April 2018 Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment Policy UK Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment Policy UK 2018

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Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment Policy UK 2018

April 2018 LGIM Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment Policy UK 2018 Contents Company board...3 Board Leadership...3 Structure and Operation...3 Remuneration...4 Key elements of pay...5 Shareholder rights...6 This policy sets out Legal & General Investment Management s (LGIM) expectations of investee companies in the UK market in terms of corporate governance. This policy sets out only where LGIM s expectations are stricter than in our main Global Principles document or where issues are specific to this market. The Global Principles document provides a full explanation of LGIM s approach and expectations in respect of key topics we believe are essential for an efficient governance framework. The UK Corporate Governance Code is a principles based guidance on Corporate Governance. LGIM has taken part in the development of these principles by responding to periodic consultations carried out by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). LGIM fully endorses the UK Code and expects all companies, regardless of domicile, to comply with these guidelines and, if not, to provide a reasoned explanation. LGIM also supports the work of the Financial Reporting Lab, which is funded by the FRC, and aims to improve corporate reporting. Companies should be aware of the developing best practice as set out by the Lab and are encouraged to adopt such practices. The FRC is consulting to make further changes to the Code following the outcome of the Green Paper in 2017. LGIM will provide its own submission to that consultation. LGIM is also actively involved in various forums which seek to develop best practice in the UK market. LGIM is a member of the Investment Association (IA), which represents over 200 UK investment managers collectively managing over 6.9 trillion of assets on behalf of their clients. Sacha Sadan, LGIM s Director of Corporate Governance, is a member of the IA s Corporate Governance and Engagement Committee and Angeli Benham, Corporate Governance Manager, is a member of the Remuneration and Share Schemes Committee. LGIM is one of the founders of the UK investor Forum and Sacha Sadan is an active board member. Jeannette Andrews is a member of the Corporate Reporting and Accounting Group, of which the IA acts as the secretariat. These Committees play an integral role in developing best practice for UK listed companies and are responsible for the development of the IA s guidelines on corporate governance, executive remuneration and corporate reporting which all listed companies should be aware of and to which they should adhere. LGIM is also a member and a founder of the UK Investor Forum, which represents 35 members collectively managing 14.1 trillion of assets, and Sacha Sadan is an active board member. Clare Payn is Co-Chair of the 30% Club Investor Group and sits on the Steering Committee of the 30% Club. The 30% Club aims to accelerate progress towards better gender balance at all levels of organisations. LGIM votes at all company meetings in the UK where the company has a premium listing. LGIM will vote at the meetings of smaller companies, such as fledgling or AIM stocks, on an ad hoc basis where we have a significant shareholding and the meeting is critical to the future of the business, or where LGIM has a significant concern with any aspect of its governance. 2

April 2018 LGIM Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment Policy UK 2018 Company board BOARD LEADERSHIP Please refer to our Global Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment Principles. STRUCTURE AND OPERATION Diversity For the UK market, LGIM has publicly supported the initiative for companies to achieve a minimum of 30% women on FTSE350 boards; and for 30% women at senior management level of FTSE100 companies by 2020. In addition, we support the similar target developed by the UK Government s Women on Boards Report, the Davies Review and the Hampton-Alexander Review. To provide investors with a comprehensive understanding of their diversity policies, we expect companies to be transparent regarding the procedures used to find new members for the board and at senior management level, and how that process ensures a diverse board and senior executive pipeline. We expect all companies to disclose a breakdown of board directors, executive directors, managers and employees by geography, main skill set and gender, along with the information on its gender pay gap and what initiatives it has in place and action it is taking in order to close any stated gap. For 2018, we expect FTSE350 companies to have at least 25% women at board level. Independence LGIM supports the criteria set out in the UK Code on Corporate Governance to measure the independence of directors. As long as board balance is maintained, LGIM will support a company if they want to retain a non-executive director beyond the recommended 9 years. However, the company must provide a full explanation of the benefits to the company of extending their services for another term. Board mandates LGIM believes that as the number of companies a director serves on increases, so does the risk that they will become less effective. This risk increases further depending on the role played on each board and the size and complexity of the company itself. A director has a duty of care to ensure they have sufficient time to contribute effectively to each directorship. LGIM expects non-executive directors not to hold more than five roles in total. We consider a Board Chair role to count as two directorships due to the extra complexity, oversight and time commitment of this role. A practising executive director should not hold more than one non-executive director role within an unrelated listed company. We expect companies to take targeted action to increase the levels of diversity at board and executive committee levels in order to reach the minimum 30% target by 2020, and to reduce the gender pay gap. By the end of 2020 we expect all companies in the FTSE350 to have at least 30% women at board level. 3

Remuneration Please refer to our Global Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment Principles on executive pay. This document contains details of our policy where our standards differ from our Global Principles and therefore should be read in conjunction with the Global Principles. The Remuneration Committee should consider carefully and be able to demonstrate how it has reviewed the pay policy of the entire workforce when setting pay for the executive team. It should be willing to meet with employee representatives at least annually to receive any appropriate input and explain how it has exercised this duty. The Investment Association is maintaining a register of companies who have had a 20% vote against a resolution at a shareholder meeting. A large voting opposition (>20%) to the remuneration proposals should not be ignored. The Remuneration Committee should: Publish an explanation for the dissent when disclosing the voting outcomes including what the board is doing to address concerns. A copy of this should be sent to the Investment Association to include in the Public Register How the performance measures selected under the annual bonus and long-term incentive plan aid the achievement of these objectives; A summary of the performance achieved over the year; A confirmation that the board believes that the pay outcome is justified given the overall performance of the business, the KPI s achieved and the shareholder experience.; A pay ratio outlining the pay of the CEO relative to the median pay in the business along with an explanation of why the board considers this ratio to be appropriate for its business; An explanation of the discretion applied whether upward or downward; and A summary of what was discussed by the remuneration committee during the year; any changes that are being introduced as a result, together with a rationale for the changes. Remuneration policy table The policy table provides an opportunity to simply explain the company s remuneration structure. LGIM will particularly look for: Remuneration Report - (Remuneration Committee Chairman s Statement) Executive remuneration is a board decision, supported by the remuneration committee. The remuneration committee chair should support the process of setting pay and this should be evidenced in the annual report. Therefore, LGIM regards the statement made by the remuneration committee chair to shareholders as an important and direct message to explain the policies that have been adopted and why. We would encourage the committee chair to personally write this statement and to consider: How the company will address salaries over the next 3 years; Details of the maximum awards under the bonus/ long-term plans; The size of normal awards if they differ from the maximum; Performance measures that will apply under the annual bonus and long term plan including the weightings between the measures; A summary of the strategic direction of the company; An explanation for the total potential award. 4

Pay Ratio All companies should produce a pay ratio of their UK employees, comparing the median employee with the CEO s single figure total pay. Restricted Share Schemes This structure is not appropriate for all companies and they should justify why this type of arrangement is appropriate and why an existing arrangement is no longer suitable. Global companies should explain how this compares with the ratio when all employees are taken into account. KEY ELEMENTS OF PAY Annual Bonus We encourage the reduction of short term annual bonus levels. 200% of salary should be set aside for the largest global companies. Performance targets should be disclosed retrospectively. All targets should be disclosed within 2 years. For those companies considering adopting a restricted scheme, we have set out the criteria of what would be acceptable to LGIM as a shareholder in your company: The Company should be able to demonstrate a history of a sensible approach to remuneration. For example, no high votes against previous proposals and can evidence where appropriate discretion and judgement has been used; Historic vesting rates should be used as a guide when determining the appropriate discount rate to apply. A 50% discount rate is the absolute minimum that should be applied;. Benefits and Pensions Pensions are a significant cost and risk for the company as well as an element of remuneration that is not linked to performance. Pension benefits should be closely aligned with what is being offered to staff. Re-location expenses should mirror what is being offered to employees at all levels. Any additional benefit for executive directors should be limited to 2 years. This should be a long-term scheme that is applied through different business cycles; Shareholding guidelines should be set at a higher limit than is currently in place;. Companies should introduce a post exit shareholding requirement, as part of the plan rules. For leavers, unvested restricted shares should be prorated for time and subject to the same vesting time frame and holding requirements as set out above; Pension contributions should be reduced over time to be more closely aligned with what is offered to all employees. Long Term Incentives LGIM encourages companies to operate a single long term incentive plan that is purely for executive directors, where performance is measured over the long-term. The minimum performance period should be 3 years. Vested shares should be held over the longer term including post exit. Discretion should be applied to reduce awards if at the end of the holding period the performance of the company and the shareholder experience is not aligned. (See: p23, para. 2 of the Executive Remuneration Working Group report) The Company should be fully transparent: targets, vesting criteria, adjustments to KPIs should be disclosed prospectively for all elements of remuneration. 5

Shareholder rights Please refer to our Global Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment Principles. Share issuance A general authority to issue shares should be limited to two-thirds of the issued share capital. Any issue of new shares in excess of one third of the issued shares capital should always apply pre-emption rights. A request to increase the authorised share capital without pre-emption rights should be limited to 5%. The revised Pre-Emption Group guidelines permits the issue of an additional 5% of share capital where the additional 5% is for the purpose of financing an acquisition or other specified capital investment that has been disclosed. LGIM supports the template resolutions published by The Pre-Emption Group and expects such requests to be proposed as separate resolutions for shareholder approval. Share repurchases or buybacks LGIM expects the authority to repurchase or buyback shares to be subject to shareholder approval and should be an annual authority limited to 15% of the issued share capital. Earnings per share metrics used in incentive plans should be adjusted to strip out any enhancement that has resulted from buy back activity. Share repurchases or buybacks can trigger Rule 9 of the Takeover Code where there is a significant shareholder. Under such circumstances, LGIM would expect the company to ensure that a buy back does not result in the significant shareholder s holding increasing. LGIM would not support a Rule 9 waiver under these circumstances. LGIM will not support the re-issue of shares at a discount to their net asset value. 6

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CONTACT US For further information on anything you have read here or to provide feedback, please contact us at: corporategovernance@lgim.com www.lgim.com/corporategovernance Important information The information presented in this document (the Information ) is for information purposes only. The Information is provided as is and as available and is used at the recipient s own risk. Under no circumstances should the Information be construed as: (i) legal or investment advice; (ii) an endorsement or recommendation to investment in a financial product or service; or (iii) an offer fer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to purchase, any securities or other financial instruments. Unless otherwise stated, the source of all information is Legal & General Investment Management Ltd. LGIM, its associates, subsidiaries and group undertakings (collectively, Legal & General ) makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, in connection with the Information and, in particular, regarding its completeness, accuracy, adequacy, suitability or reliability. To the extent permitted by law, Legal & General shall have no liability to any recipient of this document for any costs, losses, liabilities or expenses arising in any manner out of or in connection with the Information. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, and to the extent permitted by law, Legal & General shall not be liable for any loss whether direct, indirect, incidental, special or consequential howsoever caused and on any theory of liability, whether in contract or tort (including negligence) or otherwise, even if Legal & General had be advised of the possibility of such loss. LGIM reserves the right to update this document and any Information contained herein. No assurance can be given to the recipient that this document is the latest version and that Information herein is complete, accurate or up to date. All rights not expressly granted to the recipient herein are reserved by Legal & General. This document may not be used for the purposes of an offer or solicitation to anyone in any jurisdiction in which such offer or solicitation is not authorised or to any person to whom it is unlawful to make such offer or solicitation. As required under applicable laws Legal & General will record all telephone and electronic communications and conversations with you that result or may result in the undertaking of transactions in financial instruments on your behalf. Such records will be kept for a period of five years (or up to seven years upon request from the Financial Conduct Authority (or such successor from time to time)) and will be provided to you upon request. Issued by Legal & General Investment Management Ltd. Registered in England No.02091894. Registered office One Coleman Street, London, EC2R 5AA. Authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.