Identification and Price Determination with Taylor Rules: A Critical Review by John H. Cochrane. Discussion. Eric M. Leeper

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Identification and Price Determination with Taylor Rules: A Critical Review by John H. Cochrane Discussion Eric M. Leeper September 29, 2006 NBER Economic Fluctuations & Growth Federal Reserve Bank of New York

What the Paper s About Are Taylor-style single-equation regressions identified? Answer: No.

What the Paper s About Are Taylor-style single-equation regressions identified? Answer: No. Does the Taylor principle uniquely determine equilibrium? Answer: No.

What the Paper s About Are Taylor-style single-equation regressions identified? Answer: No. Does the Taylor principle uniquely determine equilibrium? Answer: No. Conclusions are bold: cannot rely on monetary policy for determinacy fiscal policy is the only economic model that uniquely determines the price level

Estimation & Identification in a Fisherian Model i t = r + E t π t+1 i t = r + φπ t + x t E tπ t+1 = φπ t + x t x t = ρx t 1 + ε t φ>1 : unique bounded solution is π t = ρπ t 1 1 φ ρ ε t OLS of i t against π t yields i t = ρπ t with R 2 =1.0 IV of no help Is this about identification or estimation?

Estimation & Identification in a Fisherian Model A problem of simultaneous equations bias? it is but there s more: π dynamics pin down ρ, but then need to use Var(π t ) to estimate both φ and σ 2 there is clearly an identification problem there is a contour along which (φ, σ 2 ) pairs yield identical likelihood values

Estimation & Identification in a Fisherian Model 0.18 Likelihood Contour at Maximum 0.16 Shock Standard Deviation: σ 0.14 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 L = (1/(φ ρ)) 2 σ 2 0.02 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 Taylor coefficient: φ

Importance of a Single AR(1) Shock Due to Todd Walker Generalize: seek a solution π t = b(l)ε t with x t = a(l)ε t Apply the famous Hansen-Sargent formula: [ La(L) φ 1 a(φ 1 ] ) b(l)ε t = 1 φl now we have the eqm π representation: φ reappears ε t π t = φπ t 1 + x t 1 φ 1 a(φ 1 )ε t if x t is AR(1), this collapses to π t = ρπ t 1 1 φ ρ ε t if x t anything except AR(1), potentially can estimate φ

Estimation & Identification in a New Keynesian Model JHC claims the problem persists in NK model Maybe, but it depends on relative variances of the shocks and other parameter estimates Shocks orthogonal to MP move π t and i t in the proportion φ simultaneous equations estimators can estimate φ There might be problems estimating other parameters but that s not really JHC s original point Is this a critical review of Taylor rules, new Keynesian models, rational expectations, or OLS? Who is the naked emperor?

Determinacy of Equilibrium There are many solutions to E t π t+1 = φπ t + x t, φ>1 All except the unique bounded one imply explosive inflation JHC: nothing in economics rules out explosive nominal paths this point reminiscent of Obstfeld-Rogoff money needs to be backed by promise to exchange it for real commodity

Determinacy of Equilibrium There are many solutions to E t π t+1 = φπ t + x t, φ>1 All except the unique bounded one imply explosive inflation JHC: nothing in economics rules out explosive nominal paths this point reminiscent of Obstfeld-Rogoff money needs to be backed by promise to exchange it for real commodity JHC: the non-ricardian [fiscal theory] fiscal regime is the only economic model that can do so this point reminiscent of Sims whether exploding π is an eqm depends on trans. tech. if non-monetary eqm exists, need right kind of FP to get determinacy

Playing by Cochrane s Rules JHC s rules of the game : take seriously the possibility of equilibria with π but posit that policy always obeys i t = φ(π t /πt ), with φ π > 1 (TR) What s wrong with these rules of the game?

Playing by Cochrane s Rules JHC s rules of the game : take seriously the possibility of equilibria with π but posit that policy always obeys i t = φ(π t /πt ), with φ π > 1 (TR) What s wrong with these rules of the game? even though following TR has produced explosive inflation, people expect the CB to continue to follow it JHC applies this logic to argue that if CB followed this policy, we likely would observe hyperinflation we don t observe hyperinflation, so TR must not be determining the eqm Any arguments for bounded equilibria that require amending or suspending TR in extreme circumstances violate the rules

What is the Taylor Rule? A magical transformation from empirical TR to theoretical TR empirical: reduced-form relationship among endogenous variables over a short sample theoretical: loftier status as a complete specification of how policy behaves in all states of the world No one who has estimated TR claims this status for them at best, TR an approximate description of policy in normal times Determinacy arguments are not about normal times To study non-normal times, need to change rules of the game

Changing the Rules New rule: if I have to take explosive equilibria seriously, I get to specify policy seriously

Changing the Rules New rule: if I have to take explosive equilibria seriously, I get to specify policy seriously In 2002, Gov. Bernanke spoke explicitly about how Fed behavior would change in face of deflation once i 0, abandon traditional means to stimulate AD he listed several non-traditional actions few of these can be studied in frictionless, cashless models

Changing the Rules New rule: if I have to take explosive equilibria seriously, I get to specify policy seriously In 2002, Gov. Bernanke spoke explicitly about how Fed behavior would change in face of deflation once i 0, abandon traditional means to stimulate AD he listed several non-traditional actions few of these can be studied in frictionless, cashless models The Federal Reserve Act price stability : see Bernanke s speech financial stability : witness 9/11, financial crises in non-normal times, Fed abandons its usual rule

The Economics of Price Level Determination There is plenty of economics around to uniquely determine equilibrium This economics just isn t represented by a time-invariant Taylor rule with time-invariant passive FP Maybe the economics that determines equilibrium is not in most of our models Ultimately, though, whether an equilibrium is determinate is...

The Economics of Price Level Determination There is plenty of economics around to uniquely determine equilibrium This economics just isn t represented by a time-invariant Taylor rule with time-invariant passive FP Maybe the economics that determines equilibrium is not in most of our models Ultimately, though, whether an equilibrium is determinate is... a known unknown that is...

The Economics of Price Level Determination There is plenty of economics around to uniquely determine equilibrium This economics just isn t represented by a time-invariant Taylor rule with time-invariant passive FP Maybe the economics that determines equilibrium is not in most of our models Ultimately, though, whether an equilibrium is determinate is... a known unknown that is... unknowable

What About Fiscal Policy? I am a card-carrying fiscal theorist I believe fiscal policy does all kinds of things not captured by our models Determining the price level might be one of them If this is so, it s more fortuitous than logically preordained If you think there are identification problems with MP... just wait until we think about FP Opening a whole new kettle of worms

Identifying Fiscal Policy Problems to confront in solving this identification 1. Not even a vague mandate guiding fiscal decisions 2. Hard to separate tax rule from debt-valuation equation 3. Multiple decision-making (elected) entities 4. Tremendous detail in tax code and in spending types 5. Potentially important low-frequency phenomena 6. How to nail down when news about fiscal decisions arrives 7. Complex interactions between monetary & fiscal policies Makes identifying MP look like child s play

A Puzzling Statement JHC: if we can specify a set of fiscal constraints that rules out explosive inflation paths, then the eqm dynamics of the new-keynesian model can remain completely unchanged. Not obvious how to do this with time-invariant policy rules

A Puzzling Statement JHC: if we can specify a set of fiscal constraints that rules out explosive inflation paths, then the eqm dynamics of the new-keynesian model can remain completely unchanged. Not obvious how to do this with time-invariant policy rules Typical fiscal theory eqm net-of-interest surplus exogenous, MP passive ( φ < 1) MP contraction: i t via open-market sale, B t,m t expansion in nominal debt = P t,realrate, y t both price and output puzzles eqm dynamics completely different

Maybe We Can Change the Rules Suppose MP always obeys the Taylor principle Tax policy is usually passive (B t /P t = T t+j ) But an explosive inflation path triggers switch in FP to exogenous taxes as B/P with fixed future T, demand falls can this eliminate explosive inflation paths? Not sure if this hangs together Eqm will always be the NK policy mix

I Agree with Cochrane If this is what s going on, let that be modeled