Fiscal Policy and the Ethno- Racial Divide: Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay

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Fiscal Policy and the Ethno- Racial Divide: Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay Nora Lustig Tulane University Inter-American Development Bank Washington, DC, November 21, 2013

Commitment to Equity (CEQ) www.commitmentoequity.org 2

CEQ by Ethnicity and Race Bolivia: Paz-Arauco, Grey-Molina, Jimenez and Yañez Brazil: Higgins and Pereira Guatemala: Cabrera, Lustig and Moran (under verification) Uruguay: Bucheli, Rossi and Amabile

Budget Size and Composition Primary and Social Spending as % of GDP 5

Fiscal Policy and Inequality Gini Coefficient by Income Concept 0.64 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.39 Market Income Net Market Income Disposable Income Post-Fiscal Income Final Income Series 1 Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Guatemala Mexico Paraguay Peru Uruguay 6

Fiscal Policy and Poverty Headcount Ratio 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% Series 1 Series 2 Brazil (2009) Mexico (2010) Peru (2009) Uruguay (2009) 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% Market Income Net Market Income Disposable Income Post-Fiscal Income 7

Measuring the Ethno-Racial Divide 1. Poverty: poverty rates by ethnic and racial groups and the ethno-racial composition of the poor 2. Inequality: ratio of income per capita between and the distribution of population within groups 3. Inequality of opportunity: a measure of equalization of incomes across circumstances 4. Equity in Public Services: use of public education and health services by ethnic and racial groups

Poverty Headcount Ratio US2.50ppp/day 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% Boliva Non-Indigenous Boliva Indigenous Brazil White Brazil Pardo Uruguay White Uruguay Afro-Descendants 10.00% 5.00% 0.00% Market Net Market Disposable Post-fiscal

Ethno-Racial Composition of the Population by Income Class 1% (thresholds from Ferreira et al., 2013) 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% Bolivia Non-Indigenous Bolivia Indigenous Brazil White Brazil Pardos Uruguay White Uruguay Afrodesc 0% 0% 0% 0% less 1.25 1.25-2.50 2.50-4.00 4.00-10.00 10.00-50.00 more 50.00 Total

Ethno-Racial Composition of the Population by Income Class Market and Disposable Income less 1.25 1.25-2.50 2.50-4.00 4.00-10.00 10.00-50.00 Bolivia Indigenous Pre-fisc Bolivia Indigenous Post-fisc Brazil Pardos pre-fisc Brazil Pardos Post-fisc Uruguay Afrodesc Pre-fisc Uruguay Afrodes Post-fisc more 50.00 Total 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

Ratio of Income Per Capita Between Ethno-Racial Groups 2.049 2.008 1.954 1.697 1.684 1.617 1.547 1.522 1.522 Market Income Disposable Income Post-Fiscal Income BOLIVA Nonind/Indig BRAZIL White/Afrodes URUGUAY White/Afrodes

Distribution of the Population by Income Class 70% (thresholds from Ferreira et al., 2013) 60% 50% 40% 30% Bolivia Nonindigenous Bolivia Indigenous Brazil White Brazil Pardos Uruguay White Uruguay Afrodesc 20% 10% 0% less 1.25 1.25-2.50 2.50-4.00 4.00-10.00 10.00-50.00 more 50.00

Distribution of the Population by Income Class Market and Disposable Income more 50.00 10.00-50.00 4.00-10.00 2.50-4.00 Bolivia Indig Pre-fisc Bolivia Indig Post-fisc Brazil Pardos pre-fisc Brazil Pardos Post-fisc Uruguay Afrodesc Pre-fisc Uruguay Afrodesc Post-fisc 1.25-2.50 less 1.25 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

Equalizing Opportunities 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 BOLIVIA BRAZIL URUGUAY 0.02 0 Market Net Market Disposable Post-fiscal Final

Assessing Characteristics of Fiscal Progressivity: Taxes: Interventions Progressive if share paid is higher than market income share for ethno-racial group with higher per capita income Regressive if share paid is higher than market income share for ethno-racial group with lower per capita income

Assessing Characteristics of Fiscal Progressivity: Interventions Transfers: Progressive if share received is higher than market income share for ethno-racial group with lower per capita income Progressive in absolute terms if share received is higher than population share for ethno-racial group with lower per capita income Regressive if share received is lower than market income share for ethno-racial group with lower per capita income

BOLIVIA POPULATION NONINDIGENOUS INDIGENOUS 46% 54% MARKET INCOME 57% 43% All Direct Transfers 39% 61% Non-contributory Pensions 39% 61% Flagship CCT 39% 61% Other Direct Transfers 44% 56% Indirect Subsidies Indirect Taxes Net Indirect Taxes Education Health 57% 43% 56% 44% 56% 44% 48% 52% Education: YSP 23% 77% Education: preschool 40% 60% Education: primary 40% 60% Education: secondary 41% 59% all except tertiary 40% 60% Education: tertiary 60% 40% Education: PAN 40% 60% 45% 55% Cajas 53% 47% Public Healt System 43% 57%

BRAZIL WHITE AFRODESCENDANTS Population 48.0% 50.8% Market Income 64.9% 33.5% Direct Taxes Direct Taxes and Contributions to Soc Sec All Direct Transfers 71.4% 27.5% 70.5% 27.7% 55.1% 44.2% CCT 26.6% 72.3% Scholarships 72.2% 27.4% Special Circumst 64.5% 34.7% Unemployment 50.5% 48.9% Other Direct Tra 51.9% 47.6% Indirect Taxes 64.5% 33.9% Net Indirect Transfers 64.7% 34.1% Education 43.5% 55.0% preschool 39.1% 59.9% primary 39.6% 59.4% secondary 40.4% 58.5% Education: all except Education: tertiary 39.7% 59.3% tertiary 59.6% 37.1% Health Educ, Health plus Housing and Urban 44.5% 54.3% 44.0% 54.7%

POPULATION MARKET INCOME Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Net Indirect Taxes In-kind Education In-kind Health URUGUAY All Direct Transfers WHITE AFRODESCENDANT % nat'l % nat'l 95.5% 3.4% 97.2% 1.9% 97.6% 1.7% 92.8% 5.8% CCT 91.9% 6.7% Non-contributory pension 92.5% 6.2% Other Direct Transfers 93.3% 5.3% 97.3% 1.9% 97.3% 1.9% 95.4% 3.7% Education: preschool 94.9% 4.3% Education: primary 94.1% 4.9% Education: secondary 95.9% 3.2% Education: tertiary 98.5% 0.9% 94.9% 3.9%

Assessing Characteristics of Fiscal Scale Effect For poor population: Coverage Per capita transfers Interventions Horizontal inequity For poor population: Incidence of a transfer (tax) higher (lower) for ethno-racial group with lower poverty rates

Bolivia: Post-Fiscal Income wrt Market Income Incidence'of'Post5Fiscal'Income:'Bolivia'' 20.0%& Percent'of'Market'Income'' 15.0%& 10.0%& 5.0%& 0.0%&!5.0%&!10.0%& y&<&1.25& 1.25&<&=&y&<&2.50& 2.50&<=&y&<&4.00& 4.00&<=&y&<&10.00& 10.00&<=&y&<&50.00& 50.00&<=&y& Income'Group' Source: Paz-Arauco et al., 2013 CEQ-IDB. Na/ onal& Non!Indigenous& Indigenous&

Why Ethno-Racial Divide is not Reduced More in Bolivia? The indigenous population has a higher coverage rate and receives a higher per capita transfer on average than the nonindigenous. The largest transfer program in terms of its budget is Renta Dignidad, a noncontributory universal pension for all citizens over 60 years old; in 2009 (year of the survey), this program represented 1.4 percent of GDP (Table Bolivia-8). Because the transfer under this program is practically the same in per capita terms for all individuals of the eligible age, its concentration coefficient is around zero (Figure Bolivia-2).

Why Ethno-Racial Divide is not Reduced More in Bolivia? In other words, the universal nature of the largest cash transfer in Bolivia is one of the reasons why the cash transfers programs are not able to do more to reduce the ethnic divide in terms of poverty rates and the large presence of the indigenous population among the poor.

Why Ethno-Racial Divide is not Reduced More in Bolivia? This is particularly so because Bolivia does not have large-scale anti-poverty programs (such as Bolsa Familia and Oportunidades). In fact, leaving out Renta Dignidad and Benemeritos, the government spends a paltry of.31 percent of GDP in cash transfers (Bono Juancito Pinto and Bono Juana Azurduy) and.21 percent on school feeding programs. Clearly, children are getting the short-end of the stick in Bolivia.

Why Ethno-Racial Divide is not Reduced More in Brazil?

Why Ethno-Racial Divide is not Reduced More in Brazil? Special Circumstances Pensions include social protection programs against illness, disability, widowhood, orphanhood and other adverse shocks that, although they are paid through the formal social security system to which beneficiaries need to be enrolled, individuals can be eligible to receive the benefit even if they have not made contributions to the system (see Table Brazil-8 for a brief description of cash transfers).

Why Ethno-Racial Divide is not Reduced More in Brazil? Special Circumstances Pensions Coverage: is higher for the white population and especially so among the poorest groups. The per capita benefit is also higher for the white population as a whole and all income groups, including the poorest. The white population also benefits more from the Scholarships program primarily because the average per capita transfer is higher. The poorer groups among the white population have not only higher per capita transfers but also higher coverage.

Brazil: Post-Fiscal Income wrt Market Income

Uruguay: the Poster Child Measured in terms of outcomes, direct taxes and cash transfers reduce quite a bit the ethno-racial divide in Uruguay in the (disposable) income space. While poverty rates remain lower for the white population, the distance is shortened substantially. Also, the nonwhites are no longer overrepresented among the ultra-poor and a notable share of the Afrodescendants is moved from the poor to the vulnerable and middle income class.

Uruguay There are no visible ethno-racial inequities in health spending except those related to quality. In education, the inequity is probably associated with higher repetition rates among the nonwhites as well as a lower access to tertiary education.