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Less than six months and counting to October 1, 2016. Summary of Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Resolution Planning Public Statements April 2016 Deloitte Recovery & Resolution Planning Center of Excellence

Table of Contents A Key takeaways B Understanding the feedback C Summary of FRB/FDIC identified deficiencies and shortcomings D Detailed FRB/FDIC identified deficiencies and shortcomings E Overview of the 2017 resolution plan guidance for US G-SIBs This document is based purely on public information; the sources considered can be found here: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20160413a.htm http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20160413a2.pdf http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20160413a1.pdf 2

Key takeaways On April 13, 2016, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (collectively, the agencies) released firm-specific feedback on the 2015 resolution plans submitted by eight US global systemically important banks (G-SIBs): Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo 3 Overview of developments Five plans deemed deficient (i.e., not credible) jointly by the agencies Bank of America Bank of New York Mellon JPMorgan Chase State Street Wells Fargo Two plans with split opinions on severity of weaknesses Goldman Sachs Morgan Stanley One plan without deficiencies but identified shortcomings Citigroup FRB and FDIC are continuing to assess the plans of the four foreign banking organizations (FBOs) Agencies issued joint letters to all eight institutions (letters ranged from nine to thirty pages) that identified specific shortcomings and deficiencies Agencies released guidance outlining expectations for the G- SIBs next full plan submissions, which are due by July 1, 2017 Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20160413a.htm Key takeaways from FRB/FDIC feedback Regulators have significantly raised their expectations: Regulators believe firms have fallen short strategically and operationally at overcoming resolvability issues and feel that significant work remains Areas for improvement: The most significant weaknesses identified are with liquidity, derivatives and trading, governance, operational continuity, legal entity rationalization, and measuring and positioning capital for an orderly resolution. The agencies expect all firms to be aggressive in their actions to improve their 2017 submissions Quick turnaround time to address deficiencies: Five firms have slightly less than six months (October 1, 2016) to address the identified deficiencies No resolution plan submissions due by July 1, 2016: The agencies are dropping the July 1, 2016 submission deadline; this allows firms to address the identified shortcomings and new supervisory guidance in their plans due by July 1, 2017 Addressing weaknesses: The deficiencies identified by the FRB and FDIC may be feasible to address, depending on the institution s underlying business-as-usual capabilities, although the aggressive time frame may be a challenge Increased transparency from agencies: The public documents identifying the criteria by which the agencies reviewed the plans and guidance on expectations for each of the critical areas coupled with the actual feedback letters to the banks have greatly improved the transparency of the process. The guidance for the 2017 plan submissions further pressures banks to publicly demonstrate improvement The industry has not been standing still: The agency evaluations are based on the state of resolution plans and readiness from more than 9 months ago. The industry has continued to make improvements and has a head start in some areas of noted shortcomings and deficiencies Progress from previous submissions: The agencies acknowledged that important changes have been made to the structure and operations of the largest firms that may improve resolvability, including derivative contract stay enhancements, the maintenance of long-term debt, and improved operational continuity Evaluations of credibility are ongoing: Firms that were not deemed jointly to have deficient plans could be deemed not credible in the future if they do not address identified shortcomings by July 1, 2017 (these firms must submit status reports by October 1, 2016) A

Understanding the feedback What does this mean for institutions? Firms should understand where they are relative to their competitors to gauge expectations Actions taken since the submission of the 2015 resolution plans should be assessed in light of the agencies feedback If a firm has a deficiency, a strong firm-wide response should be developed that maximizes chances for success If a firm has shortcomings but no deficiencies, it should not interpret those findings as acceptable and should continue to make improvements; do not put off work just because the applicable deadline now falls in 2017 Management should be proactive in responding to these findings to take steps so that regulatory concerns do not continue to be elevated Quickly identify what can be accomplished within the timeframes and convey a clear message with respect to strategy Firms should continue to communicate with the agencies to determine that strategies implemented are in line with expectations If an institution with a deficient plan is deemed jointly by the agencies to have not adequately addressed their weaknesses, heightened prudential standards on capital, leverage or liquidity as well as restrictions on growth and operations may be demanded Identified shortcomings and deficiencies Key distinction exists between the classification of deficiencies and shortcomings, including the remediation timeline for each: Deficiencies: Joint decision by the agencies that presents a weakness that individually or in conjunction with other aspects could undermine the feasibility of the firms plan Remediation of deficiencies: Identified deficiencies must be addressed by October 2016 Shortcomings: Additional weaknesses identified by the agencies that are not considered deficiencies but raise questions about the feasibility of the plan Remediation of shortcomings: Identified shortcomings must be remediated by the next full plan submission in July 2017 B Seven key areas evaluated across 2015 plans Derivatives and trading Capital Governance Operational capabilities Legal entity rationalization Responsiveness 4 Must be able to reliably measure and forecast liquidity needs prior to, and in, resolution, and measure liquidity at all material entities Must have strategies to address trading activities during a resolution, including the impact on the financial system Must be able to provide sufficient capital to material entities to ensure they can provide critical services until firm is resolved Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20160413a.htm Must have governance capable of identifying the onset and escalation of stress events in time to prepare for resolution Must maintain significant operational capabilities and engage in regular contingency planning Must have taken adequate steps to simplify or rationalize legal entity structure to facilitate an orderly resolution Must take agency guidance into account in developing future plans

Summary of FRB/FDIC identified deficiencies and shortcomings The agencies noted that institutions have made important changes to the structure and operations which may improve resolvability, however significant progress is needed to further address identified deficiencies and shortcomings C Theme Reviewed Derivatives and trading Capital Governance Operational Legal Entity Rationalization Finding Type Firms with identified shortcomings Citigroup Goldman Sachs Morgan Stanley Bank of America Firms with identified deficiencies JPMorgan Chase Wells Fargo BNY Mellon State Street Deficiencies Shortcomings Deficiencies Shortcomings Deficiencies Shortcomings Deficiencies Shortcomings Deficiencies Shortcomings Deficiencies Shortcomings Six areas where FRB/FDIC identified deficiencies and shortcomings Progress to date Adhered to the 2015 ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol Maintained substantial amounts of long-term debt issued from their now clean holding companies Taken steps to work towards shared services that will be available to affiliates in resolution Modified their service contracts with key vendors to provide for the continuation of services Developed proposals to rationalize their legal entity structure Enhanced capability to monitor liquidity needs under normal and stressed periods Derivatives & trading Capital Governance Operational capabilities Legal entity rationalization remains a significant issue and seven firms received either a shortcoming or deficiency for liquidity issues Agencies expressed concern that certain plans did not contain an analysis of how trading portfolios could be managed down in an orderly manner Regulators generally believe firms would be able to provide sufficient capital to material entities until resolution Seven firms received either a shortcoming or a deficiency for governance issues Many issues related to shared services and service level agreements as well as contingency arrangements between material entities Several firms must establish better alignment of legal entities and business lines to improve resolvability 5 Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20160413a2.pdf

Detailed FRB/FDIC identified deficiencies and shortcomings (1 of 3) The three institutions below received firm-specific letters identifying shortcomings that they must address in their next full resolution plan submissions due July 1, 2017. The agencies did not jointly determine that any of these plans had any deficiencies and, as such, the plans were not deemed to be not credible Themes Citigroup Goldman Sachs Morgan Stanley Deficiencies Shortcomings D Shortcomings in model and process for estimating the liquidity needed to fund material entities Estimate of operating liquidity should include funding frictions and other conservative buffers Resolution Execution Need (RLEN) did not have an appropriately supported methodology for liquidity in resolution for all material entities Resolution Adequacy and Positioning (RLAP) and RLEN models are insufficient Heavily reliance on ability to shift substantial liquidity around the organization No supporting analysis for minimum operating liquidity level was not provided Derivatives and Trading Optimistic assumptions about continued access to and ability to novate bilateral overthe-counter (OTC) derivative markets Lack of specificity regarding implementation of the wind-down and interconnectedness Insufficient detail on target reduction levels for OTC derivatives and systemic risk profile No cost or risk estimates provided for major assumption in the pathway to wind down Insufficient detail on residual notional portfolio Governance Capital Lack of specific triggers for escalating information and action that would be required upon reaching a trigger event Limited analysis of the range of potential legal challenges that could adversely affect its approach to providing capital and liquidity to the subsidiary prior to parent s bankruptcy filing Insufficient governance mechanisms necessary to facilitate timely execution of the planned subsidiary funding and recapitalization Enhanced mapping of triggers to specific actions Insufficient governance mechanisms for timely execution of planned funding and recapitalization of certain material entities Triggers are not in place to execute the preferred strategy with the decision to file for bankruptcy Operational Short runway period raises concerns about operational ability to implement the plan Insufficient support / basis for the Debtor-in- Possession (DIP) Stay Condition Legal Entity Rationalization 6 Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20160413a.htm

Detailed FRB/FDIC identified deficiencies and shortcomings (2 of 3) The three institutions below received firm-specific letters identifying deficiencies that they must address by October 1, 2016 as well as shortcomings they must address by July 1, 2017 Themes Bank of America JPMorgan Chase Wells Fargo Deficiencies Shortcomings D Inadequate models and processes for estimating and maintaining sufficient liquidity at, or readily available to, material entities, or for estimating its liquidity needs to fund material entities during resolution Inadequate model and process for estimating and maintaining sufficient and readily available liquidity at material entities Inadequate model and process for estimating the liquidity needed at material entities to fund resolution Derivatives and Trading Lacked detailed portfolio information and specificity regarding implementation of the wind-down the derivative portfolios Insufficient support for the firm s shrink strategy and lack of a contingency plan Capital Governance Insufficiently developed triggers, particularly related to the down-streaming of resources to material entities and the timely filing of bankruptcy and related pre-filing actions Limited analysis of the range of potential legal challenges that could adversely affect approach to providing capital and liquidity to the subsidiaries prior to bankruptcy Insufficiently developed triggers, particularly given reliance on the timely filing of bankruptcy to facilitate an orderly shrink strategy Pre-bankruptcy parent support: 2015 plan had limited analysis of the range of potential legal challenges that could adversely affect the support Material errors that undermine confidence in resolution planning preparedness Operational Identify all material outsourced services that support critical operations and could be promptly substituted Evaluate agreements governing these services to determine whether there are any that could be terminated despite continued performance upon institution s bankruptcy filing Insufficient progress toward identifying shared services and establishing contingency arrangements Insufficient progress in addressing operational capabilities required to execute divestiture and regional segment plan Legal Entity Rationalization Legal entity criteria lack specificity, are not fully implemented, and do not result in sufficient divestiture options Inadequate legal entity rationalization criteria Inadequate divestiture options and insufficient actionability of cited options Underdeveloped legal entity rationalization criteria 7 Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20160413a.htm

Detailed FRB/FDIC identified deficiencies and shortcomings (3 of 3) The two institutions below received firm-specific letters identifying deficiencies that they must address by October 1, 2016 as well as shortcomings they must address by July 1, 2017 Themes BNY Mellon State Street Deficiencies Shortcomings D Insufficient support to substantiate the assertion that there would be no systemic impact Inadequate analysis and modelling of liquidity needed to support all material entities in resolution Capital Derivatives and Trading Questionable assumptions regarding capital levels needed to execute the resolution strategy Governance Operational Legal Entity Rationalization Insufficient progress in identifying shared services and establishing contingency arrangements Problematic assumptions and insufficient supporting analysis regarding its bridge bank strategy Assumed timeline of the bridge bank exit will most likely be delayed due to lack of market substitutability Insufficient detail around operation contingency Lack of progress in implementing its legal entity rationalization criteria across all material entities Lack of specific triggers to certain stages for escalating information Did not include triggers to inject capital and liquidity into material entities Insufficient progress in identifying shared services and establishing contingency arrangements Underdeveloped legal entity rationalization criteria Legal entity rationalization structure criteria do not mandate or clearly lead to actions that promote the best alignment of legal entities and business lines to improve resolvability 8 Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20160413a.htm

Overview of the 2017 resolution plan guidance for US G-SIBs The agencies issued additional guidelines for 2017 resolution plans that outlines specific expectation. The 2017 guidance, in addition to the capabilities outlined in the FRB s Supervision and Regulation (SR) Letter 14-1 outline capabilities required to help facilitate an orderly resolution Derivatives and trading Capital Governance Operational capabilities Legal entity rationalization E Public section RLAP Capability to measure stand alone liquidity position for each material entity RLEN Capability to estimate the liquidity needs after bankruptcy filing that incorporate minimum operating liquidity need at each material entity, daily cash flow forecasts, peak funding needs 9 Rationalizing derivatives booking model practices Assessment of prime brokerage account transfers Development of rating-agency playbooks Development of clients, regulators, Financial Market Utilities (FMUs) communication playbooks Financial estimate in case of: o Passive run-off of the trading book (considering basis risk, residual portfolio) o Active run-off (considering centrally cleared derivatives) Risk profile analysis of residual portfolio post active run-off Maintain an adequate amount of Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) to recapitalize and minimum amount of long-term debt Maintenance of internal TLAC via a combination of prepositioning in affiliates and at parent level Institutions should have a methodology for estimating the amount of capital that may be needed to support each material entity after the bankruptcy filing Identify the governance process to ensure execution of required board actions at specific times that are tied to pre-action triggers and existing agreements Governance playbooks should detail board and management action (e.g., communication strategy, FRB s fiduciary responsibilities, conflicts of interest) Establish triggers requiring governance action based on capital, liquidity (incl. RLEN), and market metrics Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20160413a1.pdf Payment Clearing and Settlement (PCS) Reinforcement of PCS capabilities outlined in SR 14-1 Collateral Collateral reporting capabilities related to managing, identifying, and valuing collateral Asset traceability capabilities Management Information Systems (MIS) Reinforcement of MIS capabilities outlined in SR 14-1 Shared & outsourced services Reinforces requirements for continuity of shared services that support critical operations Legal obstacles Address all potential legal obstacles issued by the firms Develop and implement a legal entity rationalization (LER) criteria Organization structure simplification to facilitate an orderly resolution Demonstrating optionality via separability of operations Highlight steps being taken to improve resolvability Describe each ME and discuss intragroup financial and operational interconnectedness High-level description of firm s liquidity and loss absorbing capability Description of organization post resolution

Contacts RRP Center of Excellence Leads Marlo Karp Partner Deloitte Advisory mkarp@deloitte.com +1 973 602 6394 Larry Albin Principal Deloitte Consulting LLP lalbin@deloitte.com +1 212 313 1600 RRP Contacts John Corston Independent Senior Advisor to jcorston@deloitte.com +1 212 436 2388 Joseph Fellerman Independent Senior Advisor to jfellerman@deloitte.com +1 571 271 2181 Irena Gecas-McCarthy Principal Deloitte Advisory igecasmccarthy@deloitte.com +1 212 436 5316 Monica Lalani Principal Deloitte Advisory mlalani@deloitte.com +1 973 602 4493 Chris Spoth Executive Director, Center for Regulatory Strategies Director Deloitte Advisory cspoth@deloitte.com +1 202 378 5016 Laura Survant Partner Deloitte Advisory llsurvant@deloitte.com +1 213 688 4123 David Wright Director Deloitte Advisory davidmwright@deloitte.com +1 415 783 3123 Key Contributors Jesselyn Garrisi Senior Manager Deloitte Advisory Mayur Sangani Senior Manager Deloitte Advisory Brandon Sternberg Manager Deloitte Advisory Amit Jain Senior Consultant Deloitte Advisory Alex LePore Senior Consultant Deloitte Advisory 10

About the Deloitte Center for Regulatory Strategies The Deloitte Center for Regulatory Strategies provides valuable insight to help organizations in the financial services, health care, life sciences, and energy industries keep abreast of emerging regulatory and compliance requirements, regulatory implementation leading practices, and other regulatory trends. Home to a team of experience executives, former regulators, and Deloitte professionals with extensive experience solving complex regulatory issues, the Center exists to bring relevant information and specialized perspectives to our clients through a range of media including thought leadership, research, forums, webcasts, and events. www.deloitte.com/us/centerregulatorystrategies This presentation contains general information only and Deloitte is not, by means of this presentation, rendering accounting, business, financial, investment, legal, tax, or other professional advice or services. This presentation is not a substitute for such professional advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified professional advisor. Deloitte shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person who relies on this presentation. About Deloitte Deloitte refers to one or more of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, a UK private company limited by guarantee ( DTTL ), its network of member firms, and their related entities. DTTL and each of its member firms are legally separate and independent entities. DTTL (also referred to as Deloitte Global ) does not provide services to clients. Please see www.deloitte.com/about for a detailed description of DTTL and its member firms. Please see www.deloitte.com/us/about for a detailed description of the legal structure of Deloitte LLP and its subsidiaries. Certain services may not be available to attest clients under the rules and regulations of public accounting. 36 USC 220506