Ekkehart Schlicht: A Case Where Barro Expectations Are Not Rational

Similar documents
Reply to the Second Referee Thank you very much for your constructive and thorough evaluation of my note, and for your time and attention.

1 Ricardian Neutrality of Fiscal Policy

Sandra Ludwig; Philipp C. Wichardt und Hanke Wickhorst: Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent s Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests

Sam Bucovetsky und Andreas Haufler: Preferential tax regimes with asymmetric countries

1 Ricardian Neutrality of Fiscal Policy

PUBLIC DEBT AS PRIVATE WEALTH SOME EQUILIBRIUM CONSIDERATIONS

Economics 325 Intermediate Macroeconomic Analysis Problem Set 1 Suggested Solutions Professor Sanjay Chugh Spring 2009

7.3 The Household s Intertemporal Budget Constraint

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES CAN AN INCREASED BUDGET DEFICIT BE CONTRACTIONARY? Martin Feldstein. Working Paper No. l43)4

Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth

MONETARY AND FINANCIAL MACRO BUDGET CONSTRAINTS

CHAPTER 16. EXPECTATIONS, CONSUMPTION, AND INVESTMENT

Chapter 5 Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth

1 Answers to the Sept 08 macro prelim - Long Questions

ANSWER: We can find consumption and saving by solving:

Inflation Persistence and Relative Contracting

The neoclassical approach to fiscal policy (5)

Optimal Actuarial Fairness in Pension Systems

Working Paper No. 2032

Answers to Microeconomics Prelim of August 24, In practice, firms often price their products by marking up a fixed percentage over (average)

The Implications for Fiscal Policy Considering Rule-of-Thumb Consumers in the New Keynesian Model for Romania

A Note on the Solow Growth Model with a CES Production Function and Declining Population

Economic Dynamic Modeling: An Overview of Stability

Growth with Time Zone Differences

A Central Bank Theory of Price Level Determination

14.02 PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS QUIZ 3 05/10/2012

9. Real business cycles in a two period economy

Dynamic Macroeconomics: Problem Set 2

FINANCE, SAVING, AND INVESTMENT

Is an Increasing Capital Share under Capitalism Inevitable? Yew-Kwang NG. 13 August 2014 EGC Report No: 2014/10

The Ramsey Model. Lectures 11 to 14. Topics in Macroeconomics. November 10, 11, 24 & 25, 2008

Advanced Macroeconomics

Fiscal policy and minimum wage for redistribution: an equivalence result. Abstract

Does Commodity Price Index predict Canadian Inflation?

Economics 202 (Section 05) Macroeconomic Theory Problem Set 1 Professor Sanjay Chugh Fall 2013 Due: Thursday, October 3, 2013

A simple proof of the efficiency of the poll tax

Public budget accounting and seigniorage. 1. Public budget accounting, inflation and debt. 2. Equilibrium seigniorage

Chapter 7. SAVING, INVESTMENT and FINIANCE. Income not spent is saved. Where do those dollars go?

2. A DIAGRAMMATIC APPROACH TO THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF PUBLIC INPUTS

The MM Theorems in the Presence of Bubbles

In this chapter, look for the answers to these questions

EC 324: Macroeconomics (Advanced)

Chapter 4. Determination of Income and Employment 4.1 AGGREGATE DEMAND AND ITS COMPONENTS

The Fisher Equation and Output Growth

Problem set 1 ECON 4330

Project Evaluation and the Folk Principle when the Private Sector Lacks Perfect Foresight

Ricardo-Barro Equivalence Theorem and the Positive Fiscal Policy in China Xiao-huan LIU 1,a,*, Su-yu LV 2,b

INTERMEDIATE MACROECONOMICS

Transport Costs and North-South Trade

The Lifetime Incidence Of Consumption Sales Taxes

5. Equity Valuation and the Cost of Capital

Fiscal and Monetary Policies: Background

Why a future tax on bank credit intermediation does not offset the stimulative effect of money finance deficits

The Multiplier Model

Factors that Affect Fiscal Externalities in an Economic Union

Equilibrium with Production and Labor Supply

Theory. 2.1 One Country Background

Lecture 10: Two-Period Model

Home Assignment 1 Financial Openness, the Current Account and Economic Welfare

International Economics dr Wioletta Nowak. Lecture 2

Ricardian Equivalence: Further Evidence

National Debt and Economic Growth with Externalities and Congestions

AK and reduced-form AK models. Consumption taxation. Distributive politics

), is described there by a function of the following form: U (c t. )= c t. where c t

Problem set Fall 2012.

Annuity Markets and Capital Accumulation

Chapter 2 Savings, Investment and Economic Growth

From Solow to Romer: Teaching Endogenous Technological Change in Undergraduate Economics

Intertemporal choice: Consumption and Savings

General equivalency between the discount rate and the going-in and going-out capitalization rates

Monetary and Fiscal Policies: Sustainable Fiscal Policies

Rational Expectations and Consumption

Understanding Krugman s Third-Generation Model of Currency and Financial Crises

A theoretical examination of tax evasion among the self-employed

FINAL EXAM. Name Student ID 1. C 2. B 3. D 4. B 5. B 6. A 7. A 8. D 9. C 10. B 11. C 12. B 13. A 14. B 15. C

ECO209 MACROECONOMIC THEORY. Chapter 14

AK and reduced-form AK models. Consumption taxation.

Graduate Macro Theory II: Fiscal Policy in the RBC Model

On the 'Lock-In' Effects of Capital Gains Taxation

FISCAL FEDERALISM WITH A SINGLE INSTRUMENT TO FINANCE GOVERNMENT. Carlos Maravall Rodríguez 1

Optimal Stopping Game with Investment Spillover Effect for. Energy Infrastructure

WAGES, EMPLOYMENT AND FUTURES MARKETS. Ariane Breitfelder. Udo Broll. Kit Pong Wong

The classical model of the SMALL OPEN

Consumption-Savings Decisions and Credit Markets

Depreciation: a Dangerous Affair

CHAPTER 5: LEARNING ABOUT RETURN AND RISK FROM THE HISTORICAL RECORD

The classical model of the SMALL OPEN economy

Problems. units of good b. Consumers consume a. The new budget line is depicted in the figure below. The economy continues to produce at point ( a1, b

Response of Output Fluctuations in Costa Rica to Exchange Rate Movements and Global Economic Conditions and Policy Implications

John Komlos; Marc Flandreau: Using ARIMA Forecasts to Explore the Efficiency of the Forward Reichsmark Market: Austria-Hungary,

Lecture 14 Consumption under Uncertainty Ricardian Equivalence & Social Security Dynamic General Equilibrium. Noah Williams

Notes II: Consumption-Saving Decisions, Ricardian Equivalence, and Fiscal Policy. Julio Garín Intermediate Macroeconomics Fall 2018

NOTES and COMMENTS. Ricardian Equivalence and the Irish Consumption Function: The Evidence Re-examined I INTRODUCTION

Valuation and Tax Policy

COUNTRY RISK AND CAPITAL FLOW REVERSALS by: Assaf Razin 1 and Efraim Sadka 2

Welfare Evaluations of Policy Reforms with Heterogeneous Agents

Midterm Exam International Trade Economics 6903, Fall 2008 Donald Davis

Comment on: Capital Controls and Monetary Policy Autonomy in a Small Open Economy by J. Scott Davis and Ignacio Presno

Lecture 8: Introduction to asset pricing

(Incomplete) summary of the course so far

Transcription:

Ekkehart Schlicht: A Case Where Barro Expectations Are Not Rational Munich Discussion Paper No. 2012-4 Department of Economics University of Munich Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12715/

A Case Where Barro Expectations Are Not Rational Ekkehart Schlicht Abstract This note generalizes Feldstein s (1976) criticism of Barro s(1974) analysis for the case that the interest rate exceeds the growth rate. This is done by considering an economy in steady state where all agents hold Barro expectations : they believe that government debt must necessarily be repaid and therefore leave the present value of their income streams unchanged. In this scenario, a change in the mode of taxation affects the present value of disposable income in the private sector. This violates their Barro expectations. Keywords: Barro-Ricardo equivalence, Ricardian equivalence, fiscal policy, debt, taxation, rational expectations Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E2, E12, E6, H6 Ekkehart Schlicht (schlicht@lmu.de) is professor emeritus of economics at the University of Munich, Germany. 1

1 Introduction Feldstein (1976) has shown that a permanent government deficit may increase the present value of the households income if the rate of growth exceeds the rate of interest. The present note generalizes Feldstein s remarks to the case that the rate of interest exceeds the rate of growth. In this sense, it invalidates Barro s (1974) analysis also for that case. The generalization is proved by presenting an example of an economy in steady state where government decides to reduce taxation and generate a permanent deficit. All members of the private sector hold Barro expectations : they believe that government debt must necessarily be repaid and the present value of their income streams remain unchanged. Hence they do not change their expenditure. It is shown that the policy switch from a pay-as-you-go regime to a deficit regime increases the present value of disposable income in the private sector, contrary to Barro s assertion. In this sense the example disproves the logic of Barro s interpretation of Ricardian equivalence. 2 An Example Consider a closed economy that grows with the nominal rate g. Gross income at time t is Y t, private expenditure (consumption plus investment) is E t, taxes are T t and government expenditure is G t. Let D t denote government debt. Initially there is no government debt: D 0 = 0. (1) Income and government expenditure grow both with rate g. So we have Y t = (1 + g) t Y 0 (2) G t = (1 + g) t G 0 (3) The economy is initially in full equilibrium with an interest rate i > g and private expenditure E 0. Private expenditure E and government expenditure G add 2

up to total production, and the expectation held by all parties is that this will continue in the future: E t + G t = Y t. (4) Up to t = 1, the government budget was balanced, and the taxes levied in any period t < 0 were equal to government spending G t in that period. Call this the pay-as-you-go regime. All parties have expected and expect that this policy would continue throughout the future, but government changes its policy and decides to run a permanent deficit of a fraction α (0,1) of its expenditure G t in each period, beginning at t = 0 while leaving government expenditure G t unchanged. So government expenditure remains as described in equation (10). Call this the debt regime. In line with Barro s (1974; 1989) analysis, the households and firms expect that the change in policy does not affect the present value of their liftime income stream. Hence they believe that rearrangements of the timing of taxes as implied by budget deficits have no first-order effect on the economy (Barro, 1989, 51). They conclude that, sooner or later, the government has to increase taxes, leaving the present value of their incomes unaltered. So they change neither consumption nor investment. In short, everybody in the private sector holds Barro expectations and behaves accordingly. (It will turn out, however, that these expectations will not be fulfilled.) In each period t = 0,1,2... the deficit is αg t, and outstanding government debt D increases in each period by this amount. Therefore we have D 0 = 0 (5) D t+1 = D t + αg t. (6) This implies together with (3). ( (1 + g) t 1 ) D t = g αg 0. (7) So debt grows asymptotically in proportion with production. The ratio of government debt to government expenditure approaches α/g and the ratio of government 3

debt to production approaches α/g times the share of government expenditure in total production. D t lim = α t G t g, t=0 lim D t t Y t The present value of government debt is ( ) 1 t V = D t. 1 + i = 1 i = α g G0 Y 0. (8) 1 + i (i g) αg 0 (9) As i > g is assumed, the present value of the debt is a positive number (less than infinity), although debt is never retired. The deficit in period 0 is αg 0. It is entailed by the tax reduction of the same size. So we have tax receipts of T 0 = (1 α)g 0 in period 0. In period 1 government debt is D 1 = αg 0. This requires interest payments id 1. The deficit in period 1 is the sum of government expenditure G 1 plus interest payments id 1 minus tax receipts T 1. The deficit is to be αg 1. Hence we have G 1 + id 1 T 1 = αg 1. A similar consideration applies to all periods: G t + id t T t = αg t. (10) Solving for T t gives the amount of taxes to be collected in period t: T t = (1 α)g t + id t. (11) Furthermore, the ratio of taxes to production approaches T t lim = t Y t g + (i g)α g Go Y o > G o Y o. (12) The government collects higher taxes under the debt regime than under the pay-asyou-go regime. 4

Now consider the households. If the government would run a balanced budget all the time, their discounted disposable income would have been ( ) 1 t W = (Y t G t ) 1 + i t=0 = (Y 0 G 0 ) t=0 ( ) 1 + g t 1 + i = 1 + i i g (Y 0 G 0 ). (13) The debt policy, however, results in disposable income which is Z t = Y t T t + id t (14) Z t = (1 + g) t (Y 0 (1 α)g 0 ). = Y t (1 α)g t > Y t G t. (15) Under the pay-as-you-go regime, disposable income in each period would have been Y t G t. Hence the switch from the pay-as-you-go regime to the debt regime has increased disposable income for all periods by the fraction α of government expenditure G t. The present value of disposable income is ( ) 1 t Q = Z t. 1 + i t=0 This is calculated as Q = 1 + i i g (Y 0 (1 α)g 0 ) (16) The difference between this present value of disposable income under the debt regime and the corresponding present value under the pay-as-you-go regime (13) is Q W = 1 + i i g αg 0 > 0. (17) 5

Hence the present value of the household s lifetime income has increased by switching from a pay-as-you-go regime to the deficit regime. The Barro expectations held by the subjects are not fulfilled. As the value of their lifetime income stream has increased, they could have afforded higher expenditure, with more consumption and more investment, but this would have presumably affected the rate of interest and the value of production and income in turn. Hence the assumption (2) which is a cornerstone of Barro s (1974) analysis can not usefully be upheld. 1 3 Conclusion It has been urged elsewhere that Ricardian equivalence in Barro s(1989) interpretation is quite irrelevant regarding fiscal policy (Schlicht, 2006, Sect. 9). The above example points out that Barro s view is internally contradictory. In conclusion, arguments alluding to Ricardian equivalence in Barro s interpretation ought not to be applied to real economies. Despite their apparent logical appeal such arguments are misleading, not only empirically, but also theoretically (Romer, 1995, 72). References Barro, R. J. (1974). Are Government Bonds Real Net Wealth? Journal of Political Economy, 82(6): 1095 1117. URL http://www.jstor.org/pss/1830663. Barro, R. J. (1989). The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(2): 37 54. URL http://www.jstor.org/pss/1942668. Feldstein, M. (1976). Perceived Wealth in Bonds and Social Security. Journal of Political Economy, 84(2): 331 36. URL http://www.jstor.org/pss/1831904. Romer, D. (1995). Advanced Macroeconomics. McGraw-Hill. URL http://www. amazon.de/dp/0070536678. 1 For the sake of completeness I note that the present value of government debt exceeds the present value of disposable income if α < i(y 0 G 0 ) is satisfied. (1+i)G 0 6

Schlicht, E. (2006). Public Debt as Private Wealth. Metroeconomica, (4): 594 520. URL http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2143/1/schlicht-public-debt-13-rp.pdf. 7

Mathematica notebook with the calculations for A Case Where Barro Expectations Are Not Rational by Ekkehart Schlicht ü Income Y and Government expenditure G (Eqs. 2 and 3) In[1]:= Y t_ : 1 g t Y 0 ; G t_ : 1 g t G 0 ; In[3]:= ü Government debt (Eqs. 5 to 7) Clear d ; RSolve d t 1 d t G t, d 0 0, d t, t Out[4]= 1 1 g t G 0 d t g 1 1 g t G 0 In[5]:= d t_ : g In[6]:= Out[6]= In[7]:= Out[7]= In[8]:= ü Asymptotic ratio of debt to government expenditure (Eq.8) Limit d t,t, Assumptions i g && g 0 G t g ü Asymptotic ratio of debt to production (Eq. 8) Limit d t,t, Assumptions i g && g 0 Y t G 0 gy 0 ü Present value of goverment debt (Eq. 9) V 1 t 0 1 i Out[8]= 1 i G 0 g i i In[9]:= In[10]:= 1 i G 0 g i i ü Taxes (Eq. 11) t d t T t_ : 1 G t id t ü Asymptotic ratio of taxes to income (Eq. 12) Limit T t,t, Assumptions i g && g 0 Y t Out[10]= g 1 i G 0 gy 0 In[11]:= Simplify g i g G 0 gy 0 Out[11]= True

2 Barro-notebook_2.nb In[12]:= Out[12]= In[13]:= ü Household wealth with balanced budget (Eq. 13) W Simplify 1 t 0 1 i G 0 Y 0 g i 1 i t Y t G t ü Disposable income (Eqs. 14 and 15) Z t_ : Y t T t i d t In[14]:= Z t Out[14]= 1 g t 1 G 0 1 g t Y 0 In[15]:= In[16]:= Out[16]= ü Present value of disposable income (Eq. 16) Q Simplify 1 t 0 1 i 1 i 1 G 0 Y 0 g i t Z t ü Difference of present values (Eq. 17) In[17]:= Simplify Q W Out[17]= 1 i G 0 g i In[18]:= Out[18]= ü Condition for Q>V (Footnote 1) Simplify Q V 1 i i 1 G 0 iy 0 g i i 1 i In[19]:= Simplify i g i i Y 0 G 0 1 i G 0 Out[19]= True In[20]:= Reduce i Y 0 G 0 1 i G 0 0, g i, i 0, 0, 1, Y 0 G 0,G 0 0,, Reals Out[20]= G 0 0&&Y 0 G 0 && 0 i G 0 Y 0 && g i&&0 ig 0 iy 0 G 0 ig 0 i G 0 Y 0 && g i&&0 1