Consolidated EIM Initiatives Straw Proposal

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Consolidated EIM Initiatives Straw Proposal Stakeholder Meeting August 7, 2017 Megan Poage & Don Tretheway Market Design & Policy

Agenda Time Topic Presenter 10:00 10:15 Introduction and Purpose Kristina Osborne 10:15 10:30 Third Party Transmission Contribution Megan Poage 10:30 12:00 Management of Bilateral Schedule Changes Don Tretheway 12:00 1:00 Break 1:00 2:30 Equitable Sharing of Wheeling Benefits Megan Poage 2:30 2:50 New EIM Functionalities Megan Poage & George Angelidis 2:50 3:00 Next Steps Kristina Osborne Page 2

Consolidated EIM Initiatives INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE Page 3

ISO Policy Initiative Stakeholder Process POLICY AND PLAN DEVELOPMENT Issue Paper Straw Proposal Draft Final Proposal Oct 2017 EIM Governing Body Nov 2017 Board Stakeholder Input We are here Slide 4

Plan for stakeholder engagement Milestone Date Post Issue Paper June 13, 2017 Stakeholder Conference Call June 20, 2017 Stakeholder Written Comments Due June 30, 2017 Post Straw Proposal July 31, 2017 Stakeholder Meeting August 7, 2017 Stakeholder Written Comments Due August 17, 2017 Post Draft Final Proposal September 5, 2017 Stakeholder Conference Call September 12, 2017 Stakeholder Written Comments Due September 19, 2017 EIM Governing Body Meeting October 10, 2017 Board of Governors Meeting* November 1-2, 2017 *November 2017 is the target date for the Board of Governors Meeting. It is not a requirement for all 3 initiatives in this consolidated effort to go to the board at the same time. Page 5

EIM Governing Body E1 classification (Primary Authority) EIM Governing Body has primary authority for considering and approving policy changes to market rules that would not exist but for the EIM. For a policy initiative involving market rules changes that fall entirely in the EIM Governing Body s primary authority, the matter goes to the EIM Governing Body for approval, and then to the consent agenda of the next Board meeting. http://www.caiso.com/documents/guidanceforhandlingpolicyinitiatives-eimgoverningbody.pdf Page 6

Purpose of this initiative is to consolidate EIM related items into one effort Items in this initiative: Third Party Transmission Contribution Management Bilateral Schedule Changes Equitable Sharing of Wheeling Benefits New EIM Functionalities Slide 7

Consolidated EIM Initiatives THIRD PARTY TRANSMISSION CONTRIBUTION Page 8

Third Party Transmission Contribution background information Currently, EIM transfers occur on transmission provided by EIM entities. Non EIM entities have expressed interest to contribute transmission located between EIM BAAs for use in the EIM markets. Existing Transmission 100 MW EIM BAA #1 3 rd Party Transmission 50 MW EIM BAA #2 Total capacity for EIM transfer between BAA #1 and BAA #2 has increased to 150 MW Page 9

Majority of stakeholder feedback indicated this functionality would not be widely used or beneficial Congestion revenues may not be adequate compensation Functionality does not provide sufficient value Concern that implementation cost will outweigh benefits Not an efficient use of ISO resources Page 10

Third Party Transmission Contribute removed from scope Based on stakeholder feedback, the ISO has removed this from the scope of the Consolidated EIM Initiatives Reference Issue Paper for details on the original problem statement, scope, and proposed solutions The Consolidated EIM Initiatives Issue Paper is located at: http://www.caiso.com/documents/issuepaper- ConsolidatedEnergyImbalanceMarketInitiatives_Updated.pdf Page 11

Consolidated EIM Initiatives MANAGEMENT OF BILATERAL SCHEDULE CHANGES Page 12

Management of bilateral schedule changes background information Schedule changes not reflected in base schedules are exposed to real-time imbalance settlement Risk of imbalance settlement unknown at time of schedule change Issue Paper contemplated use of wheeling functionality to express bid price to accept schedule change Page 13

Majority of stakeholder feedback was neutral functionality is desired but proposal does not address fundamental issue of ability to hedge T - 57 T 40 T - 20 T base schedule deadline FMM run* NAESB etagging deadline Prior to EIM, firm transmission holders could make schedule changes with no settlement implication up to the NAESB etagging deadline of T-20 *FMM run starts at T-37.5 however etags must be submitted and approved by T-40 for data to be fed into the market Page 14

Understanding the issue how the ISO markets manage congestion ISO market is aware of schedule change before FMM run Results in fifteen minute (FMM) settlement ISO market is aware of schedule change after FMM run Results in real time dispatch (RTD) settlement Page 15

Bilateral schedule submitted before T-57 Int 1 Int 2 Int 3 Int 4 Int 5 Int 6 Int 7 Int 8 Int 9 Int 10 Int 11 Int 12 Market N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Schedule finalized prior to EIM entity base schedule deadline No imbalance settlement Page 16

Bilateral schedule submitted between T-57 & T-40 Int 1 Int 2 Int 3 Int 4 Int 5 Int 6 Int 7 Int 8 Int 9 Int 10 Int 11 Int 12 Market FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM Base schedule change known to market operator prior to first FMM run Settled at FMM price for hour T Page 17

Bilateral schedule submitted between T-40 & T-25 Int 1 Int 2 Int 3 Int 4 Int 5 Int 6 Int 7 Int 8 Int 9 Int 10 Int 11 Int 12 Market RTD RTD RTD FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM Base schedule change not known to market operator prior to first FMM run Settled at RTD price for Int 1 Int 3 Settled at FMM price for Int 4 Int 12 Page 18

Bilateral schedule submitted between T-25 & T-20 Int 1 Int 2 Int 3 Int 4 Int 5 Int 6 Int 7 Int 8 Int 9 Int 10 Int 11 Int 12 Market RTD RTD RTD RTD RTD RTD FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM FMM Base schedule change not known to market operator prior to first or second FMM run for hour T Settled at RTD price for Int 1 Int 6 Settled at FMM price for Int 7 Int 12 Page 19

Managing exposure to re-dispatch costs through EIM entity OATT - example Re-dispatch cost occurs when a wheel results in congestion Gen 1 $20 Gen 2 $30 Import 1 Line Limit = 1000 MW Export 2 Node #1 Node #2 200 MW Wheel Load 2 900 MW Page 20

Example 1 - Wheel known before T-57 Base (MW) Dispatch (MW) Imbalance (MW) Wheel known before T-57 EIM entity ensures G1 does not overload transmission line No re-dispatch will be required LMP Settlement Gen 1 800 800 0 $20 - Gen 2 100 100 0 $30 - Load 2 900 900 0 $30 - Import 1 200 200 0 $20 - Export 2 200 200 0 $30 - RTCO - Page 21

Example 2a - Wheel known between T-57 and T-40 EIM entity takes action T-57 Base (MW) T-40 Base (MW) Dispatch (MW) Imbalance (MW) Final schedule not submitted by T-57 EIM entity adjusts G1 & G2 schedules to not overload transmission line No re-dispatch required LMP Settlement Gen 1 900 800 800 0 $20 - Gen 2 0 100 100 0 $30 - Load 2 900 900 900 0 $30 - Import 1 0 200 200 0 $20 - Export 2 0 200 200 0 $30 - RTCO - Page 22

Example 2b - Wheel known between T-57 and T-40 EIM entity takes no action T-57 Base (MW) T-40 Base (MW) Dispatch (MW) Imbalance (MW) LMP Settlement Gen 1 900 900 800-100 $20 $2,000 Gen 2 0 0 100 100 $30 -$3,000 Re-dispatch costs Load 2 900 900 900 0 $30 - Import 1 0 0 200 200 $20 -$4,000 Export 2 0 0 200 200 $30 $6,000 RTCO $1,000 Congestion revenue from wheel EIM entity does not notify ISO before ISO base schedule deadline Market must re-dispatch to allow wheel because EIM entity did not update base schedules Page 23

Example 3a - Wheel known after T-40 EIM entity takes action T-57 Base (MW) Dispatch (MW) Imbalance (MW) LMP Settlement Gen 1 800 800 0 $20 - Gen 2 100 100 0 $30 - Load 2 900 900 0 $30 - Import 1 0 200 200 $20 -$4,000 Export 2 0 200 200 $30 $6,000 Congestion revenue from wheel RTCO $2,000 EIM entity does not allow G1 base schedule to exceed transmission assuming wheel can tag up until T-20 Leaves room for wheel (if it is scheduled) Wheel still results in congestion, but this is $2000 congestion revenue (could be used to provide the perfect hedge) Page 24

Example 3b - Wheel known after T-40 EIM entity takes no action T-57 Base (MW) Dispatch (MW) Imbalanc e (MW) LMP Settlement Gen 1 900 800-100 $20 $2,000 Gen 2 0 100 100 $30 -$3,000 Re-dispatch costs Load 2 900 900 0 $30 - Import 1 0 200 200 $20 -$4,000 Export 2 0 200 200 $30 $6,000 Congestion revenue from wheel RTCO $1,000 EIM entity allows G1 base schedule to use wheel transmission Re-dispatch required because transmission for wheel was not reserved Congestion wheel revenue can provide perfect hedge Re-dispatch costs would result in an RTCO charge Page 25

EIM entity can provide the perfect hedge for bilateral schedule changes using firm transmission up until T-20 If schedule changes not exposed to imbalance settlement, re-dispatch costs occur: EIM entity does not reserve the transmission by not allowing other base schedules to use transmission EIM entity does not notify ISO before T-40 of schedule change Page 26

BREAK 12:00PM 1:00PM

Consolidated EIM Initiatives EQUITABLE SHARING OF WHEELING BENEFITS Page 28

Equitable Sharing of Wheeling Benefits background information EIM BAAs in the middle receive no direct financial benefit for facilitating wheeling transactions Should the source and sink accrue all benefits or should they be shared with the entity that facilitated the transfer? Page 29

Stakeholder feedback in favor of sharing wheeling benefits to compensate for transmission recovery Compensation for transmission use, not specifically sharing benefits, is essential to address the issues of: Cost recovery for flows caused by EIM dispatches. Preventing market distortions arising from discounted transmission pricing in any one temporal market and not the others. Preventing the problem of a free rider. Cost shifts among transmission owners and customers due to reduced transmission revenues. ISO Response: Compensation for transmission recovery will not be addressed in this initiative and may considered in a future initiative. Page 30

Stakeholder feedback against sharing wheeling benefits Sufficient value has not been demonstrated: BAA s in the middle receive benefits realized in other cases Entities would lose the incentive to make additional investments in resources that can be dispatched in the EIM Rate pancaking/hurdle rate could ultimately result in market inefficiencies and decrease in overall EIM benefits Undermines principle of reciprocity Reduction in liquidity will inhibit economic flow and ultimately be disruptive to the market as a whole ISO Response: Data analysis merits further investigation and policy proposal Page 31

Stakeholder feedback data request Determine the net benefit of facilitating a wheel-through transaction Quantify benefits that this initiative would yield Determine what benefit to the market design this would provide ISO Response: Data analysis completed to determine net benefit of wheeling in comparison to importing/exporting. Equitable sharing of benefits maximizes the amount of transmission available to support EIM transfers. Page 32

Net wheeling will increase as the EIM footprint expands Page 33

Methodology for data analysis Wheel through transaction = minimum of the EIM transfers into or EIM transfers our of a BAA for a given interval Net EIM transfers in = sum of EIM transfers in minus wheels Net EIM transfers out = sum of EIM transfers out minus wheels Sum of transfers in = 60 MW Sum of transfers out = 100 MW Wheel = 60 MW Net transfers in = 0 MW Net transfers out = 40 MW Note: The terms Import(s) and Export(s) are used in future slides in reference to EIM transfer(s) in and EIM transfer(s) out respectively. Page 34

MWh Data summary: total net imports, total net exports & wheels by BAA 2,500,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 0 AZPS CISO NEVP PACE PACW PSEI Sum of Net Import MWh Sum of Net Export MWh Sum of Net Wheel MWh Page 35

MWh Data summary: total net imports + total net exports vs. wheels by BAA 4,000,000 3,500,000 3,000,000 2,500,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 0 AZPS CISO NEVP PACE PACW PSEI Sum of Import + Export Sum of Net Wheel MWh Page 36

Data summary: sum of net imports + net exports in comparison to wheeling transactions by BAA EIM Entity Sum of Import + Export (MWh) Net Wheel (MWh) %Wheels/Total Transactions AZPS 964,231 795,203 45.20% CISO 3,686,118 229,658 5.86% NEVP 1,774,096 685,275 27.86% PACE 1,699,360 385,034 18.47% PACW 785,986 427,925 35.25% PSEI 581,972 0 0.00% Page 37

The ISO proposes two options for equitable sharing of benefits and requests additional stakeholder feedback 1. Ex-post payment based on the amount of net wheeling that occurs 2. Hurdle rate that can be incorporated into the market Page 38

Proposal #1: Ex-post payment for net wheeling 1 Collect and distribute funds based on the amount of net wheeling that occurs Net settlement is compensation minus cost allocation Total Wheel Charge = Total Wheeling Transactions * Defined Rate Compensation = % of Wheeling Transactions * Total Wheel Charge Cost Allocation = % (Imports + Exports) * Total Wheel Charge Page 39

Example of ex-post payment for net wheeling (1 of 2) 1 Net Imports + Net Exports and Total Wheels from November 2016 July 2017 as % of total Total Net Import/Export Total Net Wheel EIM Entity MWh % of Total MWh % of Total AZPS 964,231 10.16% 795,203 31.52% CISO 3,686,118 38.83% 229,658 9.10% NEVP 1,774,096 18.69% 685,275 27.16% PACE 1,699,360 17.90% 385,034 15.26% PACW 785,986 8.28% 427,925 16.96% PSEI 581,972 6.13% 0 0.00% Total: 9,491,763 100.00% 2,523,095 100.00% Page 40

Example of ex-post payment for net wheeling (2 of 2) 1 Uses a defined rate of $1 Total Wheel Charge = 2,523,095 MW * $1 EIM Cost Entity Allocation Compensation Net AZPS $256,346 $795,203 $538,857 CISO $979,970 $229,658 -$750,312 NEVP $471,566 $685,275 $213,709 PACE $451,634 $385,034 -$66,600 PACW $208,912 $427,925 $219,013 PSEI $154,666 $0 -$154,666 Total: $2,523,095 $2,523,095 $0 Page 41

Pros and cons of ex-post settlement for distribute benefits from net wheeling 1 PROS Does not impact energy prices Is not a hurdle rate CONS The ISO would be averaging the relative benefit over the entire footprint across all dispatch intervals Page 42

The ISO is requesting stakeholder feedback on expost settlement for net wheeling 1 What defined rate would be used? Over what time period would the net settlement occur? Is this methodology favored by stakeholders? Comments? Page 43

Proposal #2: Hurdle rate incorporated into the market 2 Collect funds through the EIM transfer cost Currently set at $0.01 to minimize the number of etags used Distribute benefits through the real-time congestion offset Use predefined split (likely 100/0 or 50/50) Page 44

Example 2a: collection and split distribution of benefits through EIM transfer cost similar to congestion revenue 50/50 split, transfer cost of $1/MWh 2a BAA1 ETSR 1a BAA2 ETSR 1b BAA3 Collection export wheel import $1.00 $1.00 split 50/50 split 50/50 RTCO $0.50 $0.50 + $0.50 $0.50 Distribution $0.50 $1.00 $0.50 Assumes the same distribution but another option would be to give all benefits to BAA2 (see example 2b) Page 45

Example 2b: collection and distribution of all benefits to wheel BAA through EIM transfer cost 2b Do not split EIM transfer costs similar to congestion revenue. Would require new charge code. BAA1 ETSR 1a BAA2 ETSR 1b BAA3 Collection export wheel import $1.00 $1.00 RTCO $1.00 + $1.00 Distribution $2.00 Page 46

Pros and cons of using EIM transfer cost to distribute benefits from net wheeling 2 PROS Funding for net wheeling is coming out of the market run through the imbalance settlement Leverages existing EIM transfers and RTCO functionality CONS Hurdle rates are generally not favored market design features Page 47

The ISO is requesting stakeholder feedback on incorporating a hurdle rate in the market 2 Value of the EIM transfer cost? How is the value of the EIM transfer cost determined? Is it determined by the ISO or individual EIM BAAs? Should EIM transfer cost vary by EIM transfer location to encourage competition? Is this methodology favored by stakeholders? Comments? Page 48

Consolidated EIM Initiatives NEW EIM FUNCTIONALITIES Page 49

Automated matching of import/export schedule changes with a single EIM non-participating resource Auto-adjustment of non-participating resource schedules to match import or export schedule changes after T-40 Eliminates the need for EIM BAA Operator to issue manual dispatch instructions to the non-participating resource Facilitates management of changes to base schedules

Automated mirror system resources at ISO intertie scheduling points Allows the market to solve for the ISO and another EIM BAA at the same time Currently, EIM BAAs are responsible to submit base schedules and update them for mirror system resources This enhancement will automate the mirroring of ISO import/export schedule changes at ISO scheduling points after T-40 Page 51

Base EIM transfer system resource imbalance settlement Will provide EIM entities with settlement information for base ETSR schedule changes Determinate point of delivery of base ETSR LMP used for settlement between EIM entities The ISO will not require EIM entities use this data but it may facilitate settlement of bilateral transactions Page 52

Leveraging non-generator resource (Generic NGR) modeling functionality (1 of 2) Utilize the ISO s Generic NGR modeling functionality for EIM participating and non-participating resources Aggregated and non-aggregated Does not observe state of charge limits or constraints Generic NGRs can provide positive and negative energy No load only aggregation Not subject to demand charges for negative generation Page 53

Leveraging non-generator resource (NGR) modeling functionality (2 of 2) These resources will be subject to local market power mitigation (LMPM) and can use any of the methods under the ISO s tariff to establish a default energy bid Does not support resource adequacy at this time Page 54

Allow submission of base generation distribution factors (GDFs) for aggregated non-participating resources The market will distribute the base schedule and any imbalances of aggregate EIM non-participating resources using the submitted base GDFs Base GDFs will also be used to calculate the aggregate LMP for the aggregate EIM non-participating resource Page 55

Consolidated EIM Initiatives NEXT STEPS Page 56

ISO requests written comments by August 17 th 2017 Stakeholders should submit written comments to InitiativeComments@caiso.com Milestone Date Post Issue Paper June 13, 2017 Stakeholder Conference Call June 20, 2017 Stakeholder Written Comments Due June 30, 2017 Post Straw Proposal July 31, 2017 Stakeholder Meeting August 7, 2017 Stakeholder Written Comments Due August 17, 2017 Post Draft Final Proposal September 5, 2017 Stakeholder Conference Call September 12, 2017 Stakeholder Written Comments Due September 19, 2017 EIM Governing Body Meeting October 10, 2017 Board of Governors Meeting* November 1-2, 2017 Page 57