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Public Disclosure Authorized IEG ICR Review Independent Evaluation Group 1. Project Data: Date Posted : 05/12/2011 Report Number : ICRR13606 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized PROJ ID : P073438 Project Name : Justice Services Improvement Country: Peru Sector Board : Sector(s): Central government administration (100%) Theme(s): Judicial and other dispute resolution mechanisms (25% - P) Access to law and justice (25% - P) Administrative and civil service reform (24% - P) Participation and civic engagement (13% - S) Decentralization (13% - S) L/C Number: L7219 Partners involved : Evaluator : Gita Gopal Panel Reviewer : J. W. Van Holst Pellekaan Appraisal Actual Project Costs (US$M US$M): 15.20 14.77 Loan/Credit (US$M US$M): 12.00 11.77 Cofinancing (US$M US$M): Board Approval Date : 03/04/2004 Closing Date : 07/09/2008 03/30/2010 Group Manager : IEG ICR Review 2 Group: IEGPS2 2. Project Objectives and Components: Public Disclosure Authorized a. Objectives: The overall objective of the proposed project was to set the foundation for a long term, participatory and sustainable reform process for Peru s justice sector. Sub-objectives were: (a) to strengthen institutional capacity to lead the reform process and achieve specific improvements in justice services delivery, in particular in the judiciary and in selected project districts; (b) to establish human resource management systems that ensure independence, transparency and integrity; and (c) to enhance access to justice services for the Peruvian society, in particular the poor. (Project Appraisal Document (PAD), page 7). The Loan Agreement stated the objective fairly similar : The objective of the Project is to assist the Borrower in establishing the foundations for a long -term, sustainable and participatory reform process for its justice sector, by strengthening the institutional capacity of the participating institutions, improving the quality of judicial services delivered by the Judiciary, including the Project Districts, and promoting an equitable access to justice for the Peruvian poor. The Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICRR) Review bases its review on the objectives stated in the PAD because they are more specific and clearer than those in the loan agreement.

b.were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation? No c. Components (or Key Conditions in the case of DPLs, as appropriate): There are four components: Component 1: Improved Justice Services Delivery (appraisal US$6.8 million; actual US$6.72 million ). This component aimed to strengthen the strategic planning and management within the Judiciary or court system, including the deconcentration of some decision -making powers to at least 4 of the 29 judicial districts. Component 2: Human Resources Professional Development (appraisal US$2.2 million; actual US$1.04million) : Objectives were: (a) improved quality human resources; (b) introduction of modern concepts of human resources planning and management into key sector institutions; (c) coordinated strategic planning among these institutions; and (d) coordinated planning between administrative offices of the Judiciary. Component 3: Enhanced Access to Justice (appraisal US$1.6 million; actual US$2.21 million): It sought to strengthen the capacity of the sector institutions to promote access to justice and reduce barriers, including addressing corruption. It supported the implementation of a strategy to enhance access to economically and socially disadvantaged groups. Component 4: Project Management, Coordination and Monitoring (appraisal US$1.1 million ; actual US$1.8 million): A Project Coordination Unit (PCU) was responsible for financial management and for monitoring and evaluation the operation. A Technical Secretary of the Project Steering Committee (Comité Directivo) was also formed including the heads of the 4 participating institutions: (i) Judiciary; (ii) National Judicial Council (CNM); (iii) Judicial Academy (AMAG); and (iv) Ministry of Justice (MINJUS). The committee was chaired by the President of the Supreme Court. d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates: Total project cost at appraisal was US$15.2 million. The final disbursement from the Bank was US$11.7 million and the Borrower contributed US$3 million (confirmed by the Task Team Leader (TTL)). An amount of US$ 0.23 million from the Bank loan was cancelled. Reallocations occurred twice. In January 2008, $1,725,000 was transferred from Consultant Services and $ 60,000 from the Unallocated category to Goods, Small Civil Works and Training. In June 2009, $60,000 was shifted from Unallocated funds to Operational Costs. Borrower contribut ion of US$3.0 million was provided through the four participating agencies. The closing date was extended thrice : (i) for twelve months until June 30 2009; (ii) for three months until September 30, 2009, and (iii) finally until March 31, 2010. Extensions were the result of a 22-month delay between the signing of the loan and effectiveness as well as the time necessary to coordinate efforts between the 4 different institutions across two branches of the State. 3. Relevance of Objectives & Design: The objectives were highly relevant : They were consistent with the Bank's Country Partnership Strategy (2005), which aimed to enhance access to justice for the poor by addressing three significant barriers to access : a) economic (high costs in terms of fees and time, especially for the poor ); b) ethno-cultural constraints (lack of understanding of laws and procedures by the poor and especially indigenous people (IP)); and c) the perception of corruption. They were based on prior assessments conducted by the Bank (the Institutional and Governance Review and the World Bank Institute study Voices of the Misgoverned and Misruled ). They were also consistent with the country strategy, namely Peru s Acuerdo Nacional (National Pact) - a set of 29 State policies endorsed by political parties, civil society, academia, labor unions, and the private sector. The Pact included a chapter on "Justice", which was considered an important element of Peru s strategy to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, including more efficient, transparent and decentralized legal service delivery. The project design was substantially relevant : The project aimed to bring together four key stakeholders in the delivery of justice such coordination was critically needed for effective justice reform in Peru. Although the joint coordination mechanism was ambitious, this turned out to be a strong implementation feature, which worked well. The project was also designed to start in a few districts to demonstrate results. The project design was

also flexible enough to facilitate support of Asistencia Legal Gratuita (ALEGRAs), a legal aid system introduced under the auspices of MINJUS. Some of the activities, however, turned out to be unrealistic. For example, in the case of the Human Resource (HR) strengthening component, the development of a common HR policy and strategy for the four key institutions in the justice delivery sector was abandoned with the revised indicators focusing on individual institutions working together. 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy): (1) Strengthened justice services delivery, in particular in the Judiciary and in selected project districts -Substantial achievement : The participating agencies coordinated well in rationalizing training, selection, and promotions of judges. They jointly promoted the passage of the Judicial Career Law, which aims to improve the entry, promotion, and evaluation system for judges. In ten participating districts (more than the planned four), the Project helped to decrease inventories of backlogged cases through development of caseload registries and retirement of a significant proportion of inactive cases. It supported the reorganization and refurbishing of Labor and Family courts, introduced biometric registration for parolees, and established a more efficient notification systems led to improved court systems in specific districts (although substantive problems in notifications continue ). Funding, equipment and technical assistance was provided to allow notifications by Internet in Lima s commercial courts reducing time (from 20 days to 1 minute) and costs for users. Courtrooms and files were re-organized, which has facilitated better use of space, improved oversight by the judges of the staff, and discouraged entry of non-judicial staff into the work area. Deconcentration of decision making in 10 districts has been initiated with the districts having the ability to formulate their own priorities. The Project helped the 10 participating judicial districts to improve their budgeting capabilities and to focus on meeting users needs to achieve increased satisfaction. This has helped the districts to incorporate results targets in their budgets. More recently, districts have also been authorized to make smaller procurements without prior approval by central management, and to hire local staff in each participating district. However, the percentage of funds over which the district has discretion is very low, and hence the decision making in financial matter s is still small. (2) Strengthened human resource management systems that ensure independence, transparency and integri ty -Modest achievement : The project established a Steering Committee in 2004 consisting of representatives from four key institutions: (i) the Judiciary; (ii) CNM; (iii) Judicial Academy (AMAG); and (iv) MINJUS. This has resulted in the rationalization of services and the joint determination of sector -wide priorities such as the adoption of a Judicial Career Law, coordinated training, and a specialized selection process for personnel. These institutions have jointly prepared judicial profiles and ethics indicators, along with leadership and promotion criteria. Disclosure of human resources statistics has begun according to the ICR. For the follow-up project, this committee has been strengthened by an additional representative from the Attorney General s Office, which is a positive step. However, this committee continues to function as a project created committee. The indicator "common human resource planning and management policies aimed at retaining quality human resources and providing them with appropriate professional development " was revised in 2007 as follows: A better coordinated Justice sector through an institutionalized coordinating body which will provide strategic direction and oversight of service provision and management. The original indicator was not met there is no common HR policy. The revised indicator, which was not formally approved, was met. The 2008 Judicial Career Law was passed, which aimed to improve the entry, promotion, and evaluation system for judges. According to the ICRR, implementation of the Law was facilitated by the joint committee established by the Project. However, there is as yet no effective system for the selection, performance evaluation, training, and removal of judicial staff. An integrated human resource information system that incorporates all existing databases into a single database did not materialize. Data on user satisfaction (litigants/parties and trial attorneys alike) is available as confirmed in an interview with the TTL. Significant training was undertaken under the project. Development of curricula and materials for the Judicial Academy s entry-level and continuing education programs was an important output. The development of distance learning programs for the Judicial Academy s courses and of equipment for their implementation are also noted in the ICRR as being an important cost -cutting measure. There is no information, however on outcomes. An ethics code was not passed. The ICRR, however, notes that the project contributed to promoting an ethical value system among judicial personnel through support to La Oficina de Control de la Magistratura (OCMA), the Judiciary s ethics and anti-corruption office including investigative equipment, training, and specialized software to encourage, track and respond to complaints. This provided capacity for OCMA to carry out 34 sting operations (2007 12; 2008 8; 2009: 14), all of which resulted in the accused judicial

officials (or in some cases, private lawyers) being removed from their positions. Project support also resulted in increasing investigations and follow -up on complaints. 16,000 OCMA staff (including in regional and mobile offices) were trained. (3) Enhanced access to justice services for the Peruvian society, in particular the poor -Substantial achievement : ALEGRAs did not exist prior to the project; therefore, there is no baseline to assess extent of change in satisfaction. ALEGRAs, introduced under the auspices of MINJUS, deliver legal services through multi-service legal assistance centers. They provide free legal aid and conciliation services with public defenders working with social workers and CSOs to address gender -based discrimination as well as specific needs of indigenous user. The project supported the setting up of 15 legal aid clinics, 3 of which are mobile, covering a population of 1.8 million (approximately 8 percent of the total population). Given the significant demand for this model of service delivery (they are catering to approximately 200,000 users every year), ALEGRAs are now introducing an income means test to qualify for their free services. A baseline survey in 2009 indicates that 78 percent of the respondents in project areas evaluated the access to services provided by ALEGRAs positively and 77 percent responded favorably to the physical facilities. A 2009 Social Assessment of project impact upon indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups such as peasants (available in project files) found that there have been positive improvements in service delivery as well as training and awareness of their human resources; however, only 35 percent of the litigants surveyed expressed satisfaction with the courts of the judiciary. The Assessment did find that the satisfaction rate was higher in project areas than in non-project areas. 5. Efficiency (not applicable to DPLs): Overall, efficiency is substantial : The ICRR states that the project generated reasonable results and introduced a results culture among participating agencies. The project increased efficiency in the justice system by improving coordination among the participating agencies as well as in supporting electronic notification in the commercial courts in Lima (which handled most of the commercial cases ), reducing delays. The reduction of the backlog also enhanced efficiency of some courts. Results-based budgeting also helped to increase efficiency in ten districts, as did some deconcentration of decision making to the districts. There were, however, two main implementation delays: a 22-month delay between the signing of the loan and effectiveness, and the second, to coordinate efforts between 4 different institutions across two branches of the State. This resulted in the project being extended for eighteen months. a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR ERR)/Financial Rate of Return (FRR FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated estimated value at evaluation : Rate Available? Point Value Coverage/Scope* Appraisal ICR estimate No No * Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated. 6. Outcome: Project outcome is satisfactory. Relevance of objectives was, and continues to be high, and relevance of project design was substantial. Two of the three key objectives were substantially achieved, while one was modestly achieved. Efficiency is assessed to be substantial. The overall objective of setting the foundation for a long term, participatory, and sustainable reform process for Peru s justice sector has been satisfactorily achieved. a. Outcome Rating : Satisfactory 7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Some justifiable concerns exist that the results achieved will not be sustained given the relatively weak

governance related indicators. The follow-up project supported by the Bank has, however, identified these risks and will likely to address them, and it will build on the progress has achieved so far in the delivery of justice services. The strengthening of the Steering Committee by the addition of a representative from the Attorney General's office also increases the likelihood that project results will be sustained and reform will be enhanced. a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Moderate 8. Assessment of Bank Performance: Bank Performance at Entry was moderately satisfactory : The Bank supported a relevant project and ensured the participation of key stake holders in designing the project. It further encouraged the participation and collaboration of key stake holders in the implementation of the justice delivery program. Despite the above, the project was not ready for implementation, it taking 22 months between loan signing and project effectiveness. While the results framework was overall sound, the associated indicators were not fully monitorable and lacked baselines or benchmarks. Bank Support during Project Implementation was satisfactory : The Bank team appointed a national consultant to support supervision and coordination. This was appreciated by the Borrower. The Bank team focused on financial and procurement aspects, which helped to support better implementation. According to the ICRR, there was close collaboration with other relevant projects in the public sector. The ICR also notes that the Bank team s relationship with each of the counterpart agencies was excellent, including a focus on developing not only a solid Steering Committee dynamic, but also providing individual attention to the needs of each institution. There was, however, weak focus on project impact on Indigenous Peoples. a. Ensuring Quality -at at-entry Entry:Moderately Satisfactory b. Quality of Supervision :Satisfactory c. Overall Bank Performance :Moderately Satisfactory 9. Assessment of Borrower Performance: Government performance was satisfactory. The Government established the Steering Committee and supported its performance. It was committed to the project objectives, reflected not only in its request for a new project, but also to the continuation of the Steering Committee. It is continuing to show its commitments through the addition of a representative from the Attorney General's Office (AGO). While the government initially did not provide the committed counterpart funding of US$ 3.2m, it helped to facilitate an arrangement between the participating institutions that ensured that the counterpart funds amounting to US$3.0 million were provided. The performance of the Implementing Agency (the judiciary ) was satisfactory. Following the replacement of its first manager the Project Coordinating Unit (PCU) was well managed and its performance was exemplary (ICRR, page 18). The PCU supported implementation in a coordinated fashion through the Steering Committee, and helped to further project implementation under extremely difficult conditions. It managed activities in a consultative and open fashion and exercised due diligence in all fiduciary matters according to the ICRR (page 9). One deficiency noted in the ICRR is the weak dissemination or outreach activities by the judiciary, although outreach activities were conducted by the ALEGRAs. a. Government Performance :Satisfactory b. Implementing Agency Performance :Satisfactory c. Overall Borrower Performance :Satisfactory 10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

At Design : The indicators were focused for the most part on outputs, lacked baseline data and specificity. Indicators such as "confidence in the courts" were difficult to measure. Partly because of the lack of quantitative data, the indicators were focused on qualitative data. During Implementation : The team identified the inadequacy of the monitoring framework and tried to rectify it by adding more specific indicators. A user survey was financed only in 2006/2007 to collect baseline data on user satisfaction but this was late into project implementation leaving only a short period before project closing for improvements to occur. Utilization of Data : Given the lack of systematic collection of data or any baselines, there was little information except on outputs even by project mid -term review. The output data (such as number of ALEGRAs, works undertaken, equipment provided ) were utilized in making decisions, but were of limited use in evaluating results. a. M&E Quality Rating : Modest 11. Other Issues (Safeguards, Fiduciary, Unintended Positive and Negative Impacts): Safeguards Issues : The PAD had noted that the indigenous peoples aspects of the enhanced access to justice component of this Project were designed in coordination with the team supervising the Indigenous and Afro-Peruvian Peoples Development Project and are consistent with the IPDP prepared for that project. However, neither the Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) nor the ICRR report on the issue No fiduciary issues were noted in the ICRR. An unintended positive impact mentioned in the ICRR (page 16) was that Peru was able to qualify for US Millennium Challenge Corporation funding across many sectors in part because this project had strengthened the OCMA (the Anti Corruption Office within the Judiciary). 12. Ratings: ICR IEG Review Reason for Disagreement /Comments Outcome: Satisfactory Satisfactory Risk to Development Negligible to Low Moderate Progress has been made, but there are Outcome: still quality issues that need to be addressed for the results to be fully sustainable. Bank Performance : Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory According to the OPCS -IEG Harmonized Evaluation Criteria, the ICRR rating should also have been moderately satisfactory given that it rated quality-at-entry as moderately satisfactory. Borrower Performance : Satisfactory Satisfactory Quality of ICR : Satisfactory NOTES: - When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006. - The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate. 13. Lessons: Two important lessons are: A rigorous and realistic results framework should underpin a judicial reform project. A realistic set of monitorable output and outcome indicators are also needed and these should be reviewed on a regular basis.

In complex areas such as reform of delivery of justice services, broad participation of client stakeholders from key agencies as well as those receiving services is essential if reform is to be sustainable. A good understanding of political economy issues is therefore necessary to design effective sustained coordination. 14. Assessment Recommended? Yes No 15. Comments on Quality of ICR: The quality of the ICRR is satisfactory. It is candid, has discussed key issues, and provided a basis for its ratings. Greater focus on outcomes and better use of quantitative information (given that the ICRR notes that such information is available in several areas ) could have strengthened the ICRR. The ICRR could also have better explained issues related to serving the needs of the poor or disadvantaged groups (a key facet of the objective). a.quality of ICR Rating : Satisfactory