HMRC Governance Protocol on compliance with the Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks

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HMRC Governance Protocol on compliance with the Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks 26 March 2012. 1

Contents Page Introduction Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Introduction Governance Tax Planning Relationship between the bank and HMRC 2

Introduction HMRC has developed a governance process around communication and escalation procedures in any case where we have concerns about a bank s compliance with its commitments under the Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks. This document sets out these processes. Chapter 1 3

Introduction 1. HMRC may at any time take one of three views about a bank s compliance with the code of practice: i. it has not expressed concerns over a bank s compliance with the code ii. it has expressed concerns over compliance which are being discussed iii. it s concerns over compliance have not been adequately addressed and it considers that the bank has not complied with the code. 2. If HMRC has concerns about compliance with the code then the CRM or equivalent will raise them with the bank at the earliest opportunity, once this action has been approved at deputy director level. 3. If discussion between the CRM and the bank does not resolve the concerns, HMRC (normally at or above deputy director level) will escalate them to the bank s Board for further discussion at this level. 4. HMRC will only take the view that the bank has not complied with the code if its concerns still remain unresolved. If this is the case, it will i. tell the bank that it considers that the bank is not complying with its undertakings under the code; and ii. explain what it considers the bank should do in order to comply. 5. Where HMRC has told a bank that it considers it to not have complied with its code undertakings HMRC would expect the bank to acknowledge this in any public pronouncements it makes on its operation of the code. 6. Some smaller banks have been asked to adopt section 1 of the code only. This allows them a more flexible approach to documenting and governing their strategy towards tax. However the principles underpinning that strategy should be the same as for larger banks that adopt the code in its entirety. The considerations set out below therefore will be applied to all banks. 4

Chapter 2 Governance 7. HMRC may express concerns over whether a bank has met its undertakings under code paragraphs 2 to 2.2: where the concerns are over the bank s strategy for and governance of risk management for taxation matters; whether the strategy is understood and operated within the bank; or the bank s strategy towards the openness, transparency and professionalism of its relationship with HMRC. 8. Reasons HMRC may be concerned over the bank s strategy or governance could include: i. a lack of policy for proper tax risk management containing a documented strategy and governance process for taxation matters except where the bank s approach to avoiding tax risk is sufficiently clear for it to be unnecessary for the bank to have such a formal written policy ii. failure to let the CRM or equivalent officer see any such policy on request iii. evidence that the strategy, and compliance with it, is not considered at an adequately senior level consistent with the scale of risks being managed iv. failure to give the CRM on request an understanding of the processes adopted over the period concerned to ensure that the policy is taken account of in business decisions v. failure by the bank to review its actions over time to ensure it believes it is properly implementing its governance obligations under the code vi. evidence of systemic failures in implementation revealed by the bank s review or for other reasons vii. failure to provide any required certificate under schedule 46 FA 2009, viii. evidence that the tax department is not involved in, does not fully understand, or has little power to influence transactions undertaken which may present tax risk ix. a recent pattern of mistakes in completing tax returns x. significant arrears in filing returns or paying tax xi. failure to disclose transactions which may present a significant tax risk. 5

Chapter 3 Tax Planning 9. HMRC may express concerns whether a bank has met its undertakings under paragraphs 3 to 3.3 of the code where the concerns are that the bank has failed to: i. embody the tax planning strategy envisaged by the code in its formal policy, where it has one ; or ii. adopt this tax planning approach in practice; and give guidance to the bank s operating staff accordingly iii. review, prior to contracting, all potentially contentious transactions for compliance with this tax planning strategy, involving an appropriate level of tax expertise and challenge, and documenting the review appropriately iv. enter into or promote reviewed transactions only if its management was satisfied that: (1) they supported genuine commercial activity (2) they produced tax results for the bank that are consistent with the underlying economics of the arrangements; or if not, (3) the tax results they produced were not contrary to the intentions of Parliament, taking into account both a purposive construction of legislation and whether Parliament could realistically have intended the result, given a track record of acting to close loopholes to prevent transactions that are too good to be true. v. take reasonable views in coming to decisions under (iv), where the failure to do so amounts to failing systematically or wilfully to implement its undertakings about tax planning 10. Evidence of possible systematic or wilful failure may include one or more of the following: i. a pattern of executed transactions which are followed by corrective or clarificatory changes to tax law that prevent the intended tax results. ii. a deliberate or continuing failure by the bank s management to undertake a proper review of proposed transactions; to ensure that it is sufficiently well informed about the transactions and the legislative context for it to take reasonable decisions; or to challenge proposals that are inconsistent with the code. iii. an approach to the Code which ignores its overall intent of constraining destabilising tax avoidance transactions that are likely to trigger a need for Parliament to consider legislative change. 6

Chapter 4 Relationship between the Bank and HMRC 11. HMRC may express concerns whether a bank has met its undertakings under code paragraphs 4 to 4.2 where the concerns are i. over the bank s delivery of these undertakings over the period concerned; or ii. about the bank s commitment to the undertakings, or to a shared plan to resolve the delivery concerns. 12. Reasons why HMRC might indicate concern to the bank about delivery of or commitment to these undertakings could include: i. A failure to disclose significant potentially contentious transactions at the earliest reasonable date ii. A failure to provide adequate information for HMRC to understand potentially contentious transactions iii. A failure to work with HMRC to agree reasonable timelines for enquiries or potential disputes to be brought to decision point iv. A failure to discuss in advance transactions when the bank is unsure whether they are contrary to the intentions of parliament, if it is reasonable to assume a primary reason for that is to leave Parliament uninformed about the impact of the transaction until completed. 7