The Market Price of Risk and the Equity Premium: A Legacy of the Great Depression? by Cogley and Sargent

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Transcription:

The Market Price of Risk and the Equity Premium: A Legacy of the Great Depression? by Cogley and Sargent James Bullard 21 February 2007

Friedman and Schwartz The paper for this lecture is The Market Price of Risk and the Equity Premium: A Legacy of the Great Depression?" by Timothy Cogley and Thomas J. Sargent.

Friedman and Schwartz The paper for this lecture is The Market Price of Risk and the Equity Premium: A Legacy of the Great Depression?" by Timothy Cogley and Thomas J. Sargent. Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Monetary History of the United States.

Friedman and Schwartz The paper for this lecture is The Market Price of Risk and the Equity Premium: A Legacy of the Great Depression?" by Timothy Cogley and Thomas J. Sargent. Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Monetary History of the United States. Depression shattered beliefs in natural economic stability.

Friedman and Schwartz The paper for this lecture is The Market Price of Risk and the Equity Premium: A Legacy of the Great Depression?" by Timothy Cogley and Thomas J. Sargent. Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Monetary History of the United States. Depression shattered beliefs in natural economic stability. The depression generation.

Friedman and Schwartz The paper for this lecture is The Market Price of Risk and the Equity Premium: A Legacy of the Great Depression?" by Timothy Cogley and Thomas J. Sargent. Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Monetary History of the United States. Depression shattered beliefs in natural economic stability. The depression generation. Quantify this idea.

Main ideas Consumption is driven by a two-state Markov process.

Main ideas Consumption is driven by a two-state Markov process. Representative agent is a Bayesian learner.

Main ideas Consumption is driven by a two-state Markov process. Representative agent is a Bayesian learner. Initial beliefs from the 1930s are very pessimistic.

Main ideas Consumption is driven by a two-state Markov process. Representative agent is a Bayesian learner. Initial beliefs from the 1930s are very pessimistic. Learning is slow.

Main ideas Consumption is driven by a two-state Markov process. Representative agent is a Bayesian learner. Initial beliefs from the 1930s are very pessimistic. Learning is slow. Asset pricing is distorted by these beliefs for a long time.

The equity premium Reconciling observed asset prices with standard models requires a large degree of risk aversion.

The equity premium Reconciling observed asset prices with standard models requires a large degree of risk aversion. Thought experiments suggest this degree of risk aversion is too large to be plausible.

The equity premium Reconciling observed asset prices with standard models requires a large degree of risk aversion. Thought experiments suggest this degree of risk aversion is too large to be plausible. Distorted beliefs instead? Small dose of initial pessimism.

The equity premium Reconciling observed asset prices with standard models requires a large degree of risk aversion. Thought experiments suggest this degree of risk aversion is too large to be plausible. Distorted beliefs instead? Small dose of initial pessimism. Siegel (1992): EP 1802-1925 was 2.0 percent; 1926-1990 5.9 percent. Prima facie evidence.

Learning and pessimism Cecchetti, Lam, Mark (2000, AER): Equity premium due to distorted beliefs.

Learning and pessimism Cecchetti, Lam, Mark (2000, AER): Equity premium due to distorted beliefs. No learning: agents are naturally and permanently pessimistic.

Learning and pessimism Cecchetti, Lam, Mark (2000, AER): Equity premium due to distorted beliefs. No learning: agents are naturally and permanently pessimistic. This paper allows agents to learn their way out of their pessimism.

Learning and pessimism Cecchetti, Lam, Mark (2000, AER): Equity premium due to distorted beliefs. No learning: agents are naturally and permanently pessimistic. This paper allows agents to learn their way out of their pessimism. No stability theorem. Agents simply learn the exogenous stochastic process governing consumption. GE?

Consumers Mehra-Prescott 85 U = E s 0 β t C1 t α 1 t=0 1 α, (1)

Consumers Mehra-Prescott 85 U = E s 0 β t C1 t α 1 t=0 1 α, (1) Set α = 0.25 and β = 0.985. Mild risk aversion.

Consumers Mehra-Prescott 85 U = E s 0 β t C1 t α 1 t=0 1 α, (1) Set α = 0.25 and β = 0.985. Mild risk aversion. Expectations operator subjective.

Consumers Mehra-Prescott 85 U = E s 0 β t C1 t α 1 t=0 1 α, (1) Set α = 0.25 and β = 0.985. Mild risk aversion. Expectations operator subjective. Consumption exogenously produced, nonstorable.

Consumers Mehra-Prescott 85 U = E s 0 β t C1 t α 1 t=0 1 α, (1) Set α = 0.25 and β = 0.985. Mild risk aversion. Expectations operator subjective. Consumption exogenously produced, nonstorable. Consumption growth follows a two-state Markov process, states g h and g`, transition matrix F.

Consumers Mehra-Prescott 85 U = E s 0 β t C1 t α 1 t=0 1 α, (1) Set α = 0.25 and β = 0.985. Mild risk aversion. Expectations operator subjective. Consumption exogenously produced, nonstorable. Consumption growth follows a two-state Markov process, states g h and g`, transition matrix F. Shares of exogenous productive unit are traded, also there is a risk free asset.

Asset prices Let m t+1 = β Ct+1 C t α (2)

Asset prices Let m t+1 = β Ct+1 C t α (2) Then equity and risk-free asset prices are P e t = E s t [m t+1 (P e t+1 + C t+1)] P f t = E s t [m t+1 ]

Asset prices Let m t+1 = β Ct+1 C t Then equity and risk-free asset prices are P e t = E s t [m t+1 (P e t+1 + C t+1)] P f t = E s t [m t+1 ] α (2) If E s t is the expectation implied by the true transition probabilities F, the agent has rational expectations. Call this E a t. The EP will be small in that case.

Asset prices Let m t+1 = β Ct+1 C t Then equity and risk-free asset prices are P e t = E s t [m t+1 (P e t+1 + C t+1)] P f t = E s t [m t+1 ] α (2) If E s t is the expectation implied by the true transition probabilities F, the agent has rational expectations. Call this E a t. The EP will be small in that case. Cecchetti et al 2000 showed that E s t 6= Ea t helps explain EP. But permanently distorted beliefs.

Convergence The consumption process is exogenous in this model.

Convergence The consumption process is exogenous in this model. Learning about exogenous data is like econometrics: for stationary processes one can learn all moments of the distribution given enough data.

Convergence The consumption process is exogenous in this model. Learning about exogenous data is like econometrics: for stationary processes one can learn all moments of the distribution given enough data. That happens here but not in most models studied by Evans and Honkapohja.

Convergence The consumption process is exogenous in this model. Learning about exogenous data is like econometrics: for stationary processes one can learn all moments of the distribution given enough data. That happens here but not in most models studied by Evans and Honkapohja. No feedback.

Convergence The consumption process is exogenous in this model. Learning about exogenous data is like econometrics: for stationary processes one can learn all moments of the distribution given enough data. That happens here but not in most models studied by Evans and Honkapohja. No feedback. Convergence to rational expectations means EP! 0. How long does this take?

Consumption process Cecchetti et al 2000 (CLM) estimate 1890-1994 ln C t = µ (S t ) + ɛ t (3)

Consumption process Cecchetti et al 2000 (CLM) estimate 1890-1994 ln C t = µ (S t ) + ɛ t (3) Has depression-like possibilities.

Consumption process Cecchetti et al 2000 (CLM) estimate 1890-1994 ln C t = µ (S t ) + ɛ t (3) Has depression-like possibilities. Cogley-Sargent take the growth rate and transition probability estimates of the two states and set ɛ to zero.

Beliefs The household knows g h, g` but does not know the transition probabilities.

Beliefs The household knows g h, g` but does not know the transition probabilities. Household adopts a beta-binomial probability model for learning. (The PLM ).

Beliefs The household knows g h, g` but does not know the transition probabilities. Household adopts a beta-binomial probability model for learning. (The PLM ). The agent has independent beta priors over (F hh, F``).

Beliefs The household knows g h, g` but does not know the transition probabilities. Household adopts a beta-binomial probability model for learning. (The PLM ). The agent has independent beta priors over (F hh, F``). This model works because the suppression of ɛ makes this the right model for learning about the two-state process.

Beliefs The household knows g h, g` but does not know the transition probabilities. Household adopts a beta-binomial probability model for learning. (The PLM ). The agent has independent beta priors over (F hh, F``). This model works because the suppression of ɛ makes this the right model for learning about the two-state process. The agent counts the number of transitions and estimates the probability of switching.

Beliefs The household knows g h, g` but does not know the transition probabilities. Household adopts a beta-binomial probability model for learning. (The PLM ). The agent has independent beta priors over (F hh, F``). This model works because the suppression of ɛ makes this the right model for learning about the two-state process. The agent counts the number of transitions and estimates the probability of switching. Suggests why this will be slow.

Passive learning This is partial equilibrium as is most of the asset pricing literature.

Passive learning This is partial equilibrium as is most of the asset pricing literature. The agent cannot affect the system by changing beliefs.

Passive learning This is partial equilibrium as is most of the asset pricing literature. The agent cannot affect the system by changing beliefs. Hence there is no active learning incentive here.

Decisions and prices At each date t the agent has an estimate of the transition probability matrix.

Decisions and prices At each date t the agent has an estimate of the transition probability matrix. The agent makes decisions based on the values in this matrix.

Decisions and prices At each date t the agent has an estimate of the transition probability matrix. The agent makes decisions based on the values in this matrix. The values are treated as constants when making decisions, but are random variables until convergence to REE.

Decisions and prices At each date t the agent has an estimate of the transition probability matrix. The agent makes decisions based on the values in this matrix. The values are treated as constants when making decisions, but are random variables until convergence to REE. Kreps called this anticipated utility.

Decisions and prices At each date t the agent has an estimate of the transition probability matrix. The agent makes decisions based on the values in this matrix. The values are treated as constants when making decisions, but are random variables until convergence to REE. Kreps called this anticipated utility. A form of bounded rationality, but you can do the fully Bayesian optimal formulation.

The prior beliefs Cogley and Sargent would like to examine shattered prior beliefs.

The prior beliefs Cogley and Sargent would like to examine shattered prior beliefs. Suppose the household has initial, reference beliefs equal to the true transition probabilities.

The prior beliefs Cogley and Sargent would like to examine shattered prior beliefs. Suppose the household has initial, reference beliefs equal to the true transition probabilities. The depression shatters or distorts these beliefs in a particular way.

The prior beliefs Cogley and Sargent would like to examine shattered prior beliefs. Suppose the household has initial, reference beliefs equal to the true transition probabilities. The depression shatters or distorts these beliefs in a particular way. These are the worst case transition probabilities that one could have given the reference model.

The prior beliefs Cogley and Sargent would like to examine shattered prior beliefs. Suppose the household has initial, reference beliefs equal to the true transition probabilities. The depression shatters or distorts these beliefs in a particular way. These are the worst case transition probabilities that one could have given the reference model. The worst-case model should be hard to reject in a training sample T 0. Detection probability model.

Simulation Draw 1, 000 consumption growth paths of 70 years each.

Simulation Draw 1, 000 consumption growth paths of 70 years each. Let the pessimistic agent determine asset prices and apply Bayes rule each period.

Excess returns

This paper concerns Bayesian learning and asset pricing a popular idea.

This paper concerns Bayesian learning and asset pricing a popular idea. The learning problem concerns exogenously generated data.

This paper concerns Bayesian learning and asset pricing a popular idea. The learning problem concerns exogenously generated data. The departure from RE is motivated by the Great Depression.

This paper concerns Bayesian learning and asset pricing a popular idea. The learning problem concerns exogenously generated data. The departure from RE is motivated by the Great Depression. Slow convergence is critical.