Flash Economics. What must we assume if we do not believe long-term interest rates will rise sharply in the peripheral eurozone

Similar documents
Flash Economics. 11 January

Flash Economics. What to expect from the rise in oil prices for growth in the euro zone and France? 16 January

Flash Economics. Euro zone, France: Potential risk of a "scissor effect" in March

Has no impact on growth; Leads to a rise in interest rates;

Flash Economics. What difference does it make having a stable oil price at 50 dollars a barrel or an oil price rising by 10 dollars per year?

Flash Economics. Because the structural unemployment rate is high in the euro zone, its growth phases are shorter than in the United States

Flash Economics. The discount rate of supply-side policies. 16 May

Flash Economics. US monetary policy: What matters more: The Fed Funds rate or the size of the Federal Reserve s balance sheet?

Flash Economics. The end of quantitative easing in the euro zone: Will banks step in for the ECB to buy government bonds?

Flash Economics. Measured GDP and true GDP. 14 September

Flash Economics. Gradually less expansionary monetary policy in the United States: Could it trigger a rise in long-term interest rates?

Flash Economics. What adjustments are possible when unemployment returns to the structural unemployment level?

Flash Economics. Growing heterogeneity in living standards between euro-zone countries: A temporary or permanent feature?

Flash Economics. What will happen when long-term interest rates rise in the United States and the euro zone?

We seek to determine whether:

Flash Economics. Why has the euro zone s current-account balance improved? 25 August

Flash Economics. What is the ECB s real objective? 05 December

Flash Economics. Two very important structural differences between Germany and the rest of the euro zone: How can the euro zone function?

On public finances; On financial asset prices; The risks seem to come from:

Flash Economics. What happens when the Federal Reserve starts raising its interest rates? 14 September

Flash Economics. Should governments in the euro zone make additional public investments? 10 October

Flash Economics. The acceleration in global trade is very good for the euro zone; what accounts for it?

Flash Economics. What is the direction of the causality between real interest rates and total factor productivity growth?

CORPORATE & INVESTMENT BANKING

Flash Economics. The more Germany accumulates external assets, the more unlikely a break-up of the euro zone and the more a strong euro hurts Germany

Flash Economics. One concern in the United States: Commercial real estate. 07 October

Flash Economics. The three types of capitalism. 21 December

Flash Economics. 13 September

In particular, we want to see whether: We find: The causes appear to be:

Flash Economics. International monetary system: Return to Bretton Woods September

Flash Economics. A simple dollar/euro exchange-rate determination model. 20 February

Flash Economics. The common characteristics of countries where labour force skills are weak. 25 October

Flash Economics. Euro zone and France: No one can now deny that it is supply-side policies that are needed.

Flash Economics. Does monetary policy have an effect on structural unemployment? 16 January

Flash Economics. Does fiscal policy change course when the long-term interest rate goes above or below the growth rate?

Flash Economics. Potential black swans. 16 June

Flash Economics. What can be done if total factor productivity diverges between euro-zone countries? 01 December

Flash Economics. Could there no longer be any credible reserve currency? 22 March

Flash Economics. Will the euro zone s structural unemployment fall before unemployment catches up with it?

Flash Economics. Are Asian countries now managing their exchange rates based on movements in the Chinese RMB?

Flash Economics. Over-expansionary monetary policies: A real estate bubble always appears in the end. 16 January

Flash Economics. A euro-zone budget: How, why, when? 19 January

Flash Economics. The attempts to save Keynesianism in the euro zone are tiresome. 25 January

Flash Economics. Is an increase in euro-zone inflation plausible? 27 February

Negatively to labour force skills; Negatively to R&D spending;

The oil price; US tax policy; US inflation and monetary policy; The Italian economy and banks;

Flash Economics. Are the elites unaware that there is a problem? 05 September

Flash Economics. France: Is it possible to return to full employment without increasing inequalities? 08 December

Flash Economics. Can France afford its legitimate economic policy objectives? 06 April

Flash Economics. Four serious new threats for the euro zone. 12 December

NAVIGATING THROUGH THE MIST: INTRODUCING NATIXIS CHINA CAPITAL FLOW TRACKER CHINA HOT TOPICS.

Flash Economics. How should retail banks manage risk? The only reasonable solution is to apply sufficient risk premia (interest rate margins) on loans

China and Hong Kong Forex Market Developments One-way appreciation carrying into the new year

China and Hong Kong Forex Market Developments RMB made the nine-month peak and FX reserves further expanded

A new world order: Key issues for Asia, ASEAN and Thailand

Equity Markets PRIVATE PLACEMENT ONLY

NATIXIS WORKSHOP F How to optimize the liquidity portfolio with covered bonds. 15/09/2011 The Euromoney / ECBC Covered Bond Congress

Chart 1 Total assets of banking institutions (% of total)

Intraday Liquidity Management

The end of the Infrastructure congestion in Europe?

The rise and fall of gold. December 2013

Flash Economics. What would a European capitalism require to be able to exist? 17 April

US Upstream in Focus

Demand for sovereign bonds: The importance of diversity

Seventh City of London Biennial Meeting 2013

Brazil: FX and Capital Markets Highlights of the Week

FX and Capital Markets

CASH MANAGEMENT. Secure and efficient solutions to manage your payments.

Brazil: FX and Capital Markets Highlights of the Week

Roger Yuan Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. (+852)

FX and Capital Markets

FX and Capital Markets

FLASH ECONOMICS. Which euro-zone countries still suffer from Dutch disease? ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Euro Medium Term Note Callable Zero Coupon Non Linear TRADED TERMSHEET. Terms and Conditions (the Term Sheet )

% m/m % y/y % m/m Total Job Ads 178,

Eurozone Economic Watch

Italian Sustainability Day 2018 Sudip Hazra Head of ESG Research.

Macro Vision June 13, 2017

MIXED MESSAGES. KEY POINTS The ANZ Truckometer indexes lifted in August.

Figure 1. ANZ Heavy Traffic Index and GDP. Heavy traffic index, 3-month avg (LHS) Figure 2. ANZ Light Traffic Index and GDP

CRACKING UNDER PRESSURE? ASSESSING SINGAPORE S ECONOMY AND REAL ESTATE SPECIAL REPORT. 08 September 2016

The Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. (incorporated in The Netherlands with its statutory seat in Amsterdam)

The Royal Bank of Scotland plc

ANZ-ROY MORGAN AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER CONFIDENCE MEDIA RELEASE. Weekly change, % Four-week average Budget. Budget. Budget. Budget.

Weekly Market View What happens when the Fed raises rates?

Brit-in or Brexit : Hedging in Times of Geopolitical Uncertainty

MULTI-ASSET DIVERSIFIED GLOBAL CERTIFICATE 11

Will the global economy weather the storm of protectionism?

FINANCIAL FORECASTS ECONOMIC RESEARCH. January No. 1. What will be the characteristics of euro-zone financial markets in 2016?

Market Briefing: European Interest Rates

FINAL TERMS DATED 6 FEBRUARY 2009

Ireland GDP Likely to Be Up +5.5% in 2018:4Q and +4.5% in 2019:4Q

PHOENIX Memory WO - ALV GY; CS 3.00% p.a. 03 September 2018

ECONOMIC COMMENTARY. Vehicle Sales. Economics South Africa. Total sales growth continues to points towards a rebound off a low base.

A Global Economic and Market Outlook

GS Global ECS Credit Strategy Research. March 31, Alberto Gallo, CFA Goldman, Sachs & Co

Korea and Australia in a globalised world

Transcription:

December - 7 What must we assume if we do not believe long-term interest rates will rise sharply in the peripheral eurozone countries? If we believe a sharp rise in long-term interest rates in the peripheral euro-zone countries (especially and ) can be avoided, we must assume that: The Federal Reserve will not react strongly to the rise in inflation in the United States; The correlation between long-term interest rates in the United States and Germany is not too strong; The ECB will not stop quantitative easing or that the end of quantitative easing will not drive up long-term interest rates in the euro zone to any significant extent; The unfavourable situation of the economy, banks and public finances in some peripheral countries (, ) will not lead to a sharp rise in sovereign yield spreads for these countries. Patrick Artus Tel. ( ) patrick.artus@natixis.com @PatrickArtus www.research.natixis.com CORPORATE & INVESTMENT BANKING INVESTMENT SOLUTIONS & INSURANCE SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL SERVICES Distribution of this report in the United States. See important disclosures at the end of this report..

The risk for and and are already suffering from long-term interest rates that are higher than nominal growth (Charts A and B). Chart A : Nominal GDP and interest rate on -year government bonds Chart B : Nominal GDP and interest rate on -year government bonds Nominal GDP (Y/Y as %) -year govt. interest rate (as %) Nominal GDP (LHS, as %) 9 9 - - - Sources: Datastream, Istat, Natixis - 7 9 7 - - - Sources: Datastream, INE, Natixis - 7 9 7 - - An additional rise in long-term interest rates in these countries would be dangerous for these countries, where the public debt is high (Chart A) and growth is quite weak (Chart B)... But yet, the following is happening or will probably happen: - Rise in interest rates in the United States; - Gradual end of quantitative easing in the euro zone; - Economic risk in and. Chart A Public debt (as % of nominal GDP) Chart B Real GDP growth (Y/Y as %) - - - - - - forecasts 7 9 Sources: Datastream, Istat, INE, Natixis - 7 9 7 - So what would be needed to avoid a sharp rise in long-term interest rates (Charts A and B) in these two countries?

Chart A Interest rate on -year government bonds (as %) Chart B Interest rate on -year government bonds (as %) 7.... 7. 7.... 7................... 7 9 7.... Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan-7.. What would be needed for and to avoid a significant rise in their interest rates? Four conditions would have to be met. - The Federal Reserve will not react too much to the rise in inflation in the United States As a result of the acceleration in labour costs (Chart A), the rise in the oil price (Chart B) and the economic policies that the Trump administration is likely to implement (fiscal deficits, reduction in immigration), we can expect a quite marked rise in inflation and core inflation in the United States (Chart C). If the Federal Reserve reacts strongly to inflation as in the past (Chart D), the Fed Funds rate would be hiked significantly in 7, which is not at all what the markets expect at present (Chart E). A marked increase in the Federal Reserve s interest rates would obviously lead to a sharp rise in long-term interest rates in the United States (Chart F). Chart A United States: Nominal wage and unit labour costs (excl. benefits, Y/Y as %) Chart B Oil prices (Brent, USD/bbl) Nominal per capita wage Unit labour cost - Sources: Datastream, BLS, Natixis - 7 9 7 - - forecasts 7 9 7

Chart C United States: Inflation (CPI, Y/Y as %) Chart D United States: Key intervention rate and inflation Inflation Underlying inflation* (core* PCE deflator) Fed Funds rate (as %) Inflation: CPI (Y/Y as %) Inflation: Core* CPI (Y/Y as %) (*) Excl. energy and food (*) Excl. energy and food - - Sources: Datastream, BLS, Natixis forecasts - 7 9 7 - Sources: Datastream, BLS, Fed, Natixis - 9 9 - Chart E Eurodollar contract (-month) December maturity December 7 maturity Chart F United States: Fed Funds rate and interest rate on -year Treasuries (as %) Fed Funds rate -year Treasury interest rate Jan- Jun- Nov- Apr- Sep- Feb- Jul- Dec- 7 9 7 - The correlation between long-term interest rates in the United States and Germany is not too strong If the rise in US long-term interest rates spreads markedly to German long-term interest rates, those of the peripheral countries will also rise sharply. Charts A and B and Table show that the correlation between dollar and euro long-term interest rates has remained strong in the recent period. Chart A Interest rate on -year government bonds (as %) Chart B Interest rate on -year government bonds (as %) United States Germany.. United States Germany.......... - 7 9 7 - -. Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan-7 -.

Table : Correlations between US -year Treasuries and German -year government bonds In absolute terms (daily) In change terms (delta daily) -.9.7 -.7.9 -.7... Sources: Natixis calculation - The halt to quantitative easing in the euro zone will not drive up longterm interest rates in the euro zone The rise in the oil price is likely to lead to a rise in inflation in the euro zone (Chart A). Chart A Euro zone: Inflation CPI (Y/Y as %) Sources: Datastream, Natixis forecasts - 7 9 7 - For this rise in inflation not to lead to a sharp rise in long-term interest rates in the eurozone countries, the following conditions would have to be met: - Either it does not prompt the ECB to stop quantitative easing; but that also raises the question of the availability of securities the ECB can buy; - Or the gradual end of quantitative easing does not drive up long-term interest rates, which is difficult to believe given the size of the ECB s purchases (Charts B and C). - - Chart B : Net issuance and net purchases of government bonds (in EUR bn per month) Net issuance of government bonds Net purchases of Italian government bonds by the ECB (incl. QE) Sources: Datastream, ECB, Natixis - 7 - - - - - Chart C : Net issuance and net purchases of government bonds (in EUR bn per month) Net issuance of government bonds Net purchases of Portuguese government bonds by the ECB (incl. QE) - Sources: Datastream, ECB, Natixis - 7 - - - -

- The unfavourable situation of the economy (Chart B above, Charts 7A, B and C), public finances (Chart A above) and banks (Charts 7D and E), not mentioning political risk, does not lead to an additional rise in yield spreads on Italian and Portuguese government bonds (Charts 7F and G). Chart 7A Unemployment rate (as %) Chart 7B Productive investment (in volume terms, : = ) 9 9 Sources: Datastream, Eurostat, Natixis 7 9 7 Sources: Datastream, Eurostat, Natixis 7 9 7 Chart 7C Global trade and exports (in volume terms, : = ) Chart 7D Unprovisioned non-performing loans (as % of total loans) Global trade : exports : Exports 7 9 7 Sources: Datastream, IMF, FSI, Natixis 7 9 Chart 7E Household default rate (as %) Chart 7F Yield spread on countries -year government bonds against Germany (as %)...... 7. 7....... Sources: Datastream, central banks, Natixis 7 9 7 -. 7 9 7 -.

Chart 7G Yield spread on countries -year government bonds against Germany (as %)......... Jan- Apr- Jul- Oct- Jan-7......... Conclusion: Many conditions must be met for Italian and Portuguese long-term interest rates not to rise any more The following four conditions would have to be met: - The Federal Reserve hardly reacts to inflation; - Long-term interest rates in the euro zone decorrelate from those in the United States; - There is no exit from quantitative easing in the euro zone, or it does not drive up longterm interest rates; - There is no additional concern about the economies, budgets, banks, and the political situations in the peripheral countries. 7

Disclaimer The information contained in this publication and any attachment thereto is exclusively intended for a client base consisting of professionals and qualified investors. This document and any attachment thereto are strictly confidential and cannot be divulgated to a third party without the prior written consent of Natixis. If you are not the intended recipient of this document and/or the attachments, please delete them and immediately notify the sender. Distribution, possession or delivery of this document in, to or from certain jurisdictions may be restricted or prohibited by law. Recipients of this document are required to inform themselves of and comply with all such restrictions or prohibitions. Neither Natixis, nor any of its affiliates, directors, employees, agents or advisers or any other person accepts any liability to any person in relation to the distribution, possession or delivery of this document in, to or from any jurisdiction. This document has been developed by our economists. It does not constitute a financial analysis and has not been developed in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research. Accordingly, there are no prohibitions on dealing ahead of its dissemination. This document and all attachments are communicated to each recipient for information purposes only and do not constitute a personalized investment recommendation. They are intended for general distribution and the products or services described herein do not take into account any specific investment objective, financial situation or particular need of any recipient. This document and any attachment thereto shall not be construed as an offer nor a solicitation for any purchase, sale or subscription. Under no circumstances should this document be considered as an official confirmation of a transaction to any person or entity and no undertaking is given that the transaction will be entered into under the terms and conditions set out herein or under any other terms and conditions. This document and any attachment thereto are based on public information and shall not be used nor considered as an undertaking from Natixis. All undertakings require the formal approval of Natixis according to its prevailing internal procedures. Natixis has neither verified nor carried out independent analysis of the information contained in this document. Accordingly, no representation, warranty or undertaking, either express or implied, is made to the recipients of this document as to or in relation to the relevance, accuracy or completeness of this document or as to the reasonableness of any assumption contained in this document. Information does not take into account specific tax rules or accounting methods applicable to counterparties, clients or potential clients of Natixis. Therefore, Natixis shall not be liable for differences, if any, between its own valuations and those valuations provided by third parties; as such differences may arise as a result of the application and implementation of alternative accounting methods, tax rules or valuation models. The statements, assumptions and opinions contained in this document may be changed or may be withdrawn by Natixis at any time without notice. Prices and margins are indicative only and are subject to change at any time without notice depending on, inter alia, market conditions. Past performances and simulations of past performances are not a reliable indicator and therefore do not anticipate any future results. The information contained in this document may include results of analyses from a quantitative model, which represent potential future events that may or may not be realised, and is not a complete analysis of every material fact representing any product. Information may be changed or may be withdrawn by Natixis at any time without notice. More generally, no responsibility is accepted by Natixis, nor any of its holding companies, subsidiaries, associated undertakings or controlling persons, nor any of their respective directors, officers, partners, employees, agents, representatives or advisers as to or in relation to the characteristics of this information. The statements, assumptions and forecasts contained in this document reflect the judgment of its author(s), unless otherwise specified, and do not reflect the judgment of any other person or of Natixis. The information contained in this document should not be assumed to have been updated at any time subsequent to the date shown on the first page of this document and the delivery of this document does not constitute a representation by any person that such information will be updated at any time after the date of this document. Natixis shall not be liable for any financial loss or any decision taken on the basis of the information disclosed in this presentation and Natixis does not provide any advice, including in case of investment services. In any event, you should request for any internal and/or external advice that you consider necessary or desirable to obtain, including from any financial, legal, tax or accounting adviser, or any other specialist, in order to verify in particular that the transaction described in this document complies with your objectives and constraints and to obtain an independent valuation of the transaction, its risk factors and rewards. Natixis is supervised by the European Central bank (ECB). Natixis is authorized in France by the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Régulation (ACPR) as a Bank -Investment Services Provider and subject to its supervision. Natixis is regulated by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers in respect of its investment services activities. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR in France and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority in the United Kingdom. Details on the extent of regulation by the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority are available from Natixis branch in London upon request. In Germany, NATIXIS is authorized by the ACPR as a bank investment services provider and is subject to its supervision. NATIXIS Zweigniederlassung Deutschland is subject to a limited form of regulation by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) with regards to the conduct of its business in Germany under the right of establishment there. The transfer / distribution of this document in Germany is performed by / under the responsibility of NATIXIS Zweigniederlassung Deutschland. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by Bank of Spain and the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores) for the conduct of its business under the right of establishment in Spain. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by Bank of and the CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa) for the conduct of its business under the right of establishment in. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) for the conduct of its business in and from the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). The document is being made available to the recipient with the understanding that it meets the DFSA definition of a Professional Client; the recipient is otherwise required to inform Natixis if this is not the case and return the document. The recipient also acknowledges and understands that neither the document nor its contents have been approved, licensed by or registered with any regulatory body or governmental agency in the GCC or Lebanon. All of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect the author s personal views regarding any and all of the subject securities or issuers. No part of author compensation was, is or will be, directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report. I(WE), AUTHOR(S), WHO WROTE THIS REPORT HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS REPORT ACCURATELY REFLECT OUR(MY) PERSONAL VIEWS ABOUT THE SUBJECT COMPANY OR COMPANIES AND ITS OR THEIR SECURITIES, AND THAT NO PART OF OUR COMPENSATION WAS, IS OR WILL BE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, RELATED TO THE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS OR VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS REPORT. The personal views of authors may differ from one another. Natixis, its subsidiaries and affiliates may have issued or may issue reports that are inconsistent with, and/or reach different conclusions from, the information presented herein. Natixis, a foreign bank and broker-dealer, makes this report available solely for distribution in the United States to major U.S. institutional investors as defined in Rule a- under the U.S. securities Exchange Act of 9. This document shall not be distributed to any other persons in the United States. All major U.S. institutional investors receiving this document shall not distribute the original nor a copy thereof to any other person in the United States. Natixis Securities Americas LLC, a U.S. registered broker-dealer and member of FINRA, is a subsidiary of Natixis. Natixis Securities Americas LLC did not participate in the preparation of this report and as such assumes no responsibility for its content. This report has been prepared and reviewed by authors employed by Natixis, who are not associated persons of Natixis Securities Americas LLC and are not registered or qualified as research analysts with FINRA, and are not subject to the rules of the FINRA. In order to receive any additional information about or to effect a transaction in any security or financial instrument mentioned herein, please contact your usual registered representative at Natixis Securities Americas LLC, by email or by mail at Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY. The stocks mentioned might be subject to specific disclaimers. Please click on the following link to consult them: http://research.intranet/globalresearchweb/main/globalresearch/disclaimersspecifiques