Financial Market Feedback:

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Financial Market Feedback: New Perspective from Commodities Financialization Itay Goldstein Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Information in prices A basic premise in financial economics: market prices are very informative about assets fundamentals They gather information from many different participants, who trade on their own money Lots of empirical evidence supporting the idea, e.g., Roll (AER, 1984) Models of how information gets reflected in the price: Grossman and Stiglitz (AER, 1980), Kyle (Econometrica, 1985), Glosten and Milgrom (JFE, 1985) HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 1

The Feedback Effect The informativeness of prices is important, since it helps facilitate the efficient allocation of resources: An efficient market has a very desirable feature. In particular, at any point in time market prices of securities provide accurate signals for resource allocation. That is, firms can make productioninvestment decisions... Fama & Miller (1972) Who learns from the price? o Managers, Creditors, Regulators, Customers, Employees, etc. o As long as there is some information in the price they don t know HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 2

Empirical Evidence Luo (JF, 2005) Mergers are more likely to be canceled when prices react more negatively and managers are trying to learn Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (RFS, 2007) Price informativeness affects investment sensitivity to price Foucault and Fresard (RFS, 2012) Cross listed firms exhibit stronger sensitivity of investment to price Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (JF, 2012) Exogenous shock to price affects takeovers Financial markets are not a side show HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 3

Implications for Theory A feedback loop emerges between market prices and firms cash flows and fundamentals. Prices reflect and affect cash flows: "In certain circumstances, financial markets can affect the so-called fundamentals which they are supposed to reflect." George Soros Traditional models on financial markets do not capture this feedback loop o They take firm cash flows as given and study price formation as a result The Feedback Effect papers break this paradigm and consider the feedback loop between prices and cash flows / fundamentals o Modelling can be challenging because of feedback loop HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 4

Early Literature Review: Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (ARFE, 2012) Review theoretical and empirical literature on the real effect of secondary financial markets Two channels for real effect (both rely on information): o Decision makers on the real side learn new information from markets that guides their decisions o Compensation contracts for real decision makers are tied to market prices (due to their informativeness) and affect their incentives HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 5

Highlight two implications for theoretical research: o Incorporating the feedback effect into models of trading in financial markets fundamentally changes predictions on price formation in financial markets (with implications for firm cash flows) Giving rise to phenomena that otherwise look puzzling, e.g., manipulation, strategic complementarities o Different notions of efficiency Forecasting Price Efficiency vs. Revelatory Price Efficiency Former is often emphasized (Market Efficiency), but latter really matters (Real Efficiency) HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 6

Commodities Futures Financialization Commodity futures became popular among financial investors over the last two decades o Phenomenon known as commodities financialization: Cheng and Xiong (ARFE, 2014) Economists and regulators are concerned about whether and how financialization has affected the functioning of futures and spot markets o What happened to market quality (spot and futures market)? o What are the real effects? HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 7

Informational Role of Commodities Futures Markets Information incorporated in trading in futures markets may be key for investment/production decisions in commodities futures prices provide a wealth of valuable information for those who produce, store, and use commodities...the big benefit from futures markets is the side effect: the fact that participants in the futures markets can make production, storage, and processing decisions by looking at the pattern of futures prices, even if they don't take positions in that market." Black (1976) What would be the consequences of financialization analyzed through the lens of the informational channel? HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 8

Commodity Financialization and Information Transmission: Goldstein and Yang (2017) We develop an asymmetric information model where financial traders, commodity producers, and noise traders trade futures contracts o Financial traders inject new information and noise into the futures market o Price informativeness can either increase or decrease with commodity financialization Commodity producers learn information from the futures price to guide commodity production o Real effects of commodity financialization; natural framework for feedback HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 9

Model Setup Two dates: t = 0 (futures market), t = 1 (spot market) Date-1 spot market o Symmetric information; endogenous spot price o Exogenous linear commodity demand o Endogenous commodity supply from commodity producers Date-0 futures market o Asymmetric information; endogenous futures price o Players: commodity producers (mass 1), financial traders (mass ), and noise traders; parameterizes commodity financialization HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 10

Commodity Demand and Supply At date 1, the commodity demand is o captures demand shocks o, is forecastable and 0, is unforecastable At date 0, a continuum [0,1] of commodity producers choose production and position in futures market to maximize expected CARA utility o Their final wealth is: o Their information is the futures price and a private signal, where 0, HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 11

Their choices are: o Production: o Futures exposure: First component is speculation and second component is hedging Equilibrium in spot market: o Supply equals demand o Spot price Clear supply channel by which futures price affects spot price and the real economy HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 12

Financial Traders A mass of identical financial traders who trade futures both for speculation and for hedging to maximize expected CARA utility They know the demand shock speculation They invest in another market with net return of o 0, is forecastable and 0, is unforecastable o, 1,1 hedging In the financial market, there are also noise traders:, Price is obtained by market clearing; linear function of,, HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 13

Timeline. HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 14

Financialization and Price Informativeness How does an increase in financialization affect the informativeness of the price about the fundamental? HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 15

Financial traders bring both noise ( ) and information ( ) to the price o Second effect dominates only when their mass is relatively small o Initially their presence is effective to overcome noise trading ( ), but as they become more prominent in the market, the additional factors they bring ( ) also become more prominent and mask Empirical literature provides conflicting results o Raman, Robe and Yadav (2017) vs. Brogaard, Ringgenberg and Sovich (2017) o Our model can reconcile them and emphasizes the importance of how advanced the process of financialization is HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 16

Real Effect of Financialization HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 17

Thinking about the real effects is more complicated: o On the one hand, greater informativeness translates into greater operating profits for the producers This is in the spirit of the empirical evidence in Brogaard, Ringgenberg and Sovich (2017) o But, there are other things operating in the opposite direction: Greater informativeness hurts trading gains for producers in futures market Producers benefit from volatility in futures price because this is the effective price for their production decisions HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 18

Overall, greater informativeness would translate to greater real efficiency if producers were not active in the futures market But, because of other effects, it turns out that the overall real efficiency is affected in the opposite direction when producers are active in futures market Hence, interpretation of empirical evidence might be tricky There are additional complications in the context of commodities futures markets on top of the usual feedback effect models o Combination of primary (price has direct effect on production) and secondary (price has an informational effect) financial markets effects HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 19

Summary Feedback effects from financial markets to real economy are present in the data and generate important theoretical implications New dimensions for exploration in the context of commodities futures markets are very prevalent in the wake of their financialization Interpreting real effects in this context is a bit trickier when commodity producers are also active directly in futures markets o Futures markets act both as primary and secondary, as the price has a direct effect and informational effect on production HKUST 2017 Finance Symposium Page 20