L/C/TF Number(s) Closing Date (Original) Total Project Cost (USD) COFN-C1280,IDA-H3320,IDA-H6150,IDA-H8860,TF- 30-Nov ,340,000.

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Public Disclosure Authorized Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) 1. Project Data Report Number : ICRR0020142 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Project ID P089297 Project Name SB-Rural Development Program Country Practice Area(Lead) Additional Financing Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global P121631,P121631,P146021,P146021 Solomon Islands Practice L/C/TF Number(s) Closing Date (Original) Total Project Cost (USD) COFN-C1280,IDA-H3320,IDA-H6150,IDA-H8860,TF- 30-Nov-2012 33,340,000.00 90651,TF-90652,TF-97737 Bank Approval Date 11-Sep-2007 Closing Date (Actual) 28-Feb-2015 IBRD/IDA (USD) Grants (USD) Original Commitment 9,200,000.00 19,200,218.92 Revised Commitment 9,195,680.90 16,365,786.22 Actual 9,549,530.62 19,212,709.28 Sector(s) General public administration sector(34%):agro-industry, marketing, and trade(22%):agricultural extension and research(19%):other social services(16%):general transportation sector(9%) Theme(s) Rural services and infrastructure(40%):rural non-farm income generation(20%):rural policies and institutions(20%):micro, Small and Medium Enterprise support(20%) Prepared by Reviewed by ICR Review Coordinator Group Keith Robert A. Oblitas Christopher David Nelson Christopher David Nelson IEGSD (Unit 4) 2. Project Objectives and Components a. Objectives To raise the living standards of rural households by establishing improved mechanisms for the delivery of priority economic and social infrastructure and services.through: (i) increased, cost effective and sustained provision of local services and basic infrastructure determined by participatory planning prioritized by villagers;

(ii) increased capacity of agricultural institutions to provide demand-driven agricultural services at the local level; and (iii) support for rural business development Source: Financing Agreement September 24, 2007 Note: In the Second Additional Financing Project Paper (August 30, 2013), the wording of the Development Objective was changed. In place of: To raise the living standards of rural households by establishing improved mechanisms for the delivery of priority economic and social infrastructure and services", the phrase To increase access was substituted. The latter is less precise and does not specifically say that mechanisms were to be improved.. The more significant change was to drop the reference to improving living standards. However, positive impact on welfare is implied or the improved mechanisms or increased access would not be undertaken. Hence, the higher level goal to raise living standards (i.e., the original objectives) is used throughout this ICR Review. The three actions or sub-objectives following the overall objective are means (Outputs) to reach the objective, and achievements of these sub-objectives are discussed in section 4 (efficacy). b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation? Yes Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets? Yes Date of Board Approval 30-Sep-2013 c. Components Component 1: Local infrastructure and services delivery (Costs estimated at appraisal base costs without contingencies - $9.1 million. Actual costs at project completion - $19.7 million). Increasing access to services and infrastructure in rural areas through a community driven development approach with communities involved in planning, budgeting and implementation. This would be through implementing sub-projects with annual allocations of grants for investments identified by the communities using participatory processes; and (ii) capacity building of Government agencies and other stakeholders involved with the project in key activities such as planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation of the community subprojects. Component 2: Improved agricultural services (Costs estimated at appraisal base costs without contingencies - $6.4 million. Actual costs at project completion - $9.1 million). Improving the access of smallholder households to quality agricultural services, including: (i) annual financial allocations at the provincial level for financing service agreements with providers to deliver agricultural services to smallholders; and (ii) capacity building of: (a) at the national level, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, (b) at provincial level, strengthening implementation capacity of provincial agencies involved with the project; and (c) participatory processes for rural householders. Component 3: Rural business development (Costs estimated at appraisal base costs without contingencies - $2.4 million. Actual costs at project completion - $1.2 million). Facilitating development of rural enterprises through establishing an Equity Financing Facility to provide grants to establish equity for investments by small and medium enterprises in rural related businesses. This was intended to expand business activity and employment and enhance the development of agricultural markets, processing, and other rural based activities. Component 4: Program management (Costs estimated at appraisal base costs without contingencies - $3.7 million. Actual costs at project completion - $7.5 million). Supporting a Project Coordination Unit established under the Ministry of Development Planning and Aid Coordination for overall program management. The unit was responsible for coordination, communications between agencies and provinces, planning, procurement, financial management, M&E, and overall guidance and monitoring for project activities. d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates The total costs for the Rural Development Program (i.e. the project costs) were estimated at appraisal to be $21.8 million. Actual costs, including Additional Financing activities, were $37.4 million; about 73 percent above the estimates at appraisal. Actual costs for the

project s two main components were considerably higher than original expectations over double the appraisal estimate for component 1 (local infrastructure and service delivery), and an increase of 42 percent for component 2 (improved agricultural services). By contrast the costs of component 3 (rural business development) were half expected costs. Management costs (component 4) were about double the appraisal estimates, in part reflecting the longer project implementation period. Financing IDA funding comprised the initial grant of $3.2 million equivalent, and two Additional Financings (AF s) during implementation of $3.0 million each. There were four international donors involved with actual amounts provided as follows: (i) AUSAID ($8.6 million) (ii) the European Commission ($7.6 million); (iii) the Global Food Crisis Response Program ($3.0 million; and (iv) IFAD (International Fund for Agriculture Development) ($3.9 million). Key dates and project duration. RDP was approved on 09/11/2007, and Effectiveness was slightly over three month later (on 12/21/2007). The original closing date was 11/30/2012, with a planned closure date of 11/39/2012, some 5 ¼ years after approval. Actual closure was on 02/28/2015, 2 ¼ years beyond the planned date. This made for a total actual project duration of 7 ¼ years. The project s Mid-Term-Review was in February 2010. Restructuring and Additional Financing RDP had two restructurings. The first restructuring was on 09/14/2010. It involved provision of the first AF of $3.0 million (refer above) to fill the financial gap caused by international inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, and also to provide the funds for a scale-up of the project s coverage from six to eight provinces. Project objectives were not changed, but several of the monitorable indicators were modified. The second restructuring was on 09/30/2013. This involved: (i) another AF of 3.0 million to make up for the cancellation of part of the European Commission s contribution, and to respond to inflation of operational costs; and (ii) a revision of some of the indicators to make them easier to measure. 3. Relevance of Objectives & Design a. Relevance of Objectives RDP s Objectives at appraisal responded well to the Solomon Islands rural sector needs. The country was reestablishing the infrastructure and basic services required for economic and social development following the 1998-2003 civil conflicts. Following a period of negative GDP growth, economic growth had started to recover. But, while GDP grew at over 6 percent in 2006, the rural economy had remained sluggish, reflecting low government expenditures in the sector, and the paucity of rural services. Technological improvements were thwarted by the limited availability for famers of technical assistance and other agricultural services. Investment in the rural sector by private businesses was also limited by lack of opportunities due to the sector s moribund economy. Such conditions were not conducive to the alleviation of rural poverty. Faced with this situation, both the Solomon Islands Government and the Bank have made rural development a top priority. Following preparation by the Government in 2007 of an Agriculture and Rural Development Strategy, the Bank was asked to take the lead in preparation of a Rural Development Program to put the Strategy into action. The resulting project, the Rural Development Program (RDP) was intended to address the root causes of rural unrest and poverty. It aimed for better access of rural communities to economic infrastructure and services; and strengthening the capacity of the institutions providing these services. These thrusts, aimed at improving the welfare and incomes of rural communities, remained throughout the project period. The Country Partnership Strategy for FY 13-17, reaching beyond the project period, emphasized increased access to rural services. The Government s high priority given to rural growth continued in the priorities of the National Development Strategy for 2011-2020. The project is the main vehicle supporting the Rural Development Program, (henceforth termed the project or the RDP ) and covers much of the rural policy thrusts for the Solomon Islands throughout and beyond the project period. A follow-on project RDP II has commenced. RDP s objectives at appraisal were fully responsive to the Bank and Government strategy, forming essential elements of the Rural Development Program. RDP s objectives were modified during the Second Additional Finance proposal. The revised objectives referred only to the overarching objective to increase access to high priority, small-scale economic and social infrastructure, agriculture and financial services in rural areas. This did not articulate key features of the original such as the community based approach, and strengthening institutions, and it would have been better to have maintained these details. Nevertheless, based on the project s very strong and unchanging emphasis on CDD and participatory approaches, the wording omissions had no impact on the overall intentions of the project. The other change in the objectives was to substitute To raise the living standards of rural households with to increase access on the grounds that data on living standards would be difficult to obtain. Increasing access, however, does not convey the project s ultimate goal. Moreover, there are a number of indicators in the ICR that, if considered together, help to provide a basis for a judgement albeit proxy of welfare impact: for instance: satisfaction with infrastructure or service projects, reductions in time for fetching water, women s participation, proportion of communities considering that investments reflected their needs, and satisfaction with agricultural services.

The Relevance of RDP s Objectives (original) was and the relevance of the revised objective was also given the minor difference with regards to the intended transformation. The revision added nothing fundamental, and the project components continued without change, and without changing the strategy. Rating Revised Rating b. Relevance of Design RDP s design and components were closely allied to tackling the project s three outputs or "sub-objectives", based on a clear logical framework: Component 1, promoted community-based investments in infrastructure and services; Component 2 was to strengthen the implementation capacity of the institutions involved; and component 3 facilitated private investments in the rural sector. Several design features stand out. First, a strong emphasis was placed on institutional strengthening, sorely needed at all levels. Second, the project used a community driven development approach, likely to improve ownership, quality and sustainability of village investments. And third, the project was part of a continuum of development envisaged to progressively improve and scale-up the rural development program. RDP learnt a number of practical implementation actions from a predecessor project. And the development program, learning from RDP, is continuing under a successor project RDP 2. Further, the TTL has advised that a progressive scale-up of the RDP program has both characterized RDP itself and its follow-on. These thrusts and the longer-term vision of which RDP is a part, provide a core element for the Solomon Islands rural development. RDP s Relevance of Design was for both the original and revised PDO. Rating Revised Rating 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy) PHEFFICACYTBL Objective 1 Objective To raise the living standards of rural households by establishing improved mechanisms for the delivery of priority economic and social infrastructure and services Rationale Physical Achievements: The number of villages and people served fell short of targets. 283 sub-projects were completed, 76% of the planned (set during additional financing) 370 sub-projects. Nevertheless, at the time of ICR preparation, 77 sub-projects were nearing completion which would raise the number of completed sub-projects nearly to the target. Some 198,000 people about 66 percent of the targeted 300,000 persons - used or received infrastructure sub-projects or agricultural services, also short of intentions. Nevertheless, a comparison in the ICR (page 29) of the number of completed projects with the estimated total number of rural families in the Solomon Islands indicates that about 63 percent of the country s rural population benefitted from the infrastructure sub-projects. From this perspective, RDP is likely to have had a significant national impact.. Quality: As there is no direct data, the quality of the sub-projects can only be inferred from community views on the utility of the sub-projects, and the involvement of the communities in sub-project implementation. Some 92 percent of villagers were satisfied with their infrastructure or service. And the general participation in decision making was generally high (refer below). Participation: Available data suggests that participatory processes were used in identifying and implementing the sub-projects. As planned, about 30,000 persons are estimated to have participated in these processes. There were about 13,000 attendees (98 percent of the target) in the Participatory Needs Identifications. And the impact evaluation found that 94 percent of households felt that the project investment reflected their needs.

Women's participation appears to have been widespread in some aspects of the consultation process, but significantly less so in terms of their executive involvement. About 93 percent of women participated in consultations during sub-project implementation. But only 29 percent of the Sub-Project Implementation Committees contained women members. And only 43 percent of women attended Participatory Needs Identifications. Summary of Efficacy for sub-objective 1: RDP fell short of targets both in terms of the number of participants and in the number of subprojects completed. But it attracted high community involvement, through a participatory approach and had an impact over half of the Solomon Island s rural population. Given these broader achievements the Efficacy of the objective to improve agricultural services and rural infrastructure was. Overarching Project Objective: Raising the living standards of rural households by establishing improved mechanisms for the delivery of priority economic and social infrastructure and services. The second part of this overarching objective establishing improved mechanisms for the delivery of priority economic and social infrastructure and services - is already covered under the three sub-objectives above, with each was found to have Efficacy, except as concerns the shortfall in the number of sub-projects completed. In combination, the project has delivered improved economic and social infrastructure and agricultural services. There is little information on whether living standards of rural households have improved. Nevertheless, the high satisfaction of beneficiaries and their willingness to participate as communities, suggests that the project will have contributed to improving rural welfare. The overall Efficacy of the project s overarching objective to Raise the living standards of rural households by establishing improved mechanisms for the delivery of priority economic and social infrastructure and services is rated, although the limited and mainly proxy data on welfare impact raises questions, as discussed under Outcome (Section 6). Rating Revised Objective To increase access to high priority, small-scale economic and social infrastructure, agriculture and financial services in rural areas. Revised Rationale For the purposes of this assessment, we have taken the achievements against the objectives to be the same, thus no split-evaluation calculation is required. Revised Rating PHEFFICACYTBL Objective 2 Objective Increased capacity of agricultural institutions to provide demand-driven agricultural services at the local level. Rationale

Based on physical achievements, capacity improved. Some 49 percent of the villages in the project area received agricultural services, against a target of 50 percent. About 60 different technologies were applied. About 48 percent of the households that received agricultural advice changed agricultural practices, including changed crop varieties. This is a high conversion rate for a diffuse and multi-activity project across multiple administrations. Advice was across a broad spectrum: 33 percent of service visits were for cash crops, 34 percent for foodcrops, and 18 percent were for livestock. Sub-projects and technologies were chosen based on community needs. Thus, nearly 13,000 people attended participatory needs identifications, broadly the same as the targeted number. RDP s Efficacy in improving the capacity of agricultural institutions to provided demand-driven services was. Rating Revised Objective This sub-objective remained unchanged. Revised Rationale This sub-objective remained unchanged. Revised Rating PHEFFICACYTBL Objective 3 Objective Support for rural business development. Rationale There is limited information with regards to the achievements on this objective. While available data, especially the minimal default rate, indicates that only one out of the 65 businesses that were established defaulted which suggests viable achievement there is some concern that more detail on the nature of these business and how they were supported and benefited through the project is not provided. In addition, while the number of businesses was 30 percent above the appraisal target, there is inadequate evidence to explain the scale and scope of achievement for these businesses and to illustrate their sustainability and future business prospects as a consequence of the project's support. Thus, while there is useful insight with regards to the potential achievements of the project against this objective, the efficacy of supporting rural business development was rated Modest given the lack of detail and coverage in the ICR. Rating Modest Revised Objective This sub-objective remained unchanged. Revised Rationale This sub-objective remained unchanged.

Revised Rating Modest 5. Efficiency No overall economic rate of return was calculated in the ICR, but ERR s and unit-costs for individual activities and sub-projects were estimated. Costs under component 1 for commonly chosen sub-projects such as water supply and sanitation, education, and health were broadly comparable with costs for similar facilities domestically and internationally. ERR s for these sub-projects were 21 percent for water supply and sanitation, 19 percent for education, and 12 percent for health. No ERR was calculated for agricultural services (component 2), but ICR comparisons of RDP s costs per beneficiary with costs of services of other projects found that RDP s costs were within the typical range. In combination, components 1 and 2 made up 77 percent of RDP s total actual costs. Thus, for its main components RDP was economically viable. In terms of speed of implementation, the project was inefficient. Implementation was 2 ½ years longer than planned, and for a number of subprojects, physical achievements were below the original plans. On the other hand, there were some aspects where RDP exceeded expectations. In particular, project activities were expanded from 6 to 8 provinces. But, taken overall, the pace of implementation was significantly lower than originally planned, tempering an otherwise fully viable project to an Efficiency rating of Modest. Efficiency Rating Modest a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation: Rate Available? Point value (%) *Coverage/Scope (%) Appraisal 0 ICR Estimate 0 0 Not Applicable 0 Not Applicable * Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated. 6. Outcome RDP's Objectives were ly Relevant in addressing several critical issues for the Solomon Island's rural development. Rural growth was stagnant and the key needs for vitalizing the rural sector, such as village rural infrastructure and agricultural services were limited, blocking economic and social development. The project's Design was also ly Relevant in it's components, and well directed approach towards supporting the project's objectives. Progress was made on all three project sub-objectives, although achievement for the first subobjective - community infrastructure - fell short of plans, with only 76 percent of the targeted number of sub-projects completed by project closure. Nevertheless, the project tested the new CDD based investment program, and the relevant institutions developed the skills and experience for continuing this approach. The other sub-objectives met or exceeded their targets, though there is insufficient detail to give us confidence that the achievements for objective 3 suitably met the projects expectations. RDP's Efficiency was Modest, primarily because of the significant delays in project implementation. As concerns the project's Overarching Objective to raise the living standards of rural householders, it is difficult to ascertain the project's overall impact as no direct measures of incomes and assets were made. Nevertheless there are some proxy indicators such as the interest of village communities, and their level of participation in decision making, which suggest beneficial impact. The other arm of the Overarching Objective was to improve mechanisms for delivery of village infrastructure and agricultural services. As indicated above, this was achieved.

RDP's Outcome was Moderately Satisfactory. It's objectives and design were sound, and achievements of the sub-objectives were mostly on target. However, two factors moderate an otherwise fully satisfactory assessment. First was the delay in project implementation and the shortfall in the number of sub-projects implemented (efficiency). Second is the uncertainty due to lack of data concerning the impact of the project on rural welfare (efficacy) and the viability of the rural business support. a. Outcome Rating Moderately Satisfactory 7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating Risks RDP s Risk to Development Outcome is. Structural shortages of annual funds is identified in the ICR as a possibility based on the current situation where government funding is insufficient to cover the full CDD support mechanism, although this will be somewhat mitigated by provisions under RDP 2 to provide community helpers. Also, the ICR comments (page 65) that a significant portion of the existing project recipients have no plans for future maintenance of their projects. a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating 8. Assessment of Bank Performance a. Quality-at-Entry Design The Bank played a lead role in preparing the Solomon Islands Rural Development Program, and in preparing the project itself, intended to put the program into action. The project s design - built on establishing a new community driven development approach to rural development; capacity development of rural institutions; and provision of intensive agricultural extension was well structured to support the new development policies, and introduced a variety of measures, in particular, CDD, which provided the core for implementing the new program. The time required to get the CDD program underway, including training of NGOs and the private sector for provision of agricultural services, was underestimated and the primary factor behind the 2 ½ year delay in project implementation. The Bank s Performance at Design stage was Moderately Satisfactory. Quality-at-Entry Rating Moderately Satisfactory b. Quality of supervision Supervision Supervision was responsive to implementation issues, notably in making adjustments to procedures for the CDD program after an initial learning period. Supervision capability was notably strengthened with provision of an internationally recruited staff based in-country. Towards the end of the project, adaptations were made to support institutional and other features to enable transition to RDP 2. The Bank successfully coordinated the group of four development agencies co-financing the project. And, particularly important, was an effective partner with Government in devising and implementing the new rural development strategy. A co-financer the International Fund for Agricultural Development - referring to Bank performance during project implementation (annex 8 of the ICR), commented that the Bank, especially in the last three years of the project, was highly effective. The Banks Performance in Supervision is assessed Satisfactory, an upgrade to the rating assessed in the ICR of Moderately Satisfactory, to reflect the Bank s support role in helping Government in strategizing and implementing the RDP program.

Quality of Supervision Rating Satisfactory Overall Bank Performance Rating Moderately Satisfactory 9. Assessment of Borrower Performance a. Government Performance The Government-Bank partnership in strategy development was effective. But provision of funds towards the end of the project was late which caused delays in most cycle-four sub-projects, contributing to the significant shortfall in completed sub-projects (76 percent of targets) at project closure. The Financial and Economic Development Unit, the Bank s primary Government counterpart in the Solomon Islands, was generally supportive but not particularly pro-active during project preparation and implementation. Government Performance was Moderately Unsatisfactory. Government Performance Rating Moderately Unsatisfactory b. Implementing Agency Performance The Ministry of Development Planning and Aid Coordination, and in particular it s Project Coordination Unit, performed well. The unit was an effective coordinator, and project implementation delays were more the result of over-optimistic project targets than weak implementation capacity. The unit worked well with the Bank and other development agencies funding the project. It also effectively utilized the consultants employed under the project. The only significant weakness was the delays in setting up and operationalizing the M&E unit. But in other respects performance was strong. The Performance of the Implementing Agencies was Satisfactory. Implementing Agency Performance Rating Satisfactory Overall Borrower Performance Rating Moderately Satisfactory 10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization a. M&E Design A baseline survey and management information system were the anchors for assessing project impact. The MIS provided information on physical progress, financial management, and statements of expenditure. Monitoring indicators for sub-projects focused on access and quality of infrastructure and services, and satisfaction with these investments. For agricultural services, measurements covered responsiveness to farmer needs, and the application by farmers of the improved technologies. For component 3 rural business development - The Central Bank of the Solomon Islands collected data on loan performance from the participating commercial banks. An Impact Evaluation was also conducted at the end of the project, although quantitative results were hampered by the small size of the sample and the retrospective nature of much of what went into preparation for this report. b. M&E Implementation The baseline survey took a long time, not being available until about mid-term of the project, thus reducing the utility of end-of-project results. Effective establishment of the MIS also took time and required progressive design improvements from three successive consultants. Nevertheless, in the course of project implementation, an informative system was established, and by project-closure a web-based MIS was functional, going beyond the original plans for the M&E program, and providing a good foundation for the successor RDP 2 project. An impact

evaluation was added during project implementation in a partnership with the University of New South Wales and was useful in modifying some project design features, but sample size and sampling techniques limited it's utility, and it is better seen as a strategic review rather than as an impact evaluation. c. M&E Utilization Results from the M&E program were incorporated in the adjustments made at the two restructurings. Once established, the MIS system appears to be a useful information base for management decisions. Possibly the most influential use of the M&E and its MIS system was in the design of RDP 2. Although a number of mistakes were made, by the end of the project a serviceable MIS system had been established, particularly useful in designing RDP 2. However, the M&E system was established late, reducing its value for most of the project period. Hence, the Quality of M&E is rated Modest. M&E Quality Rating Modest 11. Other Issues a. Safeguards RDP was a Category B project and triggered the following safeguards: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), Forests (OP/BP 4.36), Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04), and Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10), and, added during project implementation, Pest Management (OP/BP 4.09). An Environmental and Social Management Framework was adopted as the main environmental and social management instrument. The Framework was adjusted during implementation to simplify overly complex screening processes. Also, the requirement that all subprojects had to be certified as compliant with the Framework was a project implementation bottleneck due to the extent of the provinces covered and a specialist staffing of only one to two officers. The ICR considers that spot audits would have been sufficient to ensure safeguards compliance. Safeguards issues arising during project implementation were generally minor. b. Fiduciary Compliance Procurement - The ICR advises that there were no cases of mis-procurement, although record keeping and procurement processes were inadequate at times, due to insufficiently skilled provincial staff. Community procurement started with delays and cost-overruns, but by project completion became much faster, and about 10 percent lower in price than standard procurement. A key factor that helped this process was the drawing up of price lists of suppliers for the communities to compare and select from. Community procurement was, however, time consuming for the Program Coordination Unit, which had to provide significant technical assistance. Financial Management - Annual audits were completed although late for the first half of the project. In the last two years when auditing was done by a private firm rather than the Auditor General s office audits were on time. Financial management progressively improved over the project period due to periodic reviews by the Bank, and build-up of the capacity of financial management staff through on-the-job experience and training. The ICR comments that there were three cases of misuse of funds, but these were satisfactorily resolved. c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative) --- d. Other

--- 12. Ratings Ratings ICR IEG Outcome Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory --- Risk to Development Outcome --- Bank Performance Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory --- Borrower Performance Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory --- Quality of ICR --- Reason for Disagreements/Comment Note When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006. The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate. 13. Lessons The following main lessons identified by IEG which have been discussed or referred to in the ICR are as follows: 1. Community procurement can increase community ownership and reduce costs for a village small-scale infrastructure project, but needs practical accompanying features. RDP s CDD procurement system (ICR page 24) was in the end broadly successful, and was preferred by communities, but it had delays and cost-over-runs initially, requiring modifications during implementation to make it effective. In RDP s case (community procurement implementation features are likely to need tailoring to each project s circumstances) adjustments included: the PCU drawing up price lists of potential suppliers for distributing to communities; compilation of community choices of equipment or infrastructure to exploit reduced prices from bulk buying; and, increased technical assistance through Community Helpers. 2. Agricultural development needs improvements in commercialization as well as in agricultural technology. RDP focused agricultural extension on enhancing agricultural productivity. Better results would have come from also promoting agricultural marketing and processing (ICR page 43). 3. The public sector s role in service delivery may best be restricted to guidance and monitoring of services, rather than actual delivery of services, which could be provided through private channels. Overreliance on the public sector under RDP reduced opportunities for entry of the private sector. Agricultural extension costs financed from Government s operational budget may also become unsustainable over the longer term (ICR page 43). In addition, IEG identified the following lesson: 1. Community Driven Development Projects should have a longer term strategic vision that is matched to the capacity and expectation of the Bank's partner. Where phased projects build on an awareness of commitment over time, the project is more realistic in its ambition and focus. 14. Assessment Recommended? Yes Please explain RDP is the only Bank assisted rural development program in the Solomon Islands, and lessons from the PPAR diagnostic would be useful for the future. Also, the performance of several aspects of the RDP - amongst them, community procurement, women s roles in increasing productivity, and the respective roles of the public and private sectors in provision of agricultural services would be of interest in the Solomon Islands and elsewhere.

15. Comments on Quality of ICR The ICR is a well-structured and complete report. The write-up is forward looking and oriented to the lessons emerging from the project, with issues raised transparently and discussed candidly. The following could have been amplified: more information on the rural sector and on the predecessor and successor projects would have added to the project s context; and, more detail on component 3 particularly with regards to the viability and sustainability of these business opportunities in the longer term. But overall, the ICR is a strong review and its Quality is. a. Quality of ICR Rating