We seek to determine whether:

Similar documents
Flash Economics. The discount rate of supply-side policies. 16 May

Flash Economics. What to expect from the rise in oil prices for growth in the euro zone and France? 16 January

Flash Economics. Gradually less expansionary monetary policy in the United States: Could it trigger a rise in long-term interest rates?

Flash Economics. US monetary policy: What matters more: The Fed Funds rate or the size of the Federal Reserve s balance sheet?

Flash Economics. The acceleration in global trade is very good for the euro zone; what accounts for it?

Flash Economics. Measured GDP and true GDP. 14 September

Flash Economics. Growing heterogeneity in living standards between euro-zone countries: A temporary or permanent feature?

Flash Economics. Because the structural unemployment rate is high in the euro zone, its growth phases are shorter than in the United States

Flash Economics. 11 January

CORPORATE & INVESTMENT BANKING

Flash Economics. Does fiscal policy change course when the long-term interest rate goes above or below the growth rate?

Flash Economics. Euro zone, France: Potential risk of a "scissor effect" in March

Flash Economics. Why has the euro zone s current-account balance improved? 25 August

Flash Economics. What adjustments are possible when unemployment returns to the structural unemployment level?

Has no impact on growth; Leads to a rise in interest rates;

Flash Economics. One concern in the United States: Commercial real estate. 07 October

Flash Economics. What difference does it make having a stable oil price at 50 dollars a barrel or an oil price rising by 10 dollars per year?

Flash Economics. What will happen when long-term interest rates rise in the United States and the euro zone?

Flash Economics. The common characteristics of countries where labour force skills are weak. 25 October

Flash Economics. Should governments in the euro zone make additional public investments? 10 October

Flash Economics. What happens when the Federal Reserve starts raising its interest rates? 14 September

On public finances; On financial asset prices; The risks seem to come from:

Flash Economics. What is the direction of the causality between real interest rates and total factor productivity growth?

Flash Economics. Two very important structural differences between Germany and the rest of the euro zone: How can the euro zone function?

Flash Economics. What must we assume if we do not believe long-term interest rates will rise sharply in the peripheral eurozone

Flash Economics. The end of quantitative easing in the euro zone: Will banks step in for the ECB to buy government bonds?

Flash Economics. 13 September

Flash Economics. Will the euro zone s structural unemployment fall before unemployment catches up with it?

Flash Economics. A simple dollar/euro exchange-rate determination model. 20 February

Flash Economics. Does monetary policy have an effect on structural unemployment? 16 January

Flash Economics. What can be done if total factor productivity diverges between euro-zone countries? 01 December

Flash Economics. Are Asian countries now managing their exchange rates based on movements in the Chinese RMB?

In particular, we want to see whether: We find: The causes appear to be:

Flash Economics. What is the ECB s real objective? 05 December

Flash Economics. International monetary system: Return to Bretton Woods September

Flash Economics. The more Germany accumulates external assets, the more unlikely a break-up of the euro zone and the more a strong euro hurts Germany

Flash Economics. Over-expansionary monetary policies: A real estate bubble always appears in the end. 16 January

Flash Economics. Euro zone and France: No one can now deny that it is supply-side policies that are needed.

Flash Economics. Could there no longer be any credible reserve currency? 22 March

Flash Economics. The three types of capitalism. 21 December

Flash Economics. A euro-zone budget: How, why, when? 19 January

Negatively to labour force skills; Negatively to R&D spending;

Flash Economics. Is an increase in euro-zone inflation plausible? 27 February

Flash Economics. France: Is it possible to return to full employment without increasing inequalities? 08 December

Flash Economics. Potential black swans. 16 June

Flash Economics. The attempts to save Keynesianism in the euro zone are tiresome. 25 January

Flash Economics. Are the elites unaware that there is a problem? 05 September

Flash Economics. Can France afford its legitimate economic policy objectives? 06 April

NAVIGATING THROUGH THE MIST: INTRODUCING NATIXIS CHINA CAPITAL FLOW TRACKER CHINA HOT TOPICS.

Flash Economics. Four serious new threats for the euro zone. 12 December

The oil price; US tax policy; US inflation and monetary policy; The Italian economy and banks;

Flash Economics. How should retail banks manage risk? The only reasonable solution is to apply sufficient risk premia (interest rate margins) on loans

China and Hong Kong Forex Market Developments One-way appreciation carrying into the new year

China and Hong Kong Forex Market Developments RMB made the nine-month peak and FX reserves further expanded

NATIXIS WORKSHOP F How to optimize the liquidity portfolio with covered bonds. 15/09/2011 The Euromoney / ECBC Covered Bond Congress

A new world order: Key issues for Asia, ASEAN and Thailand

Equity Markets PRIVATE PLACEMENT ONLY

Chart 1 Total assets of banking institutions (% of total)

The end of the Infrastructure congestion in Europe?

Intraday Liquidity Management

The rise and fall of gold. December 2013

Flash Economics. What would a European capitalism require to be able to exist? 17 April

US Upstream in Focus

CASH MANAGEMENT. Secure and efficient solutions to manage your payments.

Euro Medium Term Note Callable Zero Coupon Non Linear TRADED TERMSHEET. Terms and Conditions (the Term Sheet )

Seventh City of London Biennial Meeting 2013

CRACKING UNDER PRESSURE? ASSESSING SINGAPORE S ECONOMY AND REAL ESTATE SPECIAL REPORT. 08 September 2016

Italian Sustainability Day 2018 Sudip Hazra Head of ESG Research.

The Royal Bank of Scotland plc

Flash Economics. The winner takes all. 26 January

The Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. (incorporated in The Netherlands with its statutory seat in Amsterdam)

FINAL TERMS DATED 6 FEBRUARY 2009

MULTI-ASSET DIVERSIFIED GLOBAL CERTIFICATE 11

PHOENIX Memory WO - ALV GY; CS 3.00% p.a. 03 September 2018

FX and Capital Markets

FX and Capital Markets

Demand for sovereign bonds: The importance of diversity

FX and Capital Markets

Figure 1. ANZ Heavy Traffic Index and GDP. Heavy traffic index, 3-month avg (LHS) Figure 2. ANZ Light Traffic Index and GDP

FINAL TERMS DATED 29 SEPTEMBER 2011

URBANISATION AND RESOURCE INTENSITY

MIXED MESSAGES. KEY POINTS The ANZ Truckometer indexes lifted in August.

Pricing indicators were broadly steady. ANZ Business Confidence Index and ANZ Own Activity Index

ABN AMRO Bank N.V. The Royal Bank of Scotland N.V.

Brazil: FX and Capital Markets Highlights of the Week

Video March 1, StratTV at the TMT Conference. Watch the video: Related Research

FINAL TERMS. The Royal Bank of Scotland plc

Brazil: FX and Capital Markets Highlights of the Week

Macro Vision June 13, 2017

Pricing Guidelines for Listed Products and OTC Derivatives Clearing Services offered by UBS EMIR Articles 38(1) and 39(7)

1. Introduction. 2. Client Profitability

ANZ-ROY MORGAN NZ CONSUMER CONFIDENCE

ANZ-Roy Morgan NZ Consumer Confidence

ANZ New Zealand Business Outlook

The Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. (incorporated in The Netherlands with its statutory seat in Amsterdam)

The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (incorporated in Scotland with limited liability under the Companies Acts 1948 to 1980 registered number SC090312)

Transcription:

8 June 7-7 Has the relationship between PMI and real growth changed? Why? PMIs (surveys on future production) have now picked up significantly (we look at the, the, Germany, France, and ). We seek to determine whether: The relationships between composite PMI and real GDP growth are the same as in the past or, on the contrary, have changed; is a high PMI currently associated with lower growth than in the past? The answer is yes for the, the, Germany, France and, but not for ; PMIs seem to be too high relative to actual growth, and what is the cause of this phenomenon. We can think of: "Relief" among companies after a period of sluggish growth; A nominal bias, with companies reacting positively to the resumption of the rise in prices; A measurement error, leading to an underestimation of real growth by national accounting. Patrick Artus Tel. ( ) 58 5 patrick.artus@natixis.com @PatrickArtus www.research.natixis.com CORPORATE & INVESTMENT BANKING INVESTMENT SOLUTIONS & INSURANCE SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL SERVICES Distribution of this report in the. See important disclosures at the end of this report.distribution of this report in the. See important disclosures at the end of this report.

Marked improvement in cyclical surveys We look at composite PMIs (for the economy as a whole) for the, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and (Charts A, B and C and A, B and C). Chart A Composite ISM or PMI (index) Chart B 7 Germany France 7 5 8 5 7 8 5 7 5 5 8 5 7 8 5 7 5 Chart C Chart A Composite ISM or PMI (index) 7 7 58 5 58 5 5 5 8 5 7 8 5 7 5 5 8 8 Jan- Jul- Jan-5 Jul-5 Jan- Jul- Jan-7 Jul-7 Chart B Chart C Germany France Jan- Jul- Jan-5 Jul-5 Jan- Jul- Jan-7 Jul-7 Jan- Jul- Jan-5 Jul-5 Jan- Jul- Jan-7 Jul-7 We see a very significant improvement in all these countries composite PMIs from the summer of, which is one of the factors of optimism about the growth outlook in these countries. But we seek to determine whether the link between PMI and actual GDP growth is the same as in the past.

Link between composite PMI and real GDP growth We simply estimate econometrically: Real GDP (% per quarter) = a+b.composite PMI for the countries in Charts A, B and C above and for different periods. Charts A, B, C, D, E and F compare the composite PMI, in quarterly data and GDP growth. Chart A : Composite PMI and real GDP Chart B : Composite PMI and real GDP Real GDP (Q/Q as %, LHS) Real GDP (Q/Q as %, LHS) - - - - 5 8 8-5 8 8 - Chart C Germany: Composite PMI and real GDP Chart D France: Composite PMI and real GDP 7..5..5. 5 8 8 - - - 5 8 8 -.5 -. -.5 -. Chart E : Composite PMI and real GDP Chart F : Composite PMI and real GDP 7..5..5. -.5 -. - 5 5 8 8 -.5 -. -.5 5 8 8 - -

Table shows the quarterly growth that corresponds to a composite PMI of at different periods, according to our econometric estimation. Table : Quarterly real GDP growth corresponding to a composite PMI of -5 - -5-7 United.8.7.8. States United.78..7.5 Kingdom Germany..57.8. France.....8.7.5..5...7 Source: Natixis calculation We see that in the, the, Germany, France and, but not in, a given level of composite PMI is associated with a lower level of GDP growth than in the past. Conclusion: What possible explanations? If a high composite PMI currently corresponds to lower real GDP growth, this may be due to: - A change of reference: a growth rate seen as high corresponds to lower actual growth than in the past; - A nominal illusion: the upturn in prices, especially industrial producer prices (Charts A, B and C and 5A, B and C), leads to faster growth in nominal production, which is positive for companies and may make them optimistic; - A measurement error: we know that national accounting probably underestimates real growth (incorrect value sharing between volume and price, as the price is too high and the volume is too small) for several reasons: inaccurate calculation of the quality in services, incorrect measurement of prices of new goods and services. Real growth should probably in reality be higher (and inflation lower). Chart A Inflation (CPI, Y/Y as %) Chart B Inflation (CPI, Y/Y as %) 5 5..5 Germany France..5...5.5...5.5 Sources: Datastream, BLS, ONS, Natixis - 5 7 -. Sources: Datastream, Destatis, INSEE, Natixis -.5 5 7. -.5

Chart C Inflation (CPI, Y/Y as %) Chart 5A Industrial producer prices (PPI, Y/Y as %) - - - Sources: Datastream, INE, Istat, Natixis - 5 7 - - - - Sources: Datastream, BLS, Eurostat, Natixis - 5 7 - - - Chart 5A Industrial producer prices (PPI, Y/Y as %) Chart 5C Industrial producer prices (PPI, Y/Y as %) - - 8-8 - - - - - - Sources: Datastream, BLS, Eurostat, Natixis - 5 7 - - - Sources: Datastream, Eurostat, Natixis -8 5 7 - -8 5

Disclaimer The information contained in this publication and any attachment thereto is exclusively intended for a client base consisting of professionals and qualified investors. This document and any attachment thereto are strictly confidential and cannot be divulgated to a third party without the prior written consent of Natixis. If you are not the intended recipient of this document and/or the attachments, please delete them and immediately notify the sender. Distribution, possession or delivery of this document in, to or from certain jurisdictions may be restricted or prohibited by law. Recipients of this document are required to inform themselves of and comply with all such restrictions or prohibitions. Neither Natixis, nor any of its affiliates, directors, employees, agents or advisers or any other person accepts any liability to any person in relation to the distribution, possession or delivery of this document in, to or from any jurisdiction. This document has been developed by our economists. It does not constitute a financial analysis and has not been developed in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research. Accordingly, there are no prohibitions on dealing ahead of its dissemination. This document and all attachments are communicated to each recipient for information purposes only and do not constitute a personalized investment recommendation. They are intended for general distribution and the products or services described herein do not take into account any specific investment objective, financial situation or particular need of any recipient. This document and any attachment thereto shall not be construed as an offer nor a solicitation for any purchase, sale or subscription. Under no circumstances should this document be considered as an official confirmation of a transaction to any person or entity and no undertaking is given that the transaction will be entered into under the terms and conditions set out herein or under any other terms and conditions. This document and any attachment thereto are based on public information and shall not be used nor considered as an undertaking from Natixis. All undertakings require the formal approval of Natixis according to its prevailing internal procedures. Natixis has neither verified nor carried out independent analysis of the information contained in this document. Accordingly, no representation, warranty or undertaking, either express or implied, is made to the recipients of this document as to or in relation to the relevance, accuracy or completeness of this document or as to the reasonableness of any assumption contained in this document. Information does not take into account specific tax rules or accounting methods applicable to counterparties, clients or potential clients of Natixis. Therefore, Natixis shall not be liable for differences, if any, between its own valuations and those valuations provided by third parties; as such differences may arise as a result of the application and implementation of alternative accounting methods, tax rules or valuation models. The statements, assumptions and opinions contained in this document may be changed or may be withdrawn by Natixis at any time without notice. Prices and margins are indicative only and are subject to change at any time without notice depending on, inter alia, market conditions. Past performances and simulations of past performances are not a reliable indicator and therefore do not anticipate any future results. The information contained in this document may include results of analyses from a quantitative model, which represent potential future events that may or may not be realised, and is not a complete analysis of every material fact representing any product. Information may be changed or may be withdrawn by Natixis at any time without notice. More generally, no responsibility is accepted by Natixis, nor any of its holding companies, subsidiaries, associated undertakings or controlling persons, nor any of their respective directors, officers, partners, employees, agents, representatives or advisers as to or in relation to the characteristics of this information. The statements, assumptions and forecasts contained in this document reflect the judgment of its author(s), unless otherwise specified, and do not reflect the judgment of any other person or of Natixis. The information contained in this document should not be assumed to have been updated at any time subsequent to the date shown on the first page of this document and the delivery of this document does not constitute a representation by any person that such information will be updated at any time after the date of this document. Natixis shall not be liable for any financial loss or any decision taken on the basis of the information disclosed in this presentation and Natixis does not provide any advice, including in case of investment services. In any event, you should request for any internal and/or external advice that you consider necessary or desirable to obtain, including from any financial, legal, tax or accounting adviser, or any other specialist, in order to verify in particular that the transaction described in this document complies with your objectives and constraints and to obtain an independent valuation of the transaction, its risk factors and rewards. Natixis is supervised by the European Central bank (ECB). Natixis is authorized in France by the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Régulation (ACPR) as a Bank -Investment Services Provider and subject to its supervision. Natixis is regulated by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers in respect of its investment services activities. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR in France and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority in the. Details on the extent of regulation by the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority are available from Natixis branch in London upon request. In Germany, NATIXIS is authorized by the ACPR as a bank investment services provider and is subject to its supervision. NATIXIS Zweigniederlassung Deutschland is subject to a limited form of regulation by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) with regards to the conduct of its business in Germany under the right of establishment there. The transfer / distribution of this document in Germany is performed by / under the responsibility of NATIXIS Zweigniederlassung Deutschland. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by Bank of and the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores) for the conduct of its business under the right of establishment in. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by Bank of and the CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa) for the conduct of its business under the right of establishment in. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) for the conduct of its business in and from the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). The document is being made available to the recipient with the understanding that it meets the DFSA definition of a Professional Client; the recipient is otherwise required to inform Natixis if this is not the case and return the document. The recipient also acknowledges and understands that neither the document nor its contents have been approved, licensed by or registered with any regulatory body or governmental agency in the GCC or Lebanon. All of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect the author s personal views regarding any and all of the subject securities or issuers. No part of author compensation was, is or will be, directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report. I(WE), AUTHOR(S), WHO WROTE THIS REPORT HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS REPORT ACCURATELY REFLECT OUR(MY) PERSONAL VIEWS ABOUT THE SUBJECT COMPANY OR COMPANIES AND ITS OR THEIR SECURITIES, AND THAT NO PART OF OUR COMPENSATION WAS, IS OR WILL BE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, RELATED TO THE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS OR VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS REPORT. The personal views of authors may differ from one another. Natixis, its subsidiaries and affiliates may have issued or may issue reports that are inconsistent with, and/or reach different conclusions from, the information presented herein. Natixis, a foreign bank and broker-dealer, makes this report available solely for distribution in the to major U.S. institutional investors as defined in Rule 5a- under the U.S. securities Exchange Act of. This document shall not be distributed to any other persons in the. All major U.S. institutional investors receiving this document shall not distribute the original nor a copy thereof to any other person in the. Natixis Securities Americas LLC, a U.S. registered broker-dealer and member of FINRA, is a subsidiary of Natixis. Natixis Securities Americas LLC did not participate in the preparation of this report and as such assumes no responsibility for its content. This report has been prepared and reviewed by authors employed by Natixis, who are not associated persons of Natixis Securities Americas LLC and are not registered or qualified as research analysts with FINRA, and are not subject to the rules of the FINRA. In order to receive any additional information about or to effect a transaction in any security or financial instrument mentioned herein, please contact your usual registered representative at Natixis Securities Americas LLC, by email or by mail at 5 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY. The stocks mentioned might be subject to specific disclaimers. Please click on the following link to consult them: http://research.intranet/globalresearchweb/main/globalresearch/disclaimersspecifiques