DG Internal Market and Services Unit H.4 Financial Stability 1049 Brussels Belgium

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European Commission DG Internal Market and Services Unit H.4 Financial Stability 1049 Brussels Belgium markt-nonbanks@ec.europa.eu Chris Barnard Actuary Germany 07 December 2012 Your Ref: Comment letter on Consultation on a Possible Recovery and Resolution Framework for Financial Institutions Other than Banks Dear Sir. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to comment on your Consultation on a Possible Recovery and Resolution Framework for Financial Institutions Other than Banks. I will comment on how this framework could be applied to insurance companies. Insurance companies This consultation evaluates when the failure of a financial institution other than a bank can threaten financial stability. 1 It then considers what arrangements would be appropriate to prevent their failure from compromising financial stability. I agree that a principles-based approach will provide the best outcome for all of the different financial institutions and their businesses. However, it is also important to find consistent solutions for financial institutions, including consistent coverage, triggers and resolution powers, in order to avoid the risk of regulatory arbitrage between the different financial institutions. I would therefore recommend that effective recovery and resolution arrangements should be based fully on substance over form. For example, concerning insurance companies, I agree that insurers may also create risks for financial stability, for example when they are highly interconnected to the rest of the financial system, or when they are highly interconnected to the real economy and are not readily substitutable. 2 It is vitally important that complete, consistent and credible recovery and resolution plans are applied to the different financial institutions and their businesses. 1 The main institutions considered in this respect are financial market infrastructures, such as central counterparties and central securities depositories, and systemic insurance companies. 2 See section 4.1, p.24 of the consultation. Comment_Letter_EC_Recovery_Chris_Barnard_071212 1

I fully agree that a measured approach will be most suitable for traditional insurance businesses. The traditional insurance business model is based on pooling policyholders risks, 3 and increasing size provides greater diversification here. Product design normally includes various buffers and management levers in order to reduce risk, and investment policy is predominantly based on matching assets against liabilities. Economic and market crises rarely generate a run on insurers that banks often face. Insurance companies are also far less interconnected than banks, do not require wholesale funding as premiums are received up-front for claims payable in the future, and carry out few systemically important functions. The excellent report Systemic Risk in Insurance: An analysis of insurance and financial stability by the Geneva Association, 4 concludes that based on the FSB criteria, no insurance companies pose a systemic risk. The report indicates that even hypothetical failures in the more concentrated, interconnected and globally pooled reinsurance market would have a negligible impact on the wider insurance market. 5 Whilst I agree with these conclusions, I would suggest that certain activities do require more attention, including bank-like activities, highly complex financial transactions, for example to hedge complex contracts such as variable annuities, and further derivatives trading on non-insurance balance sheets (see above). I do not want to comment any further on this here, but my strong recommendation would be that effective recovery and resolution planning for traditional insurance companies should be based predominantly on existing and currently proposed regulatory reforms in the insurance sector. I look forward with interest to see how the recovery and resolution framework will develop for non-traditional and non-insurance activities. 3 Insurance is a portfolio-driven business, whereas banking is a transaction-driven business. 4 Available at: http://www.genevaassociation.org/portals/0/geneva_association_systemic_risk_in_insurance_report _March2010.pdf 5 Ibid, p.52: The total loss for the primary insurance industry out of an immediate failure of 20 per cent of reinsurance capacity would be about USD 28 billion representing less than 2 per cent of global primary non-life insurance premium. Comment_Letter_EC_Recovery_Chris_Barnard_071212 2

Answers to specific questions raised by the consultation 1. Are the resolution tools applicable to traditional insurance considered above adequate? Should their articulation and application be further specified and harmonised at EU-level? Yes, the resolution tools applicable to traditional insurance are adequate. 6 2. Do you think that a further framework of measures and powers for authorities, additional to those already applicable to insurers, to resolve systemically relevant insurance companies is needed at EU level? This should be considered, especially where such a framework would reduce friction in crossborder cooperation and potentially reduce resolution costs. 3. In your view, which scenarios/events might lead to the need to resolve a systemically relevant insurance company? Even before that, which types of scenarios systemic insurers and authorities need to be prepared for which may imply the need for recovery actions if not yet resolution? The consultation outlines the types of activities that might lead to the need to resolve a systemically relevant insurance company, particularly in times of financial stress. The main activities are insurance that is highly interconnected with the rest of the financial system, and insurance that is highly interconnected with the real economy and is not readily substitutable. 4. Do you agree with the above objectives for resolution of systemic insurance companies? What other objectives could be relevant? Yes, I agree that protecting policyholders and preserving financial stability are the most important objectives here. 5. Do you think that recovery plans should be developed by systemic insurers and resolution plans by resolution authorities? Do you think that resolution authorities should have the power to request changes in the operation of insurers in order to ensure resolvability? Yes, I agree with these proposals. They will improve risk management and systemic risk mitigation capabilities, and enhance transparency and confidence in the broader financial system. 6. Do you agree that resolution should be triggered when a systemic insurer has reached a point of distress such that there are no realistic prospects of recovery over an appropriate timeframe, when all other intervention measures have been exhausted, and when winding up the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would risk causing financial instability? 6 See for example the cases of Equitable Life (UK) at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/fin_equitable_life.htm and Mannheimer Lebensversicherung AG (Germany) at http://www.protektor-ag.de/english/rescuecompany/94.aspx Comment_Letter_EC_Recovery_Chris_Barnard_071212 3

I agree that resolution should be triggered in such cases. 7. Should these conditions be refined? For example, what would be suitable indicators that could be used for triggering resolution of systemic insurers? Given the complex and evolving nature of insurance business, I believe that resolution of systemic insurers needs to be principles based and on a case-by-case basis. 8. Do you agree that resolution authorities of insurers could have the above powers? Should they have further powers to successfully carry out resolution in relation to systemic insurers? Which ones? Resolution authorities should have further powers to take any action necessary for protecting policyholders and preserving financial stability. 9. Should they be further adapted or specified to the specificities of insurance resolution? See above. 10. Would the tools mentioned above be appropriate for the resolution of systemic insurers? What other tools should be considered and why? These tools would be appropriate for the resolution of systemic insurers. 11. Do you think that, within the EU, resolution colleges should be set up and involved in resolution issues of cross border insurance groups? This idea certainly has some merit. It could help to reduce friction in cross-border cooperation and potentially reduce resolution costs. 12. How could the decision-making process be organized to make sure that swift decisions can be taken? Should this be aligned with the procedures already set out in Title III of Directive 2009/138/EC? It would make sense to use the framework and procedures set out in Title III of Directive 2009/138/EC as a starting point here. 13. Alternatively, do you think that responsibility for resolving systemic insurers should be centralised at EU-level? I am not convinced that this is absolutely necessary. I would prefer an approach aligned with the framework and procedures for group supervision under Solvency II. 14. Do you think that a recognition regime should be defined to enable mutual enforceability of resolution measures? Yes, this would be necessary for complete coverage for resolution measures. Comment_Letter_EC_Recovery_Chris_Barnard_071212 4

15. Do you think that to this end bilateral cooperation agreements could also be signed with third countries? Yes, this should be considered in order to facilitate information sharing and further cooperation with third countries. Yours faithfully Chris Barnard Comment_Letter_EC_Recovery_Chris_Barnard_071212 5