Fiscal Policy, Urban- Rural Inequality and Rural Poverty in Brazil

Similar documents
Sean Higgins and Claudiney Pereira Department of Economics Tulane University. LASA 2013, Washington, DC May 31, 2013

Social Spending, Taxes and Income Redistribu8on in Colombia. Nora Lus4g; Tulane University, CEQ Director Marcela Meléndez

Social Spending, Taxes and Income Redistribu8on in Paraguay

Taxes, Transfers, Inequality, and Poverty: Argen9na, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru

THE EFFECTS OF BRAZIL S HIGH TAXATION AND SOCIAL SPENDING ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME

Fiscal Policy and the Ethno- Racial Divide: Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay

Income Inequality and Labor Market Dynamics in Brazil

Taxation, Transfers, and Redistribution Brazil and the United States

Comparing Taxation, Transfers, and Redistribution in Brazil and the United States

Overall Results - CCTs (Brazil)

Fiscal Policy and the Ethno- Racial Divide: Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay

THE IMPACT OF TAXES AND SOCIAL SPENDING ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, MEXICO AND PERU: A SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS

The Bolsa Família Program: 12 years of inclusion and citizenship in Brazil

SESSION 8 Fiscal Incidence in South Africa

Social Spending, Taxes and Income Redistribution in Uruguay 1 Marisa Bucheli, Nora Lustig, Maximo Rossi and Florencia Amábile 2 August 31, 2012

FISCAL POLICY INCIDENCE AND POVERTY REDUCTION: EVIDENCE FROM TUNISIA

National Secretariat on Citizenship Income. Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger. Federative Republic of Brazil

Table 1 Evolution of Bolsa Família eligibility lines: extreme poverty and poverty between 2003 and Date Regulation Eligibility lines

Universal Social Protection

Fiscal Incidence Analysis in Theory and Practice Nora Lustig Tulane University Nonresident Fellow CGD and IAD

Rodrigo Orair International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), Brazil

SOCIAL SPENDING, TAXES AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION IN PARAGUAY. Working Paper No. 13 February 2013

Social rate of return: A new tool for evaluating social programs

Social safety nets in good and bad times

Discrepancies in the Data: What can we conclude about poverty and inequality in Brazil? Sean Higgins 4 December 2009

Fiscal Incidence, Fiscal Mobility and the Poor: A New Approach

Reducing Inequality and The Brazilian Social Protection System. South-South Learning Forum 2014 Rio de Janeiro, March 17

Brazil. Poverty profile. Country profile. Country profile. November

Brazil Measuring Poverty Using Household Consumption

EXPLAINING LOW REDISTRIBUTIVE IMPACT IN BOLIVIA. Working Paper No. 6 January 2013

THE IMPACT OF REFORMING ENERGY SUBSIDIES, CASH TRANSFERS, AND TAXES ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN GHANA AND TANZANIA

TAXATION OF MICRO AND SMALL BUSINESSES IN BRAZIL

SOCIAL SPENDING, TAXES AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION IN PARAGUAY Sean Higgins, Nora Lustig, Julio Ramirez, William Swanson COMMITMENT TO EQUITY

How Much? Spending on SSN Programs

Labour and productive inclusion policies and programmes A regional experience

The Role of Conditional Cash Transfers in the Process of Equitable Economic Development

COMMITMENT TO EQUITY ASSESSMENT: HANDBOOK Nora Lustig and Sean Higgins COMMITMENT TO EQUITY

Bolsa Família Program (PBF)

How much reduction in inequality and poverty

THE IMPACT OF TAXES AND EXPENDITURES ON POVERTY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN ARGENTINA

AN APPLICATION OF THE CEQ EFFECTIVENESS INDICATORS: THE CASE OF IRAN

THE IMPACT OF TAXES AND EXPENDITURES ON POVERTY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN ARGENTINA

Fiscal policy and redistribu2on in Namibia

Rising Food Prices and Household Welfare: Evidence from Brazil in 2008

Public Disclosure Copy

Inequality Evolution in Brazil: the Role of Cash Transfer Programs and Other Income Sources. Luiz Guilherme Scorzafave

Public Disclosure Copy

employment patterns, poverty 2and income inequality

Commitment to Equity in Fiscal Policy World Bank, 2013 World Bank Conference on Equity June 10-11, Washington DC

On Assessing Pro-Poorness of Governments Programs: International Comparisons

Labor vulnerability, Income Volatility and Coverage of the Bolsa Familia Program

FISCAL POLICY AND ETHNO-RACIAL INEQUALITY IN BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, GUATEMALA AND URUGUAY Nora Lustig COMMITMENT TO EQUITY

Extending social protection by anchoring rights in law Brazil

The Impact of the Expansion of the Bolsa Família Program on the Time Allocation of Youths and Labor Supply of Adults

FISCAL POLICY, INEQUALITY AND THE ETHNIC DIVIDE IN GUATEMALA Maynor Cabrera, Nora Lustig and Hilicías Morán COMMITMENT TO EQUITY

The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Social Spending in Croatia

Can a Poverty-Reducing and Progressive Tax and Transfer System Hurt the Poor?

Taxes, Social Spending, Inequality and the Middle Class in Latin America

Rising Food Prices and Household Welfare: Evidence from Brazil in 2008

** Bolsa Família and the Economy (A Look on Final Goals)

Motivation. Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have become very popular: first in Latin America and now across the world

Social Protection and Decent Work: Commitments for Prosperity

Emil Tesliuc and Phillippe Leite November 23, 2009

THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY IN INDONESIA. Jon Jellema, Matthew Wai-Poi and Rythia Afkar

WIDER Working Paper 2018/136. Fiscal redistribution in Brazil. Dynamic microsimulation,

ECON 256: Poverty, Growth & Inequality. Jack Rossbach

FISCAL POLICY AND ETHNO-RACIAL INEQUALITY IN BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, GUATEMALA AND URUGUAY

Fiscal Incidence and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from Tunisia

Discussion Paper Markets, the State and the Dynamics of Inequality: The Case of Brazil

COMMITMENT TO EQUITY: DIAGNOSTIC QUESTIONNAIRE. Working Paper No. 2. August By Nora Lustig

THE IMPACT OF TAXES AND SOCIAL SPENDING ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN EL SALVADOR

How to use ADePT for Social Protection Analysis

econstor Make Your Publications Visible.

WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO ERADICATE EXTREME POVERTY AND PROMOTE SHARED PROSPERITY?

Fiscal Policy and Redistribution in Latin America

Social Spending, Taxes and Income Redistribution in Uruguay

Impact evaluation of the brazilian non-contributory pension program Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC) on family welfare

Conditional Cash Transfers: Helping reduce poverty in the short- and long-term. Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development Network World Bank

SOCIAL SPENDING AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION IN ARGENTINA DURING THE 2000S: THE RISING ROLE OF NONCONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS

A long way from tax justice: the Brazilian case

research brief Bolsa Família after Brasil Carinhoso: an Analysis of the Potential for Reducing

Income and Wealth Inequality A Lack of Equity

The Impact of Taxation and Public Expenditure on Income Distribution in Indonesia

Economic Development. Problem Set 1

Income Polarization in Brazil, : A Distributional Analysis Using PNAD Data

Social Protection Floor in Brazil

The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Transfers in Poland

Fiscal policy for inclusive growth in Asia

PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID) APPRAISAL STAGE

Poverty Reduction in Brazil: Changes in the Profile and in the Determinants during the Early 2000s

Inequality and Fiscal Redistribution in Middle Income Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru and South Africa

How to use ADePT for Social Protection Analysis

Economics from NOVA School of Business and Economics (Portugal) with Double Degree. Partnership with INSPER (Brazil)

Conditional Cash Transfers for Improving Utilization of Health Services. Health Systems Innovation Workshop Abuja, January 25 th -29 th, 2010

State Transfers, Taxes and Income Inequality in Brazil *

Abstract. Keywords: fiscal incidence, social spending, inequality, developing countries

PUBLIC & PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN MICROFINANCE

ECONOMY. Designing a new future THE BRAZILIAN

POVERTY AND THE NEW RURAL MIDDLE CLASS

Fiscal Policies, Inequality and Poverty: An Application of the Commitment to Equity (CEQ) Assessment to Argentina and Mexico

Transcription:

Fiscal Policy, Urban- Rural Inequality and Rural Poverty in Brazil Sean Higgins and Claudiney Pereira Department of Economics Tulane University New Orleans, LA October 18, 2013

Introduction Other studies Helfand et al. (2008) Neri (2011) Our contribulon: Most comprehensive study to date: Transfers Subsidies Indirect taxes Comparable methodology (CEQ)

Introduction PopulaLon, 2009 (1000s) Total % Urban % Rural % Brazil 191796 161041 83.96 30755 16.04 North 15555 8.11 12125 7.53 3430 11.15 South 27776 14.48 23113 14.35 4663 15.16 Northeast 54020 28.17 39310 24.41 14710 47.83 Southeast 80466 41.95 74203 46.08 6263 20.36 Midwest 13978 7.29 12289 7.63 1689 5.49

De-inition of income concepts: Benchmark case

De-inition of income concepts: Sensitivity analysis

Data POF 2008-20009 Labor income Direct taxes Use of public educalon ConsumpLon Health PNAD 2008 NaLonal accounts Revenue Spending

Direct Transfers Bolsa Família CondiLonal cash transfer program for the poor Health and educalon condilons 41.2 million individuals in beneficiary families in 2009 (MDS 2011) Average benefit per person living in a beneficiary household: $0.35 PPP per day BPC Non- contributory pension for elderly poor 3.2 million beneficiaries in 2009 (SAGI/MDS 2012) Average benefit per person living in a beneficiary household: $2.18 PPP per day

Direct Transfers (continued) Unemployment insurance Require working conlnuously for six months prior to layoff 8 million beneficiaries in 2009 (Ministério do Trabalho 2011) Average benefit per person living in a beneficiary household: $0.74 PPP per day Special circumstances pensions Part of contributory system but considered non- contributory because of low or no contribulon requirements and means- teslng 2.9 million beneficiaries in 2009 (INSS 2011) Average benefit per person living in a beneficiary household : $5.22 PPP per day

Direct Transfers (continued) Milk transfers (PAA Leite) Largest food transfer program in Brazil Provides milk to low- income households with child, pregnant woman, or elderly In Northeast region and part of Minas Gerais state Eligible households receive one or two free liters of milk per day Other direct transfers Minimum income programs (state and municipal) Government auxílios Basic food basket program

Targeted Energy Subsidies Social Tariff on Electric Energy (TSEE) Price subsidy for low income households with total energy consumplon below 220 khw per month Discount ranges from 10% to 65% Average benefit per person in a beneficiary household: $0.36 PPP per day

In- Kind Bene-its Public educalon Free at all levels including pre- school and terlary Public health care No nalonal health insurance system Unified Health System (SUS) guarantees free and unlimited access to care at public health facililes Part of 1988 ConsLtuLon

Taxes 35% of GDP Direct taxes are 45% of total, indirect 55% High exemplon threshold and large informal sector à less than 10% of economically aclve pay individual income tax Many indirect taxes ICMS, IPI, PIS, COFINS, Cascading effect

Methodology: Direct Transfers Direct idenlficalon from survey Bolsa Família Discrepancy between total beneficiary households in nalonal accounts (12.1 million) and survey (7.3) Use propensity score matching method (Souza, Osório, and Soares 2011) to impute benefits to very similar households who did not report receiving benefits Milk transfers (PAA Leite) Assumed milk consumed with the form of purchase reported as donalon by households in eligible states came from the program

Methodology: Energy Subsidies Lack data on consumplon in kilowaj hours (kwh) which determines program eligibility Have (post- tax) energy consumplon in R$/month Collect data on (pre- tax) prices for all Brazilian energy companies and within each state, average across companies in that state Combine with tax code for electricity in that state and with subsidy rates to determine consumplon in kwh Calculate benefit Spending for household s consumplon in kwh at market rates minus actual spending

Methodology: Indirect Taxes ICMS and IPI Group consumplon goods into nine categories Apply effeclve tax rates for these categories calculated by Nogueira et al. (2011) Uses input- output matrix Accounts for evasion PIS and COFINS Apply effeclve tax rates by decile calculated by Rezende and Afonso (2010)

Methodology: Health Bene-its Alternate survey (PNAD 2008 health supplement) Group types of health services reported in PNAD into 3 aggregate categories Primary care In- palent care PreventaLve care From administralve data, calculate average per- visit spending by state and by type of care Impute this benefit to individuals in that state who received that type of care from a public facility

Results Inequality Benchmark Market Income Net Market Income Disposable Income Post- fiscal Income Final Income Na$onal 0.578 0.563 0.542 0.539 0.464 Urban 0.567 0.552 0.5331 0.535 0.448 % change wrt market income - 1.4-3.4-3.2-11.8 % change wrt net market income - 1.9-1.7-10.4 Rural 0.559 0.552 0.516 0.0519 0.362 % change wrt market income - 0.06-4.2-4 - 19.6 % change wrt net market income - 3.6-3.3-19

Results Inequality SensiLvity Analysis (pensions as government transfers) Market Income Net Market Income Disposable Income Post- fiscal Income Final Income Na$onal 0.594 0.591 0.540 0.537 0.460 Urban 0.586 0.581 0.531 0.533 0.443 % change wrt market income - 0.05-5.6-5.3-14.2 % change wrt net market income - 5-4.7-13.7 Rural 0.599 0.594 0.514 0.516 0.359 % change wrt market income - 0.05-8.5-8.3-24 % change wrt net market income - 8-7.7-23.5

Results Poverty Benchmark Market Income Post- fiscal Income Na$onal Heacount index (%) $1.25 PPP/day (ultra poor) 5.80% 4.50% $2.5 PPP/day (extreme poor) 15.10% 16.30% $4 PPP/day (poor) 26.20% 31.00% Urban Heacount index (%) $1.25 PPP/day (ultra poor) 4.30% 3.20% $2.5 PPP/day (extreme poor) 11.90% 13.00% $4 PPP/day (poor) 22.00% 26.70% Rural Heacount index (%) $1.25 PPP/day (ultra poor) 13.90% 11.20% $2.5 PPP/day (extreme poor) 32.50% 34.80% $4 PPP/day (poor) 49.40% 54.30% Poverty is worsened amer accounlng for all taxes and transfers! Indirect taxes have a deleterious effect on poverty But not true on sensilvity analysis (pensions as government transfers) for rural areas

Results Incidence of Taxes and Transfers Incidence of transfers is significantly higher in rural areas But indirect taxes have a deleterious effect on post- fiscal income At the nalonal level, households from the fourth decile onward become net payers In rural areas, households in the fimh decile and above become net payers If we include in- kind transfers, final income for the first four deciles in rural areas is at least twice as large as market income. In urban areas, only the first decile more than doubles its income compared to market income. The overall urban populalon is a net payer

Results Concentration Coef-icients Bolsa Familia- (CCT) - 0.61 ConLnuous Cash Benefit (BPC) - 0.52 Program for the EradicaLon of Bolsa Escola Minimum Income Programs Early Childhood EducaLon Primary EducaLon Secondary EducaLon Gas Subsidy Total Health Spending Total EducaLon Spending Total CEQ Social Spending Allowance PIS/PASEP Other Subsidies Total Direct Transfers Unemployment Benefits Special Circumstances Pensions Other Scholarships Basic Benefits Basket TerLary EducaLon Final Income Gini Final Income* Gini Post- Fiscal Income Gini Disposable Income Gini Net Market Income Gini Market Income Gini - 0.50-0.44 Urban - 0.38-0.34-0.32-0.23-0.20-0.17-0.15-0.09-0.04-0.04 0.00 0.15 0.17 Legend Educa$on Spending Health Spending Targeted Transfer Non- Contributo ry Pension Gini 0.29 0.35 0.43 0.456 0.467 0.529 0.531 0.550 0.562-0.800-0.300 0.200 0.700 ConcentraLon Coefficient (or Gini specified) Bolsa Familia- (CCT) ConLnuous Cash Benefit (BPC) Bolsa Escola Early Childhood EducaLon Primary EducaLon Program for the EradicaLon of Child Secondary EducaLon Total CEQ Social Spending Gas Subsidy Total EducaLon Spending Total Direct Transfers Other Subsidies Total Health Spending Minimum Income Programs Allowance PIS/PASEP Special Circumstances Pensions Unemployment Benefits Other Scholarships Final Income Gini Final Income* Gini TerLary EducaLon Post- Fiscal Income Gini Basic Benefits Basket Disposable Income Gini Net Market Income Gini Market Income Gini - 0.41-0.28-0.24-0.24 Rural - 0.23-0.13-0.12-0.11-0.08-0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.26 Legend Educa$on Spending Health Spending Targeted Transfer Non- Contributory Pension Gini 0.389 0.402 0.46 0.511 0.51 0.515 0.552 0.556-0.800-0.600-0.400-0.200.000.200.400.600.800 ConcentraLon Coefficient (or Gini when s

Results Coverage and Leakages For all programs (direct and in- kind), the share of benefits going to the poor is higher in rural areas 80% of total Bolsa Familia benefits paid to rural households accrue to the poor compared to 65% of the program s payments in urban areas. 94% of the rural extreme poor receive Bolsa Familia compared to 81% of the urban extreme poor Bolsa familia average benefit $0.38/day in rural areas compared to $0.35 PPP/day in urban areas All direct transfers: Urban: 23% accrue to the poor Rural:57% accrue to the poor BPC, TerLary educalon only 8% of benefits go to the poor Urban bias : average beneficiary in urban areas: $0.99 PPP/day compared to $0.64 PPP/day In rural areas (Special Circumstances pensions and scholarships)

Results Closing extreme poverty gap It will require broader coverage and higher benefits in rural areas The two main programs: Bolsa Familia and BPC are well- targeted programs with low leakages, but eligibility cut- off needs to be changed Bolsa familia cut- offs: UncondiLonal benefit is $1.34 PPP/day (R$70/month) just above the ultra poor line of $1.25 PPP/day CondiLonal benefit: R$140, lower than the poverty line used by IPEA for rural areas BPC cut- off: one fourth of one monthly minimum wage (R$117 reais in 2009) is lower than IPEA s cost of basic need poverty lines Achieve universal coverage with current cut- off points (Soares, Ribas, and Soares,2010): 19 million households (13.4 million in 2011) Fiscal feasibility: Bolsa Familia and BPC are less than 1% of GDP in 2009

Conclusions Most progressive programs (Bolsa Família, BPC, milk transfers) are small In terms of budget share (each <0.6% of GDP) And in terms of average benefit per beneficiary Indirect taxes offset the poverty- reducing benefits of direct transfers and indirect subsidies Post- fiscal income poverty is higher than market income poverty for most poverty lines Fiscal policy had a larger impact on inequality in rural than urban areas Poverty is higher in rural areas compared to urban areas

Conclusions Coverage of the ultra- poor is not universal (Brasil Sem Miseria) Eligibility cuj- offs of Bolsa Familia and BPC could be increased TerLary educalon has low coverage among the poor in both urban and rural areas Health spending is only relalvely progressive in rural areas

Conclusions Policy recommendalons: Reform of the tax system (a very small change was implemented earlier this year). Basic food staples as rice and beans pay about 17%of indirect taxes. Change on the eligibility cut- offs for Bolsa Familia and BPC Increased access to terlary educalon and public health for the rural poor There is no future in rural poverty the path to prosperity inevitably runs through ciles (Ed Glaeser and A. Joshi- Ghani, Economic Premise, World Bank, Number 126, October 2013)

Obrigado!