International Social Security Association Fourteenth International Conference of Social Security Actuaries and Statisticians Mexico City, 23-25 September 2003 Minimum pension guarantees Fiscal expenditure and the Chilean social security system: A State guarantee for minimum Director of Research and Studies Social Security Research, Study and Development Corporation Chile ISSA/ACT/CONF/14/4(a)
Minimum pension guarantees Fiscal expenditure and the Chilean social security system: A State guarantee for minimum Director of Research and Studies Social Security Research, Study and Development Corporation Chile Summary The Chilean social security system in force since 1981 provides for to be financed by workers contributions paid into a personal account together with the return on those contributions. However in case these individual accounts are not enough to fund a minimum pension, the State acts as guarantor, helping to fund the pension when the account is depleted. This expenditure is one of the permanent components of government expenditure on social security. This paper provides a brief description of the Chilean social security system, enumerates those items of public expenditure relating to social security, and shows their cost in relation to gross national product (GNP). In this way, and on the basis of various other studies, it projects government expenditure on social security for the coming years. Finally, in order to reduce the government s risk, it is proposed that the government enter into a contract with insurance companies to cover the risk represented by future expenditure on minimum ; an unemployment insurance scheme is also proposed to cover contributions based on a minimum income for unemployed workers, so as to prevent subsequent funding shortfalls in individuals retirement accounts. 1. The Chilean pension system The current Chilean pension system came into force in November 1980 with the publication of Decree-Law No. 3500. It encompasses old age, disability and survivors benefits on the basis of compulsory personal capitalization, whereby the worker is responsible for building up his or her own pension, without prejudice to the regulatory and subsidiary guarantor role taken on by the State. The following are the main principles and features of the system: personal savings with constitutionally protected private ownership right over them; solidarity; universality;
2 freedom of choice; management by private concerns who are authorized to market their services to potential clients. The State has a regulatory role through the Office of the Regulator of Pension Fund Managers (Superintendencia de Administración de Fondos Provisionales (AFP)) and a subsidiary role as the ultimate guarantor of the system, which is operationalized as follows: it is responsible for the continuing distributory obligations of the old system through the Social Security Normalization Institute (Instituto de Normalización Previsional (INP)); it continues to operate the Armed Forces and Police (Fuerzas Armadas y Carabineros ()) Pension Funds, which were exempted from the reform; it funds, through the payment of "recognition bonds", the entitlements earned by workers under the old system who changed to the new one; it oversees the fulfilment of minimum returns required of the system, covered in advance by a return fluctuation reserve fund 1 and a legal provision fund 2 maintained by the private managers; it acts as guarantor in case of a fund manager s bankruptcy; 3 it is the mechanism of solidarity, through the guarantee of a minimum pension, and of redistribution through welfare. 2. The State guarantee of a minimum pension The State guarantees a minimum pension so long as the registered worker s legal obligations have all been complied with and if the sum of all his or her taxable, income and remuneration is equal to less than the minimum pension. This guarantee comes into play if the balance of the private capitalization account reaches zero in the case of pensioners affiliated under the early retirement and temporary income mechanism, or if the pension contracted falls below the minimum in the case of an annuity. To qualify for a minimum pension the age limit is 60 for women and 65 for men, plus twenty years of contributions in any of the social security schemes. To qualify for disability or survivors, ten years of contributions to any scheme, or two years contributions out of the previous five, are required. Table 1 shows the amounts for guaranteed minimum. 1 The return fluctuation reserve fund is made up from excess income return earned by the pension fund as stipulated under current rules. 2 Managers are required to keep in cash a legal provision fund of 1 % of assets to cover possible shortfalls in relation to the minimum return. 3 If a manager ceases payments or goes into bankruptcy, the State guarantees the following: additional contributions in case a member becomes disabled or dies; contributions; disability based on a preliminary certification, and the death benefit. Furthermore, if an insurance company ceases payments or goes into bankruptcy, the State guarantees lifelong income up to 100 % of the minimum pension plus 75 % of the excess over that amount up to a maximum of 45 UF (unidades de fomento) per month per pensioner or beneficiary (a UF is an inflation-adjusted unit of account, valued at USD1.75 as of May 2003).
3 Table 1. Value of the minimum guaranteed pension as currently in force Beneficiary/ benefit Under 70 years of age Minimum pension for beneficiaries without State guarantee entitlement Final pension for beneficiaries with State guarantee entitlement 70 years of age and over Minimum pension for beneficiaries without State guarantee entitlement Final pension for beneficiaries with State guarantee entitlement USD Old age or disability 108.1 108.1 118.2 118.2 Full disability pension for widow and widower without 64.9 108.1 70.9 118.2 pensionable children Partial disability pension for widower without 46.5 100.6 50.8 110.7 pensionable children Full disability pension for widow and widower with 54.1 91.9 59.1 100.5 pensionable children Partial disability pension for widower with 38.9 85.4 42.6 94.0 pensionable children Unmarried mothers with non-pensionable 38.9 64.9 42.6 70.9 children Unmarried mothers with pensionable 32.4 55.2 35.5 6 children Sons or daughters under 16.2 16.2 24 years of age Totally disabled son or daughter over 24 years of 16.2 16.2 17.7 17.7 age Partially disabled son or daughter over 24 years of 11.9 12.4 13.0 13.5 age Mother or father 54.1 58.7 59.1 63.8 Note: The final pension corresponds to the minimum pension plus bonuses and increments granted under Laws 19,454; 19,539 and 19,578. The exchange rate used was the average for 2002 of CLP (Chilean pesos) 688.94 to the USD.
4 3. Overall public expenditure on the system The reform of the Chilean system was a structural solution to the growing deficit inherited over decades as a result of a set of norms that encouraged evasion of contributions and abuse of benefits. However, although this dealt with the growing deficit of the old system, it did not spare the State the burden of its debts, nor did it enable it to circumvent the expenditure involved in its back-up role as guarantor of last resort role under the new system. In this context four components of public expenditure can be identified: the operational deficit of the reformed distribution scheme; the assumption by the State of responsibility for the entitlements of people who switched to the new system; the preservation of the FFAA benefits system; the component arising from the State s back-up role in the new system, namely the minimum guaranteed pension together with the welfare. The two first components consist of expenditure arising from the transitional phase, while the others will remain in place permanently. Graphics 1 and 2 and Tables 2 and 3 summarize the amounts involved under each heading listed above, as a proportion of GDP and of total expenditure on. Graphic 1. Public sector social security deficit (percentage of GDP) 8.0 % 7.0 % Minimum Welfare Recognition bonds Operational deficit 6.0 % 5.0 % 4.0 % 3.0 % 2.0 % 1.0 % % 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 Percentage of GDP Sources: Dirección de Presupuestos, Superintendencia de AFP, Central Bank of Chile, INP.
5 Table 2. Reformed pension system déficit of the Chilean public sector as percentage of GDP Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1.6 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.3 Operational deficit 1.8 3.0 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.0 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.7 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 Recognition bonds % 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 Welfare 0.5 0.5 0.5 Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 5 6 Total 3.7 5.5 6.5 6.8 6.3 5.9 5.5 4.9 4.7 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.4 Sources: Dirección de Presupuestos, Superintendencia de AFP, Central Bank of Chile, INP. Graphic 2. Pension deficit of the public sector 100 % 80 % 60 % 40 % 20 % 0 % 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 Percentage share Minimum Welfare Recognition bonds Operational deficit Sources: Dirección de Presupuestos, Superintendencia de AFP, Central Bank of Chile, INP.
6 Table 3. Reformed pension system deficit of the Chilean public sector (share of participants) Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 43.2 36.4 32.3 32.5 30.2 32.2 30.9 28.5 27.6 25.9 24.3 25.9 26.3 25.4 25.2 24.9 24.7 23.6 22.4 22.9 21.5 22.1 Operational deficit 48.6 54.5 58.5 56.2 57.1 54.2 54.5 54.9 57.3 58.5 60.9 57.9 56.2 55.0 53.9 54.5 53.4 53.1 52.5 51.1 50.1 49.8 Recognition bonds % 1.8 3.1 3.6 4.8 5.1 7.3 8.5 8.7 9.7 8.5 10.1 11.6 13.1 14.0 14.0 15.4 16.3 17.7 18.2 2 19.6 Welfare 8.1 7.3 6.2 7.7 7.9 8.5 7.3 8.1 6.4 5.7 6.1 5.9 5.7 6.3 6.6 6.2 6.2 6.5 6.8 7.1 7.2 7.4 Minimum 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 Total Sources: Dirección de Presupuestos, Superintendencia de AFP, Central Bank of Chile, INP. It can be seen that the transitional expenditures represent some 70 % of public expenditure on the pension system. On the other hand, expenditure arising from the State s back-up role have since the beginning of the new system been less than 10 % of the fiscal deficit, and the expenditure on the guaranteed minimum only passed 1 % in 2002. The level of the minimum pension is established at the discretion of the government. This type of guarantee also applies to the modified former distributory system, which is accounted for in the transitional operational deficit, so that the figures shown here only cover expenditure related to the deficit of the personal capitalization accounts. As Graphic 1 and Table 1 show, it only began to increase beyond 1 % of GDP in the 1990s, rising to 37 % and reaching 58 % in 2002. However, the forward projections of the deficit under this heading are highly relevant, since in the long run it could become the most important component of pension expenditure. 4. Projections of overall public expenditure on the system The projection presented here, and summarized in Graphic 3 and Tables 4 and 5, is based on the work of the Central Bank economists Herman Bennett and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (2001).
7 Graphic 3. Projected deficit (percentage of GDP) 6.0 % 5.0 % Minimum Welfare Recognition bonds Operational deficit 4.0 % 3.0 % 2.0 % 1.0 % % 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Percentage of GDP 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 Source: Bennet and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001. Graphic 3 shows that public expenditure on is projected to fall steadily from 5.5 % of GDP in 2003 to 3.22 % in 2030 due to the decline of transitional items of expenditure, which in the case of the recognition bonds will disappear altogether around 2026. Note that these last are finite in time and on a declining trend, so that the pressure they exert on public expenditure on social security in the future is correspondingly reduced, as is the margin of error of estimates of the present value of future debt. Table 4. Projected liabilities (public debt) of the Chilean reformed pension system (percentage of GDP) Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 1 Operational deficit 2.70 2.60 2.50 2.44 2.34 2.24 2.14 2.04 1.90 1.82 1.70 1.63 1.60 1.50 1.40 1.33 1.10 1.03 Recognition bonds % 1.06 2 8 1.30 1.32 1.34 1.32 4 1.14 1.00 0.93 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0 0.23 Welfare Minimum 6 7 8 9 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.28 1 5 8 1 5 0.50 0.55 Total 5.42 5.49 5.46 5.43 5.36 5.30 5.20 5.05 4.89 4.78 4.55 4.44 4.31 4.15 3.98 3.84 3.66 3.50 3.41
8 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 1.00 0.90 0.84 0.78 0.70 0.63 0.60 0.50 7 4 0.20 0.13 0.10 7 4 2 0 0 0 0 0.61 0.66 0.73 0.79 0.86 0.92 0.99 1.05 1.11 1.18 3.41 3.29 3.27 3.24 3.20 3.17 3.19 3.15 3.17 3.22 Source: Bennet and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001. Table 5. Reformed pension system deficit of the Chilean public sector (share of participants) Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 21.9 22.0 22.1 22.4 22.6 23.1 23.8 24.5 25.1 26.3 27.0 27.8 28.9 30.2 31.3 33.0 34.3 35.1 35.2 36.4 36.7 37.0 37.5 37.8 37.6 38.0 37.8 37.3 Operational deficit 47.4 45.8 44.9 43.7 42.3 4 4 38.8 38.1 37.3 36.7 37.1 36.2 35.2 34.7 32.8 31.4 30.2 29.3 27.3 25.7 24.1 21.9 19.8 18.7 15.9 14.6 13.7 Recognition bonds % 22.2 23.4 23.9 24.6 25.3 25.4 24.6 24.5 23.9 22.0 20.9 18.6 16.9 15.1 13.0 10.9 8.6 6.7 5.9 3.9 3.1 2.2 1.3 0.6 Welfare 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.2 8.4 8.8 9.0 9.3 9.6 10.1 1 10.9 11.4 11.7 11.7 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.5 12.6 12.5 12.7 12.6 12.4 Minimum 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.3 3.9 4.6 5.6 6.3 7.2 8.3 9.5 10.6 12.4 14.3 16.2 17.9 20.2 22.3 24.4 26.8 29.1 31.1 33.4 34.9 36.6 Total Source: Bennet and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001. For their part, the size of the permanent components of the deficit, because they will develop over a longer period or even for ever, is a central issue for the stability of fiscal policy and for an estimation of the margin of safety available to the capitalization system. In order to emphasize this point the projections are presented in Graphic 4. As can be seen, the only item of expenditure which increases as a proportion of GDP over the long run is the expenditure on the guaranteed minimum pension, rising from 0.1 % in
9 2002 to 1.18 % in 2030, by when it will represent 36.6 % of total public sector expenditure. Graphic 4. Projected permanent deficit 2002-2030 Percentage of GDP 2.1 % 1.8 % 1.5 % % 0.9 % 0.6 % % % Welfare Minimum 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 Source: Bennet and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001. It is important to note that, as Bennett and Schmidt-Hebbel point out, the projection of the guaranteed minimum pension is the most uncertain element of their projection, since its level is at the discretion of the government, and also because of uncertainty as to the strategic behaviour of the potential beneficiaries throughout their working life, given the moral hazard which arises from this kind of State guarantee, in addition to the intervening effects of other factors which influence the projection and which we shall now consider. 5. Other studies Studies on the subject of guaranteed minimum in the Chilean case vary in the methodology used, in the period covered by their estimates and in the assumptions on which their projections are based. It is particularly important to note that the choice of period covered will have an important effect on the calculation and comparison of current annualized values, given the upward trend of expenditure. Table 6 summarizes the methodology, main assumptions and results in terms of annualized present value of the studies surveyed. It is worth stating that none of these studies, nor the present study, takes into account recent changes in the industry, such as multifund system and the possibility of making individual, and in the near future collective, additional voluntary savings. Clearly these two recent changes complicate even further the estimation of fiscal deficits generated by the guaranteed minimum. However, their potential effect on the
10 estimates of profitability and the stock of funds in contributors individual accounts is positive and, therefore, would bring about a reduction in the estimates provided of future deficits. Table 6. Projected public sector déficit owing to the Chilean pension system Benet and Schmidt- Hebbel Ortúzar Wagner Zurita Methodology Actuarial Actuarial Actuarial Assumptions Value of the minimum pension Growth of real wages Contributions density Return on the fund Results Range of years of projection Present value of the annual deficit 75 % of minimum wage 75 % of minimum wage 80 % of minimum wage Insurance simulation 75 % of minimum wage Arenas de Mesa and Marcel Actuarial 75 % of minimum wage 3 % p.a. 2 % p.a. 2 % p.a. 0 % 3 % p.a. 70 % 80 % 61 % men 56 % women 5,5 % 4,0 % 5-3 % 2000-2030 1986-2016 0,47 % of GDP 0,193 % of GDP Based on membership as of 1990 0,13-0,58 % of GDP 95 % 65 % 5 % at a 4 a 7 % volatility Based on membership as of September 1993 0,31-0,38 % of GDP 4,0 % 2000-2010 0,25 % of GDP Sources: Benet and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001; Ortúzar, 1986; Wagner, 1991; Zurita, 1994; and Arenas de Mesa and Marcel, 1999. 6. Factors determining the level of the minimum pension To summarize: the following is a list of the parameters taken into account when estimating the level of guaranteed minimum, together with their determinants. level of the minimum wage: set by the government; growth of wages: depends on the evolution of the economy and to some extent determines the level of the minimum wage; the density of contributions: this depends on the individual contributor and is influenced, inter alia, by periods of unemployment; the rate of return of pension funds: depends on the type of fund in which contributions are invested; commissions charged by fund managers: depends on market conditions; rate of contributions: stipulated by law; retirement age: stipulated by law; gender: gender differences in the retirement age, in life expectancy and in average wages; pensioners life expectancy: according to life tables, and may change in the long run. recognition bonds; disability rates (percentages) and sample of contribution; underdeclaration of income, arising from the moral hazards inherent in this type of guarantee;
11 opportunities to invest in voluntary individual and collective schemes; the effect on rates of return on accumulated funds arising from the facility to choose investment funds options (multifondos) and to shift savings between them. 7. Methods for estimating the burden arising from the State guarantee of a minimum pension The present institutional arrangement in force in Chile with respect to minimum makes the State responsible for their funding, creating a contingent and implicit long term commitment to provide the corresponding resources. It is fundamental that a sufficiently clear identification, evaluation and explication of this type of future public sector obligation is made, if future fiscal commitments and responsibilities are to be correctly foreseen, and if the following risks are to be averted: The sacrifice of government funds allocated to other purposes. That is, once the minimum levels of benefit have been fixed, the demands of current social security expenditure could eventually force transfers to be made from other items of public expenditure so as to achieve the primary purpose of maintaining adequate fiscal discipline. Risk of a reduction in social security benefits. Once again, the government, in order to achieve its primary objective of fiscal discipline, may adjust social security expenditure exercising its discretion in deciding the level of defined benefits. The risk that the government may wish to preserve an underlying source of tax increases. On the assumption of a budget constrain over time, the present value of government expenditure should equal its income, from which it follows that poor measurement, or simply a failure to take into account future deficits arising from implicit or contingent factors, would inevitably lead to the need to increase savings by private agents. A significant advance in the formal definition and attribution of budget responsibilities over time has been made in Chile by using the public sector structural account methodology. This methodology "brings budget accounting closer into line with the concept of the net evolution of the public sector s resources (variación patrimonial neta (VPN)), taking into account all operations which bring about changes in the public sector s resource base and, in financial terms, the net effect of asset transactions between the public sector and the private sector, even when these do not strictly constitute a public debt". 4 However, although this procedure constitutes an important advance, it still does not produce a tangible contingency reserve fund, which is the traditional method used to ensure that the State can meet its minimum pension obligations, nor does it produce an institutionalized insurance mechanism, thus leaving open a significant margin of risk arising from the considerations enumerated above. 4 Marcel, M.; Tokman, M.; Valdés, R.; Benavides, P. 2001. "Balance Estructural del Gobierno Central, Metodología y Estimaciones para Chile: 1987-2000", Estudios de Finanzas Públicas, September.
12 8. Establishment of an institutionalized insurance system The minimum pension guarantee can be treated as an insurance programme. 5 An efficient way of systematizing the measurement and of rendering explicit future obligations arising from the payment of the minimum guaranteed pension would be to draw up a fixed term insurance contract with private insurance companies. As is well known, insurance companies are expert in the measurement of the most varied types of risk. Furthermore, the transfer to them of the management of potential pension payments for the minimum guaranteed "floor", would constitute a demonstration that the highest standard methods have been used in the quantitative estimation of deficits which are currently the responsibility of the State. This evaluation exercise would obviously involve setting clear limits to the risks associated with current actuarial calculations of future deficits, requiring explanation and publication of the factors influencing future pension payments. For example, the future trend of wages and of the procedures governing adjustments in the to be guaranteed would have to be established, and this in turn would require their subjection to an explicit set of rules. Such a set of rules would externalize risks inherent in the discretionary element in current determination of the level of minimum, namely political risk, as well as risks arising from interest group pressures which change over time. At the same time, by transferring to the insurance companies the responsibility and the risk arising from the minimum pension guarantee, a contingent implicit fiscal deficit whose size is unknown due to errors of measurement and to the discretionary element in public expenditure, would be transformed into an annual premium payment known in advance, and fixed for defined periods and terms. This method would also have indirect effects, in addition to the direct effect of stabilizing the system by improving calculation methods and, even more importantly, for the beneficiaries, by rendering the benefits and expenses of the system public and predictable. Indeed, once the social return of covering minimum guaranteed benefits (the objective of the programme) has been assured through an insurance system, the public funds transferred as premiums to the insurance companies as applicable resources, could have positive macroeconomic effects. This is because it can be expected that the private insurance companies, given their expertise as fund managers, would achieve a higher rate of return due to their specialized capacity to set off risk and return in allocating their assets. They would achieve better results than would be the case either under the present system (budget flows plus actuarial projections) or under a contingency reserve controlled by a non-specialist agent (the State) vulnerable to the constant temptation to put the reserve to other uses. Two problems arise in setting up a system such as the public debate (involving the government, Congress, interest groups etc.) on the idea itself and its acceptability; and the negotiation which the public sector and the insurance companies would be forced to undertake, agreeing the parameters, costs, and prices involved in this type of system. pension. 5 Indeed, Zurita (1994) uses this type of methodology to calculate the deficit arising from the minimum
13 Alternatively, or as a complement to the idea proposed here of an ex post insurance system for payment of minimum guaranteed, it also seems desirable to study ex ante mechanisms to avoid or prevent the eventuality of the State guarantee being called upon. One of the reasons why workers do not reach the minimum "floor" level of a pension is the insufficiency of their contributions during their working life, resulting from interruptions due to periods of unemployment - a problem which is particularly severe among less skilled workers. The establishment of a mechanism covering contributions during these periods could significantly attenuate the need to call on the State s guarantee of minimum. Once again, the insurance system appears to offer a solution to this problem, through a solidarity-based arrangement for the payment of premiums enabling the insurance companies to cover contributions during periods of unemployment. 6 This would have to include restrictions limiting the financing costs of the contributions, for example: limits to the duration of the period over which the insured contributions would be covered (4-5 months); payments to be limited to contributions due on the minimum taxable wage; the beneficiary would have to have paid a certain minimum number of contributions prior to becoming unemployed. The financing of the contributions under the proposed scheme would fall, on the one hand, on the members of the system as a whole, following the solidarity principle, and on the State as ultimate guarantor on the other. In the latter case, it is possible to calculate the future savings obtained by removing now those persons who receive this benefit during their working life from the number of future recipients of the guaranteed minimum pension, as well as the potential public expenditure savings from the application of the solidarity principle. At the time of writing cost estimates of the sums involved in this proposal were not available, but the CIEDESS plans to measure and evaluate them in the future. Finally, it is worth mentioning and emphasizing that a State guaranteed minimum pension regime enables public funds to be targeted at persons in the lowest income groups and therefore constitutes a State insurance benefiting the poorest. Bibliography Arenas de Mesa, A. and Marcel, M. 1993. "Proyecciones de Gasto Previsional 1992-2038: Un Modelo de Simulación para los Bonos de Reconocimiento", Ministerio de Hacienda de Chile, mimeo.. 1999. "Fiscal Effects of Social Security Reform in Chile: The Case of the Minimum Pension", Ministerio de Hacienda de Chile, mimeo. Arrau, P. 1991. "La Reforma Previsional Chilena y su Financiamiento Durante la Transición", Colección Estudios CIEPLAN 32. Benet, H. and Schmidt-Hebbel, K. 2001. "Déficit Previsional del Sector Público y Garantía de Pensión Mínima", Central Bank of Chile, Research Notes, Revista de Economía Chilena, Vol. 4, No. 3, December. Central Bank of Chile. Boletín Mensual, several issues. 6 In this respect it would closely resemble the current scheme within the system for disability and survivor insurance, but would differ from the current unemployment insurance scheme which does not provide for social security contributions.
14. Informe Económico y Financiero, several issues. CIEDESS. 1996. "Proyecto de Reforma al Sistema de Pensiones de las Fuerzas Armadas y de Orden y Seguridad Pública", mimeo.. 2002. "Modernización de la Seguridad Social en Chile, Resultados y Tendencias", CIEDESS (ed.), 4th edition. INP. Anuario Estadístico, Instituto de Normalización Previsional, several issues. Marcel, M.; Tokman, M.; Valdés, R.; Benavides, P. 2001. "Balance Estructural del Gobierno Central Metodología y Estimaciones para Chile: 1987-2000", Estudios de Finanzas Públicas, September. Ortúzar, P. 1986. "Costo de la Garantía Estatal Contemplada en el Nuevo Sistema Previsional", Oficina de Planificación Nacional. Pini, C. 1998. "El Déficit Operacional del Sistema Público de Pensiones en Chile: Análisis, Proyecciones e Implicancias de Política", Monografía de Graduación, Master of Arts ILADES- Georgetown University. Piñera, J. 1996. "Reforma Previsional para las Fuerzas Armadas", Economía y Sociedad, No. 78. Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones. Boletín Estadístico, several issues. Wagner, G. 1991. "La Seguridad Social y el Programa de Pensión Mínima Garantizada", Estudios de Economía, No. 18 (1). Zurita, S. 1994. "Minimum Pension Insurance in the Chilean Pension System", Revista de Análisis Económico, No. 9 (1).