Unemployment (Fears), Precautionary Savings, and Aggregate Demand

Similar documents
Unemployment (fears), Precautionary Savings, and Aggregate Demand

Unemployment (Fears), Precautionary Savings, and Aggregate Demand

Unemployment (Fears), Precautionary Savings, and Aggregate Demand

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES. No UNEMPLOYMENT (FEARS) AND DEFLATIONARY SPIRALS. Wouter Den Haan, Pontus Rendahl and Markus Riegler

Unemployment (Fears) and Deflationary Spirals

Discussion of Unemployment (Fears) and Deflationary Spirals

The Employment and Output Effects of Short-Time Work in Germany

Unemployment benets, precautionary savings and demand

Credit Crises, Precautionary Savings and the Liquidity Trap October (R&R Quarterly 31, 2016Journal 1 / of19

UNEMPLOYMENT (FEARS) AND DEFLATIONARY SPIRALS

Household income risk, nominal frictions, and incomplete markets 1

Uninsured Unemployment Risk and Optimal Monetary Policy

On the Design of an European Unemployment Insurance Mechanism

TFP Decline and Japanese Unemployment in the 1990s

Lecture Notes. Petrosky-Nadeau, Zhang, and Kuehn (2015, Endogenous Disasters) Lu Zhang 1. BUSFIN 8210 The Ohio State University

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics. Ph. D. Comprehensive Examination: Macroeconomics Fall, 2016

Microeconomic Heterogeneity and Macroeconomic Shocks

Asymmetric Labor Market Fluctuations in an Estimated Model of Equilibrium Unemployment

Pro-cyclical Unemployment Benefits? Optimal Policy in an Equilibrium Business Cycle Model

Staggered Wages, Sticky Prices, and Labor Market Dynamics in Matching Models. by Janett Neugebauer and Dennis Wesselbaum

1 Dynamic programming

Estimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach

2. Preceded (followed) by expansions (contractions) in domestic. 3. Capital, labor account for small fraction of output drop,

A MODEL OF SECULAR STAGNATION

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics. Ph. D. Preliminary Examination: Macroeconomics Fall, 2009

Monetary Economics Final Exam

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics. Ph. D. Comprehensive Examination: Macroeconomics Fall, 2010

PIER Working Paper

Heterogeneous Firm, Financial Market Integration and International Risk Sharing

GT CREST-LMA. Pricing-to-Market, Trade Costs, and International Relative Prices

Short & Long Run impact of volatility on the effect monetary shocks

Asset purchase policy at the effective lower bound for interest rates

1 Explaining Labor Market Volatility

The Value of Unemployment Insurance

Heterogeneity and the Public Wage Policy

Asset Pricing and Equity Premium Puzzle. E. Young Lecture Notes Chapter 13

Financial markets and unemployment

Stochastic Volatility in Real General Equilibrium

Balance Sheet Recessions

A MODEL OF SECULAR STAGNATION

Health Care Reform or Labor Market Reform? A Quantitative Analysis of the Affordable Care Act

Taxing Firms Facing Financial Frictions

On the Design of an European Unemployment Insurance Mechanism

Idiosyncratic risk and the dynamics of aggregate consumption: a likelihood-based perspective

Chapter II: Labour Market Policy

The Impact of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act on the Spatial Distribution of High Productivity Households and Economic Welfare

The Risky Steady State and the Interest Rate Lower Bound

Lecture 23 The New Keynesian Model Labor Flows and Unemployment. Noah Williams

Keynesian Views On The Fiscal Multiplier

International Debt Deleveraging

A Neoclassical Model of The Phillips Curve Relation

Inflation Dynamics During the Financial Crisis

Is the Maastricht debt limit safe enough for Slovakia?

Idiosyncratic risk, insurance, and aggregate consumption dynamics: a likelihood perspective

Regional unemployment and welfare effects of the EU transport policies:

Aggregate Demand and the Dynamics of Unemployment

Unemployment, Consumption Smoothing and the Value of UI

Frequency of Price Adjustment and Pass-through

Debt Constraints and Employment. Patrick Kehoe, Virgiliu Midrigan and Elena Pastorino

A Macroeconomic Model with Financial Panics

Graduate Macro Theory II: The Basics of Financial Constraints

The New Keynesian Model

Employment prospects and the propagation of fiscal stimulus

PIER Working Paper

Menu Costs and Phillips Curve by Mikhail Golosov and Robert Lucas. JPE (2007)

Market Reforms at the Zero Lower Bound

Capital Constraints, Lending over the Cycle and the Precautionary Motive: A Quantitative Exploration

Trade and Labor Market: Felbermayr, Prat, Schmerer (2011)

ECON 815. A Basic New Keynesian Model II

and over the Business Cycle

State Dependency of Monetary Policy: The Refinancing Channel

Optimal Taxation Under Capital-Skill Complementarity

Aggregate Implications of Lumpy Adjustment

Household Heterogeneity in Macroeconomics

Monetary Policy Implications of State-Dependent Prices and Wages

Groupe de Recherche en Économie et Développement International. Cahier de recherche / Working Paper 09-02

Housing Prices and Growth

Debt Covenants and the Macroeconomy: The Interest Coverage Channel

Household Debt, Financial Intermediation, and Monetary Policy

The I Theory of Money

Optimal Credit Market Policy. CEF 2018, Milan

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics. Ph. D. Comprehensive Examination: Macroeconomics Spring, 2016

Labor-market Volatility in a Matching Model with Worker Heterogeneity and Endogenous Separations

ECON 3010 Intermediate Macroeconomics Chapter 7

New Business Start-ups and the Business Cycle

Macroeconomics 2. Lecture 6 - New Keynesian Business Cycles March. Sciences Po

Optimal Unemployment Insurance in a Search Model with Variable Human Capital

Comparative Advantage and Labor Market Dynamics

Self-fulfilling Recessions at the ZLB

Eco504 Spring 2010 C. Sims MID-TERM EXAM. (1) (45 minutes) Consider a model in which a representative agent has the objective. B t 1.

1 Figure 1 (A) shows what the IS LM model looks like for the case in which the Fed holds the

A MODEL OF SECULAR STAGNATION

Unemployment Fluctuations and Nominal GDP Targeting

Optimal Public Debt with Life Cycle Motives

Welfare Evaluations of Policy Reforms with Heterogeneous Agents

Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy. Vasco Curdia (FRB New York) Michael Woodford (Columbia University)

Investment-Specific Technological Change, Taxation and Inequality in the U.S.

On the Merits of Conventional vs Unconventional Fiscal Policy

The Transmission of Monetary Policy through Redistributions and Durable Purchases

Problem Set 3. Thomas Philippon. April 19, Human Wealth, Financial Wealth and Consumption

Transcription:

Unemployment (Fears), Precautionary Savings, and Aggregate Demand Wouter J. Den Haan (LSE/CEPR/CFM) Pontus Rendahl (University of Cambridge/CEPR/CFM) Markus Riegler (University of Bonn/CFM) June 19, 2016

What we do Show that the interaction between can 1 One friction in financial markets: incomplete risk sharing 2 Two frictions in labor markets: sticky nominal wages: dw/dp < 1 matching give rise to "aggregate demand" like propagation from supply shocks lead to novel policy implication regarding unemployment insurance (UI)

Interaction of two frictions key Complete risk sharing = Sticky nominal wages dampen effect shocks Flexible nominal wages = Incomplete risk sharing dampens effect shocks Both shocks magnify effect shocks

Key components behind these results Aggregate risk UI policy implications different without aggregate risk Asset price volatility Portfolio rebalancing towards liquid/unproductive asset during recession Nonlinearities induced by standard matching framework

Four cases 1 Complete markets and flexible wages 2 Complete markets and sticky wages 3 Incomplete markets and flexible wages 4 Benchmark:Incomplete markets and sticky wages

Case 1: flexible wages & complete markets usual matching stuff: productivity = expected future productivity = job creation = employment rate = unemployment rate = expected duration unemployment

Case 2: Sticky nominal wages & complete markets productivity = Upward pressure on prices = downward pressure on real wages = nominal wage rigidity dampens shocks!

Case 3: Flexible nominal wages & incomplete markets productivity = investment in job creation = unemployment = idiosyncratic risk = precautionary savings = reduction in job creation is smaller = incomplete markets dampens shocks

Case 4: Sticky nominal wages & incomplete markets Incomplete markets: Precautionary savings when unemp = precautionary demand for money = downward pressure on P = W/P (sticky W) = job creation investment by more not by less! = unemployment rate = precautionary savings = etc. = deflationary spiral Risk for unemployed = countercyclical W/P = volatile asset prices

Main results 1 Incomplete markets together with sticky wages amplify shocks, but on their own repress shocks 2 Increase in unemployment insurance from 50% to 55% = everybody better off not true in economy without aggregate risk

Just a little bit of empirical motivation

Euro Area A: Price level (*) 1.1 1.05 1 0.95 0.9 0.85 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 1.15 B: Price level (*) and nominal wage (+) 1.1 1.05 1 0.95 0.9 0.85 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

0.85 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Euro Area 1.15 B: Price level (*) and nominal wage (+) 1.1 1.05 1 0.95 0.9 0.85 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 C: Price level (*) and nominal unit labor cost (o) 1.1 1.05 1 0.95 0.9 0.85 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

Model: Key ingredients 1 Heterogeneous households and incomplete markets 2 Nominal wages do not respond 1-for-1 with P 3 Search frictions in the labor market 4 # jobs = # firms = # shares

Existing firms One-worker firms Profits are given by Key parameter is ω P 1 D t = P t exp (z t ) W t ( zt ) ( ) ωz ωp Pt W t = ω 0 z P z P Aactive firms do not make decisions

Individual households one-worker households employed workers earn nominal wage (1 τ t ) W t unemployed earn µ (1 τ t ) W t & search for jobs idiosyncratic risk exogenous job loss probability, δ lower chance of getting a job in a recession agents can save/invest in unproductive asset: money, M i,t productive asset: equity, q i,t 0 (i.e., firm ownership/jobs)

Individual households max E t β j j=0 i,t+j 1 + χ 1 γ c1 γ ) 1 ζ P t+j 1 1 ζ ( Mi,t+1+j with respect to P t c i,t + J t (q i,t+1 (1 δ) q i,t ) + M i,t+1 = (1 τ t ) W t e i,t + µ (1 τ t ) W t (1 e i,t ) + D t q i,t + M i,t and q i,t+1 0

First-order conditions J t P t = βe t c γ i,t [ (ci,t+1 c i,t ) γ ( Dt+1 + (1 δ) J ) ] t+1 P t+1 P t+1 [ ] Pt = βe t c γ P i,t+1 + χ t+1 ( ) ζ Mi,t Marked departure from literature: Individual MRS is used in both Euler equations Inequality constraints ignored here P t

Equity market equilibrium h }{{} t + ((1 δ) q i q (e i, q i, M i ; s t )) df i A }{{} t (e i, q i, M i ) Equity creation Equity sold = (q (e i, q i, M i ; s t ) (1 δ) q i ) df i A + }{{} t (e i, q i, M i ), with Equity bought A = {i : q(e i, q i, M i ; s t ) (1 δ)q i 0}, A + = {i : q(e i, q i, M i ; s t ) (1 δ)q i 0}, "go to equity supply derivation"

Employment q t = i A+ + q (e i, q i, M i ; s t ) df t (e i, q i, M i ) i A q (e i, q i, M i ; s t ) df t (e i, q i, M i ) = (1 δ) q t 1 + h t

Money market equilibrium Equilibrium (M i M (e i, q i, M i ; s t )) df i B }{{} t (e i, q i, M i ) = Money sold (M (e i, q i, M i ; s t ) M i ) df i B + }{{} t (e i, q i, M i ), Money bought Money supply, M, is constant in the benchmark economy.

Government τ t q t W t = (1 q t ) µ (1 τ t ) W t τ t = (1 q t ) µ q t + µ (1 q t )

Calibration ω P : range of values W t = ω 0 ( zt z ) ( ) ωz ωp Pt z P P One-year post-displacement consumption drop is 34% (Kolsrud, Landais, Nilsson, & Spinnewijn 2015; Sweden) Expected unemployment duration 3.57 quarters

MODEL PROPERTIES

Money holdings Money holdings upon displacement 0.7 0.6 Cond. on expansion Cond. on recession 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Unemployment duration (quarters)

Money demand 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Real cash on hand Intro Empirical motivation Model Model properties Business Cycles UI Amount invested in liquid asset 0.9 0.8 0.7 Employed in expansion Unemployed in expansion Employed in recession Unemployed in recession 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1

BUSINESS CYCLES

Type of experiment considered productivity z t Representative-agent version: P t = dw/dp = nominal-wage stickyness dampens shocks

Log deviation Log deviation Log deviation Log deviation Ppt. deviation Log deviation IRFs with sticky nominal wages 0-3 #10 Productivity 0.2 Employment -1-2 -3 0-0.2-4 -0.4-5 -6-0.6 Incompl. markets Compl. markets -7 0 10 20 30 40 50-0.8 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 Output 6-3 #10 Real wage -0.002 4-0.004 2-0.006 0-0.008-2 -0.01-4 -0.012 0 10 20 30 40 50-6 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 Asset prices 0.02 Price level -0.02 0.01-0.04 0-0.06-0.01-0.08-0.02-0.1 0 10 20 30 40 50 Time (quarters) -0.03 0 10 20 30 40 50 Time (quarters)

Log deviation Log deviation Log deviation Log deviation Ppt. deviation Log deviation IRFs with flexible nominal wages 0-1 -2-3 -4-5 -6-3 #10 Productivity 0.1 0-0.1-0.2-0.3-0.4-0.5 Employment Incompl. markets Compl. markets -7 0 10 20 30 40 50-0.6 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 Output 0-3 #10 Real wage -0.002-0.5-0.004-0.006-0.008-0.01-1 -1.5-2 -0.012 0 10 20 30 40 50-2.5 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 Asset prices 0.02 Price level -0.01-0.02 0.01-0.03 0-0.04-0.05-0.01-0.06-0.07 0 10 20 30 40 50 Time (quarters) -0.02 0 10 20 30 40 50 Time (quarters)

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

Unemployment Insurance Two unemployment insurance (UI) experiments 1 Compare economies with different replacement rates 2 Unexpectedly increase replacement rate and take into account transition Two ways to deal with effect on wages 1 wage rule not affected 2 wage rule is adjusted to keep same implied Nash bargaining weights

Unemployment insurance Mechanism emphasized in the literature Replacement rate = 1 Agents better insured = savings = employment 2 Through bargaining wage = employment This also happens in our model too, but...

Mean employment rate and higher UI... there is a strong countervailing effect arising from aggregate uncertainty: Replacement rate = 1 Asset prices less volatile = demand equity = employment 2 Employment is concave in equity prices, J = E [employment] when SD [J]

UI and employment 0.91 ω P =0.7, µ does not affect wages 0.91 0.9 0.9 Employment level 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.85 0 ω P =1, µ does not affect wages

Switch to alternative UI policy 1 Replacement rate increases from 0.5 to 0.55 2 Switch is unexpected 3 Switch is permanent 4 Agents take transition into account

Average welfare effect of change in UI 1.5 ω P =0.7, µ affects wages 1 0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 1 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 ω P =1, µ affects wages

Who likes/dislikes higher UI? 1.5 µ=0.55, ω 0 unchanged 1.5 µ=0.55, ω 0 increases 1 1 Welfare gain 0.5 0.5 0 EE UU UE EU 0.5 1 1.5 2 Real cash on hand 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 Real cash on hand

Concluding comments With incomplete markets and sticky nominal wages, a decline in productivity sets off a self-reinforcing aggregate demand effect This happens despite the fact that both incomplete markets as well as sticky nominal wages in isolation repress propagation. One of the core components of this mechanism is the missing market for unemployment insurance. A rise in UI generosity can therefore increase average employment and raise welfare for all agents even the asset-rich employed

Creation of new jobs/firms/equity number of new firms created: vacancy yield: h t = ψv η t u1 η t h t v t = ψ ( ) η 1 vt u t

Supply of new equity Matching function zero-profit condition = ( ) ψ J η/(1 η) t h t = ψ u t κ P t

Creation of new jobs/firms/equity zero-profit condition = vacancies as a function of J t /P t : κ = ψ ( vt ) η 1 J t u t P t supply of new equity (job/firm creation): "back to main" ( ) ψ J η/(1 η) t h t = ψ u t κ P t

Unemployment duration 0.4 0.35 0.3 Cond. on expansion Cond. on recession Frequency 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Duration of unemployment spell (quarters)

Equity holdings upon displacement 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 Cond. on expansion Cond. on recession Equity holdings 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Unemployment duration (quarters)

Portfolio choice: fraction in liquid asset share of money in portfolio 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 employed in boom unemployed in boom employed in recession unemployed in recession 0.1 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 real cash on hand

Technical challenges Even rep-agent version not trivial to solve accurately non-linearity matching function matters suffi ciently volatile employment = volatile surplus volatile equity prices "go to accuracy graph rep-agent model" Adding moderate aggregate uncertainty to model is not a small change substantial changes in means volatile surplus and asset prices multiplicity

Log employment level 0.08 0.1 0.12 2 nd order perturbation 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24 5th order projections method 0.26 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 50 "back to main"

Increase in UI & transition dynamics Increase in UI first period of recession No change in wage rule = equity less risky = average employment less deflationary spiral = recession less deep = employment Change in wage rule = the same as above + profits = average employment

Switch to higher level of unemployment benefits 0.91 Employment 0.9 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.86 µ=0.5 µ=0.55 µ=0.55, ω 0 increases 0.85 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Time (quarters)