel (2010). Offshoring: Kremer Maskin (2003), Antras Garicano Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Nocke Yeaple (2008). What do these models have in common? Factor allocation can be summarized by an assignment function. Large number of factors and/or goods. What is the main difference between these models? Two sides of each match are in finite supply (as in Becker 1973). One side of each match is in infinite supply (as in Roy 1951).

This Lecture We restrict attention to Roy-like assignments models, e.g. Ohnsorge and Trefier (2007 JPE), Costinot (2009 Ecta), and Costinot and Vogel (2010 JPE). For reasons which will become clear later, we refer to these as Comparative Advantage Based Assignment Models (CABAM). Objectives: 1 Describe how these models relate to standard neoclassical models. 2 Introduce simple tools from the mathematics of complementarity. 3 Use these tools to derive cross-sectional and comparative static predictions. Focus here is largely on methodology. Papers provide fascinating applications and (qualitative) discussions of relation to data.

Today s Plan 1 2 3 4 5 Overview: Use of asignment models to study Trade and Labor Markets. Review of mathematics of log-supermodularity (ie complementarity). Comparative advantage based asignment models. Cross-sectional predictions from these models. Comparative static predictions from these models.

Log-supermodularity Definition Definition 1 A function g: X R + is log-supermodular if for all x, x X, g (max (x, x )) g (min (x, x )) g (x) g (x ). Bivariate example: If g : X 1 X 2 R + is log-spm, then x 1 x 1 and x 2 x 2 imply g (x 1, x 2 ) g (x 1, x 2 ) g (x 1, x 2 ) g (x 1, x 2, ). If g is strictly positive, this can be rearranged as / / g (x 1, x 2 ) g (x 1, x 2 ) g (x 1, x 2 ) g (x 1, x 2 ).

Log-supermodularity Results Lemma 1. g, h : X R + log-spm gh log-spm. Lemma 2. g : X R + log-spm G (x i ) = g (x) dx i log-spm. X i Lemma 3. g : T X R + log-spm x (t) arg max x X g (t, x) increasing in t

Today s Plan 1 2 3 4 5 Overview: Use of asignment models to study Trade and Labor Markets. Review of mathematics of log-supermodularity (ie complementarity). Comparative advantage based asignment models. Cross-sectional predictions from these models. Comparative static predictions from these models.

Basic Environment Consider a world economy with: 1 2 3 Multiple countries with characteristics γ Γ. Multiple goods or sectors with characteristics σ Σ. Multiple factors of production with characteristics ω Ω. Factors are immobile across countries, perfectly mobile across sectors. Goods are freely traded at world price p (σ) > 0.

Technology Within each sector, factors of production are perfect substitutes: Q(σ, γ) = A(ω, σ, γ)l(ω, σ, γ)dω, Ω A(ω, σ, γ) 0 is productivity of ω-factor in σ-sector and γ-country. A1 A(ω, σ, γ) is log-supermodular. A1 implies, in particular, that: 1 2 High-γ countries have a comparative advantage in high-σ sectors. High-ω factors have a comparative advantage in high-σ sectors,

Factor Endowments V (ω, γ) 0 is inelastic supply of ω-factor in γ-country. A2 V (ω, γ) is log-supermodular. A2 implies that: High-γ countries are relatively more abundant in high-ω factors. Preferences will be described later on when we do comparative statics.

Today s Plan 1 2 3 4 5 Overview: Use of asignment models to study Trade and Labor Markets. Review of mathematics of log-supermodularity (ie complementarity). Comparative advantage based asignment models. Cross-sectional predictions from these models. Comparative static predictions from these models.

4.1 Competitive Equilibrium We take the price schedule p (σ) as given [small open economy]. In a competitive equilibrium, L and w must be such that: 1 Firms maximize profit: p (σ) A (ω, σ, γ) w (ω, γ) 0, for all ω Ω p (σ) A (ω, σ, γ) w (ω, γ) = 0, for all ω Ω s.t. L (ω, σ, γ) > 0 2 Factor markets clear: V (ω, γ) = L (ω, σ, γ) dσ, for all ω Ω σ Σ

4.2 Patterns of Specialization Predictions Let Σ (ω, γ) {σ Σ L(ω, σ, γ) > 0} be the set of sectors in which factor ω is employed in country γ. Theorem In a CABAM, Σ (, ) is increasing. Proof: 1 Profit maximization Σ (ω, γ) = arg max σ Σ p (σ) A(ω, σ, γ). 2 A1 p (σ) A(ω, σ, γ) log-spm by Lemma 1. 3 p (σ) A(ω, σ, γ) log-spm Σ (, ) increasing by Lemma 3. Corollary High-ω factors specialize in high-σ sectors. Corollary High-γ countries specialize in high-σ sectors.

4.2 Patterns of Specialization Relation to the Ricardian literature Ricardian model Special case of CABAM w/ A (ω, σ, γ) A (σ, γ). Previous corollary can help explain: 1 2 Multi-country-multi-sector Ricardian model: Jones (1961) According to Jones (1961), effi cient assignment of countries to goods solves max ln A (σ, γ). According to Corollary, A (σ, γ) log-spm implies PAM of countries to goods; Becker (1973), Kremer (1993), Legros and Newman (1996). Institutions and Trade: Acemoglu Antras Helpman (2007), Costinot (2006), Cuñat Melitz (2006), Levchenko (2007), Matsuyama (2005), Nunn (2007), and Vogel (2007). Papers vary in terms of source of institutional dependence σ and institutional quality" γ...but same fundamental objective: providing micro-theoretical foundations for the log-supermodularity of A (σ, γ).

4.3 Aggregate Output, Revenues, and Employment Previous results are about the set of goods that each country produces. Question: Can we say something about how much each country produces? Or how much it employs in each particular sector? Answer: Without further assumptions, the answer is no.

4.3 Aggregate Output, Revenues, and Employment Additional assumptions A3. The profit-maximizing allocation L is unique. A4. Factor productivity satisfies A(ω, σ, γ) A (ω, σ). Comments: 1 2 3 A3 requires p (σ) A(ω, σ, γ) to be maximized in a single sector. A3 is an implicit restriction on the demand-side of the world-economy.... but it becomes milder and milder as the number of factors or countries increases.... generically true if continuum of factors. A4 implies no Ricardian sources of CA across countries. Pure Ricardian case can be studied in a similar fashion. Having multiple sources of CA is more complex (Costinot 2009).

4.3 Aggregate Output, Revenues, and Employment Output predictions Theorem If A3 and A4 hold in a CABAM, then Q (σ, γ) is log-spm. Proof: { } 1 Let Ω (σ) ω Ω p (σ ) A(ω, σ) > max σ =σ p (σ ) A(ω, σ ). A3 and A4 imply Q(σ, γ) = 1I Ω(σ) (ω) A(ω, σ)v (ω, γ)dω. 2 A1 Ã(ω, σ) 1I Ω(σ) (ω) A(ω, σ) log-spm. 3 4 Intuition: 1 2 A2 and Ã(ω, σ) log-spm + Lemma 1 Ã(ω, σ)v (ω, γ) log-spm. Ã(ω, σ)v (ω, γ) log-spm + Lemma 2 Q(σ, γ) log-spm. A1 high ω-factors are assigned to high σ-sectors. A2 high ω-factors are more likely in high γ-countries.

4.3 Aggregate Output, Revenues, and Employment Output predictions (Cont.) Corollary. Suppose that A3 and A4 hold in a CABAM. If two countries produce J goods, with γ 1 γ 2 and σ 1... σ J, then the high-γ country tends to specialize in the high-σ sectors: Q (σ 1, γ 1 ) Q (σ J, γ 1 ) Q (σ 1, γ 2 )... Q (σ J, γ 2 )

4.3 Aggregate Output, Revenues, and Employment Employment and revenue predictions Let L (σ, γ) Ω(σ) V (ω, γ)dω be aggregate employment. Let R (σ, γ) r (ω, σ) V (ω, γ)dω be aggregate revenues. Ω(σ) Corollary. Suppose that A3 and A4 hold in a CABAM. If two countries produce J goods, with γ 1 γ 2 and σ 1... σ J, then aggregate employment and aggregate revenues follow the same pattern as aggregate output: L (σ 1, γ 1 ) L (σ J, γ 1 ) R (σ 1, γ 1 ) R (σj, γ and 1 )...... L (σ 1, γ 2 ) L (σ J, γ 2 ) R (σ 1, γ 2 ) R (σ J, γ 2 )

4.3 Aggregate Output, Revenues, and Employment Relation to the previous literature 1 2 Worker Heterogeneity and Trade Generalization of Ruffi n (1988): Continuum of factors, Hicks-neutral technological differences. Results hold for an arbitrarily large number of goods and factors. Generalization of Ohnsorge and Trefier (2007): No functional form assumption (log-normal distribution of human capital, exponential factor productivity). Firm Heterogeneity and Trade Closely related to Melitz (2003), Helpman Melitz Yeaple (2004) and Antras Helpman (2004). Factors Firms with productivity ω. Countries Industries with characteristic γ. Sectors Organizations with characteristic σ. Q(σ, γ) Sales by firms with σ-organization in γ-industry. In previous papers, f (ω, γ) log-spm is crucial, Pareto is not.

Today s Plan 1 2 3 4 5 Overview: Use of asignment models to study Trade and Labor Markets. Review of mathematics of log-supermodularity (ie complementarity). Comparative advantage based asignment models. Cross-sectional predictions from these models. Comparative static predictions from these models.

5.1 Closing The Model Additional assumptions Assumptions A1-4 are maintained. In order to do comparative statics, we also need to specify the demand side of the model: { } ε ε 1 ε 1 U = [C (σ, γ)] ε dσ σ Σ For expositional purposes, we will also assume that: A (ω, σ) is strictly log-supermodular. Continuum of factors and sectors: Σ [σ, σ] and Ω [ω, ω].

5.1 Closing the Model Autarky equilibrium Autarky equilibrium is a set of functions (Q, C, L, p, w ) such that: 1 Firms maximize profit: p (σ) A (ω, σ) w (ω, γ) 0, for all ω Ω p (σ) A (ω, σ) w (ω, γ) = 0, for all ω Ω s.t. L (ω, σ, γ) > 0 2 3 Factor markets clear: V (ω, γ) = L (ω, σ, γ) dσ, for all ω Ω σ Σ Consumers maximize their utility and good markets clear: C (σ, γ) = I (γ) p (σ) ε = Q (σ, γ)

5.1 Closing the Model Properties of autarky equilibrium Lemma In autarky equilibrium, there exists an increasing bijection M : Ω Σ such that L(ω, σ) > 0 if and only if M (ω) = σ. Lemma In autarky equilibrium, M and w satisfy dm (ω, γ) A [ω, M (ω, γ)] V (ω, γ) = (1) dω I (γ) {p [M (ω), γ]} ε d ln w (ω, γ) ln A [ω, M (ω)] = (2) dω ω with M (ω, γ) = σ, M (ω, γ) = σ, and p [M (ω, γ), γ] = w (ω, γ) /A [ω, M (ω, γ)].

5.2 Changes in Factor Supply Question: What happens if we change country characteristics from γ to γ γ? If ω is worker skill, this can be though of as a change in terms of skill abundance : V (ω, γ) V (ω, γ ), for all ω > ω V (ω, γ) V (ω, γ ) If V (ω, γ) was a normal distribution, this would correspond to a change in the mean.

5.2 Changes in Factor Supply Consequence for factor allocation Lemma M (ω, γ ) M (ω, γ) for all ω Ω. Intuition: If there are relatively more low-ω factors, more sectors should use them. From a sector standpoint, this requires factor downgrading.

5.2 Changes in Factor Supply Consequence for factor allocation Proof: By contradiction: if there is ω s.t. M (ω, γ ) < M (ω, γ), then there exist: 1 2 M (ω 1, γ ) = M (ω 1, γ) = σ 1, M (ω 2, γ ) = M (ω 2, γ) = σ 2, and M ω (ω 1,γ ) M ω (ω 1,γ). M ω (ω 2,γ ) M ω (ω 2,γ) Equation (1) = V V ( ω2, γ ) C ( σ1, γ ) V ( ω2, γ) C ( σ1, γ ( ω1, γ ) C ( σ2, γ ) V ( ω1, γ) C ( σ2, γ) ). 3 4 5 6 V log-spm = C (σ 1,γ ) C (σ 1,γ) C (σ ). 2,γ C (σ 2,γ) d ln p(σ,γ) ln A[M 1 (σ,γ),σ] Equation (2) + zero profits = d σ = σ. M 1 (σ, γ) < M 1 (σ, γ ) for σ (σ 1, σ 2 ) + A log-spm p(σ 1,γ) p(σ 1,γ ) <. p(σ 2,γ) p (σ 2,γ ) p(σ 1,γ) < p(σ 1,γ ) + CES C (σ 1,γ ) > C (σ 1,γ). A contradiction. p(σ 2,γ) p (σ 2,γ ) C (σ2,γ ) C (σ 2,γ)

5.2 Changes in Factor Supply Consequence for factor prices A decrease form γ to γ implies pervasive rise in inequality: The mechanism is simple: 1 w ( ω, γ ) w ( ω, γ ) w ( ω, γ), for all ω > ω w ( ω, γ) Profit-maximization implies 2 d ln w (ω, γ) ln A [ω, M (ω, γ)] = dω ω d ln w (ω, γ ) ln A [ω, M (ω, γ )] = dω ω Since A is log-supermodular, task upgrading implies d ln w (ω, γ ) d ln w (ω, γ) dω dω

5.2 Changes in Factor Supply Comments Costinot and Vogel (2010) also consider changes in diversity. This corresponds to the case where there exists ω such that V (ω, γ) is log-supermodular for ω > ω, but log-submodular for ω < ω. CV (2010) also consider changes in factor demand (Computerization?): { } ε ε 1 U = B (σ, γ) [C (σ, γ)] ε dσ σ Σ ε 1

5.3 North-South Trade Free trade equilibrium Two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F ), with γ H γ F. A competitive equilibrium in the world economy under free trade is s.t. dm (ω, γ T ) A [ω, M (ω, γ T )] V (ω, γ T ) = dω ε I, T {p [M (ω, γ T ), γ T ]} where: d ln w (ω, γ T ) ln A [ω, M (ω, γ T )] =, dω ω M (ω, γ T ) = σ and M (ω, γ T ) = σ p [M (ω, γ T ), γ T ] = w (ω, γ T ) A [ω, M (ω, γ T )] V (ω, γ T ) V (ω, γ H ) + V (ω, γ F )

5.3 North South Trade Free trade equilibrium Key observation: V (ω,γ H ) V (ω,γ F ) V (ω,γ H ) V (ω,γ T ) V (ω,γ F ) V (ω,γ H ) V (ω,γ F ), for all ω > ω V (ω,γ H ) V (ω,γ T ) V (ω,γ F ) Continuum-by-continuum extensions of two-by-two HO results: 1 Changes in skill-intensities: M (ω, γ H ) M (ω, γ T ) M (ω, γ F ), for all ω 2 Strong Stolper-Samuelson effect: w (ω, γ H ) w (ω, γ T ) w (ω, γ F ) w (ω, γ H ) w (ω, γ T ) w (ω, for all ω > ω, γ F )

5.3 North South Trade Other Predictions North-South trade driven by factor demand differences: Same logic gets to the exact opposite results. Correlation between factor demand and factor supply considerations matters. One can also extend analysis to study North-North trade: It predicts wage polarization in the more diverse country and wage convergence in the other.

Future Work? Dynamic issues: Sector-specific human capital accumulation. Endogenous technology adoption. Empirics: Revisiting the consequences of trade liberalization.

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