Networks and Poverty Reduction Programmes

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ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Community Networks and Poverty Reduction Programmes Evidence from Bangladesh Oriana Bandiera (LSE), Robin Burgess (LSE), Selim Gulesci (LSE), mran Rasul (UCL) January 04 2010

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion ntro Motivation ntroduction "Ultra poor" often bypassed by micro nance - to bene t from a loan you need to know what to do with it. [Murdoch 1998, Baland et al 2008, Grameen Bank 2009] n recent years, increase in number of NGO and government programmes targeting the "ultra poor", pioneered by BRAC replicated at various countries (Haiti, Honduras, ndia, Pakistan, Peru, Ethiopia and Yemen.) in Bangladesh alone 860,300 households to be targeted by 2011 Such programmes involve a "large" asset transfer, accompanied with enterprise training and empowerment Average targeted ultra-poor HH in our sample receives an asset worth 9958 TKs ($145) - twice the mean value of ultra-poor assets at baseline, 24% of median assets in the community

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion ntro Motivation Research Questions What are the direct e ects of the programme on the targeted ultra poor and the composition of their networks? What are the spillover e ects on the others in the community? Such a large transfer to the poorest is likely to a ect the others Do these e ects vary by the type of connection to the treated? Spillover e ects on those connected to the ultra poor are likely to be di erent from those who are not connected

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion ntro Motivation Research Questions What are the direct e ects of the programme on the targeted ultra poor and the composition of their networks? What are the spillover e ects on the others in the community? Such a large transfer to the poorest is likely to a ect the others Do these e ects vary by the type of connection to the treated? Spillover e ects on those connected to the ultra poor are likely to be di erent from those who are not connected Methodology: Full census of all the households in the village: observe universe of households directly and indirectly a ected

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion ntro Motivation Research Questions What are the direct e ects of the programme on the targeted ultra poor and the composition of their networks? What are the spillover e ects on the others in the community? Such a large transfer to the poorest is likely to a ect the others Do these e ects vary by the type of connection to the treated? Spillover e ects on those connected to the ultra poor are likely to be di erent from those who are not connected Methodology: Full census of all the households in the village: observe universe of households directly and indirectly a ected Full map of social and economic networks, allowing us to identify: ultra poor - "treated" noneligible HHs who were connected to the treated - "indirectly treated", and the type of connection noneligible HHs who were not connected to the treated

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion BRAC Targeting BRAC s Ultra Poor Program Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, largest NGO in the world, 117.067 employees (Jan 2009) micro nance, education, health, social development, environmental, economic development programs

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion BRAC Targeting BRAC s Ultra Poor Program Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, largest NGO in the world, 117.067 employees (Jan 2009) micro nance, education, health, social development, environmental, economic development programs STUP (Specially Targeted Ultra Poor): asset transfer 6000-12000 Takas ($87-173) (e.g. 2 cows, 1 cow 2 goats, 1 cow 10 poultry, 5 goats) enterprise training subsistence allowance (Tk 15 per day) health subsidy social development support (training in rights & justice) At the end of 2nd year: invitation to micro nance Village Elite Committees (GDBC)

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion BRAC Targeting dentifying the "Ultra Poor" dentify area (BRAC Centre) dentify "spot" (BRAC branch o ce) Participatory wealth ranking (1 (richest) - 5 (poorest)) wealth rank 5 "community-selected ultra poor" everyone in wealth rank 5 is included in a "primary selection survey" further examination to verify exclusion/inclusion criteria Final selection

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion BRAC Targeting dentifying the "Ultra Poor" Exclusion criteria (all binding) Household is borrowing from a micro-credit providing NGO Household is recipient of government development program (e.g. poverty cards) There is no adult woman in the household who is physically able nclusion criteria (need to satisfy at least 3) Total land owned including homestead is not more than 10 decimals No adult male income earner in the household Adult women in the household work outside the homestead School going-aged children have to work Household has no productive assets

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Methodology Data Methodology Large scale randomized evaluation of the program underway This paper - census of everyone in the two branch o ces in Naogaon - 1 treatment (black), 1 control (red) branch

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Methodology Data Data 22 spots, 1620 households in treatment; 13 spots, 923 households in control Baseline survey 2007, annual followup surveys until 2011 n addition to standard data on wealth and welfare we collect data on which households they interact with, in each of the surveyed activities family ties market transactions - labour, land and other assets sale and rental, credit informal insurance - transfers in cash/kind (food, crisis-coping, other transfers) socio-economic empowerment: aspirations, expectations, attitudes towards others and others attitudes towards the household

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Baseline Networks Ultra-poor HHs at baseline, compared to HHs in higher wealth ranks are more likely to be female-headed: 45% for ultra-poor, 15% for other WR5, close to 0% for all others have lower human capital: literacy rate is 9% among ultra-poor (26% among other WR5 and 55% in top class); BM of the leading female in the HH is 18.6 among ultra-poor, increasing by wealth up to 20.9 in top class have lower pce: ultra-poors pce is 60% of middle class and 25% of upper class on average have lower wealth: value of HH durables of ultra-poor is 23% of middle class and 6% of top; value of business assets of the ultra-poor is 2.4% and.03% of middle and top classes respectively have di erent occupational structure than other wealth classes spend more time as wage-workers outside the house (maid and agricultural day-labor) devote much less time to livestock rearing (382 annual hrs among ultra-poor, 815 in middle class and 847 in top class)

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Baseline Networks

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Direct E ects Networks Direct E ects on the Treated Ultra-Poor denti cation: Di erence in Di erence between selected ultra-poor HHs in treatment spots and control spots, at baseline and followup Outcomes directly a ected by the programme: 5-fold increase in value of business assets, 6-fold in savings - ultra-poor HHs surpass average HH in WR4 in terms of assets Time devoted to livestock rearing increases by 1.5 times, to day-labour and maid decreases by 1.3 and 2 times respectively. ncrease in HH chores (30%) and total time devoted to work (7%). ncome of respondent doubles when we account for the stipend. 10% increase in pce, though imprecisely estimated, coming from non-food expenditure. ncrease in number of HH durables (radio and bicycle) mproved human capital - BM by 1.07, children s z-scores by.72 Self-reported business skills for tasks that do not involve a third party improve by 20%, for tasks that involve others by 10%

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Direct E ects Networks Direct E ects on Social Networks m j1 = α 1 + β 1 T j + γ 1 X j + ɛ j if m j0 = 1 m j1 = α 2 + β 2 T j + γ 2 X j + κ j if m j0 = 0 m j1 = 1 if household j is connected to at least 1 STUP at followup, 0 otherwise m j0 = 1 if household j is connected to at least 1 STUP at baseline, 0 otherwise T j treatment branch X j controls

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Direct E ects Networks Market network - no impact on average, but upper classes more likely to remain connected and make new connections to STUPs nformal nsurance network - becomes larger. Ultra-poor are less likely to remain in network whereas class 3 are more likely. New ultra-poor and classes 4&5 are more likely to enter network

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion ndirect E ects of the Programme We analyze indirect e ects on similar outcome variables for HHs that are (at baseline and followup) in the family network of STUPs in the informal insurance network of STUPs have no connection to the STUPs We do not look at the indirect e ects on the market network, as only 13 HHs are in this network both at baseline and followup Five ndings are of note: 1. Neither connected nor unconnected HHs experience an increase in outcomes directly a ected by the programme - business assets and savings.

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion 2. The programme e ects time-use of connected HHs: members of both family and insurance networks increase time devoted to HH chores at expense of leisure, the magnitude of the e ect is comparable to same e ect for the ultra-poor - about 400 hours per year

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion 2. The programme e ects time-use of connected HHs: members of both family and insurance networks increase time devoted to HH chores at expense of leisure, the magnitude of the e ect is comparable to same e ect for the ultra-poor - about 400 hours per year 3. Family Network - experience a signi cant and large increase in pce - 30% higher relative to baseline amount, mirrored by an increase in HH durables (bicycles and beds)

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion 2. The programme e ects time-use of connected HHs: members of both family and insurance networks increase time devoted to HH chores at expense of leisure, the magnitude of the e ect is comparable to same e ect for the ultra-poor - about 400 hours per year 3. Family Network - experience a signi cant and large increase in pce - 30% higher relative to baseline amount, mirrored by an increase in HH durables (bicycles and beds) 4. nformal nsurance Network - increase in pce is smaller (18%) and imprecisely estimated, no signi cant change in HH durables or any other item. Signi cant increase in self-reported business skills, by roughly half the comparable magnitude for the STUPs (.18 vs.40)

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion 2. The programme e ects time-use of connected HHs: members of both family and insurance networks increase time devoted to HH chores at expense of leisure, the magnitude of the e ect is comparable to same e ect for the ultra-poor - about 400 hours per year 3. Family Network - experience a signi cant and large increase in pce - 30% higher relative to baseline amount, mirrored by an increase in HH durables (bicycles and beds) 4. nformal nsurance Network - increase in pce is smaller (18%) and imprecisely estimated, no signi cant change in HH durables or any other item. Signi cant increase in self-reported business skills, by roughly half the comparable magnitude for the STUPs (.18 vs.40) 5. Programme has no discernible impact on outcomes of non-connected HHs, ruling out any common trends that may be driving the ndings for connected HHs.

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Di erence between family and informal insurance networks is consistent with them having di erent functions: family engages in wealth redistribution, a ected by permanent increase in wealth (either by direct transfer from STUPs or reduction in transfers to STUPs) insurance network smoothes out temporary income shocks, una ected by permanent increase in wealth

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Di erence between family and informal insurance networks is consistent with them having di erent functions: family engages in wealth redistribution, a ected by permanent increase in wealth (either by direct transfer from STUPs or reduction in transfers to STUPs) insurance network smoothes out temporary income shocks, una ected by permanent increase in wealth nsurance network endogenously chosen, possibly among people with similar interests who can bene t from learning business skills from the ultra-poor

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Di erence between family and informal insurance networks is consistent with them having di erent functions: family engages in wealth redistribution, a ected by permanent increase in wealth (either by direct transfer from STUPs or reduction in transfers to STUPs) insurance network smoothes out temporary income shocks, una ected by permanent increase in wealth nsurance network endogenously chosen, possibly among people with similar interests who can bene t from learning business skills from the ultra-poor These are only indicative, further work on di erent functions of these networks is underway

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Conclusion Future work Conclusion Methodology - combining RCT evaluation with a full census in treatment and control locations, mapping entire social networks Programme transforms economic lives of the bene ciaries, composition of their social network, and selected outcomes of their network members As they exogenously become wealthier, bene ciaries establish connections with HHs in wealthier classes Spillover e ects - distinction between HHs socially connected to bene ciaries and those that are not is crucial Spillovers are heterogenous by network type, indicating that family network shares wealth whereas informal insurance network shares information on business skills

ntro Program Method UP Direct ndirect Conclusion Conclusion Future work Future Work Using data from future survey rounds, test if these short-run e ects get smaller or larger in the long-run dentify the mechanisms behind the heterogenous spillover e ects by network type transfers to/from family network information sharing with informal insurance network General equilibrium e ects - prices