The Day after Tomorrow: The Future of the Financial Intermediation

Similar documents
1. Resolution of banks and investment firms

II-Annex 2: Resolution of Insurers

Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions

Bank bail-in and bail-out from a civil society and public interest perspective

Council of the European Union Brussels, 27 November 2017 (OR. en)

The Bank Recovery and Resolution Regime in the EU

Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet

June 2018 The Bank of England s approach to setting a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL)

Resolution Regimes: FSB s Key Attributes, TLAC & EU s MREL. Seminar on Crisis Management and Bank Resolution

Delegations will find below a revised Presidency compromise text on the abovementioned proposal.

Treating the E.U. as a Single Jurisdiction for the Implementation of TLAC (EBA Report on MREL, December 2016)

COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) /... of

EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 25 April 2014 (OR. en) 2012/0150 (COD) PE-CONS 14/14 EF 16 ECOFIN 42 DRS 10 CODEC 120

Recent Cases of EU Banking Resolution - Liquidation One Rule Does Not Fit All

The Bank of England s approach to resolution. October 2017

Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures. Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions

SIFIs: What remains to be done? A host-country perspective

EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Brussels, COM(2010) 579 final

Intesa Sanpaolo response to the European Commission

APPLICATION OF THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENT FOR OWN FUNDS AND ELIGIBLE LIABILITIES (MREL) Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive 2014/59/EU

Draft Technical Standards on criteria for MREL. 19 January 2015

Response to the Commission s Communication on An EU Cross-border Crisis Management Framework in the Banking Sector

Decision memorandum Application of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities

Bank Resolution Powers and Tools. Oana Nedelescu Senior Financial Sector Expert IMF

September 28, Overview of Submission

Introduction Post crisis Bank resolution principles with a focus on the BRRD in the EU

Council of the European Union Brussels, 6 March 2018 (OR. en)

Technical advice on the delegated acts on the circumstances when exclusions from the bail-in tool are necessary

Resolution of Systemically Important. Financial Institutions. Progress Report

***I REPORT. EN United in diversity EN. European Parliament A8-0216/

Discussion paper on the debt write-down tool bail-in

Single Resolution Mechanism

RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE DIFC

Consultative report. Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems. Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions

June 2018 The Bank of England s approach to setting a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL)

Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

Implementation of Group Resolution The German Perspective. Adam Ketessidis Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht

6 July FINANCIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT The Swedish National Debt Office s work on financial stability

Resolution Funding: Who pays when financial institutions fail?

The Relevance of the Resolution Tools Within the SRM

THE FUNDING OF RESOLUTION. David G Mayes University of Auckland

4 Bank failing or likely to fail

SRB 2 nd Industry Dialogue January 12th, 2016

The role and work of the EBA in the new European resolution regime Stefano Cappiello EBA Head of Unit, Recovery and Resolution

Cross-border recognition of resolution action. Consultative Document

Communication on the Resolution Strategy. of ACPR Resolution Board

ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIME FOR BANKS

Consultation paper. Application of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities. REPORT Distribution: Open

ECB-PUBLIC OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK. of 8 March 2017

Chapter E: The US versus EU resolution regime

EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

Are CCPs the new Too Big To Fail?

How to ensure enough Loss Absorbing Capacity: From TLAC to MREL

Setting of MREL for subsidiaries of foreign banks

The Albanian Recovery and Resolution framework. Natasha Ahmetaj Second Deputy Governor Bank of Albania

ABI response to the FSB consultation on the adequacy of loss-absorbing capacity of global systemically important banks in resolution.

Developments and Challenges in EU Financial Market Regulation

I-Annex 2 Essential Elements of Institution-Specific Cross-border Cooperation Agreements

IRSG Opinion on Potential Harmonisation of Recovery and Resolution Frameworks for Insurers

Process and next steps

Implementing Financial Sector Resolution

Capital Inquiry: Recovery and Resolution Evidence from the British Bankers Association

Bank resolution from a small host perspective

Financial Sector Crisis Resolution Bill

Banking union: restoring financial stability in the Eurozone

The FSA's Approach to Introduce the TLAC Framework

Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) SRB Policy for 2017 and Next Steps. Published on 20 December 2017.

Safe to Fail? Client Alert December 5, 2014

Comments on Consultative Document on Effective Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions - Recommendations and Timelines

Resolution of Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) - Overview of International Efforts -

Single Resolution Mechanism Resolution planning process

***I DRAFT REPORT. EN United in diversity EN. European Parliament 2016/0365(COD)

Delegations will find hereby the above mentioned Opinion of the European Central Bank.

Public support and the use of the Resolution Fund under BRRD

The Lender of Last Resort in the Euro Area: Where Do We Stand?

Overview of the post-consultation revisions to the TLAC Principles and Term Sheet

TLAC and MREL: From design to implementation

Remarks given at IADI conference on Designing an Optimal Deposit Insurance System

Changes to the previous compromise text (doc /13) are highlighted in bold and underlined. Deletions are marked with [ ].

Financial System Crisis Preparedness and Management. Prepared by D.S. Hoelscher and presented by David Walker, IADI

The following section discusses our responses to specific questions.

The impact of bank resolution and bail-in mechanisms on bank management.

Methodology for Ex-Ante Funding Contribution Calculations Banking Resolution and Recovery Directive. Gibraltar Resolution and Compensation Unit

Recovery and Resolution Planning Progress& Resolution Work I

Resolution Plans Living Wills

Cyprus Financial Assistance Programme Memoranda signed with the EU and the International Monetary Fund: Q&A regarding the financial sector

Methodology for Ex-Ante Funding Contribution Calculations Banking Resolution and Recovery Directive. Gibraltar Resolution and Compensation Unit

Recovery and Resolution First experience, challenges and obstacles

Funding Strategy Elements of an Implementable Resolution Plan. Consultative Document

Bank recovery and resolution proposal: Frequently Asked Questions

Note on the Strategic Development of an Enhanced Bank Resolution Framework for Ukraine in Alignment with the EU Acquis March 2019

THE CROATIAN PARLIAMENT

The below new definitions are inserted into the TOB at Annex 1, Part 1, definitions:

Federal Reserve System/IMF/World Bank. Seminar for Senior Bank Supervisors October 19 30, David S. Hoelscher

After the global financial crisis: challenges for the EU Banking System

Deposit Insurance and Bail-in: Issues and Challenges

Bail-in in the new bank resolution framework: is there an issue with the middle class? 1

Resolution. An evolving journey in Europe. KPMG International November kpmg.com/ecb

2018 SRB Policy for the second wave of resolution plans

Deposit guarantee schemes: their role in resolution

Transcription:

The Day after Tomorrow: The Future of the Financial Intermediation Challenges of resolution planning The Joint NBR and IMF Financial Stability Seminar - 12 th edition Krzysztof Broda The Bank Guarantee Fund, Poland Bucharest, October 27, 2017 1

Why resolution planning? To be prepared Plan Plan Act Review Standard Management Cycle Act Update Resolution Planning Cycle Monitor Monitor Review 2

Fiscal cost Why resolution planning? Try to avoid (indirect costs) Bailout steemit.com Ordinary proceedings Resolution Disorderly bankruptcy (indirect costs) On the basis of Čihák & Nier (2009), IMF WP/09/200 Systemic impact (financial instability) American Free Press 3

Why resolution planning? KA1 Scope Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions 1. 3. The resolution regime should require that at least all domestically incorporated global SIFIs (G-SIFIs): i. Have in place a recovery and resolution plan ( RRP ), including a group resolution plan, containing all elements ( ); ii. iii. Are subject to regular resolvability assessments ( ); and Are subject tof institution-specific cross border cooperation agreements. KA 11 Recovery and resolution planning 11.1 Jurisdictions should put in place an ongoing process for recovery and resolution planning, covering at a minimum domestically incorporated firms that could be systemically significant or critical if they fail. 11.2 Jurisdictions should require that robust and credible RRPs, containing the essential elements ( ), are in place for all G-SIFIs and for any other firm that its home authority assesses could have an impact on financial stability in the event of its failure. 4

Why resolution planning? Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions KA 11 Recovery and resolution planning 11.6 The resolution plan is intended to facilitate the effective use of resolution powers to protect systemically important functions, with the aim of making the resolution of any firm feasible without severe disruption and without exposing taxpayers to loss. It should include a substantive resolution strategy agreed by top officials and an operational plan for its implementation and identify, in particular: (i) financial and economic functions for which continuity is critical; (ii) suitable resolution options to preserve those functions or wind them down in an orderly manner; (iii) data requirements on the firm s business operations, structures, and systemically important functions; (iv) potential barriers to effective resolution and actions to mitigate those barriers; (v) actions to protect insured depositors and insurance policy holders and ensure the rapid return of segregated client assets; and (vi) clear options or principles for the exit from the resolution process. 5

Why resolution planning? BRRD requirements Art. 10 par. 1 Art. 13 par. 2 The resolution authority, after consulting the competent authority and after consulting the resolution authorities of the jurisdictions in which any significant branches are located insofar as is relevant to the significant branch shall draw up a resolution plan for each institution that is not part of a group subject to consolidated supervision pursuant to Articles 111 and 112 of Directive 2013/36/EU. Member States shall ensure that group-level resolution authorities, acting jointly with the resolution authorities referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article, in resolution colleges and after consulting the relevant competent authorities, including the competent authorities of the jurisdictions of Member States in which any significant branches are located, draw up and maintain group resolution plans. 6

Why resolution planning? Save time for unexpected Learn the entity Find what they know on themselves Identify and verify options Identify impediments and address them Data availability Build loss absorption and recapitalization capacity 7

What resolution plan? How detailed? Planning assumptions Resolution reality Fot. Agencja BE&W Tapeciarnia.pl Financial data less critical for planning than for execution Structure and organization Information system and data availability Funding Dependencies and interconnections (internal, third parties, infrastructure, services) 8

What resolution plan? How detailed? Planning assumptions Resolution reality Resolution plan Likely to fail Operational handbooks for resolution tools Computershare Forbes Operational plan/resolution scheme Sherlock Investigation Inc. 9

Data for resolution planning Be pragmatic Recovery Plan Resolution plan Provides data otherwise to be collected by RA Saves time for describing things already prepared by entity (and sometimes verified by supervisor) Some options may be planned (and used) at earlier stage be aware on their availability (ex. funding) Some options if planned and used earlier would be proved as not effective Shows when entity could be expected in front of resolution gates (recovery triggers, time for recovery actions) Gives some idea whether recovery could be successful 10

Data for resolution planning Be consistent Recovery Plan Resolution plan Recovery plan (section A of Annex BRRD) Resolution plan (art. 10 par. 7 BRRD) Information to be included in recovery plan (2) a summary of the material changes to the institution since the most recently filed recovery plan Shall include if appropriate and possible: (b) a summary of the material changes to the institution that have occurred after the latest resolution information was filed; (7) identification of critical functions (c) a demonstration of how critical functions and core business lines could be legally and economically (14) arrangements and measures to restructure separated, to the extent necessary, from other business lines; functions so as to ensure continuity upon the failure of the institution; (8) a detailed description of the processes for determining the value and marketability of the core business lines, operations and assets of the institution (g) a description of the processes for determining the value and marketability of the critical functions, core business lines and assets of the institution 11

Data for resolution planning Recovery Plan Resolution plan Recovery plan Identification of critical function Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/778 Recital 5 and 7 Critical functions of an institution or group are set out in its recovery plan. The recovery plan should be assessed by the resolution authority and form the basis of the resolution plan. The resolution authority should conduct its own assessment of critical functions when establishing the resolution plan and should demonstrate how critical functions and core business lines could be legally and economically separated from other functions so as to ensure continuity upon the failure of the institution. Critical functions should be identified in a two-step procedure: - the institutions perform a self-assessment then establishing their recovery plans, - the resolution authorities critically review the recovery plans of the individual institutions to ensure consistency and coherence in the approaches used by banks. 12

Data for resolution planning Be consistent Recovery Plan Resolution plan Recovery plan (section A of Annex BRRD) Information to be included in recovery plan (4) a range of capital and liquidity actions required to maintain or restore the viability and financial position of the institution (11)arrangements and measures to ensure that the institution has adequate access to contingency funding sources, including potential liquidity sources, an assessment of available collateral and an assessment of the possibility to transfer liquidity across group entities and business lines, to ensure that it can continue to carry out its operations and meet its obligations as they fall due (13) arrangements and measures to restructure liabilities Resolution plan (art. 10 par. 7 BRRD) Shall include if appropriate and possible: (i) an explanation by the resolution authority as to how the resolution options could be financed 13

Data for resolution planning Be consistent Recovery Plan Resolution plan Recovery plan (section A of Annex BRRD) Information to be included in recovery plan (12) arrangements and measures to reduce risk and leverage (14) arrangements and measures to restructure business lines; (17) preparatory arrangements to facilitate the sale of assets or business lines in a timeframe appropriate for the restoration of financial soundness; (16) arrangements and measures necessary to maintain the continuous functioning of the institution s operational processes, including infrastructure and IT services Resolution plan (art. 10 par. 7 BRRD) Shall include if appropriate and possible: (j) a detailed description of the different resolution strategies that could be applied according to the different possible scenarios and the applicable timescales (q) a description of essential operations and systems for maintaining the continuous functioning of the institution s operational processes; 14

Data for resolution planning Be consistent Recovery Plan Resolution plan Recovery plan (section A of Annex BRRD) Information to be included in recovery plan (15) arrangements and measures necessary to maintain continuous access to financial markets infrastructures; (6) a detailed description of any material impediment to the effective and timely execution of the plan, including consideration of impact on the rest of the group, customers and counterparties (3) a communication and disclosure plan outlining how the firm intends to manage any potentially negative market reactions; Resolution plan (art. 10 par. 7 BRRD) Shall include if appropriate and possible: (l) a description of options for preserving access to payments and clearing services and other infrastructures and, an assessment of the portability of client positions; (f) a description of any measures required pursuant to Article 17 to address or remove impediments to resolvability identified as a result of the assessment carried out in accordance with Article 15; (n) a plan for communicating with the media and the public; 15

Challenges Strategy Restructuring (resolution) v. Liquidation (see next slide on public interest test) MPE v. SPE (cross border issue) Application level (not operating entity if possible but covered with resolution powers) Tool(s) 16

Challenges Strategy Selection of liquidation is not end of the process (feasibility of pay out, funding etc.) Resolution reality may seriously change perception (sudden switch to resolution [without adequate plan]?) 17

Challenges Public interest Resolution overrides or limit property rights and shall be justified Maintain critical/systemically important functions Protect financial stability (avoid disruption) Protect tax payers money (avoid tax payers loss) Protect depositors 18

Challenges Public interest Protect financial stability (avoid disruption) SRB decision on public interest in case of Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. and Veneto Banca S.p.A. In particular, neither of these banks provides critical functions, and their failure is not expected to have significant adverse impact on financial stability. 19

Challenges Public interest Protect financial stability (avoid disruption) Commissioner in charge of competition policy, Margrethe Vestager, said: "Italy considers that State aid is necessary to avoid an economic disturbance in the Veneto region as a result of the liquidation of BPVI and Veneto Banca, who are exiting the market after a long period of serious financial difficulties. The SRB has concluded that resolution action is not warranted in the public interest for either BPVI or Veneto Banca, which means that Italian authorities have to wind-down the banks under Italian national insolvency procedures. In this context, Italy has determined that the winding up of these banks has a serious impact on the real economy in the regions where they are most active. Outside the European banking resolution framework, EU rules foresee a possibility for Italy to seek Commission approval for the use of national funds to facilitate the liquidation by mitigating such regional economic effects. As the aided banks exit the market there should be no distortion of competition in European banking markets. 20

Challenges Public interest Maintain critical/systemically important functions Sudden interruption would have material negative impact on third parties, rise contagion or undermine confidence of market participants because of systemic relevance of the function and systemic relevance of entity in provision of function. Market [customer] reach and their nature (retail, corporate, public ) Market relevance of entity (local, regional, national, European) Nature of disruption (market disruption, customer business disruption, market participants perception) Not substitutable in reasonable time frame and acceptable manner (cost [but not recognize loss as cost?]) 21

Challenges Protect depositors Public interest Covered deposits are protected Depositors preference is the only way of other protection? Significant volume of lost deposits may initiate bank run? financial stability issue Significant volume of lost deposits may start contagion? financial stability issue Is deposit taking a critical function if serious volumes? Least cost test usually confirms resolution much cheaper than deposit pay out (indirectly fees may influence banking [lending] activity) 22

Application TLAC/MREL Burden sharing Challenges MPE v. SPE Issue SPE MPE Failing resolution entity (usually group top level [parent] entity) and only if not able to absorb group losses External consolidated at top level, internal at least at resolution entities level Parent entity equity holders and creditors (usually global range) Failing entity External at entity level Entities investors (range depends on entity scale, regional or local) Ownership changes Minority interest investors Market concentration (depends on TLAC/MREL investors) At parent entity level; at subsidiary level even stronger control by parent At subsidiary level benefit in case of loss absorption, diluted in case of recapitalization No direct change Possible change of control (dominating, parent entity) Absorb losses, may be diluted Possible deconcentration 23

Challenges MPE v. SPE Issue SPE MPE Resolution tool Bail-in Full range Process Subsidiary RA initiate loss absorption and recapitalization without resolution. Resolution at subsidiary level as back up option. Resolution at parent level only if it is not able to absorb losses on going basis Independent decision of RAs; group coordination Entity control Only if resolution commenced Yes because of resolution commenced Operational business continuity Tax issues At subsidiary level on standard basis, at parent depends on type of entity (holdco v. operating one) Possible, depends on mechanism of loss absorption and recapitalization Depends on resolution tool, kept for critical functions (but not necessary by the same entity) No other than standard 24

Challenges MPE v. SPE - host concept SPE Intention of subsidiary sale Perspective to stay in the group Not likely to issue external TLAC/MREL SPE Integrated (wide intra group dependencies) Group structure Not integrated, independent entities MPE MPE Serious unable to be removed Operational or tax impediments SPE Possibility to issue external TLAC/MREL SPE Ownership structure Weak dominating position ex. < 60 % of votes MPE MPE Strong dominating position ex. > 90 % of votes SPE Form of internal TLAC/MREL Collateralized guarantee SPE TLAC/MREL amount Less than 90 % of external TLAC/MREL 25

Challenges Tools Resolution tool Pros & Cons Issues Sale of business (purchase and assumption) Bridge institution (bank) Asset separation (Bad bank) Easy (widely tested and experienced), acquirer takes over responsibility, financial and operational risk Risky (potentially costly), RA take over financial, operational and reputation risk, buy time Moral hazard, clean balance sheet and support other tools Market structure and concentration Market development (M&A) Financial incentives Funding Success depends on further sale (market issues as above) Market competition and risk taking Valuation (market/longterm) In Europe only in conjunction 26

Challenges Tools Resolution tool Pros & Cons Issues Bail-in Manage TBTF without further market concentration Not verified (only capital instruments) Recapitalization capacity (TLAC/MREL structure) Funding (open bank bailin) Business operational continuity (if not at holdco level) Market confidence Unintended ownership 27

Challenges TLAC/MREL Amount depends on resolution tool - <capital requirements : 2x capital requirements> Structure (capital v. liabilities if lack of liabilities no recapitalization) depends on resolution tool forbearance risk Form (equity, liability, guarantee) Subordination (pari passu, NCWO issue, contagion) Allocation ([cross border] group issue, home-host confidence) Investors (contagion private?, deductions) 28

Challenges Impediments Which one is material/substantive? How long remove impediments? Is it better to have plan that currently does not resolve entity or extend the time for plan development (BRRD art. 17 par. 2) if there is a plan let s execute it (who would take care of impediments?) 29

Challenges Impediments Search for other options? More costly? More risky? or change of entity (structure, business model, risk profile) and risk battle with it 30

Challenges Resolvability Feasible operationally and economically able to be executed (no impediments) Credible do we really believe we will do it if necessary Quora.com 31

THANK YOU www.bfg.pl 32