Path dependence. Federico Frattini. Advanced Applied Economics

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Transcription:

Path dependence Federico Frattini Advanced Applied Economics

Scott E. Page (2006) Path dependence, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2006, 1, 87-115.

Basic notion a small initial advantage or a few minor random shocks along the way could alter the course of history David P. (1985), Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, American Economic Review, 75(2), pp. 332 37. «in common interpretations, path dependence means that current and future states, actions, or decisions depend on the path of previous states, actions, or decisions» (p. 88) history matters

Related causes «four related causes: increasing returns, self-reinforcement, positive feedbacks, and lock-in. Though related, these causes differ. Increasing returns means that the more a choice is made or an action is taken, the greater its benefits. Self-reinforcement means that making a choice or taking an action puts in place a set of forces or complementary institutions that encourage that choice to be sustained. With positive feedbacks, an action or choice creates positive externalities when that same choice is made by other people. [ ] Finally, lock-in means that one choice or action becomes better than any other one because a sufficient number of people have already made that choice» (p. 88)

Different typologies of history dependence path dependence, where the path of previous outcomes matters state dependence, where the paths can be partitioned into a finite number of states which contain all relevant information phat dependence, where the events in the path matter, but not their order early path dependence recent path dependence outcomes are history-dependent equilibria (limiting distribution over outcomes) depend on history

Common misunderstandings /1 «The first misunderstanding is the [ ] conflation of path dependence and increasing returns. They are logically distinct concepts. Increasing returns are neither necessary nor sufficient for path dependence. The conflation of increasing returns with path dependence rests on the following logic. If a process generates two possible paths, then some outcome must be more prevalent in one path than in the other. That is true. However, it need not be increasing returns that causes one outcome to be selected more often. Almost any externalities can alter the outcomes. [ ] Increasing returns can create path dependence but so can almost any type of negative externalities. These could be caused by any kind of constraint: spatial, budgetary, or even cognitive» (p. 90)

Common misunderstandings /2 «The second misunderstanding stems from a credit assignment problem. In many of the examples of path dependence, while increasing returns do exist, negative externalities are the true cause. This is not merely a reframing of positive relative returns as negative relative returns. It requires a fundamental rethinking of the causes of path dependence» (p. 90)

Common misunderstandings /3 «The third misunderstanding stems from the use of the Polya Process, [but] outcomes in the the Polya Process do not depend on the order of past events. They only depend on the distribution over those events. Put in the formal language of this paper: the Polya Process is phat-dependent but not pathdependent. In a phat-dependent process, the order of events does not matter» (p. 91)

Common misunderstandings /4 «The fourth misunderstanding results from a failure to distinguish between outcomes that are path-dependent and path-dependent equilibria. If this period s outcome depends on the past, that does not imply that the long-run equilibrium does» (p. 91)

Common misunderstandings /5 «The final misunderstanding conflates early path dependence and sensitivity to initial conditions. Sensitivity to initial conditions, a term borrowed from chaos theory, refers to deterministic dynamic systems in which the trajectory or the equilibrium depends sensitively on the initial point of the system. Extreme sensitivity to initial conditions implies minor initial changes have enormous implications. Extreme sensitivity to initial conditions can be defined in deterministic systems. [ ] In contrast, early path dependence describes processes in which early random outcomes shape the probability distribution over future histories. They do not determine it. They shape it. [ ] The future is not deterministic, but stochastic and biased toward early decisions. The process exhibits early path dependence and not extreme sensitivity to initial conditions» (p. 91)

General dynamic process outcomes x t at discrete time intervals indexed by the integers, t = 1, 2, environment at time t contains exogenous factors y t that influence outcomes (other information, opportunities, or events that arise in a given time period) history h T at time T is the combination of all outcomes x t up through time T 1 and all other factors y t up through time T outcome function G t that maps the current history into the next outcome. The outcome generated by a dynamic process can then be written as follows: x t+1 = G t ( h t ) The outcome function G t can change over time so it is indexed by t. The function G t is not necessarily deterministic. It can also generate a probability distribution over outcomes. [ ] History dependence need not imply deterministic dependence. It need only imply a shift in the probabilities of outcomes as a function of the past (p. 92)

Main typologies of dynamic outcome dependence History can matter in determining the outcome x t at time t. [1] a process is outcome-dependent if the outcome in a period depends on past outcomes or upon the time period equilibrium dependence History can matter for the limiting distribution over outcomes x t at time t. [2] a process is equilibrium-dependent if the long-run distribution over outcomes depends on past outcomes equilibrium dependence implies outcome dependence: if the equilibrium distribution over outcomes depends on the past, then so must the outcomes in individual time periods (p. 93)

Ball and urn model «These models consist of a collection of various colored balls placed in an urn. In each period, a ball is selected from the urn and, depending on the color of the ball selected, other balls may be added or removed from the urn. The selection of the ball plays the role of the outcome function. Because the ball is selected randomly, the probability of an outcome depends on the composition of the urn: how many balls of each color it contains» (p. 93)

Independence [3] A process is independent if the outcome x t in any period t does not depend upon past outcomes x t-1 or upon the time period t. x t+1 = G ( ) «A process that is not independent can be history-dependent: the current outcome or both the current outcome and the equilibrium distribution over outcomes could depend on the past history of outcomes. In either case, there remains the question of how much and to what extent history matters for outcomes and equilibria. [...] three types of history dependence: state dependence, phat dependence, and path dependence. These types can be thought of as levels of history dependence with state-dependent processes being the least and path-dependent processes being the most historydependent» (p. 94)

(1) Independence Bernoulli process the urn contains M maroon balls and B brown balls each period a ball is chosen randomly and then put back in the urn «The probability of drawing a maroon ball equals M / ( M + B ) and the probability of drawing a brown ball equals B / ( M + B ) in every period t» (p. 94)

State dependence [4] a process is state-dependent, if the outcome x t in any period t depends only upon the state of the process s t at that time t. x t+1 = G ( s t ) where s t+1 = T ( s t, x t ) is a state transition rule, that maps the current state s t and (possibly) the current outcome x t into the next period s state s t+1. Since the outcome x t only depends on the state s t, this implies that G t = G for all time periods t. (p. 95)

Phat dependence [5] a process is phat-dependent if the outcome x t in any period t depends on the set of outcomes and opportunities that arose in a history but not upon their order { h t }. x t+1 = G t ( { h t } ) where { h t } denotes the set of outcomes up to time t. (p. 97)

(2) Phat dependence /1 Polya process initially, M = B = 1 in any period t, if a brown (maroon) ball is selected then it is put back in the urn together with an additional ball of the same color «The Polya Process is equilibriumdependent. Not only can the process converge to more than one ratio of maroon and brown balls, it can converge to any ratio of maroon and brown balls. [...] The Polya Process is not, however, path-dependent, but it is phat-dependent. The outcome x t at time t only depends on the set of past outcomes { h t }, not on their order» (p. 98)

(3) Phat dependence /2 Balancing process initially M = B = 1 in any period t, if a brown (maroon) ball is selected then it is put back in the urn together with an additional ball of the opposite color «the balancing process cannot generate multiple equilibria [:] suppose that the process converged to something other than an equal number of maroon and brown balls. Imagine an urn with a large number of balls, 60% of which are maroon and 40% of which are brown. From that point onward, maroon balls would be more likely to be selected. Selecting these maroon balls would add brown balls to the urn, increasing the proportion of brown balls above 40%» (p. 99)

(4) Phat dependence /3 Balancing Polya process red (R) and green (G) balls as well as maroon and brown balls initially, M = B = R = G = 1 in each period t, the ball selected is returned to the urn in addition: if a red ball is selected, a maroon ball is added to the urn; if a maroon ball is selected, a red ball is added to the urn; if a green ball is selected, a brown ball is added to the urn; if a brown ball is selected, a green ball is added to the urn. «this process exhibits equilibrium phat-dependence[:] paint the red balls maroon and the green balls brown [recreating] the Polya process which [...] is equilibrium phat-dependent. It is also easy to show that the balancing Polya process does not satisfy increasing returns. In any given period t, choosing any color ball decreases the probability of picking that ball in the next period t+1. Thus, increasing returns are not necessary for equilibrium dependence. [This] process also provides a hint as to how complementarities between outcomes [...] can generate equilibrium dependence» (p. 100)

Increasing returns «the more an outcome occurs, the higher the relative return to that outcome, and therefore, the more likely it occurs in the future [...] [6] a dynamic process generates increasing returns if an outcome x t of any type in period t increases the probability of generating that outcome in the next period t+1» (p. 99)

(5) Increasing returns Biased Polya process initially, M = 1 and B = 2 in each period a ball is selected if a maroon ball is selected, it is put back in the urn together with another maroon ball and another brown ball if a brown ball is selected in period t, it is put back in the urn together with 2t additional brown balls «Once [a] brown ball is selected, the probability that the next ball is brown exceeds 75%. Eventually, the proportion of brown balls in the urn converges to 100%, so this process generates a unique equilibrium. Selecting a brown ball clearly satisfies increasing returns. Select a brown ball in one period, and a brown ball is more likely to be selected in the next period. Surprisingly, though, maroon balls also satisfy increasing returns. Select a maroon ball, and the probability of selecting a maroon ball in the next period also increases» (p. 101)

Path dependence [7] a process is path-dependent if the outcome x t in any period t depends on history and can depend on their order h t. x t+1 = G t ( h t ) where h t denotes the ordered set of outcomes up to time t. (p. 97)

Strong path dependence «any two distinct paths lead to different outcome probabilities» [8] a process is strong path-dependent if, for any two distinct histories h it and h -it, the outcome function G t differs. x t+1 = G t ( h t ) where G t ( h it ) G t ( h -it ) if h i h -i for some i = 1 to t. (p. 102)

(6) Path dependence /1 Strong path-dependent process initially M = B = 1 in period t, a ball is chosen and 2 t-1 balls are added to the urn of the color of the chosen ball Consider the path: M B M M B t = 1: +1 M t = 2: +2 B t = 3: +4 M t = 4: +8 M t = 5: +16 B t = 6: 14 M, 19 B M B M M B is the unique history generating the outcome 14 M and 19 B in t = 6, even not converging to any fixed probability distribution (p. 103)

(7) Path dependence /2 Burden of history initially M = B = 1 in period t, a ball is chosen and put back in the urn together with a ball of the same color in addition, for each period s < t, 2 t-s 2 t-s-1 balls are added to the urn of the color of the ball chosen in the period s Consider the path: M B etc. t = T: +2 T 1 M, +2 T 2 B, etc. «In this process, the first ball selected always determines the color of approximately one half of the balls added to the urn, the second ball selected determines approximately one fourth of the balls added to the urn and so on. Later periods matter exponentially less. The process can be shown to converge to a unique equilibrium distribution for any history up to a set of measure zero» (p. 103)

Initial outcome dependence [9] a process is initial outcome-dependent if all subsequent outcomes x t+i depend only on the first outcome x t=0. (p. 104) x t = G ( h 1 )

(8) Initial outcome dependence Founder process initially M = B = 1 if the ball chosen in period 1 is maroon, the maroon ball is put back in the urn and the brown ball is removed similarly, if the ball chosen is brown, the brown ball is put back in the urn and the maroon ball is removed «This process has only two paths. All future outcomes must be the same as the first outcome» (p. 104)

Early path dependence [10] a process is early path-dependent if all subsequent outcomes x t+i depend only on the history h T up to a period T. (p. 104) x t+1 = G t ( h t ) for t T x t+1 = G ( h T ) for t > T

(9) Early path dependence Cascade initially M = B = 1 balls are selected and replaced in the urn until 3 consecutive balls of the same color are selected when this occurs, the ball of the other color is removed from the urn «In this process, outcomes are equally likely until [a certain number of] consecutive outcomes are identical, at which point the process locks into that outcome» (p. 104)

Recent path dependence [11] a process is recent path-dependent if all subsequent outcomes x t+i depend only upon the outcomes and opportunities in the recent past. (p. 105) x t+1 = G t ( h t ) for t T x t+1 = G ( h t / h t-t ) for t > T

(10) Last outcome dependence Unstable government either of two parties, D or R, can be in power if D is in power then M = 1 and B = 2 if R is in power then M = 2 and B = 1 a randomly chosen party is in power in the first period each period, a ball is chosen in subsequent periods, the party in power equals D if a B was chosen and equals R if a M was chosen «in the unique equilibrium distribution, maroon and brown balls are equally likely to be selected» (p. 105)

(11) Recent path dependence Forgetting process initially M = B = 1 an additional ball of the same color as the selected ball is added for K > 0 periods and then removed from the urn the process discounts the past at some rate (p. 105)

Summary (p. 106) Process Properties (1) Bernoulli Independence (2) Polya Phat dependence: multiple equilibria (3) Balancing Phat dependence: unique equilibrium (4) Balancing Polya Phat dependence: no increasing returns (5) Biased Polya Increasing returns: unique equilibrium (6) Strong path-dependent Path dependence: no convergence (7) Burden of history Path dependence: convergence (8) Founder Initial outcome dependence (9) Cascade Early path dependence (10) Unstable government Last outcome dependence (11) Forgetting Recent path dependence