Inequality in the Western Balkans and former Yugoslavia Will Bartlett Visiting Fellow, LSEE & International Inequalities Institute
International Inequalities Institute project: Specific research questions Together with Gorana Krstic, Jelena Zarkovic Rakis and Nermin Oruc research questions: 1. What is the extent of income inequality in four Yugoslav successor states, and how much has it changed over the last three decades? 2. What factors determine the level of labour income inequality? 3. What has been the role of different welfare policies in determining the pattern of earnings inequalities?
Welfare system before breakup Yugoslav market socialism aimed to reconcile efficiency and equity through self-management (workplace democracy) and social ownership Adopted an inclusive welfare system based upon mixed principles of contribution and solidarity combining Bismarckian and Universal systems major benefits provided on contributory basis (pensions, health care, unemployment and maternity benefits) Non-contributory cash benefits (social assistance, child allowance, war veterans benefits) All this led to low levels of inequality In 1968, standardised household income Gini = 0.24
Varieties of capitalism (VoC) in Yugoslav successor states Successor states emerged from common institutional background Path dependency, but: Different effects of wars and conflicts Differences in pace and pattern of privatisation Speed of reforms Early reformers: Croatia and Macedonia Late reformers: Slovenia and Serbia Impact of neo-liberal agenda on welfare reform varied between countries Primary influence of World Bank and IMF (Bosnia, Serbia), EU (Slovenia, Macedonia), mixed influences (Croatia) Quite different outcomes in terms of inequality Can VoC paradigm explain this outcome? Coordinated market economies versus Liberal market economies
European Values Survey: % of respondents with much confidence in trade unions 60 53 50 40 34 30 20 18 10 12 0 Serbia Croatia Macedonia Slovenia
Portugal Serbia Greece Sweden Germany UK Lithuania Romania EU-28 Denmark Bulgaria Hungary Ireland Spain France Cyprus Croatia Latvia Estonia Macedonia Italy Luxembourg Belgium Poland Austria Finland Netherlands Czech Malta Slovenia Slovakia Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income before pensions and social transfers 56.7 60.762.4 51.8 53.2 53.7 55.4 56.4 51.7 51.6 51.5 51.1 50.8 50.2 49.9 49.3 49.1 49.1 48.7 48.6 48.1 48.0 47.9 46.1 47.4 47.6 44.9 40.4 43.9 44.4 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 64.1
Quantity of employment In Serbia, Krstić (2014) using SILC survey data concluded that inequality of incomes of employees is related to: Quantity and quality of employment In Serbia, 18.2% of persons live in households with very low work intensity (10.5% in EU) Almost 50% of persons in lowest income quintile live in households with very low work intensity Related to low participation rate of working age population due to unemployment and retirement and other reasons
People living in households with very low work intensity (aged 0 to 59 years) Serbia Ireland Macedonia Greece Spain Belgium Croatia UK Italy Bulgaria Denmark Cyprus Portugal Finland EU-28 Netherlands Germany Hungary Lithuania Malta Sweden France Austria Romania Latvia Slovenia Slovakia Poland Czech Estonia 5.7 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.6 10.9 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.2 9.8 9.4 9.2 9.2 8.7 8.6 8.2 7.9 7.8 7.4 7.1 6.9 6.8 6.6 15.4 14.9 14.4 17.4 16.8 0 5 10 15 20 25 19.2 21.2
Gini coefficient 40 Low work intensity and Gini inequality 38 Serbia 36 34 Macedonia 32 30 Croatia 28 26 24 22 Slovenia y = 0.3663x + 26.773 R² = 0.1128 20 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 % of people living in households with very low work intensity
Quality of employment In Serbia, three quarters of employed poor do not live in households with low work intensity (Krstić, 2014) So, low quality of employment contributes to poverty and inequality In 2014, 12.9% of employed were part-time workers, 24.1% were self-employed, and 18.2% were temporary workers Self employed and part-time workers are most exposed to poverty risk Many of the self-employed are informal workers who are outside the social protection system 22% of employees are informal workers, earning 22% less than formal workers (Krstić & Sanfey 2011) One third of part-time workers are poor, compared to 13% of full time workers Many part-time workers are in the informal sector, as working parttime in the formal sector faces very high marginal tax rates due to low progressivity of the Serbian tax system In contrast, Slovenia has a progressive system of personal income tax
Own account workers % of total employment 25 22.2 20 15 13.9 10 8.5 8.9 5 0 Croatia Slovenia Macedonia Serbia
Redistributive impact of pensions and social assistance on Gini inequality Serbia Lithuania Romania Bulgaria Latvia Estonia Spain Greece Portugal Macedonia Cyprus UK Italy EU-28 Poland Croatia Germany Ireland France Luxembourg Hungary Malta Denmark Austria Sweden Netherlands Belgium Finland Czech Slovenia Slovakia 24.5 38.2 33.7 31.0 30.4 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Gini before SA + P Gini before SA Gini EDI Linear (Gini EDI) Linear (Gini before SA) Linear (Gini before SA + P)
Gini coefficients in ex-yugoslavia & EU (%) 70 60 62 50 52 44 49 49 46 40 30 37 31 30 25 37 36 30 34 38 20 10 0 EU-28 Slovenia Croatia Macedonia Serbia Gini before SA + P Gini before SA Gini EDI
Redistributive impact of pensions and social transfers 25 24.2 20 20.8 19.4 18.9 15 15.3 13.6 15.0 12.5 12.5 16.6 10 5 5.5 5.8 6.4 7.6 2.5 0 EU-28 Slovenia Croatia Macedonia Serbia Effect of social transfers and pensions Effect of pensions Effect of social transfers
Rank order of redistributive effort from pensions and social assistance 35 30 28 30 31 31 26 25 24 22 20 19 15 12 15 13 15 16 14 10 7 5 2 3 2 0 Slovenia Macedonia Estonia Croatia Sweden Serbia Before pensions or social transfers After pensions before social transfers After pensions and social transfers
S80/S20 equivalised disposable income share ratio, 2015 Serbia Romania Lithuania Bulgaria Spain Macedonia Latvia Greece Estonia Portugal Italy UK Cyprus Croatia EU-28 Poland Germany Ireland Hungary Luxembourg France Malta Sweden Denmark Austria Netherlands Belgium Finland Slovenia Slovakia Czech 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 7.1 6.9 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.0 5.8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 7.5 8.3 9.0
Share of equivalised disposable income by each decile income group, 2015 30 27.2 25 20 15 Slovenia Croatia Macedonia Serbia 20.2 23.9 22.6 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Income shares of upper, middle and lower class after pensions and social transfers (% of national equivalised disposable income) Serbia Lithuania Romania Bulgaria Latvia Estonia Spain Macedonia Greece Portugal Cyprus Italy UK Croatia EU Poland Ireland Germany France Malta Luxembourg Hungary Denmark Austria Belgium Netherlands Sweden Finland Czech Republic Slovenia Slovakia 24.0 24.6 24.7 25.5 25.7 26.1 26.3 26.5 26.8 27.2 27.6 28.0 28.2 28.9 29.1 29.3 29.6 29.7 30.6 30.6 30.7 30.8 31.7 31.7 31.9 32.1 32.7 32.8 33.1 33.2 33.8 48.8 46.7 48.2 46.3 48.0 48.4 48.9 49.6 47.9 46.7 45.2 48.0 46.6 48.5 46.9 46.9 47.1 46.8 44.8 46.8 46.7 46.8 45.6 46.0 47.4 45.5 47.3 46.2 45.0 46.6 47.0 27.2 28.8 27.1 28.4 26.3 25.6 24.8 23.9 25.3 26.1 27.2 24.1 25.2 22.6 24.1 23.9 23.3 23.6 24.6 22.5 22.7 22.4 22.6 22.3 20.8 22.3 20.1 21.0 21.7 20.2 19.3 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Lower class (bottom 50%) Middle class (40%) Upper class (top 10%)
Variation of income shares Income shares of the middle class are much less variable than of the lower or upper classes Middle classes are protected by their sharp elbows or voice Upper classes in predatory societies extract surplus from the lower classes Easier to do where political power is concentrated in economic-political elite Lower class Middle class Upper class S.D Mean C.V 2.836 29.145 0.097 1.157 47.006 0.025 2.420 23.871 0.101 S.D.= Standard deviation CV = Coefficient of variation
Shares of disposable income gained by top 1% (% of national equivalised income), 2015 Romania Cyprus Lithuania Serbia Bulgaria UK Denmark Greece France Portugal Germany EU-28 Luxembourg Netherlands Latvia Austria Italy Spain Ireland Poland Hungary Estonia Sweden Czech Finland Malta Belgium Macedonia Croatia Slovenia Slovakia 5.2 5.5 5.65.86.0 5.2 5.2 4.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.4 3.3 6.4 6.5 7.1 7.5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 8.3
Why does inequality differ between countries of former Yugoslavia? Explanation 1: Varieties of capitalism and paths of transition The gradual corporatist Slovenian transition was egalitarian, while the delayed shock therapy neoliberal Serbian transition was more extractive of the surplus from lower class workers generating relatively high levels of poverty Explanation 3: Labour market institutions Differences in the quantity and quality of jobs may contribute to an explanation of the differences in inequality between these countries Linked to degree of resistance to labour market reforms And to progressivity or regressivity of tax system and consequent extent of informality Explanation 2: Elite composition and forms of political capitalism The Slovenian elite was formed of ex-nomenklatura elements who resisted reforms, while the Croatian elite was reconstituted by members of the HDZ party and the diaspora who supported rapid but incomplete privatisation
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