NDC Schemes and Heterogeneity in Longevity: Proposals for Re-design

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NDC Schemes and Heterogeneity in Longevity: Proposals for Re-design Robert Holzmann, Jennifer Alonso-García, Héloïse Labit-Hardy, Andrés Villegas CEPAR, UNSW Business School, Australia 26th Colloquium on Pensions and Retirement Research 3rd July 2018 Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 1/24

Contents 1 Context and motivations 2 Distribution of heterogeneity in life expectancy 3 Reducing the effect of heterogeneity through benefit redesign Benchmark case Annuities proxied by lifetime income Two-tier arrangement 4 Final remarks

1. Context and motivations 1 Context and motivations 2 Distribution of heterogeneity in life expectancy 3 Reducing the effect of heterogeneity through benefit redesign Benchmark case Annuities proxied by lifetime income Two-tier arrangement 4 Final remarks Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 3/24

1. Context and motivations Overview of pensions Funding methodologies Pay as you go (PAYG): current contributors pay current pensioners (Unfunded schemes) Funding: contributions are accumulated in a fund which earns a market return (Funded schemes) Benefit formula Defined Benefit (DB): Pension is calculated according to a fixed formula which usually depends on the members salary and the number of contribution years. Defined Contributions (DC): Pension is dependent on the amount of money contributed each year and their return. Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 4/24

1. Context and motivations Overview of pensions The financing choice is present for both DB and DC pension schemes. In PAYG: increasing fiscal burden of wage-based pension schemes In Funding: defined contribution shift return risk to the individuals Global shift from DB to DC Mixing possibilities: Pay-as-you-go Funding DB Classical social security Classical Employee DB Plan DC Nonfinancial (NDC) Pension savings accounts Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 5/24

1. Context and motivations Advantages of PAYG DC (NDC) It s more or less actuarially fair (takes into account life expectancy and contributions) Portability of pension rights between jobs, occupations and sectors is permitted. It promises to deal with the effects of population ageing more or less automatically. Arbitrariness in benefit indexation rules and adjustment factors is avoided. Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 6/24

1. Context and motivations Mortality heterogeneity Everybody talks about heterogeneity in longevity but few to no solutions have been proposed. There is increasing evidence that heterogeneity in longevity is high, increasing for many dimensions, in particular for income, with expected further rise This heterogeneity acts like a tax/subsidy mechanism, reducing the link between lifetime contributions and pensions typically found in defined contribution pension schemes Data points for OECD countries suggest that tax rates can reach 30 percent for low income, and subsidy rates of over 20 percent for high income earners. Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 7/24

1. Context and motivations Our contribution We explore five mechanisms to compensate for mortality heterogeneity in NDC scheme: Individualized annuities Individualized contribution rates Two-tier contribution structured (social+individual contribution rate) Two additional schemes to deal with the tails Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 8/24

2. Distribution of heterogeneity in life expectancy 1 Context and motivations 2 Distribution of heterogeneity in life expectancy 3 Reducing the effect of heterogeneity through benefit redesign Benchmark case Annuities proxied by lifetime income Two-tier arrangement 4 Final remarks Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 9/24

2. Distribution of heterogeneity in life expectancy Challenge to the distribution of heterogeneity Linking life expectancy to a measure from life-time income requires the crossing of various sources of data (e.g. tax declaration and death certificate) Most available datasets provide data points for income terciles, quartiles and quintiles, or link mortality to educational attainment However, the tails of the income matter and full distributions are preferable. We use two datasets: United States: Chetty et al. (2016) use federal income tax and social security records England and Wales: income and mortality data for statistical geographies used by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 10/24

2. Distribution of heterogeneity in life expectancy Life expectancy vs Lifetime income in 2014 at age 65 Period Life Expectancy at age 65 (years) 24 21 18 15 a)us Sex Female Male 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Household Lifetime Income ($ million) Period Life Expectancy at age 65 (years) 23 21 19 17 b)uk Sex Female Male 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 Individual Lifetime Income ( million) Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 11/24

2. Distribution of heterogeneity in life expectancy Heterogeneity in longevity as tax-subsidy mechanism The pension at retirement is commonly calculated as the lifetime accumulated wealth AK k (tc) and the average life expectancy LE a (with a contribution rate tc). We measure the pension wealth PWx k r for an individual k at retirement age x r and assess the effect of individual life expectancy LE k : PWx k r = P xr LE k = AK k (tc) LE a LE k = AK k (tc)(1 + t k ) If the individual s life expectancy differs from the average mortality experience a tax or subsidy will arise: t k = Actual liability Accumulated notional capital 1 = = LE k LE a 1 PW k x r AK k (tc) 1 Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 12/24

2. Distribution of heterogeneity in life expectancy Tax and subsidy for US and England & Wales: t k 20% 15% a) US 15% b) UK 10% 10% 5% 5% Tax/Subsidy 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% Sex Female Male 0 25 50 75 100 Household Income Percentile Tax/Subsidy 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% Sex Female Male 0 25 50 75 100 Individual Income Percentile Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 13/24

2. Distribution of heterogeneity in life expectancy Implications for scheme design and pension reform If left un-addressed, heterogeneity in longevity will diminish much of the rationale for approach It eliminates the direct link between contributions and benefits and thus claimed fairness It eliminates the linear intertemporal budget constrains for individuals earning further away from average income and thus the neutrality of retirement decisions It introduces again implicit redistributive features and hence eliminates the neutrality of NDC where redistribution needs to be introduced explicitly Taxes to deprived and subsidies to higher income households is (jointly) undesired. Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 14/24

3. Reducing the effect of heterogeneity through benefit redesign 1 Context and motivations 2 Distribution of heterogeneity in life expectancy 3 Reducing the effect of heterogeneity through benefit redesign Benchmark case Annuities proxied by lifetime income Two-tier arrangement 4 Final remarks Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 15/24

3. Reducing the effect of heterogeneity through benefit redesign Explored design alternatives 0: Benchmark: status-quo (non-individualized rates or annuities) 1: Individualized annuities 2: Individual contribution rates (2 versions) 3: Two-tier contribution schemes with flat and individualized contribution rates 4: Two-tier contribution scheme with caps on the contributions 5: Two-tier contribution scheme with individualized contribution rates to deal with lower tail Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 16/24

3. Reducing the effect of heterogeneity through benefit redesign Starting Position and Benchmark (Design 0) We assess the redistribution of the system by defining a measure of aggregate tax/subsidy effects: Total Absolut Tax Subsidy Indicator (TATSI) = average of absolute values of tax and subsidy rates We assess the effect of gender by studying a joint and gender-specific pools: To explore how much of TATSI for a country can be reduced by simply separating the risk pools Benchmark (Design 0): non-individualized rates or annuities Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 17/24

3. Reducing the effect of heterogeneity through benefit redesign Individualized annuities (Design 1) Life expectancy as a function of income To reduce the tax/subsidy distortion, we seek to model life expectancy using a simple function that policymakers can use Depending on the data availability, the function links individual life expectancy to lifetime income, education, geographical location, etc. Among the simple specifications we have: quadratic: LE i = a + b Y i + c Y 2 i logarithmic: LE i = a + b log(y i ) Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 18/24

3. Reducing the effect of heterogeneity through benefit redesign Calculation of the two-tier arrangement (Design 3) Proposal: divide the total contribution tc into social contribution that yields average pension rights: sc contribution that yields individualized pension rights: nc We calculate the split by minimising the squared differences between the individualized annuities (zero-subsidy) and the two-tier pension: sc = tc k I ( Y k LE LE k LE a) ( Y k Y a) k I k (Y k Y a ) 2 Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 19/24

3. Reducing the effect of heterogeneity through benefit redesign Comparison between re-designs Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 20/24

4. Final remarks 1 Context and motivations 2 Distribution of heterogeneity in life expectancy 3 Reducing the effect of heterogeneity through benefit redesign Benchmark case Annuities proxied by lifetime income Two-tier arrangement 4 Final remarks Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 21/24

4. Final remarks Conclusion Heterogeneity in longevity is multi-dimensional and with regard to life-time income likely to continue increasing Without addressing heterogeneity, DC type reforms may not move forward and cannot convincingly be argued (such as reducing the hard to measure tax wedge of NDB schemes) There are promising and operational policy options to reduce the tax/subsidy effects of heterogeneity Risk pooling by gender would help but alone is not sufficient Individualized annuities by individual life expectancy estimations promise to be effective without being too complex A two-tier contribution scheme (for NDC) may go a long way, with some gender differentiation Other elements can be added to the two-tier design, dealing in particular with the tails of the distribution Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 22/24

4. Final remarks Next step for this research Explore empirically the full set of policy alternatives developed and presented, and develop new ones. In particular, deeper investigation of the tails of the distribution is required. Access or construct similar life expectancy/lifetime income data for other countries and improve on lifetime estimates, and the link to other heterogeneity characteristics, particularly education. This would improve the estimates and make them even more policy relevant. Empirically compare results across countries to better understand what may simply be a statistical issue or artifact, or whether issues exist that require policy interventions beyond heterogeneity. Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 23/24

5. Final remarks Reference Chetty, R., Stepner, M., Abraham, S., Lin, S., Scuderi, B., Turner, N., Bergeron, A., and Cutler, D. (2016), The association between income and life expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014, Jama, 315, 1750 1766. Mail: h.labithardy@unsw.edu.au Héloïse Labit Hardy NDC and heterogeneity 24/24