Lecture 14: Taxes. Trevor Gallen. Spring, See Barro Ch. 13

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Transcription:

Lecture 14: Taxes See Barro Ch. 13 Trevor Gallen Spring, 2016 1 / 65

Where are we? Taking stock We have an equilibrium business cycle model We ve started adding government in, but we did so in a crazy way: lump-sum taxes This isn t how we actually raise revenue! We ll try to add more realistic taxes and discuss the distortions they create 2 / 65

Government Revenue 3 / 65

Federal Revenue 4 / 65

State Revenue 5 / 65

Federal and State Revenue Takeaways Customs/import taxes used to be a huge deal Now they are not For Feds, individual income tax and social-insurance taxes are a big deal Seniorage is tiny (why we ignored it last chapter) For states, property taxes, sales taxes are a big deal None of these taxes look remotely like a lump-sum tax 6 / 65

How do income taxes work? The basic idea: Gross income =Income - Personal Exemption - Standard Deduction 7 / 65

How do income taxes work? The basic idea: Gross income =Income - Personal Exemption - Standard Deduction Personal exemption in 2015 is $4000 8 / 65

How do income taxes work? The basic idea: Gross income =Income - Personal Exemption - Standard Deduction Personal exemption in 2015 is $4000 Standard deduction (single) in 2015 is $6300 9 / 65

How do income taxes work? The basic idea: Gross income =Income - Personal Exemption - Standard Deduction Personal exemption in 2015 is $4000 Standard deduction (single) in 2015 is $6300 So if you made $15,000, you are taxed on the last $4,700 10 / 65

How do income taxes work? The basic idea: Gross income =Income - Personal Exemption - Standard Deduction Personal exemption in 2015 is $4000 Standard deduction (single) in 2015 is $6300 So if you made $15,000, you are taxed on the last $4,700 So why are you guys taxed? 11 / 65

How do income taxes work? The basic idea: Gross income =Income - Personal Exemption - Standard Deduction Personal exemption in 2015 is $4000 Standard deduction (single) in 2015 is $6300 So if you made $15,000, you are taxed on the last $4,700 So why are you guys taxed? Payroll taxes! For poorer households, payroll is a bigger deal! 12 / 65

How do income taxes work? The basic idea: Gross income =Income - Personal Exemption - Standard Deduction Personal exemption in 2015 is $4000 Standard deduction (single) in 2015 is $6300 So if you made $15,000, you are taxed on the last $4,700 So why are you guys taxed? Payroll taxes! 6.2% to social security + 6.2% from employer For poorer households, payroll is a bigger deal! 13 / 65

How do income taxes work? The basic idea: Gross income =Income - Personal Exemption - Standard Deduction Personal exemption in 2015 is $4000 Standard deduction (single) in 2015 is $6300 So if you made $15,000, you are taxed on the last $4,700 So why are you guys taxed? Payroll taxes! 6.2% to social security + 6.2% from employer 1.45% to Medicare + 1.45% from employer For poorer households, payroll is a bigger deal! 14 / 65

Average and Marginal Both average and marginal tax rates matter Average tax rate answers the question how much do I take home if I earn $100 total? Marginal tax rate answers the question if I work one more hour, how much do I get to keep? Imagine you re working 2000 hours at $10/hour and thinking about adding another hour. Think about two scenarios: 1. Your average tax rate is 20% but your marginal tax rate is 0%. 2. Your average tax rate is 20% but your marginal tax rate is 50% In both your current income is (1 0.2) $20, 000 = $16, 000. But in one you give up an hour of leisure for $10, in the other you give up an hour of leisure for $5 15 / 65

What are the tax brackets for the individual income tax? For singles: Taxes as a function of income Initial AGI Income Payroll Marginal Average Income Tax Tax Income Income Tax Rate Tax Rate 10,300 0 0 1,575 0% 0% 19,525 9,225 922 2,987 10% 10% 47,750 37,450 5,156 7,306 15% 14% 101,050 90,750 18,481 15,460 25% 20% 199,600 189,300 46,075 17,595 28% 24% 421,800 411,500 119,401 27,945 33% 29% 423,500 413,200 119,996 27,945 35% 29% 1,010,300 1,000,000 352,369 27,945 39.60% 35% Note: this table is a sketch, I didn t include some nitty-gritty rules like personal exemption phase-out. 16 / 65

Marginal Income Tax Rates 17 / 65

Marginal Income + Payroll Tax Rates 18 / 65

Implicit Marginal Tax Rates 19 / 65

Income tax returns are very skewed! Percent of Taxes Paid by Top X% Income Households Year Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Top 25% Top 50% 1970 16.7% 31.4% 41.8% 62.2% 83.0% 7.4 18.3 28.0 49.4 74.7 1980 17.4% 33.7% 45.0% 66.6% 87.0% 7.8 19.2 29.1 51.4 76.7 1990 25.1% 43.6% 55.4% 77.0% 94.2% 14.0 27.6 38.8 62.1 85.0 2000 37.4% 56.5% 67.3% 84.0% 96.1% 20.8 35.3 46.0 67.2 87.0 Numbers in black are percent of total income taxes paid 20 / 65

Income tax returns are very skewed! Percent of Taxes Paid by Top X% Income Households Year Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Top 25% Top 50% 1970 16.7% 31.4% 41.8% 62.2% 83.0% 7.4 18.3 28.0 49.4 74.7 1980 17.4% 33.7% 45.0% 66.6% 87.0% 7.8 19.2 29.1 51.4 76.7 1990 25.1% 43.6% 55.4% 77.0% 94.2% 14.0 27.6 38.8 62.1 85.0 2000 37.4% 56.5% 67.3% 84.0% 96.1% 20.8 35.3 46.0 67.2 87.0 Numbers in black are percent of total income taxes paid Numbers in red are percent of income earned 21 / 65

Takeaways Taxes aren t lump-sum: they change based on income 22 / 65

Takeaways Taxes aren t lump-sum: they change based on income Taxes are graduated, meaning they increase with income: marginal tax rates rise with income 23 / 65

Takeaways Taxes aren t lump-sum: they change based on income Taxes are graduated, meaning they increase with income: marginal tax rates rise with income Average tax rates follow marginal tax rates slowly 24 / 65

Takeaways Taxes aren t lump-sum: they change based on income Taxes are graduated, meaning they increase with income: marginal tax rates rise with income Average tax rates follow marginal tax rates slowly Marginal tax rates are what matter for most labor market decisions 25 / 65

Takeaways Taxes aren t lump-sum: they change based on income Taxes are graduated, meaning they increase with income: marginal tax rates rise with income Average tax rates follow marginal tax rates slowly Marginal tax rates are what matter for most labor market decisions In order to understand government revenues we need to recognize big skew in income and taxes (can t just use the average agent) 26 / 65

Takeaways Taxes aren t lump-sum: they change based on income Taxes are graduated, meaning they increase with income: marginal tax rates rise with income Average tax rates follow marginal tax rates slowly Marginal tax rates are what matter for most labor market decisions In order to understand government revenues we need to recognize big skew in income and taxes (can t just use the average agent) Average tax rates matter for government revenues (holding constant labor market behavior) 27 / 65

Putting more realistic taxes in the model Let s look at labor income taxes Before we had, in a one-period budget constraint: C + B P + K = w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V T 28 / 65

Putting more realistic taxes in the model Let s look at labor income taxes Before we had, in a one-period budget constraint: C + B P + K = w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V T Now we have taxes that are a function of your labor income: C + B P + K = w ( ) B ( w ) P L + r P + K + V T P L Where we could have something like: T ( w P L) w = τ w P L, taking τ w dollars for every extra dollar of labor income you earn 29 / 65

Putting more realistic taxes in the model Let s look at labor income taxes Before we had, in a one-period budget constraint: C + B P + K = w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V T Now we have taxes that are a function of your labor income: C + B P + K = w ( ) B ( w ) P L + r P + K + V T P L Where we could have something like: T ( w P L) w = τ w P L, taking τ w dollars for every extra dollar of labor income you earn Plugging this in, we would get: C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w P L + r ( ) B P + K + V 30 / 65

Putting more realistic taxes in the model Let s look at labor income taxes Before we had, in a one-period budget constraint: C + B P + K = w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V T Now we have taxes that are a function of your labor income: C + B P + K = w ( ) B ( w ) P L + r P + K + V T P L Where we could have something like: T ( w P L) w = τ w P L, taking τ w dollars for every extra dollar of labor income you earn Plugging this in, we would get: C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w P L + r ( ) B P + K + V In other words, as far as you re concerned, higher taxes just look like a lower wage 31 / 65

Two important questions 1. How does an increase in government expenditures impact labor market behavior? 2. How does an increase in government transfers impact labor market behavior? 32 / 65

An increase in government expenditures What happens to behavior when G (government expenditures) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w P L + r ( ) B P + K + V 33 / 65

An increase in government expenditures What happens to behavior when G (government expenditures) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w P L + r τ w must go up to finance more expenditures ( ) B P + K + V 34 / 65

An increase in government expenditures What happens to behavior when G (government expenditures) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w P L + r ( ) B P + K + V τ w must go up to finance more expenditures So households have a lower wage: how does their labor change? 35 / 65

An increase in government expenditures What happens to behavior when G (government expenditures) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w P L + r ( ) B P + K + V τ w must go up to finance more expenditures So households have a lower wage: how does their labor change? Income effect says work more, substitution effect says work less: ambiguous in sign 36 / 65

An increase in government expenditures What happens to behavior when G (government expenditures) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w P L + r ( ) B P + K + V τ w must go up to finance more expenditures So households have a lower wage: how does their labor change? Income effect says work more, substitution effect says work less: ambiguous in sign From what we ve seen in the time series, we think this is around zero 37 / 65

An increase in government expenditures What happens to behavior when G (government expenditures) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w P L + r ( ) B P + K + V τ w must go up to finance more expenditures So households have a lower wage: how does their labor change? Income effect says work more, substitution effect says work less: ambiguous in sign From what we ve seen in the time series, we think this is around zero But that s for the whole wage! A marginal change is mostly substitution! 38 / 65

An increase in government expenditures What happens to behavior when G (government expenditures) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w P L + r ( ) B P + K + V τ w must go up to finance more expenditures So households have a lower wage: how does their labor change? Income effect says work more, substitution effect says work less: ambiguous in sign From what we ve seen in the time series, we think this is around zero But that s for the whole wage! A marginal change is mostly substitution! An average rise in taxes spent on government expenditures small effect, a marginal rise has a bigger (negative) effect 39 / 65

An increase in government transfers What happens to behavior when V (government transfers) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V 40 / 65

An increase in government transfers What happens to behavior when V (government transfers) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V τ w must go up to finance more expenditures 41 / 65

An increase in government transfers What happens to behavior when V (government transfers) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V τ w must go up to finance more expenditures But transfers also increases! So households have a lower wage and higher property income: how does their labor change? 42 / 65

An increase in government transfers What happens to behavior when V (government transfers) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V τ w must go up to finance more expenditures But transfers also increases! So households have a lower wage and higher property income: how does their labor change? Income effect says work more, substitution effect says work less: ambiguous in sign (call it zero, from before) 43 / 65

An increase in government transfers What happens to behavior when V (government transfers) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V τ w must go up to finance more expenditures But transfers also increases! So households have a lower wage and higher property income: how does their labor change? Income effect says work more, substitution effect says work less: ambiguous in sign (call it zero, from before) Income effect of more transfers says work less 44 / 65

An increase in government transfers What happens to behavior when V (government transfers) increases? C + B P + K = (1 τ w ) w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V τ w must go up to finance more expenditures But transfers also increases! So households have a lower wage and higher property income: how does their labor change? Income effect says work more, substitution effect says work less: ambiguous in sign (call it zero, from before) Income effect of more transfers says work less So the total effect is to work less! 45 / 65

Summing up The effect of taxes has an unambiguously negative substitution effect on labor If the taxes are used to increase transfers then there is no (or only a small) income effect, and the negative substitution effect dominates If the taxes are used to finance government transfers, then there is also a income effect that increases labor supply, partially offsetting the substitution effect The substitution effect is bigger when it s a marginal tax rate change rather than an average tax rate change, because income changes less when it s a marginal tax rate change When thinking about increasing labor income taxes, we ll typically think about the substitution effect dominating This yields a decline in the effective wage rate, so a decline in labor supply 46 / 65

For distortionary taxation Little Inc, Big Substitution: Labor Marginal How spent? Transfers Little income effect, big substitution effect: Labor Expenditure Marginal or average? Average Big Inc, Big Substitution: Labor? 47 / 65

Increase in the Labor-Income Tax Rate: Labor Supply 48 / 65

Increase in the Labor-Income Tax Rate: Capital Services 49 / 65

What about a tax on asset income? So far we ve only looked at labor income taxation Depending on what distortionary tax we use and how we spend it, we think it either decreases or keeps labor the same What about taxes on asset income? Capital gains taxes, for instance, property taxes, estate tax? C + B P + K = w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V T 50 / 65

What about a tax on asset income? So far we ve only looked at labor income taxation Depending on what distortionary tax we use and how we spend it, we think it either decreases or keeps labor the same What about taxes on asset income? Capital gains taxes, for instance, property taxes, estate tax? C + B P + K = w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V T Labor income taxes hit wages 51 / 65

What about a tax on asset income? So far we ve only looked at labor income taxation Depending on what distortionary tax we use and how we spend it, we think it either decreases or keeps labor the same What about taxes on asset income? Capital gains taxes, for instance, property taxes, estate tax? C + B P + K = w ( ) B P L + r P + K + V T Labor income taxes hit wages Capital income taxes hit returns 52 / 65

Taxing asset income-i Before, I gave up $1 and get back $(1 + r) back tomorrow 53 / 65

Taxing asset income-i Before, I gave up $1 and get back $(1 + r) back tomorrow Now, I ll give up $1 and get back $(1 + r τr) 54 / 65

Taxing asset income-i Before, I gave up $1 and get back $(1 + r) back tomorrow Now, I ll give up $1 and get back $(1 + r τr) What? What are we taxing here? Shouldn t it be (1 + r)(1 τ k )? 55 / 65

Taxing asset income-i Before, I gave up $1 and get back $(1 + r) back tomorrow Now, I ll give up $1 and get back $(1 + r τr) What? What are we taxing here? Shouldn t it be (1 + r)(1 τ k )? It depends. The first taxes gross capital income, while the second taxes net. Most countries do the latter. 56 / 65

Taxing asset income-i Before, I gave up $1 and get back $(1 + r) back tomorrow Now, I ll give up $1 and get back $(1 + r τr) What? What are we taxing here? Shouldn t it be (1 + r)(1 τ k )? It depends. The first taxes gross capital income, while the second taxes net. Most countries do the latter. So we re just hitting r with our tax. How does this effect behavior? What do interest rates control? Interest rates cause us to defer consumption Interest rates tell us how much capital to utilize 57 / 65

Asset income tax on consumption Effect of a tax (holding the interest rate constant!) are pretty clear Save less today Consume more today Consume less in the future 58 / 65

Asset income tax on capital utilization Before, we chose to maximize: Now, we have to maximize: Net rate of return = R P κ δ(κ) (1 τ k )Net rate of return = (1 τ k ) ( ) R P κ δ(κ) 59 / 65

Asset income tax on capital utilization Before, we chose to maximize: Now, we have to maximize: Net rate of return = R P κ δ(κ) (1 τ k )Net rate of return = (1 τ k ) ( ) R P κ δ(κ) How does our choice change? How to we maximize this object? 60 / 65

Asset income tax on capital utilization Before, we chose to maximize: Now, we have to maximize: Net rate of return = R P κ δ(κ) (1 τ k )Net rate of return = (1 τ k ) ( ) R P κ δ(κ) How does our choice change? How to we maximize this object? You can t change anything by choosing κ differently! The maximum is exactly the same 61 / 65

Asset income tax on capital utilization Before, we chose to maximize: Now, we have to maximize: Net rate of return = R P κ δ(κ) (1 τ k )Net rate of return = (1 τ k ) ( ) R P κ δ(κ) How does our choice change? How to we maximize this object? You can t change anything by choosing κ differently! The maximum is exactly the same Statutorially, the capital income tax doesn t fall on demand, so if supply isn t changing neither is demand 62 / 65

Asset income tax on capital utilization Before, we chose to maximize: Now, we have to maximize: Net rate of return = R P κ δ(κ) (1 τ k )Net rate of return = (1 τ k ) ( ) R P κ δ(κ) How does our choice change? How to we maximize this object? You can t change anything by choosing κ differently! The maximum is exactly the same Statutorially, the capital income tax doesn t fall on demand, so if supply isn t changing neither is demand Nothing changes in capital markets! 63 / 65

Summarizing asset taxes Capital utilization doesn t change But households face lower interest rates They save less, consume more In macroeconomy, C or C(?), I (save less) 64 / 65

Taxes Chapters 12 and 13 looked at different forms of taxation and spending When you re thinking about how taxes change behavior, you should think about: Is the government spending it on expenditures or transfers? Is it a permanent tax hike or a temporary one? Am I talking about labor, savings/investment, or consumption behavior? Is it lump-sum, an average/across-the-board tax hike, or a marginal tax hike? Is the tax on consumption, labor, or capital? 65 / 65