SPECIAL REPORT. TD Economics THE WORRISOME DECLINE IN THE U.S. PARTICIPATION RATE

Similar documents
SPECIAL REPORT. TD Economics ECONOMIC GROWTH AFTER RECOVERY: QUANTIFYING THE NEW NORMAL

The Labor Force Participation Puzzle

Additional Slack in the Economy: The Poor Recovery in Labor Force Participation During This Business Cycle

OBSERVATION. TD Economics U.S. DEFICITS & DEBT: PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE

Observation. January 18, credit availability, credit

SPECIAL REPORT. TD Economics CONDITIONS ARE RIPE FOR AMERICAN CONSUMERS TO LEAD ECONOMIC GROWTH

Special Report. May 28, the United States and. represent over 50% of total employment in 60. the country. In addition to their majority

Rocky Mountain ECONOMIST: Labor force participation rates have fallen sharply THE

OBSERVATION. TD Economics EUROPE S LOST GENERATION

U.S. HOUSING RECOVERY WILL NOT DROWN IN A SEA OF DISTRESSED SALES

OBSERVATION. TD Economics U.S. INFLATION LIMBO HOW LOW CAN IT GO?

Special Report. March 10, ,600 1,400 1,200

Methodology behind the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta s Labor Force Participation Dynamics

Labor Force Participation Rates by Age and Gender and the Age and Gender Composition of the U.S. Civilian Labor Force and Adult Population

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (2017) All rights reserved

CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web

TD Economics Special Report

In fiscal year 2016, for the first time since 2009, the

No Jobs Recovery? The Connecticut Economic Outlook: August 2009

SPECIAL REPORT. TD Economics CANADIAN CORPORATE BALANCE SHEETS

When will US Employment Recover from the Great Recession?

Monitoring the Performance of the South African Labour Market

ACTUARIAL REPORT 25 th. on the

THE GROWTH RATE OF GNP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY. Remarks by. Emmett J. Rice. Member. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Beyond stereotypes. Myths and facts about people of working age who receive social security

Implications of Fiscal Austerity for U.S. Monetary Policy

Table 1: Economic Growth Measures

IBO. Despite Recession,Welfare Reform and Labor Market Changes Limit Public Assistance Growth. An Analysis of the Hudson Yards Financing Plan

TD Economics QUARTERLY ECONOMIC FORECAST U.S. OUTLOOK: OVERCOMING THE HEADWINDS

Do demographics explain structural inflation?

Monetary Policy as the Economy Approaches the Fed s Dual Mandate

Estimating Key Economic Variables: The Policy Implications

Business insights. Employment and unemployment. Sharp rise in employment since early 1975

THE IMPACT OF AGING BABY BOOMERS ON LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EURO AREA AND THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

Socio-economic Series Long-term household projections 2011 update

OBSERVATION. TD Economics PERSISTENT FEDERAL DEFICITS ON THE HORIZON

Monitoring the Performance of the South African Labour Market

TD Economics. Monetary Policy Monitor 1. September 8,

People Who Are Not in the Labor Force: Why Aren't They Working?

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (2018) All rights reserved

New England Economic Partnership May 2012: Massachusetts

The State of Working Florida 2011

Stuck in the Great Recession s Income Slump: Sluggish Job Earnings Impede an Economic Expansion

Equal pay for breadwinners

2000s, a trend. rates and with. workforce participation as. followed. 2015, 50 th

PART-TIME PURGATORY YOUNG AND UNDEREMPLOYED IN AUSTRALIA

DEMOGRAPHICS, REAL INTEREST RATES AND EQUITY MARKETS WHITE PAPER

8.6% Unemployment Is a Myth

P o v e r t y T r e n d s b y Family Type, Highlights. What do we mean by families and unattached individuals?

Labor force participation of the elderly in Japan

November 15, Northern Trust Global Economic Research 50 South LaSalle Chicago, Illinois northerntrust.com

If the Economy s so Bad, Why Is the Unemployment Rate so Low?

Opting out of the labor force and does the unemployment rate still matter?

Demographic Drivers. Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 11

TD Economics QUARTERLY ECONOMIC FORECAST U.S. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: GLOBAL HEADWINDS WILL NOT BLOW GROWTH OFF COURSE

Too old to hire, too young to retire.

NEW ENTRANTS 300 (6.8%) EMPLOYMENT CHANGE

The labour force participation of older men in Canada

The diagram above illustrates the pattern of: A) Wage movements over time B) Price level movements C) Economic growth patterns D) Business cycles

The Province of Prince Edward Island Employment Trends and Data Poverty Reduction Action Plan Backgrounder

C URRENT SSUES. Second. district highlights. New York New Jersey Job Expansion to Continue in 2000 James Orr and Rae D. Rosen

Women Leading UK Employment Boom

New England Economic Partnership May 2013: Massachusetts

Test Bank Labor Economics 7th Edition George Borjas

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

Notes Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding. Unless otherwise indicated, years referred to in describing the bud

Special Report. May 18, 2010

The U.S. Economy After the Great Recession: America s Deleveraging and Recovery Experience

ACTUARIAL REPORT 27 th. on the

Potential Output in Denmark

COMMENTS ON SESSION 1 PENSION REFORM AND THE LABOUR MARKET. Walpurga Köhler-Töglhofer *

The 2008 Statistics on Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage by Gary Burtless THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

The Employment Situation, February 2010: Unemployment Rate for Older Workers Increases Again 1

For 2013 as a whole, aggregate tax revenues rose by 6.8% from year-ago levels, bringing them 11% above their pre-recession peak.

Can We Restart The Recovery All Over Again?

Growth in Personal Income for Maryland Falls Slightly in Last Quarter of 2015 But state catches up to U.S. rates

We are in the midst of a weak and fragile recovery, with unemployment grinding

Labour Market Bulletin

10,100 NEW ENTRANTS 1,300 (3%) EMPLOYMENT CHANGE

Summary. Personal income in Massachusetts has grown at a relatively modest pace in the current recovery despite fairly robust employment growth.

Farmers have significantly increased their debt levels

Research Brief. Great Recession Accelerated Long-Term Decline of Employer Health Coverage. The Great Recession Accelerated Existing Trend

KING COUNTY AND SEATTLE MOTOR VEHICLE EXCISE TAX BASE PROJECTIONS

CHAPTER 2. Hidden unemployment in Australia. William F. Mitchell

ECONorthwest ECONOMICS FINANCE PLANNING

Research notes Basic Information on Recent Elderly Employment Trends in Japan

Labor Force Participation in New England vs. the United States, : Why Was the Regional Decline More Moderate?

The Myth of Full Employment and Why the Fed Won't Raise Rates This Year

Despite tax cuts enacted in 1997, federal revenues for fiscal

Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry Association. Equity Ownership

Ins&tute for Fiscal Studies

First Quarter 2016 Quarterly narrative REGIONAL SUMMARIES Fort Smith region Northwest Arkansas Central Arkansas Jonesboro

Experience Required. The Diminished Employment Prospect of Teens & Young Adults in Los Angeles. neeta fogg paul harrington.

The Urgent Need for Job Creation

Perspectives on the Youth Labour Market in Canada

Critical Demographics: Rapid Aging and the Shape of the Future in China, South Korea, and Japan

Texas: Demographically Different

Eurozone. EY Eurozone Forecast December 2014

Jobenomics Unemployment Report: August By: Chuck Vollmer 6 August 2014

Transcription:

SPECIAL REPORT TD Economics THE WORRISOME DECLINE IN THE U.S. PARTICIPATION RATE Highlights The U.S. participation rate has declined significantly over the last few years, dragging the U.S. the labor force down by close to a million people. The recent recession shoulders much of the blame for the declining participation rate, but structural forces are also at play that could make it permanent. The people most likely to see a rebound in participation are core working-age people between 25 and 54 years old. However, discouraged workers appear unlikely to return to the workforce quickly. Several sectors in the U.S. remain structurally impaired, and for people who have been out of work for several years, the potential to come back into the workforce is limited. At a minimum the U.S. labor force should be expected to turn from negative to positive growth over the next year, which means that increases in employment will have to take the full load of reducing the unemployment rate. The recent declines in the unemployment rate seen over the last year due to a reduction in the labor force are unlikely to continue. In the medium-term, removing the structural forces that are impeding a recovery in the labor force will be fundamental to restoring U.S. economic growth to its full potential. The U.S. unemployment rate has declined sharply over the last year, falling from 9.4% to 8.5%. This fall has been steeper than most economists ourselves included had expected. Unfortunately, our forecast miss was not because we underestimated the strength in the economy, but instead because of a rise in the number of people who have stopped searching for work altogether. However, while the decline in labor force participation has meant a faster decline in the unemployment rate, this is not a good news story. Growth in the labor force is a primary determinant of the potential growth Index (28=) rate of the U.S. economy. A declining labor force represents nothing short of a loss of economic 4 potential. As the job market continues to recover, the natural assumption would be that discouraged workers will return to the labor force and the participation rate will rebound. However, dissecting the participation rate by age categories reveals that less temporary factors are also at play. In particular, rising school enrollment has likely led to lower participation among 16-24 year olds. At the other end of the age spectrum, aging baby boomers will also put downward pressure on the participation rate. The best hope for a rebound in the participation rate lies with core working age people (25-54). However, historical experience suggests that this will not occur swiftly and will likely require a 2 98 96 94 92 9 U.S. CIVILIAN POPULATION & LABOR FORCE Population Labor Force 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2 211 James Marple, Senior Economist, 416-982-2557

much faster pace of job growth than is currently anticipated. Moreover, structural impairment in a number of U.S. sectors alongside an unprecedented increase in the duration of unemployment have made it even more difficult for people who have left the job market to quickly return to it. All told, as long as the economy remains structurally impaired, there is reason to be careful about how fast discouraged workers will move back into the workforce, even as job growth continues. Hi-ho hi-ho it s off to school we go Young people have seen the biggest change in participation rates over the last several years. Since the start of the recession, the percentage of people aged 16-24 participating in the workforce has declined from 61% to just over 55%. While a sour job market accelerated the fall, young people s participation rates had been declining well before the recession. In fact, the overall participation rate of 16-24 year olds peaked in 1989. Had it not been for female entry into the workforce it would have peaked even earlier the participation rate for males aged 16-24 peaked in 1949. Two main factors explain the secular decline in young people s participation rates: increased school enrollment and declining labor force participation rates among students in high school and college. Since 1985 (the first year data is available), the share of young people enrolled in school has risen by 18 percentage points. Enrollment in school does not exclude a person from participating in the labor market, but the enrolled have a much lower participation rate. In fact, from 1985 to 2, the fall in the participation rate of 16-24 year olds was due entirely to rising enrollment. 1.5.5 -.5-1.5-2.5-3.5 CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGE IN PARTICIPATION RATE OF 16-24 YEAR OLDS School enrollment Participation rate of enrolled Participation rate of not enrolled 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 1 3 5 7 9 11 Source: BLS, TD Economics In the early 2s, the decline in the youth participation rate accelerated and its core driver changed. While school enrollment continued to rise, the main contributor to falling labor force participation became a decrease in labor force attachment among students. In particular, between 2 and 211, the participation rate of students enrolled in high school fell by a whopping 19 percentage points, accounting for over 7% of the decline in the enrolled participation rate over this time. Given the relatively long-run nature of the decline in youth participation, it seems unlikely that it will rebound swiftly, even as the job market recovers. Indeed, the vast majority of youth who are not participating in the workforce have no desire to get a job. Since 21, the share of 16-24 year olds who do not want a job has risen relatively consistently. 55 45 35 ENROLLED IN SCHOOL Percent of reference population aged 16-24* Male Female 16-24 YEAR OLDS WHO DO NOT WANT A JOB NOW Percent of population aged 16-24* 38 36 32 28 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 1 3 5 7 9 11 26 95 96 97 98 99 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 2

While lower youth participation would in itself temper economic potential, the upside is that in the longer-run, higher labor productivity, as a result of increased education levels, will provide an offset. Given the steady increase in the percentage of the population with advanced degrees, this is one area where there is a case for optimism. Discouraged or out for good? The biggest rebound potential in the participation rate over the next several years lies within the core working-age population. Over the last three years, the participation rate of people in their core working years 25 to 54 has fallen from 83.1% to 81.6%, a decrease of 1.5 percentage points (and equivalent to 1.8 million people). Participation rates among core working age people do appear to be influenced by the business cycle. This can be seen more clearly by removing the longer-run trend from the participation rate and looking at differences from this trend (see chart below). Just as in the past recession, the cycle component of the participation rate appears to fall even in the early stages of economic recoveries and does not appear to rebound until four to five years into a new business cycle. During the 199s, the participation rate was below trend until mid-1996, while following the 21 recession, it remained below trend until 26. Based on historical experience, it may take several years of relatively robust job growth before the participation rate for this crucial age cohort sees a significant rebound. Indeed, the nature of the current recession and recovery could provide an even longer period of time before the core participation rate rebounds. In the early stages of the 1.4 1.2 1..8.4.2 REASONS FOR NOT SEARCHING FOR WORK OTHER THAN DISCOURAGEMENT Percent of people not in the labor force* In school or training Other reasons Ill health or disability Family responsibilities 1997 1999 21 23 25 27 29 211 recession, the decline in the participation rate was made up entirely of men. Over the last two years, however, females have also been increasingly leaving the workforce. In 211, the female labor force participation rate fell by percentage points, the same decline as males. For men, the earlier decline is consistent with a fall in construction activity where men make up 87% of employment. For women, the later decline may reflect the fact that structural impairment has now moved to sectors where women play a bigger role. One of the very worst performing sectors in terms of employment in 211 was state and local government where women make up % of employment. Another factor that tempers expectations for a near-term rebound in the participation rate is a decline in the number of discouraged workers in 211. Unfortunately, the fall was.4.2 PARTICIPATION RATE OF 24-55 YEAR OLDS DIFFERENCE FROM TREND.8 Twelve month moving average PARTICIPATION RATE OF 25-54 YEAR OLDS Percent of male population Percent of female population 92. 77. 91.5 76.5 91. 76. 9.5 -.2 -.4 - -.8 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 21 26 211 Source: BLS, TD Economics. 9 89.5 89. Male (lhs) 88.5 Female (rhs) 88. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 75.5 75. 74.5 74. 3

2 Dec-7 Dec-11 AVERAGE DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT BY AGE 16-19 2-24 25-35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ not due to movement back into the labor force, but instead reflected an increase in people who are not currently looking for work for reasons other than discouragement. The biggest category to gain at the expense of discouraged workers was literally other reasons, which includes people who simply did not provide any answer at all as to why they were not currently looking for work. The fact that people are no longer considering themselves discouraged could signal a more permanent move away from labor force participation. The average duration of unemployment currently sits at 39.4 weeks, more than twice as high as it was prior to the recession. For people who have been out of the workforce for several years, the potential to come back into the workforce is likely severely impaired and could result in a participation rate that will take even longer to rebound than normal. All told, while there are signs of stabilization in the participation rates of core-working age people, there are a number of reasons to be cautious about expecting a significant or swift rebound. Postponing retirement, but not forever While labor force participation rates have been declining among young and middle-aged people, the same cannot be said for older workers over the age of 55. On the contrary, the participation rates of both men and women over 55 years old continued to rise through the recession and only showed signs of slowing down in the last year and a half. Much like the decline in the participation rate of younger people, the increase in participation rates of older workers is a trend that had been in place well before the recession. Indeed, it has mirrored another, longer-term trend the movement of the baby boomers into their pre-retirement years. In fact, over the last several years, the rise in the participation rates of older workers has only offset the downward pressure exerted by more people moving into their older years. Population aging exerts downward pressure on participation rate because of a life-cycle pattern where participation rates peak in the early forties and then begin to decline with every older age group. While the declines are small between the 35-44 and 45-54 age categories, there is a significant drop in participation rates in people over 55 (see chart below). In 211, even with the rise in older worker s participation, the participation rate of 25-54 year olds was more than 12 8 6 4 2 Percent of total population 16-19 2-24 Percent 9 8 7 2 16-17 18-19 25-29 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION - 35-39 - 44 45-49 1991 211-54 55-59 PARTICIPATION RATES BY AGE 2-24 25-29 - 35-39 - 44 Age 45-49 - 54 55-59 - 64-64 65-69 65-69 27 211 7-74 7-74 75+ 4

percentage points higher than people over 55. This matters because the largest age cohort in the U.S. population is currently to 54 year olds. With some relatively simple arithmetic, the change in the aggregate participation rate can be decomposed into the influence of changes in population distribution and changes in the participation rates of specific age groups. In the five years prior to 211, increasing participation among workers over the age of 55 contributed an average of.2 percentage points a year to the participation rate, offsetting the decline due to population aging. In 211, however, the labor force participation of older workers stopped rising and this contribution fell to zero. Over the next five years, population aging will subtract a quarter of a percentage point a year from the aggregate labor force participation rate. In order to offset this, the participation rate of workers above 55 would have to rise by percentage points a year. If, as in 211, the rise in the participation rates of older workers slows, population aging will lead to an overall decline in the labor force participation rate. Bottom Line Forecasts for the unemployment rate depend not only on the number of jobs that are created, but also on growth in the U.S. labor force. While it is easy to blame the decline in the U.S. labor force over the last few years on the recession, there are both cyclical and structural forces that explain its recent movement. At the extreme, if there is no cyclical improvement in age-specific participation rates over the next year, labor force growth will turn positive, but population aging will limit it to average growth of only 7, persons a month. This means that in order to bring down the unemployment rate, the economy would have to create just over 7, jobs a month, which is significantly less than what labor market dynamics would have suggested before the recession. In all likelihood, however, the participation rates of the core working age population will slowly begin to rebound,.3 -.3 - -.9-1.2 CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGE IN PARTICIPATION RATE 16-24 Part. rate 25-54 Part. rate 55+ Part. rate Population Aging 21 23 25 27 29 211 Total change in participation rate allowing the aggregate participation rate to improve modestly. This will push the labor force growth up to between 12, and 1, persons a month, which is roughly where it would have been expected to be over the last several years. In the event that participation rates of younger people rebound by more than this, the outcome in the near-term will be an unemployment rate that will be slower to move down, and one that could even move back up. However, given that labor force participation is itself dependent on the pace of job growth, a relatively tepid job growth environment means that a significant rebound in labor force participation is less likely to occur. Of course, there is a real and significant downside to a relatively moribund participation rate. In the slightly longerterm, growth in the labor force is a primary determinant of the growth rate of the economy. The structural forces that are impeding a true recovery in the labor force will be a key challenge to restoring U.S. economic growth to its full potential. James Marple Senior Economist 416-982-2557 This report is provided by TD Economics. It is for information purposes only and may not be appropriate for other purposes. The report does not provide material information about the business and affairs of TD Bank Group and the members of TD Economics are not spokespersons for TD Bank Group with respect to its business and affairs. The information contained in this report has been drawn from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed to be accurate or complete. The report contains economic analysis and views, including about future economic and financial markets performance. These are based on certain assumptions and other factors, and are subject to inherent risks and uncertainties. The actual outcome may be materially different. The Toronto-Dominion Bank and its affiliates and related entities that comprise TD Bank Group are not liable for any errors or omissions in the information, analysis or views contained in this report, or for any loss or damage suffered. 5