Skin in the Game: Evidence from the Online Social Lending Market Thomas Hildebrand, Manju Puri, and Jörg Rocholl October 2010 This paper analyzes the certification mechanisms and incentives that enable lending markets to match demand and supply despite the absence of financial intermediaries with skin in the game. Our analysis of the online social lending market, in which there is no financial intermediary, shows that the creation of self-organized groups helps the market to work efficiently but allowing group leader rewards, similar to origination fees in securitization, is detrimental. We are able to take advantage of a change imposed on group leaders in which group rewards are eliminated to examine how the same groups behave once these origination fees are removed. In general, group leaders signal borrower quality to other lenders by endorsing and submitting bids for listings in their groups. Borrowers in these groups have a significantly higher likelihood of receiving a loan, pay significantly lower interest rates, and default less often than comparable borrowers outside groups. However, when group leaders receive an origination fee for successful loan listings, it creates adverse incentives so despite bids and endorsements, loans originated by such group leaders have higher default rates. Group leaders become more careful in screening after the elimination of these rewards, and if their loan participation is high, i.e. when they have skin in the game and are thus severely hurt by a borrower default. These results have important implications for the question of how lending markets can function properly, on the need for retail consumer protection, and for the ongoing debate about the lessons from the financial and economic crisis. We thank Christian Ehm, Masami Imai, Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala, Yishay Yafeh, and seminar participants at the Western Finance Association (WFA) meetings, 11th Annual Bank of Finland/CEPR Conference, German Finance Association (DGF) meetings, Financial Management Association (FMA) meetings, BI Oslo, Duke University, ESMT Berlin, University of Karlsruhe, University of Mannheim, and University of Maastricht. ESMT European School of Management and Technology. Email: thomas.hildebrand@esmt.org. Tel: +49 30 21231-5612. Duke University and NBER. Email: mpuri@duke.edu. Tel: (919) 660-7657. ESMT European School of Management and Technology. Email: rocholl@esmt.org. Tel: +49 30 21231-1292.
1. Introduction The functioning of markets crucially depends on the matching of demand and supply, and this holds in particular for financial markets such as the lending market. Borrowers and lenders face substantial information asymmetries, which may eventually lead to the breakdown of this market as described by Akerlof (1970) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and as observed in the recent financial crisis. Banks have traditionally taken the role of financial intermediaries to screen and monitor potential borrowers by using public and private information to overcome at least partly these information asymmetries and to allow the lending market to work, i.e. to give creditworthy borrowers access to credit at sustainable interest rates that incorporate the borrowers risk of default. Their commitment to the scrutiny of screening and monitoring and thus the forbearance from unscrupulous lending to informationally disadvantaged borrowers such as retail customers has traditionally been secured by their skin in the game, as described in Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). However, the widespread use of loan securitization and the originate-to-distribute model have altered the incentives for financial intermediaries and raised the important question whether and to what extent the lack of skin in the game has affected the quality of lending decisions. Discussion about this question has been at the forefront of the regulatory and academic debate about the financial crisis. 1 Further, with the recent advances in information technology, new lending platforms have emerged that do not rely on the existence of a financial intermediary any more and in which lenders and borrowers do not have the chance for personal interaction, as for example described in Ravina (2008). Important open questions are how markets can responsibly match demand and supply despite the lack of a financial intermediary and skin in the game as well as which conditions have to be fulfilled and what incentives have to be given to market participants to protect retail customers from unscrupulous lending. The answers to these questions have potentially far-reaching implications for the future of the financial industry. 1 For example, President Obama motivated the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency as follows: Millions of Americans who have worked hard and behaved responsibly have seen their life dreams eroded by the irresponsibility of others and the failure of their government to provide adequate oversight. Our entire economy has been undermined by that failure. 2
We address some of these questions by examining the online social lending platform Prosper.com, on which lenders can give their money directly to borrowers without the intermediation of a financial institution. Prosper.com has attracted over 365,000 requests for loans with a total volume of more than $2,700,000,000 since its inception in 2006. As an outcome, 32,245 of these loan requests have resulted in actual loans with a volume of $193,000,000. Prosper.com has thus developed into the market leader for online social lending and can be seen as an ideal opportunity for our analysis as it provides on its webpage detailed information on individual borrowers, their loan requests, funding success, interest rates, and subsequent loan performance. We are able to examine which incentives work well in this market as well as identify mechanisms that lead to a deterioration in lending quality. We find that one important mechanism that allows this market to work efficiently is the creation of self-organized groups that are headed by a group leader and joined voluntarily by further members. The group leader is allowed to grant or deny members access to their group, ask for verification of the information provided by the group members and define the purpose of the group as well as the nature and interests of its members. In particular, the group leader can endorse and submit bids for the borrower listings in her group, i.e. put her money where her mouth is, or have skin in the game. Groups can have the equivalent of an origination fee wherein the group leader is allowed to charge a fee for his role in matching demand and supply for loans. This fee regularly comprises an immediate closing fee and additional interest over the lifetime of the loan. Prosper.com abolishes this group leader reward on 09/12/2007, following an announcement on 09/05/2007. This imposed change on the group leader provides us with a unique opportunity to analyze the functioning of the market before and after this change in the reward structure for the group leader. Importantly, we can see the behavior of the same group leaders and groups before and after the removal of origination fees and assess differences in the kinds of loans originated and their performance, using a difference-in-difference methodology. 3
We find that groups have a positive effect in that borrowers in groups have a significantly higher likelihood of getting a loan than those who are not in groups. Borrowers also pay significantly lower interest rates and default less often. However, group rewards have an adverse effect. Borrowers in groups with rewards have a lower probability of getting a loan, face higher interest rates and higher default rates. Group leaders use bids and endorsements frequently in these reward groups as well, and these also lead to a higher listing success. However, there is a remarkable difference for the default rates before and after the change of the reward structure. When group leaders can still earn rewards for successful listings in their groups, the default rates are substantially higher for loans with than for loans without group leader bids and endorsements. From an economic standpoint, it still pays for the group leader to endorse or submit bids even for weaker listings. The successful closure of these listings provides him with a reward that exceeds the losses from the increased likelihood of default, while other lenders and borrowers lose on these loans. In strict contrast, after the change in the reward structure when the group leader does not receive any fees for a successful closure of a listing any more, group leader bids and endorsements are used much more responsibly and are thus associated with significantly lower borrower default rates. Similarly, even before the elimination of group leader rewards, a group leader bid and endorsement is credible when the group leader contributes a substantial fraction to the requested loan amount. In this case, the default rates are significantly lower than for other loans and almost identical to those for loans after the elimination of group leader rewards. These results suggest that a group leader has the right incentives to screen only if he has substantial skin in the game and is severely hurt by losing money when a borrower defaults. This evidence has important implications for the current debate about the proper protection of retail customers in financial markets. In particular, it suggests that only originators who retain a substantial share of the originated loan have the right incentives to screen loans efficiently and make responsible lending decisions that do not hurt borrowers and co-lenders. 4
Our paper is related to different strands of the literature. First, it deals with the general questions raised in Akerlof (1970) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) of how to match demand and supply and thus enable the lending market to work. We provide evidence how group leader bids and endorsements as well as group leaders skin in the game provide credible signals to other lenders and thus induce them to bid on these listings. The paper thus directly relates to the literature that focuses on the unobservable actions by the lender in checking potential borrowers creditworthiness. The theoretical work by Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) as well as the empirical work by Sufi (2007) stress the importance of the share of the loan retained by financial intermediaries to overcome information asymmetries. Second, our paper relates to the growing literature on irresponsible advice and lending by financial intermediaries and the resulting need for regulatory intervention and consumer protection, such as for example Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007), Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2007), and Inderst and Ottaviani (2009). Third, we analyze which particular role important concepts from the banking literature play in this context. One important related concept is the differentiation between hard and soft information such as in Stein (2002), and Berger, et al., (2005). An important change due to the use of new technologies in finance such as online lending is a greater reliance on hard relative to soft information in financial transactions. At the same time, information technology may lead to the hardening of soft information, i.e. the possibility to transform the nature of the information from soft into hard as for example in credit ratings. Another important related concept is the inherent risk of free-riding in monitoring when a larger number of lenders face a single borrower, along the lines in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). Finally, there is a growing number of papers that analyze the lending behavior on Prosper.com. Hulme and Wright (2006) provide an overview of the historical origins and contemporary social trends of online social lending and conduct a case study of the world s first online social lending platform, Zopa. Ravina (2008) and Pope and Sydnor (2009) analyze whether there is discrimination on Prosper.com in terms of socio-demographic variables such as race and gender. These characteristics are taken care of by the difference-in-difference methodology employed in this paper, assuming their distribution is time-invariant across the different groups. Iyer, Khwaja, Luttmer, and Shue (2009) test whether lenders can 5
infer soft information in Prosper. Lin, Prabhala, and Viswanathan (2009) test which role social networks and in particular the company that borrowers keep, i.e. the borrowers friends, play for the lending outcome. In our study, we focus on the creation of groups and group leader bids and endorsements as mechanisms used by the group leader to promote listings. Specifically, we examine in detail the consequences of the elimination of group leader rewards for funding success, the resulting interest rate, and loan performance. This helps us to better understand the implications of the use of different incentives in consumer lending and in particular the importance of skin in the game. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the institutional setting on the platform and provides an overview over the data. Section 3 presents the analysis and the univariate and multivariate results. Section 4 concludes. 2. Institutional Setting and Data 2.1. The General Setup Prosper.com provides a basis for the interaction between two sides: on the one side the potential borrowers, who are looking for money for some specific purpose; on the other side the potential lenders, who are interested in opportunities and projects to invest their money into. 2 After registering on the platform, borrowers can post a listing in which they ask for money and provide different types of information so that potential lenders can better assess their creditworthiness. These types of information can be classified into hard and soft information: Hard information o On the borrower: Prosper.com assigns a unique identification number to each borrower and requires him to provide his social security number, driver s license number, and bank account information so that Prosper.com can verify 2 Institutions are not allowed on Prosper.com during the sample period, so only private persons may serve as borrowers or lenders. 6
his identity and obtain his Experian Scorex PLUS SM credit report. Of particular importance here is the credit grade, which ranges from AA for the best customers over A, B, C, D, and E to HR for the worst customers and which is assigned to potential borrowers based on their Experian credit score. The credit report, which is not reviewed or verified by Prosper.com, also includes the borrower s default history, which is thus observable by potential lenders. o On the listing: Borrowers set the amount they request, which is between $1,000 and $25,000, as well as the maximum interest rate they are willing to pay. In some states, there are interest rate caps, while in the other states the maximum interest rate may go up to 35% an interest rate cap set by Prosper.com. Soft information This information is provided by the borrower herself and only some of it is verified. Examples of this soft information are borrower state, income range, and house ownership. Additionally, the borrower has the possibility to post one or more photos, e.g. of her or the object that she wants to finance with the loan. Borrowers can explain what they want to spend the money on, how they intend to pay it back by providing a budget, and why they are particularly reliable and trustworthy. Lenders have the possibility to screen the listings and can place one or several bids of at least $50 on any of them at any interest rate below or equal to the maximum interest rate requested by the borrower. These bids cannot be canceled or withdrawn. The bidding on the listing is performed as an open uniform-price auction in which everybody can observe each other s actions. As long as the aggregate supply on a listing does not exceed the borrower s demand, bidders can see the amount of the other bids, but not the interest rates of those bids. They only observe the maximum interest rate that the borrower is willing to pay. Once the aggregate supply exceeds the borrower s demand, bidders can also see the marginal interest rate so that they know which rate they have to underbid to 7
be able to serve as a lender. As a consequence, lenders who offer the highest interest rates are outbid, so that the resulting interest rate is bid down until the duration of the listing expires and the listing becomes a loan. Alternatively, borrowers can also choose that the listing is closed and the loan is funded as soon as the total amount bid reaches the amount requested. In the end, all winning bidders receive the same interest rate, which is the marginal interest rate. In case the total amount bid does not reach or exceed the amount requested within the duration time, the listing expires and no transaction takes place. All loans on Prosper.com are 36-months annuity loans, which can be paid back in advance though. The platform makes money from charging fees to borrowers and lenders once a listing is completely funded and becomes a loan. Borrowers pay depending on their credit grade a one-time fee (between 1% and 5% of the loan amount), which is subtracted from the gross loan amount. Lenders pay a 1% annual servicing fee. A borrower who defaults on his loan is reported to credit bureaus so that this information is recorded in the borrower s credit report. Prosper.com uses collection agencies to recover the outstanding balances, and the fees for these agencies are borne by the defaulting borrowers lenders. Loans are unsecured and there is no second market for these loans unless they become overdue; Prosper.com then reserves the right to sell the loans to outside debt buyers. On Prosper.com, platform members can organize themselves in groups in order to facilitate the process of borrowing and lending as well as the interaction between each other. Each user can form a group by defining the purpose of the group as well as the nature and interests of its members and thus become a group leader. Each user can be member (and thus group leader) of at most one group. The group leader administers her group and can additionally act as a lender and / or borrower on the platform. Furthermore, the group leader has the right to grant or deny other users access to her group and ask for verification of the information that these users provide. Many group leaders request additional information from potential borrowers, and this process is 8
referred to as Vetting. Furthermore, some group leaders request to review every listing before it is posted in the group. Finally, there are group leaders who explicitly offer help to the potential borrower in writing and designing the listing. The group leader can exploit this potential informational advantage and the fact that everybody can observe each other s actions to promote in different ways the listings posted in her group among potential lenders: she can place a bid on the respective listing, thereby potentially signaling a financial commitment to the trustworthiness of the borrower. Furthermore, the group leader can write an endorsement for the potential borrower, i.e. a short text in which she describes why this respective borrower is particularly trustworthy. While bids and endorsements can also be made by other members of Prosper.com, we concentrate on the analysis of bids and endorsements by the informationally advantaged group leaders, who are also much more active than other group members and are the key facilitators in their respective groups. Group leader bids and group leader endorsements are often given together. We thus use the following approach. First, in the univariate analysis, we consider the two signaling mechanisms separately. Later, in the multivariate analysis, we analyze group leader bids and group leader endorsements simultaneously. 2.2. Reward Groups, No-Reward Groups, and the Elimination of Group Leader Rewards Apart from the fact that groups aim at different purposes and people, they are very heterogeneous by nature: Group leaders may either provide their service for free, for example because of the interest they can earn on the loans to which they lend money or simply the benefits from social interaction or prestige, or charge a fee on loans closed in their group. 3 Therefore, in our analysis we distinguish between no-reward groups and reward groups. More precisely, we define a group as a reward group if the group leader 3 The group leader obtains a one-time reward ( match reward, 0.5% of the loan amount except for E-loans and HR-loans) once the listing is completely funded and a monthly payment ( payment reward, 1% p.a. for AA-loans and A-loans, 2% p.a. for B-loans, C-loans and D-loans, 4% p.a. for E-loans and HR-loans.). Alternatively, the group leader can also choose to only partly capture this reward. 9
requires a group leader reward at least for one listing in her group. Otherwise, the group is defined as a no-reward group. Prosper.com started its business officially in 2006. Since then, there have been several policy changes on the platform to adjust the business model to changes in the macroeconomic environment and to the constantly better understanding of how online social lending works. Figure 1 provides a corresponding timeline of these policy changes. In our analysis, we focus on one specific policy change: the elimination of group leader rewards, which takes place on 09/12/2007. Prosper.com motivates the elimination of group leader rewards in its announcement by (t)he original philosophy to enable borrowers in close-knit communities to leverage the reputation and peer pressure of their group, where compensation is not the dominant motivation for the group leader s services. This event constitutes an imposed change on leaders of reward groups and systematically changes their incentives in the loan granting process. It thus represents an ideal event to analyze how group leaders react to a sudden change in incentives. To exclude possible influences of other significant policy changes, we restrict our analysis to the loans originated between 02/13/2007 and 04/15/2008 in which no other significant policy change occurs and follow their performance until 03/01/2010. 4 On 02/12/2007, Prosper.com redefines the credit grades E and HR, excludes borrowers without any credit grade from the platform, changes the borrower closing fee from 1% to 2% for the credit grades E and HR and the lender servicing fee from 0.5% to 1% for the credit grades B- HR. Also, endorsements for friends are introduced in addition to group leader endorsements. On 04/15/2008, Prosper.com increases the lender servicing fee for AAloans from 0% to 1%. The policy change of interest in our study the elimination of group leader rewards is thus well centered in the sample period. 4 During the sample period, there are two minor policy changes: On 10/30/2007, Prosper.com changes the lender servicing fee from 0.5% to 1% for A-loans and from 0.5% to 0% for AA-loans. Moreover, from this date on Prosper.com allows borrowers who already have a current loan to create a new listing in order to obtain a second loan. Second loans are allowed only for borrowers whose first loan has been active for some time and whose two loans together do not exceed the maximum amount of $25,000. To control for this latter policy change, we remove from the analysis the corresponding listings in which borrowers apply for second loans. On 01/04/2008, Prosper.com changes the borrower closing fees from 1% to 2% for the credit grades A and B, from 1% to 3% for the credit grades C and D, and from 2% to 3% for the credit grades E and HR. 10
2.3. Descriptive Statistics Until today, 32,245 loans have been originated out of more than 365,000 listings on Prosper.com. The total amount funded exceeds $193,000,000. The company makes a snapshot of its entire public data available on its website for download and data analysis. After restricting the sample period as discussed above, we obtain a final sample of 153,541 listings, 34,858 of which are posted in groups. Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the most important variables. 5 Panel A shows the distribution of listings by credit grades and by groups. Most listings are either posted outside a group (118,683) or in a reward group (32,966); much fewer listings are posted in no-reward groups (1,892). Listings with the credit grade HR present by far the most dominant group of listings with 66,734 observations, again mostly outside a group and in reward groups. From panel B of Table 1 we see that this does not hold true for the distribution of loans. From the 12,183 loans, only 1,167 originate from successfully funded HR-listings, while there are by far more AA/A-loans (3,143). Only for E-loans, the number of loans is smaller than for HR-loans. The results in panel B also suggest that the listing probability is highest in no-reward groups, followed by that in reward groups and outside groups. The number of loans in no-reward groups of 654 constitutes almost 35% of the number of listings of 1,892 in these groups, while this rate decreases to about 12% for reward groups and 6% outside groups. In panel C of Table 1, the information on group-specific characteristics is summarized. Despite the fact that they are not compensated for their work, group leaders are relatively more active in no-reward groups than in reward groups in terms of bidding and endorsing listings. They are also more involved in terms of vetting, i.e. they review and certify the information given to them by the potential borrowers, reviewing listings, and offering 5 Variable definitions for all variables in the tables of the paper are given in Table 9. 11
help to the borrower. For example, the share of listings with at least one group leader bid is considerably higher in no-reward groups (45.8%) than in reward groups (32.0%). 3. Empirical Analysis and Results 3.1. Univariate Analysis 3.1.1. Reward Groups and No-Reward Groups We analyze the functioning of the different types of groups along three dimensions. These dimensions comprise the listing success, which is the probability with which a listing becomes a loan, the interest charged for each loan, and the loan performance, i.e. its likelihood of default. Table 2 presents the results for these dimensions for listings that are submitted in no-reward and reward groups as well as outside groups. These results are shown for each of the group types as well as for each credit grade within a group type. Panel A of Table 2 shows the results for the listing success. The success is highest for listings in no-reward groups, followed by listings in reward groups and listings outside groups. For example, listings for loan applicants with the highest credit grade of AA/A have a 60% probability of receiving a loan in no-reward groups, 40% probability in reward groups, and 30% probability outside groups. The differences between these probabilities as well as those for the other credit grades are statistically significant throughout at the 1% level. This means that for each credit grade the success rate of listings in no-reward groups is significantly higher than the success rate in reward groups, which in turn is higher than the success rate posted outside groups. Panel B of Table 2 presents the results for the analysis of the interest rates of loans, i.e. funded listings. The interest rates are borrower interest rates, so that for reward groups and before the elimination of group leader rewards they also include the group leader reward the borrower has to pay if the loan is funded. Independently of the group type, the interest rates of loans decrease in credit quality. More importantly for the purpose of this study, they are significantly smaller in no-reward groups than in reward groups and 12
outside groups for each credit grade. For the comparison of interest rates of loans in reward groups and outside groups, low-risk borrowers with credit grades AA/A, B, and C do not benefit from having their listing funded in a reward group; but borrowers with credit grades D, E and HR pay lower interest rates in reward groups than outside groups. 6 Finally, panel C of Table 2 presents failure rates of loans per 1,000 loan-days. 7 We employ this measure to be able to compare the performance of loans with different observation lengths in our sample period; we can track the full 36-month performance only for those loans originated at the beginning of the sample period. Any payment that is not made on time is considered as a failure, so that failure events comprise late payments, charge-offs and defaults. 8 As expected, these failure rates decrease in credit quality. For the comparison of the different group types, the failure rates of loans originated in noreward groups (11.0) are the lowest ones, significantly lower than those in reward groups (17.6) and those outside groups (12.1). This is the case for all credit grades except HR. The failure rates in reward groups are significantly higher than those in no-reward groups and outside groups for each of the different credit grades and thus show the worst performance of all loans. Taken together, the results suggest that no-reward groups work best. Listings in these groups have the highest listing success, and the resulting loans have the lowest interest rates and the best loan performance. In contrast, reward groups do not work well. While listings in these groups have a higher listing success than those outside groups and for the worse credit grades the resulting loans have lower interest rates than those outside groups, they exhibit significantly higher failure rates than other loans. This raises the question why reward groups do not work in comparison to no-reward groups. 6 Borrowers with the credit grades AA/A even pay significantly higher interest rates in reward groups (11.3%) than outside groups (10.9%). 7 We repeat this analysis by just considering defaults with the first year after loan originations. The results are very similar to those obtained in this analysis. 8 In our sample period, Prosper.com declared only very sporadically loans as defaulted, and if they did so, then it often was a huge number of loans at the same time. We believe that this does not mirror the real picture of defaulted loans and therefore consider the alternative specification described above. The results we obtain in the descriptive statistics and later in the multivariate models are robust with respect to a specification where failure events are defaults, charge-offs or payments that are four or more months late. 13
3.1.2. Group Leader Bids and Group Leader Endorsements One hypothesis for the worse performance of reward groups is that the rewards may create adverse incentives for group leaders and induce them to persuade other lenders to bid on weak listings. They could achieve this by endorsing and bidding on listings and thus make other lenders believe that these listings are creditworthy. In general, group leaders can use their bids as one important mechanism to promote listings in their groups. In the observed period, group leaders bid on 32.7% of the listings and these bids tend to be successful: among all first group leader bids on a listing, only 13% are outbid. Mostly, these bids constitute small amounts very often $50 or $100 so that the median amount of the first group leader bid is $70. Usually, these bids are placed very fast. Indeed, if a group leader bids, her first bid is typically also the first overall bid on the respective listing. Table 3 analyzes for no-reward and reward groups the listing success, interest rates, and loan performance based on whether the group leaders bids on or endorses a listing or whether he abstains from either of the two. Panel A of Table 3 shows how success rates of listings are related to group leader bids and group leader endorsements. In no-reward groups, success rates for listings with a group leader bid (52.8%) or a group leader endorsement (60.6%) are much higher than for those which have neither (16.6%). This is true for all credit grades, which shows that both group leader bids and group leader endorsements increase the probability of funding regardless of the riskiness of the listing. The analysis of reward groups draws a similar picture: here, only 6.9% of the listings without a group leader bid and without a group leader endorsement are funded, while the listing success is significantly increased by group leader bids (22.4%) and group leader endorsements (39.3%). From panel B of Table 3 we observe that in no-reward groups, neither group leader bids nor group leader endorsements significantly influence the interest the borrower has to 14
pay, except for slightly lower interest rates for credit grades D and HR. The effect is more pronounced for reward groups. The analysis by credit grade reveals that loans with a group leader bid or a group leader endorsement are associated with significantly smaller interest rates, in particular for the riskier credit grades. For example, borrowers with a loan in the credit grade HR pay on average 26.1% if the listing has neither a group leader bid nor a group leader endorsement, but only 24.2% if the group leader bids on the listing and only 24.3% if the group leader writes an endorsement. From panel C of Table 3 we see that in no-reward groups, loans of the riskier credit grades E and HR have lower failure rates if they have a group leader bid or a group leader endorsement. By sharp contrast, loans in reward groups with a group leader bid or a group leader endorsement in general have significantly higher failure rates than loans without any of these two (18.9 / 19.0 vs. 15.7). This is the case for almost all credit grades. Apparently, group leader bids and group leader endorsements do not work as credible signals in reward groups. Taken together, in both group types the success rates of listings with group leader bids and endorsements are much higher than for listings without group leader bids and endorsements. Yet, while in no-reward groups these two promotion mechanisms are associated with listings of good quality despite their bad credit grade E or HR, in reward groups failure rates are systematically increased for listings with a group leader bid or a group leader endorsement. Group leader bids and endorsements thus lead to adverse outcomes in reward groups. If this is due to adverse incentives for group leaders, then we should expect to see a change in behavior with a change in reward structure. 3.1.3. Group Leader Behavior Before and After the Elimination of Group Leader Rewards We thus analyze next whether and how the change in reward structure affects the group leader behavior. Panel A of Figure 2 shows the weekly share of listings with at least one group leader bid in no-reward groups and in reward groups over the sample period. In no- 15
reward groups, the share of listings with at least one group leader bid does not show any remarkable trend over the sample period. By sharp contrast, in reward groups this share decreases dramatically from about 40% to less than 10% once group leader rewards are eliminated. Panel B of Figure 2 draws a similar picture for the other important mechanism: group leader endorsements. In particular, the share of listings with a group leader endorsement decreases significantly in reward groups from about 20% to less than 10% after the elimination of group leader rewards. The slight and rather slow increase of the respective share in the no-reward groups can be explained by the fact that friend endorsements were introduced only shortly before the beginning of our sample period (also see Figure 1), so that if nothing had changed i.e. if group leader rewards had not been eliminated we would have expected the same trend for no-reward groups and reward groups. Table 4 confirms the results from Figure 2 by considering different credit grades. The results in panel A suggest that the share of listings with a group leader bid in no-reward groups does not change significantly after the elimination of group leader rewards for any credit grade. It remains at a level of about 45%. In strict contrast, the decrease in reward groups is significant for all credit grades, and it is most distinct for riskier credit grades. For example, it decreases from 34.7% to 3.9% for credit grade HR. Panel B shows the respective results for the group leader endorsements. In no-reward groups, the share of listings with group leader endorsements increases on average after the elimination of group leader rewards, consistent with Figure 2. In contrast, in reward groups, the share of listings with a group leader endorsement decreases after the elimination of group leader rewards from 13.9% to 6.8%, which is especially due to the significant decrease in the corresponding shares of the high-risk listings with credit grades C, D, E and HR. In sum, these results indicate that group leaders of reward groups significantly lower the effort they put into listings and in particular risky listings after the elimination of group 16
leader rewards as opposed to group leaders of no-reward groups who do not change their behavior. The resulting open question is how this change in behavior affects outcomes. 3.1.4. Effect of Change in Group Leader Behavior A first price of evidence for the effect of the change in group leader behavior on outcomes is provided by Figure 3, which shows success rates of listings posted outside groups as well as of listings posted in no-reward groups and in reward groups. As shown before, success rates of listings in no-reward groups are generally the highest ones: they are significantly higher than those of listings in reward groups and those of listings posted outside groups. Success rates of listings in reward groups are also higher than those not posted in groups, but, most importantly for the purpose of this study, only before group leader rewards are eliminated and in a short transition period after the change. The changes in outcome patterns are analyzed in more detail in Table 5. Panel A of Table 5 shows that the overall success rate remains constant at 34.6% in no-reward groups before and after the elimination of group leader rewards. The results are also very similar for each of the different credit grades, with the exception of HR. In strict contrast to no-reward groups, success rates in reward groups decrease significantly from 13.4% to 8.6%. This decrease is particularly pronounced in the risky credit grades C to HR, while there is no significant change for the credit grades AA/A and B. This means that worse credit grades have a substantially lower chance of getting funded after the elimination of group leader rewards. Panel B of Table 5 suggests that interest rates do not significantly change after the elimination of group leader rewards, neither in no-reward groups nor in reward groups. The only exceptions are interest rates for credit grade B in no-reward groups and credit grades E and HR in reward groups, which pay slightly more after the change. 17
As shown in panel C of Table 5, failure rates in reward groups consistently decrease after the elimination of group leader rewards across all credit grades. The average decrease in failure rates of loans per 1,000 loan-days amounts to about 4. In the extreme case, failure rates decrease from 17.9 to 11.2 for credit grade D. In no-reward groups, no systematic pattern can be found. While failure rates increase for credit grades AA/A, they decrease for credit grade HR. Taken together, these results show that no-reward groups work the same way before and after the elimination of group leader rewards. In contrast, reward groups work much better after the elimination of group leader rewards than before, as failure rates are substantially lower. A decrease in listing success along with a decrease in failure after the elimination of group leader rewards suggests that group leaders now much more carefully screen and choose the listings that are funded. An open question is why before the elimination of group leader rewards the listing success in reward groups is high despite the fact that the resulting loans also have a high likelihood of defaulting. This suggests that co-lenders do not fully foresee the consequences of the adverse incentives created by upfront rewards, most likely because of the short period between the creation of the webpage and the point of time when these lenders have to make their decisions. 9 3.2. Multivariate Analysis In order to determine the driving factors behind the results described above and to control for the joint influences, we now turn to the multivariate analysis. 3.2.1. Listing Success Table 6 shows odds ratios of logistic regressions of listing success. In specification (1), we consider all listings, i.e. those posted in groups as well as those posted outside groups. Almost all covariates are highly significant and go into the expected direction: Listing 9 Lenders do not possess the full information that is used in this paper, as their decisions are made within the sample period, while the data for this paper cover the whole sample period. 18
success is decreasing in credit grade risk, debt-to-income ratio, and the number of historical and current records in the credit report; it is increasing in homeownership and in income. Self-employed and in particular retired or unemployed borrowers face a particularly low funding probability. In terms of the listing characteristics, listing success is decreasing in the amount requested and increasing in the duration of the listing. Potential borrowers who decide to close their listing as soon as it is funded also exhibit higher chances to have their listing funded; obviously potential lenders tend to jump on these listings as there is a good chance to earn high interest rates given that one cannot be outbid. Similarly to the results in descriptive statistics, listing success highly depends on whether the listing is posted in a group and if this is the case the group type: Specification (1) shows that listings that are not posted in a group (No Group) or that are posted in a reward group (Reward Group) have significantly lower funding probabilities than those posted in no-reward groups, which is the reference group in all our regressions. Finally, after the elimination of group leader rewards (After), listing success decreases. In specifications (2) to (4) of Table 6, we concentrate on those listings that are posted in groups and analyze in particular the different group-specific variables. 10 The probability that the listing is funded increases significantly if the group leader requires the listing to be reviewed before it is posted in the group (Listing Review Requirement) or if the group leader offers help in designing the listing (Group Leader Offers Help). Vetting, i.e. the verification of the information by the group leader, seems surprisingly unimportant for the success of the listing. However, by far the most important group variables in terms of listing success are group leader bids and group leader endorsements at the top of specifications (2) to (4), which we analyze now more closely. In specification (2), we include dummy variables for group leader bids and group leader endorsements into the regression and distinguish between Only GL Bid, Only GL Endorsement and GL Bid & GL Endorsement. Listings that have GL Bid & GL 10 The results obtained with respect to the other covariates are robust across the different specifications. 19
Endorsement exhibit particularly high funding probabilities. Listings with just one of these two elements are still about two to three times more likely to be funded than listings without any of these two. When comparing the coefficients for Only GL Endorsement and Only GL Bid, it may seem surprising at first sight that Only GL Endorsement where there is no monetary commitment by the group leader at stake, i.e. where group leaders do not have skin in the game has an even slightly higher positive influence on the funding probability than Only GL Bid has. We analyze this observation more carefully in the next specification. In specification (3), we break down the influence of group leader bids and group leader endorsements for reward and no-reward groups. The results show that Only GL Bid, Only GL Endorsement and GL Bid & GL Endorsement work in the same way in reward and no-reward groups. However, Only GL Endorsement works particularly well in reward groups, while Only GL Bid works better in no-reward groups. The larger coefficient for Only GL Endorsement in specification (2) is thus solely due to its higher listing success in reward groups. We will later analyze whether these endorsements eventually also lead to loans with lower failure rates, or whether the group leader simply persuades potential lenders to participate in a loan so that he can earn the upfront reward associated with a successful listing. Finally, specification (4) employs a difference-in-difference methodology with two sources of identifying variation: (i) the time before and after the removal of group leader rewards, (ii) the distinction between listings inside and outside reward groups. Our inference is based on evaluating whether reward groups perform differently after the elimination of group leader rewards. It shows that after this event the influence of the combination of a group leader bid and a group leader endorsement in the reward groups is significantly higher than before. 11 The result indicates that after the elimination of group leader rewards potential lenders trust much more than before the correctness of 11 Due to the high correlation of group leader bids and group leader endorsements and the resulting low sample size for Only GL Bid and Only GL Endorsement after the elimination of group leader rewards, we do not distinguish the two variables Only GL Bid and Only GL Endorsement in the reward groups between before and after the elimination of group leader rewards. 20
the group leader s signal that comes from his bid and endorsement. This suggests that after this change, lenders might be less concerned about the group leader behaving opportunistically and promoting listings only for his own benefit. 3.2.2. Interest Rates of Loans In order to determine the influence of the different variables on the interest rates that borrowers have to pay to the lenders if their listing is funded, we run Tobit regressions of this interest rate (in percent) on the same independent variables as in the regressions in Table 6. Table 7 reports the results, where the dependent variable is truncated at left at 0% and at right at 35%, which is the maximum interest rate possible on Prosper.com. 12 Naturally, the sample is restricted to those listings that are completely funded and therefore become loans. The interest rate of loans in the reference group, which are AA/A-loans, is about 5%. As before, most covariates are significant and have the expected signs. The borrower s credit grade is by far the most important influencing factor for the interest rate charged to the borrower. Apart from that, the borrower interest rate is increasing in the debt-to-income ratio and in the number of historical and current records in the credit report. It is also decreasing in income, although this effect becomes insignificant if only group loans in specifications (2) to (4) are considered. Furthermore, a higher amount requested typically increases the interest rate. The interest rate increases by about 3% if the borrower chooses that the listing shall be closed as soon as it is completely funded; the interest rates cannot be bid down in this case. Specification (1) confirms the results from the univariate analyses and shows that interest rates of loans funded outside groups (No Group) or in reward groups (Reward Group) are higher than those of loans in no-reward groups. Specification (2) shows that loans originated from listings with Only GL Bid benefit from particularly low interest rates, and interest rates are even lower for loans with GL Bid & GL Endorsement. We also find that 12 OLS regression results differ only marginally and are therefore not reported here. 21
the interest rate of the loan is significantly lower if the group leader claims to verify additional information from the borrower (Vetting) or if the group leader offers help in designing the listing (Group Leader Offers Help). Specification (3) shows the results for reward and no-reward groups. Loans with Only GL Endorsement do not benefit from significantly lower interest rates. Otherwise, group leader bids and endorsements lead to lower interest rates both in reward and no-reward groups. Finally, from specification (4), which uses again a difference-in-difference methodology, we deduce that after the elimination of group leader rewards, the interest rate of loans with GL Bid & GL Endorsement in reward groups is about 1% smaller than before. This result indicates that after this event, group leader bids and group leader endorsements have a significantly higher influence on the resulting interest rate in this group type. This suggests again that the signal of a group leader bid and endorsement is much more credible after the elimination of group leader rewards than before. 3.2.3. Loan Performance In order to analyze the determinants of loan performance, we specify Cox proportional hazards models with the same independent variables as before. The underlying assumption of the models is that the coefficients are not time-varying, i.e. the importance of a variable for the probability of defaulting or being late is constant over time. 13 Loans are exposed to the process from the time they are originated until they are either completely paid back, they default or their data runs out. The results of the Cox proportional hazards models are reported in Table 8. 13 If e.g. a loan with credit grade HR is more susceptible to have a failure than a loan of the reference group AA/A, the strength of this relationship does not depend on time. Thus, for example, the HR-loan does not become more susceptible to fail over time, compared to the AA/A-loan. 22