OMER UNSAL Mobile: (269) 548 55 24 Email: ounsal@uno.edu 2000 Lakeshore Dr Personal: omunsal@gmail.com New Orleans, LA 70122 Web: omerunsal.com EDUCATION Ph.D. in Financial Economics Expected May 2017 Master of Business Administration 2013 Western Michigan University B.A. Economics 2011 Yildiz Teknik University AREAS OF INTEREST Research CEO and Board Characteristics, Lobbying, Firm-Level Political Contributions, CEO Compensation, Agency Cost Teaching Corporate Finance, Financial Management, Investments PUBLICATIONS Omer Unsal, M. Kabir Hassan, and Duygu Zirek. Corporate Lobbying, CEO Political Ideology and Firm Performance, Journal of Corporate Finance, (2016):126-149 1
UNDER JOURNAL REVIEW Omer Unsal, M. Kabir Hassan, and Duygu Zirek. Corporate Lobbying and Labor Relations: Evidence From Employee-Level Litigations, [Submitted], 2016, Omer Unsal, M. Kabir Hassan, and Duygu Zirek. Product Recalls and Security Prices, [Submitted], 2016 Incheol Kim, Dongnyoung Kim, Thomas Krueger, Omer Unsal. Relations and Firm Value, [Submitted], 2016 CEO Political Ideology, Employee OTHER PUBLICATIONS M.Kabir Hassan, Omer Unsal, and Hikmet Emre Tamer. Risk Management and Capital Adequacy in Turkish Participation and Conventional Banks: A Comparative Stress Testing Analysis, Borsa Istanbul Review,(2016) WORKING PAPERS Omer Unsal, Incheol Kim, Dongnyoung Kim, Two Faces of Corporate Lobbying: Evidence From the Pharmaceutical Industry, Working Paper, 2016 Omer Unsal, M. Kabir Hassan, William Hippler, Financial Institutions and Corporate Lobbying: Evidence from Shareholder Litigations, Working Paper, 2016 Omer Unsal, M. Kabir Hassan, William Hippler, Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance: FDA Product Submissions, Working Paper, 2016 DISSERTATION Two Essays on Politics and Finance Corporate Lobbying, CEO Political Ideology and Firm Performance (Published : Journal of Corporate Finance) Corporate Lobbying and Labor Relations: Evidence From Employee-Level Litigations (Job Market Paper) 2
CONFERENCES Corporate Lobbying and Labor Relations: Evidence from Emloyee-Level Litigations Doctoral Student Consortium, Financial Management Association (FMA), Las Vegas, 2016 Two Faces of Corporate Lobbying:Evidence From the Pharmaceutical Industry Financial Management Association (FMA), Las Vegas, 2016 Southern Finance Association (SFA), San Destin, 2016 Product Recalls and Security Prices Southern Finance Association (SFA), San Destin, 2016 Eastern Finance Association (EFA), Baltimore, 2016 Southwestern Finance Association (SWFA), Oklahoma City, 2016 CEO Political Ideology, Employee Relations and Firm Value Financial Management Association (FMA), Orlando, 2015 Southern Finance Association (SFA), Captiva Island, 2015 Corporate Lobbying, CEO Political Ideology and Firm Performance Eastern Finance Association (EFA), New Orleans, 2015 Southwestern Finance Association (SWFA), Houston, 2015 AWARDS AND HONORS Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, Graduate School,, 2016-2017 Outstanding Doctoral Student Award, Review of Financial Economics, 2016 Privateer Graduate Award,, 2013-2017 Doctoral Award,, 2013-2017 Center for European Union Education and Youth Programmes Erasmus Exchange Programme Fellowship, Undergraduate School, Universidade do Minho, Portugal, 2010 RESEARCH ASSISTANT EXPERIENCE M.Kabir Hassan,, 2014-Present Duygu Zirek,, 2014-Present Incheol Kim, Fordham University, 2013-Present 3
ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE Instructor (full responsibilities), Summer 2016 : Macroeconomics (Econ 1203) Rating : 5.00/5.00 Spring 2016 : Fundamentals of Financial Management (Fin 3300) Rating : 4.80/5.00 Fall 2015 : Fundamentals of Financial Management (Fin 3300) Rating : 4.93/5.00 Summer 2015 : Fundamentals of Financial Management (Fin 3300) Rating : 4.67/5.00 Teaching Assistant, Spring 2016 : Financial Markets and Institutions (MBA Course : Fin 6303) SKILLS Computer: SAS, STATA Database: COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, RiskMetrics, CRSP Language: Turkish (Native), English (Fluent) PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Financial Management Association(FMA) Southern Finance Association (SFA) Eastern Finance Association (EFA) Academy of Economics and Finance (AEF) 4
REFERENCES M. Kabir Hassan Hibernia Professor of Economics and Finance Bank One Professor in Business Email: mhassan@uno.edu Alternative Email: kabirhassan63@gmail.com Cell phone: 610 529-1247 Walter Lane Associate Chair Email: wlane@uno.edu Cell phone: 504 280-7145 Tarun Mukharjee Professor of Finance James R. Moffett Chair in Financial Economics Editor of Review of Financial Economics Email: tmukherj@uno.edu Cell phone: 504 280-6379 Duygu Zirek Assistant Professor of Finance Email: dzirek@uno.edu Cell phone: 646 713-4585 JOB MARKET PAPER Corporate Lobbying and Labor Relations: Evidence from Emloyee-Level Litigations In this paper, we study the influence of corporate lobbying on employee relations. First, we analyze the firms which sponsor labor and employment related bills. Second, we investigate the employee-level litigations filed by employees. We then try to understand the relation between litigation and lobbying activity. We find that firms with greater number of employee related lawsuits are more likely to lobby in labor and employment topics to alter policy proposals. Further, we document that when the sponsored bill becomes law, more litigations are dismissed by court and more cases are withdrawn by employees which protects lobbying firms from reduced firm value. Finally, we argue that whether firm-level lobbying builds political capital that would alter both case results and policy proposals on behalf of firms benefit. 5
WORKING PAPER ABSTRACTS Two Faces of Corporate Lobbying: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry This paper addresses two side effects of corporate lobbying on firm value in the pharmaceutical industry. Employing corporate lobbying and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval data for the period from 1998 to 2013, we find that lobbying firms have a 67.3 percent higher chance that their new prescription drugs are approved by the FDA compared to non-lobbying firms. On the 3-day window surrounding FDA approval announcements, lobbying firms yield, on average, a 1.1 percent higher market reaction than non-lobbying peers. However, we also find that insiders in lobbying firms abnormally purchase their own stocks prior to FDA approvals. These opportunistic purchases substantially increase a firms litigation risk. Our evidence highlights the ambivalence of lobbying. While lobbying enhances firm value, it also offers an opportunity for insiders to trade their shares first by exploiting private information that eventually hurts firm value. Financial Institutions and Corporate Lobbying: Evidence from Shareholder Litigations In this paper, we study the relationship between corporate lobbying and shareholder-based litigations for financial firms. First, we find that lobbyist financial institutions are less likely to be subjected to shareholder litigations compared to non-lobbyist firms. Second, we report that more cases are dismissed and average settlement amount is lower lobbying firms. We then find that litigation announcement is more severe for non-lobbying firms compared to lobbying peers. Finally, we measure the firm performance of sample firms and document that lobbying firms have higher stock returns while non-lobbying firms suffer by lower stock returns due to litigations. Our results reveal the fact that political connections, in terms of lobbying expenditure, may benefit the financial institutions and protect them from reduced firm value. Product Recalls and Security Prices We examine 1460 product recalls that were announced by U.S Official Agencies between January 1990 and December 2014. Consistent with previous research, we report statistically significant negative abnormal returns during the announcement dates. Moreover, our results suggest two main objectives. First, we find that the effect of product recalls vary for industries in terms of operation and competition. Second, we show that recall announcements cause spillover effect at industry where rival firms receive short term positive abnormal returns during announcement dates. Over post-announcement periods, Cumulative Abnormal Returns lose significance and results are robust for both selected market index and estimation method. 6