ETUC Position Paper: A European Treasury for Public Investment

Similar documents
Review of European Economic Governance (ETUC position)

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION. Denmark. Report prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty

11244/12 RD/NC/kp DG G1A

The Stability and Growth Pact Status in 2001

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION. Slovakia. Report prepared in accordance with Article 104(3) of the Treaty

Spanish position on strengthening the EMU

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. Recommendation for a COUNCIL OPINION

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. Recommendation for a COUNCIL OPINION

Implementation of the EU fiscal governance framework: Assessment of the fiscal stance appropriate for the euro area

Contributions from the Sherpas of the Member States to the Five Presidents' Report SPAIN. Second Contribution

2016 Country Specific Recommendations for the Euro Area

Council of the European Union Brussels, 27 November 2015 (OR. en) Mr Jeppe TRANHOLM-MIKKELSEN, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union

Official Journal of the European Union L 140/11

Box 2 Lessons to be drawn from the oil price shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s

Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL. on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area

COMMISSION OPINION. of on the Draft Budgetary Plan of Portugal. {SWD(2017) 525 final}

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT. Analysis of the Draft Budgetary Plan of Latvia. Accompanying the document COMMISSION OPINION

COMMISSION OPINION. of on the Draft Budgetary Plan of Italy and requesting Italy to submit a revised Draft Budgetary Plan

Council of the European Union Brussels, 16 January 2017 (OR. en) General Secretariat of the Council

Spring Forecast: slowly recovering from a protracted recession

COMMISSION OPINION. of on the Draft Budgetary Plan of BELGIUM

Fiscalgovernance inthe euroarea

How to avoid a double-dip recession in the eurozone

The EFB: the first year

15070/16 ADB/mz 1 DG B 1C

9435/18 RS/MCS/mz 1 DG B 1C - DG G 1A

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 6 July 2012 (OR. en) 11257/12 UEM 212 ECOFIN 586 SOC 563 COMPET 431 ENV 527 EDUC 204 RECH 267 ENER 296

International Monetary and Financial Committee

International Monetary and Financial Committee

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION. Finland. Report prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT. Analysis of the 2016 Draft Budgetary Plan of GERMANY. Accompanying the document COMMISSION OPINION

A Fiscal Union in Europe: why is it possible/impossible?

Commission takes steps under the excessive deficit procedure for France, Greece, Ireland, Spain and UK; assesses Stability Programme of Cyprus

EUROPEA U IO. Brussels, 26 April 2013 (OR. en) 2011/0386 (COD) PE-CO S 6/13 ECOFI 163 UEM 38 CODEC 463 OC 109

7569/18 DA/NT/fh DGG 1A

EU fiscal governance and cyclical stabilisation Searching for a lasting arrangement

Stability and Growth Pact: Implementation of the comply or explain rule (March 2015)

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION. Portugal. Report prepared in accordance with Article 104(3) of the Treaty

QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY OVERVIEW

Deepening Europe s Economic and Monetary Union. Commission Note ahead of the European Council and the Euro Summit of June 2018

IP/09/273. Brussels, 18 February 2009

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION. Finland. Report prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT. Analysis of the Draft Budgetary Plan of Lithuania. Accompanying the document COMMISSION OPINION

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT. Analysis of the draft budgetary plan of Luxembourg. Accompanying the document COMMISSION OPINION

INVESTMENT AND THE GOLDEN RULE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Czech Republic s Updated Euro-area Accession Strategy

Comment on Beetsma, Debrun and Klaassen: Is fiscal policy coordination in EMU desirable? Marco Buti *

11261/12 RD/NC/kp DG G1A

SUMMARY OF THE DOCTORAL THESIS PUBLIC DEBT AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

L-6 The Fiscal Multiplier debate and the eurozone response to the crisis. Carlos San Juan Mesonada Jean Monnet Professor University Carlos III Madrid

The Coordination of Fiscal Policies in Europe

EMU AFTER THE EU ELECTION CYCLE THE WAY FORWARD

Annex: A transfer of national debt to the ECB and a European New Deal

STABILITY PROGRAMME:

11259/12 RD/NC/kp DG G1A

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION. From financial crisis to recovery: A European framework for action

Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION. on the 2017 National Reform Programme of Belgium

Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs WORKING DOCUMENT. on the review of the economic governance framework: stocktaking and challenges

Council of the European Union Brussels, 5 March 2015 (OR. en)

The reform of EU s fiscal rules: between centralisation and decentralisation

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 6 July 2012 (OR. en) 11273/12 UEM 224 ECOFIN 598 SOC 575 COMPET 443 ENV 539 EDUC 216 RECH 279 ENER 308

International Monetary and Financial Committee

Assessment of the 2018 Stability Programme for. Portugal

9293/17 VK/MCS/mz 1 DG B 1C - DG G 1A

Anne Bucher. Director DG ECFIN European Commission

Financial Integration in the Arab Region: A Focus on Monetary Coordination and a Presentation of New Ideas and Developments by:

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 6 July 2012 (OR. en) 11267/12 UEM 219 ECOFIN 593 SOC 570 COMPET 438 ENV 534 EDUC 211 RECH 274 ENER 303

Yves Mersch: The interplay between monetary policy and fiscal policy in EMU

Assessment of the 2017 convergence programme for. Bulgaria

Ireland s Medium-Term Budgetary Framework

A review of the surplus target, SOU 2016:67

ARTICLES FISCAL POLICY INFLUENCES ON MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND PRICES

ECB-PUBLIC OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK. of 9 November 2018

OPENING STATEMENT BY MARIO DRAGHI CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT OF THE ECB TO THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Strenghts (+) and weaknesses ( )

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. Recommendation for a COUNCIL OPINION

Spanish position on the Future of Europe February Introduction

9283/17 VK/MCS/mz 1 DG B 1C - DG G 1A

June 2014 Is government spending the key to successful consolidation?

Financial Stability in a World of Very Low Interest Rates

EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT MARKETS

QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY 1 OVERVIEW

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION. Assessment of action taken. by FRANCE

Assessment of the 2015 Convergence Programme for SWEDEN

OVERVIEW. The EU recovery is firming. Table 1: Overview - the winter 2014 forecast Real GDP. Unemployment rate. Inflation. Winter 2014 Winter 2014

DRAFT REPORT. EN United in diversity EN. European Parliament 2018/2033(INI) on the economic policies of the euro area (2018/2033(INI))

GERMANY REVIEW OF PROGRESS ON POLICY MEASURES RELEVANT FOR THE

UK membership of the single currency

Budgetary policy in EMU: times to change?

APPENDIX: Country analyses

The main assumptions underlying the scenario are as follows (see the table):

THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR FISCAL POLICIES

European Public Debt: A Solution to Fragility

Banco de Portugal. Economic Research. Economic bulletin. June Volume 9 Number 2. Economic policy and situation. Articles

Recommendation for a COUNCIL DECISION

The Economic Situation of the European Union and the Outlook for

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 8 July 2013 (OR. en) 11198/13

THE SUSTAINABILITY OF MALTESE GOVERNMENT DEBT: 2018Q1 UPDATE

National Audit Office's Fiscal Policy Audit and Monitoring Report on the Parliamentary Term

Transcription:

ETUC Position Paper: A European Treasury for Public Investment Adopted at the ETUC Executive Committee on 15-16 March 2017 For many years now, the ETUC has been calling for public investment in Europe as the right trigger for a sound and sustainable recovery. At its 8-9 June 2016 Executive Committee, the ETUC reiterated its request for a revision of the Stability and Growth Pact with regard to its pro-cyclicality and impact on public investment. Henceforth, the European Commission considers that for 2017, a fiscal expansion of up to 0.5% of GDP is desirable across the euro area as a whole. However, this objective is not compatible with the current country-level policy decisions following Country-Specific Recommendations under the Stability and Growth Pact rules on public finances. The ETUC requests a steady level of public investment in every Member State. The following proposal for a European Treasury could be a way to insure a minimum level of public investment, in all Member States, ensuring a positive fiscal stance and limiting the widening of macroeconomic imbalances between Member States. With such a position, the ETUC expects to shape the future debates on the implementation of a fiscal capacity at the European level. Introduction The Five Presidents report, Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union, released in June 2015, calls for fiscal stabilisation tools, and suggests the setting up of a European Treasury. The ETUC considers as positive the European institutions recent efforts to stimulate growth and employment in Europe, especially through the launch of the Investment Plan for Europe (Juncker plan). However, total investment related to the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) is hardly reaching half of the annual investment the Commission considers necessary and is highly concentrated in some Member States. Some of those that suffered severe unemployment and chronic underinvestment have not benefited anywhere near as much as others from the Juncker Plan. Better complementarities between the different European schemes (EFSI and European funds) for economic development should be found, while a more balanced allocation of capital is vital under the Juncker plan. Nonetheless, the ETUC is highly critical of strict respect for the rules embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), even after endorsement by the Council, in February 2016, of the Commission s Communication, published on 13 January 2015, on Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. The ETUC believes that the flexibilities suggested by the European Commission, while softening austerity, are still inadequate considering the state of affairs in some Member States, and reiterates its call for a revision of the SGP, allowing counter-cyclical policies and economic recovery to take place 1. The ETUC regrets that public investment has become one of the first targets for adjustment. We are demanding far greater public investment in infrastructure and research, as well as in universal and high-quality education, healthcare and social services. This is particularly relevant in economic downturns. We express strong 1 See ETUC position on the flexibilities within the Stability and Growth Pact, June 2016. European Trade Union Confederation Luca Visentini, General Secretary Bld du Roi Albert II, 5, B - 1210 Brussels +32 (0)2 224 04 11 etuc@etuc.org www.etuc.org

reservations on public-private partnerships given problematic past experiences in a number of countries 2. This position stems from the ETUC s analysis of the crisis as a consequence of financial deregulation which allowed balance of payment and banking crises and which ultimately resulted in a rise in public debt ratios. In this respect, the imposition of a one-size-fits-all policy, namely austerity policy, could not achieve the expected results. The policies implemented, through structural reforms of labour and product markets, had major negative social consequences and did not allow the economy to recover. Instead of finding a common way out of the crisis, beggar-thy-neighbour polices became a norm. Europe, therefore, is experiencing a significant rise in exports and records a current account surplus, due to a fall in internal demand and unconventional monetary policies. However, imbalances between Member States did not disappear. The economic governance regime was unable to provide the guidance to counter the symmetric shock of the 2007-2008 crisis. Its reinforcement was unable to prevent or diminish the occurrence and the extent of imbalances. As a result, Europe is now trapped in a low-growth, low-employment, low-investment, low-inflation situation while monetary policy is supportive of economic recovery. The ETUC believes that this state of affairs could be overcome by setting up a European Treasury in charge of raising funds to finance public investment and to allow the European economy to recover on a sustainable basis, in a world of global economic and political uncertainty. The lack of public investment There are two reasons why public investment is central for promoting economic growth. First, the private sector, which lacks confidence in the future, is still very risk-adverse and is failing to invest enough. The way to deal with this is for public authorities to show the way by kick-starting public investments. This will increase economic growth and create more confidence in the future, which will stimulate private investment. Secondly, public investment is needed to achieve long-term objectives 3, especially in a time of environmental crisis and digital transformation. Sufficient public investment guarantees that the next generation inherits an economic and infrastructural framework which allows further long-term sustainable growth. The estimates of the hole in public and private investment in Europe in 2013 were between 230 billion and 370 billion. Public investment both in the Euro area and the European Union has been continuously decreasing since 2009. This leaves room for manoeuvre for additional investment. If funded by a European Treasury, this would allow Member States in difficult situations, especially in economic downturn, to avoid cutting public investment. Many studies conducted by international economic institutions are now sensitive to and supportive on the issue. The IMF 4, the OECD 5 and the ECB 6 state that increased public 2 See Sound economic governance depends on strong civil service, IMF official says, in Public Finance International, 13 March 2017. See also http://www.tuac.org/fr/public/e-docs/00/00/0e/d7/document_doc.phtml 3 P. De Grauwe & J. Paulson (2016), Monetary Policy and Public Investment, CEPS. 4 A. Abiad, D. Furceri & P. Topalova Now Is a Good Time to Invest in Infrastructure, IMF direct, 2014. 5 OECD Economic outlook, June 2016. 6 Public investment in Europe, ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 2/2016. 2

infrastructure investment, especially following an economic crisis, can be beneficial to the economy by raising output in the short term, by boosting demand, and by raising productive capacities in the long run. Positive effects can be increased through increased cooperation and continuing accommodative monetary policy. In addition, all the studies find positive effects on debt to GDP ratios. However, the need to respect the principles embedded in the Stability and Growth Pact prevents Member States keeping their level of public investment, or even keeping positive net investment levels, implying a destruction of the public capital stock, while unused capacity in labour and capital is still significant. In addition, for those Member States that have achieved their fiscal goals and/or have more fiscal space to act, the tools of the European Semester can just recommend, not enforce more expansionary fiscal policies. In other words, the negative fiscal stance 7 implied by the policies implemented after 2010 had detrimental effects, did not prevent current account imbalance developments and therefore did not provide the ground for a strong and sustainable recovery 8. A positive fiscal stance has just been recommended by the European Commission 9. For 2017, a fiscal expansion of up to 0.5% of GDP is suggested. However, this objective is not compatible with current country-level policy decisions. Establishing a Treasury would make it possible to achieve such a positive fiscal stance. Finally, as analysed by many studies, increasing public investment, while boosting recovery, would also enable Member States to diminish their public debt to GDP ratios. A European Treasury The Five Presidents report requests such a stabilisation function to rest on the following guiding principles: It should not lead to permanent transfers between countries, nor should it undermine the incentives for sound fiscal policy-making at the national level. The ETUC thinks that a Treasury with such features could be the right tool for future institutional and economic improvement while fixing some economic governance issues 7 While there is no universally accepted definition, the "fiscal stance" is usually understood as the orientation given to fiscal policy by governments' discretionary decisions on tax and expenditure. Traditionally, the fiscal stance is captured by the change in the structural primary balance (i.e. the budget balance corrected for the impact of the economic cycle, non-permanent measures and interest payments), although other indicators can also be used to characterise it (such as indicators based on expenditure growth net of new revenue measures). Depending on whether the government decides to support, reduce or leave unchanged the impact of public finances on the real economy via the increase/reduction of spending, net of new tax measures the fiscal stance is considered "expansionary", "contractionary" or "neutral", respectively. European Commission communication (2016), Towards a positive fiscal stance for the euro area, COM(2016) 727 final. 8 As regards the application of the European fiscal rules under the Stability and Growth Pact, serious consideration should be given to revising the way in which public investment is taken into account, with a view to more favourable treatment of that expenditure. This could be done by replacing investment expenditure with the amortisation of public investments when determining the relevant budget balance. That would amount to adjusting the government s budget balance for net investments. This proposal would facilitate an investment boost, which is highly desirable in the current circumstances of low public investment, weak demand and low inflation, low potential growth and low interest rates. National Bank of Belgium (2016), Press release - Should public investment be boosted?; See also ETUC position on the flexibilities within the Stability and Growth Pact. 9 European Commission communication (2016), Towards a positive fiscal stance for the euro area, COM(2016) 727 final. 3

and boosting public investment, in line with the United Nations Sustainable Developments Goals. The model proposed here closely follows J. Bibow s scheme for correcting a failed economic governance system 10 : the principle would be to create a Treasury 11 as a vehicle to pool future public investment spending in Europe and have it funded by proper European treasury securities. Member State governments would decide the total volume of public investment needed, for example 3% of the region s GDP, and its annual growth rate 12. To ensure that no debt mutualisation would take place, each Member State would be endowed with a grant in proportion to its share of total GDP for investment purpose only. Each Member State is then free to choose in what sectors to invest. Interest payments made by Member States National Treasuries would follow the same rule, ensuring a non-mutualisation of debts. Member States with sufficient fiscal space could still be in a position to increase further their level of public investment, however, at their own national rate of interest. In principle, Member States would see their tax contributions to finance the interest burden on the Treasury debt gradually build up over time as their debt service on national public debt is set to decline simultaneously. In other words, the Treasury would allow for a favourable effect on national primary budgets that should be stimulatory overall. The Treasury would therefore stabilise public investment, the financial sector 13 while facilitating the work of national automatic stabilisers. The point being that attempting to unconditionally balance the budget and reduce national public debts to very low levels without establishing the crucial treasury-central bank axis and organising deficit spending at the centre is not a workable regime solution 14. The European Treasury would allow and enable national treasuries to balance their structural current budgets. Indeed, as a first step, the ETUC requested a revision of the Stability and Growth Pact with regard to its pro-cyclicality and impact on public investment. A European Treasury would also imply a revision of the Stability and Growth Pact and would ensure a minimum level of public investment in all Member States. The concept covering current expenditure would need to be redefined within the proposed scheme as new public investment (excluding investment launched under national financing) and would now be covered by the Treasury. Member States would still be required to abide by all the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, including recent 10 J. Bibow (2013), Lost at sea: The Euro Needs a Euro Treasury, LSE markets group special paper series, special paper n 227. 11 A Treasury at the Euro area level would be the easiest and most straightforward way to go, while a Treasury at the EU level is surely conceivable. An opt in process could be envisaged for non-euro EU Member States. 12 In accordance with the Maastricht criteria assumptions. 13 Normalization of credit spreads and convergence of interest rates across the currency union will also beget important relief for private borrowers. With the Euro Treasury added to the euro regime, the term structure on Euro Treasury debt will become the common benchmark for financial instruments issued by debtors of euro member states irrespective of nationality 14 The current regime envisions member states running (near-) balanced public budgets forever, which would see public debt ratios decline towards (near) zero in the long run. This is a truly impossible endeavour; in J. Bibow (2015), Making the Euro Viable: the Euro Treasury Plan, Levy Economics Institute, Working paper n 842. 4

flexibilities, but applied to current public expenditures only (and nationally funded public investment) as public capital expenditures would form a separate capital budget funded through common Treasury securities. The Treasury turns the golden rule 15 of sound public finances, implying that new public investment should be debt-financed, into the anchor of the European integration process. The Treasury would automatically withhold investment grants in case of non-compliance with the balanced (structural) budget rule as applied to current expenditures (and additional national capital expenditures) and by the full amount of the target missed. Member States would thus have a very strong incentive not to miss out on the investment grant. Finally, the global volume of public investment could be revised upward in case of global recession giving extra margin of manoeuvre for automatic stabilisers to come into effect. The European Stability Mechanism could be integrated in the Treasury as a real backstop to banking crises, and given its direct link with the ECB, could put an end to the bank-sovereign doom-loop. The Treasury will be funded by a debt instrument designed to equal U.S. Treasury securities a debt instrument the ECB can purchase for monetary policy and financial stability purposes. In case of asymmetric shocks, by requiring and enabling the decline of national public debt ratios to very low levels in abidance with the rule of balancing structural current budgets at the national level, automatic stabilisers will have the necessary fiscal space to function freely. Indirectly then, the Treasury contributes to both area-wide and local stabilisation 16. Conclusion In the short term, the establishment of a Treasury would allow Member States to relaunch public investment on sustainable and steady bases. Engaging public investment at the global level and removing public capital expenditure (financed by the Treasury) from public deficits would allow Member States to increase their fiscal space while respecting the rules of the SGP (revised to take account of current expenditure and national investment financing only). The required degree of further consolidation at the national level is therefore diminished. In addition, transitioning from paying high interest on national debt to paying low interest on common debt results in significant overall budgetary relief. This benefit arises rapidly as soon as national debt ratios are seen to be set on favourable trajectories and credit ratings improve. In other words, the Treasury will create a beneficial impact on national primary budgets that should be stimulatory overall 17. 15 See also footnote 7. 16 The Treasury could also be used as the conduit through which member states make or receive temporary fiscal transfers depending on their relative cyclical position vis-à-vis the regional average. Providing a liquidity pool for any temporary mismatches arising from automatic operation of a mutual insurance scheme based on a fixed rule can be most cheaply done through the Treasury issuing Treasury bills. 17 J. Biböw (2015), Making the Euro Viable: the Euro Treasury Plan, Levy Economics Institute, Working paper. 5