Flash Economics. What can be done if total factor productivity diverges between euro-zone countries? 01 December

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1 December 16-151 What can be done if total factor productivity diverges between euro-zone countries? Total factor productivity diverges between euro-zone countries. Since total factor productivity is the productivity of capital and labour combined, it cannot be adjusted by transfers of capital, investment and savings between countries. This is a deeply structural divergence in technological progress from one country to another, due to chronic factors which it is very difficult to change, at least quickly: education level of the labour force, degree of modernisation of capital, productive specialisation, etc. If the divergence merely concerned labour productivity, it could be corrected more easily by transfers of capital and savings, as in the Juncker Plan. If there is a divergence in total factor productivity between euro-zone countries, we can expect a long-run divergence between countries' income levels which will be very hard to correct, resulting in increasing political tension in the absence of federalism (permanent transfers between countries). Patrick Artus Tel. (33 1) 5 55 15 patrick.artus@natixis.com @PatrickArtus www.research.natixis.com CORPORATE & INVESTMENT BANKING INVESTMENT SOLUTIONS & INSURANCE SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL SERVICES Distribution of this report in the United States. See important disclosures at the end of this report..

Changes in total factor productivity in euro-zone countries We shall examine the four largest euro-zone countries,,, and. Charts 1A and B show the level of and growth in total factor productivity in these four countries. 1 16 1 1 9 96 9 Chart 1A Global factor productivity* (199:1 = ) (*) Real GDP / [(employment)^(/3) x (net total real capital)^(1/3)] 9 9 Sources: Datastream, AMECO, Natixis 9 9 9 99 1 3 5 6 7 9 1 11 1 13 1 15 1 16 1 1 9 96 9 - - Chart 1B Global factor productivity* (as % per year) (*) Real GDP / [(employment)^(/3) x (net total real capital)^(1/3)] Sources: Datastream, AMECO, Natixis -6-6 9 99 1 3 5 6 7 9 1 11 1 13 1 15 - - Note the divergence between total factor productivity: it is higher in and, stable in, and declining in. Total factor productivity can be corrected far less easily than labour productivity Per capita labour productivity also diverges between euro-zone countries (Chart ). 115 Chart Per capita productivity (199:1 = ) 115 15 15 Sources: Datastream, Eurostat, Natixis 95 9 6 1 1 1 16 95

But total factor productivity is very different from per capita productivity: - Per capita labour productivity depends on per capita capital. When a country (such as ) has invested little (this is now being corrected in Europe, in and in but not in, Chart 3), its per capita productivity declines; - A transfer of capital (savings) to countries where labour productivity is low therefore restores labour productivity. This would be the case if was again prepared to lend its excess savings to other euro-zone countries (Chart ), as is the case under the Juncker Plan; - But total factor productivity is the productivity of capital and labour combined. It is therefore not restored if there is additional investment, a transfer of capital or savings to the country. 1 16 Chart 3 Productive investment (in volume terms, 199:1 = ) 1 16 1 Chart Current-account balance (as % of nominal GDP) 1 1 1 - - 1 Sources: Datastream, Eurostat, Natixis 9 6 1 1 1 16 1 - Sources: Datastream, IMF, Eurostat, Natixis -1 9 6 1 1 1 16 - -1 Total factor productivity is pure technological progress, independent of capital accumulation. What does total factor productivity depend on? Total factor productivity (technological progress) can depend on structural factors such as: - The level of education and skills of the labour force (Tables 1 and ), which is effectively higher in and than in or ; - The degree of modernisation of capital (Table 3), which is greater in than in the other countries; - Productive specialisation, e.g. the weight of industry (Chart 5), which is greater in. 3

Table 1: Structure of the population aged 15 to 6 according to the level of studies attained (as %) Less than primary education, primary education and lower secondary education (levels -) Higher secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3 et ) Higher education (levels 5-).1 3.3 56.7 56 56.9.. 35. 1.9 1.5 3.6 3 37 55. 53.7 55.7..7 37..3. 3.6 9.1 3.6 36.3 5.5 51. 55.3 1 1 3.1 1.1.7.5 1 5. 35.5 51.7 5.6 5.6 1.1.3 3.6.6 3. 6.1 1. 6.6 35 5.9 9.5 55.3 1.1. 39.1.1 6. 11. 7 3.5 3 5.1.7 56.1 1.6 3.1 39.3.. 6. 1.3 33 9. 7.9 56.3.3 3.1 39.5 1.. 7 1.7 9 3. 9.5 7.1 55. 1. 3..1.3 5.9 7. 1. 1 1 31.9.1 6.3 56.3 1.9 3..7.7 6.. 13 11 1.1 31. 7 5.5 57.6 3.7 1..3 6.7 9.3 13. 1 17.9 3. 6.. 57. 1.9 3.6 1.9.9 7.7 3 13.9 13 17.7 5.6 3. 57.1 3.1 3.5. 5..9 3.9 1. 1 19.7 6.5.5.3 57.1 3.7 3.9.7 3. 9.7 31.7 15 15 19. 6 3.5 1.9 56. 3.6..7 3. 3. 3.1 15.5 Sources: Eurostat, Natixis Table : PIAAC survey, overall score by decreasing score Country Score Japan 9. Finland 6. Netherlands 3.6 Sweden. Australia 7.9 Belgium 7.9 Denmark 77. Austria 76. 7.7 Canada 73. United Kingdom 71.6 United States 66.7 Ireland 66.3 5... Source: OECD Table 3: Stock of industrial robots (per jobs in the manufacturing sector) Country 3 5 6 7 9 1 11 1 13 1 15 1.37 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.93 1.9 1.9..16.1.5.35.3.7.77.6.9 1. 1.7 1.1 1.16 1.3 1. 1. 1.1 1. 1.1.6.7.76..9.99 1. 1. 1.5 1.35 1.39 1.1 1. 1.5 1. 1. 1.16 1. 1.9 1.3 1.39 1. 1.5 1.51 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.57 Sources: IFR International Federation of Robotics, Natixis

1 16 1 1 Chart 5 Value added in the manufacturing sector (in volume terms, as % of real GDP) 1 16 1 1 1 Sources: Datastream, Eurostat, Natixis 3 5 6 7 9 1 11 1 13 1 15 16 17 1 It is extremely difficult to change the education level of the labour force, the degree of modernisation of capital, and productive specialisation. We can therefore legitimately think that it is far more difficult to change total factor productivity than labour productivity, that total factor productivity is far more inert. Investing more and transferring savings from countries can change labour productivity, but not total factor productivity. Conclusion: Significant political tension is likely in the euro zone If total factor productivity diverges between euro-zone countries, because restoring total factor productivity is a very slow and very complicated process we can expect a chronic divergence in potential growth (Chart 6A) and income levels (Chart 6B) between eurozone countries. 3 Chart 6A Potential growth* (*) Per capita productivity smoothed over the past 5 years (Y/Y as %) + labour force (Y/Y as %) 3 Chart 6B Per capita GDP in euros (as % of German per capita GDP) 1 1 9 9-1 Sources: Datastream, Eurostat, Natixis - 3 5 6 7 9 1 11 1 13 1 15 16 17-1 - 7 Sources: Datastream, EC, Natixis 6 3 5 6 7 9 1 11 1 13 1 15 16 7 6 Potential growth depends only on growth in total factor productivity and population growth. The divergence in income between euro-zone countries due to the divergence in total factor productivity, which it is very difficult and long to correct, will, unless there is federalism (permanent transfers from the richest to the poorest countries), undoubtedly generate significant political tension between euro-zone countries. 5

We reiterate that mutualising a number of investments, e.g. via the Juncker Plan, can change short-term labour productivity but not long-term total factor productivity. 6

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