Internet Appendix to Credit Default Swaps, Exacting Creditors and Corporate Liquidity Management

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Internet Appendix to Credit Default Swaps, Exacting Creditors and Corporate Liquidity Management (not to be included for publication) Table A1 Probability of Credit Default Swaps Trading This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit default swaps (CDS) trading and the comparison between CDS and propensity score-matched firms. Panel A presents the estimates of the probability of CDS trading, obtained using a probit model. Propensity scores are estimated based on the model parameters. ln(assets) is the logarithm of the firm s total asset value. Leverage is defined as the ratio of book debt to total assets. ROA is the firm s return on assets. r it 1 r mt 1 is the firm s excess return over the past year. Equity Volatility is the firm s annualized equity volatility. PPENT/Total Asset is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. Sales/Total Asset is the ratio of sales to total assets. EBIT/Total Asset is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets. WCAP/Total Asset is the ratio of working capital to total assets. RE/Total Asset is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets. /Total Asset is the ratio of cash to total assets. CAPX/Total Asset is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. Rated is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is rated. Senior Unsecured Debt is the ratio of senior unsecured debt to total debt. Lender Size is a measure of the size of the lending banks and underwriters. Lender Credit Derivatives measures the credit derivative activities of the lenders. Lender FX Usage is a measure of the FX hedging activities of the lending banks and underwriters, and Lender Tier 1 Capital is the Tier 1 capital ratio of the lenders. The sample period is 1997-2009. Panel B compares the difference in characteristics between CDS and propensity score-matched non-cds firms. Propensity score-matched firms are selected based on Model 3 in Table A1 Panel A, with nearest propensity score. is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. B/M is the book-to-market ratio. ROE is the firm s return on equity. Distance-to-Default is the firm s distance-to-default calculated from Merton (1974). Propensity Score is the propensity score estimated from the model of probability of CDS trading presented in Model 3 of Table A1 Panel A. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.) 1

Panel A: Probability of CDS Trading CDS Prediction CDS Prediction CDS Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Ln(Assets) 0.790 0.804 0.797 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) Leverage 0.429 0.440 0.431 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) ROA 0.001 0.001 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) r it 1 r mt 1 0.104 0.104 0.104 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) Equity Volatility 0.063 0.069 0.067 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) PPENT/Total Asset 0.306 0.321 0.307 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) Sales/Total Asset 0.026 0.027 0.026 (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) EBIT/Total Asset 0.315 0.375 0.338 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) WCAP/Total Asset 0.142 0.145 0.143 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) RE/Total Asset 0.022 0.023 0.024 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) /Total Asset 0.290 0.302 0.294 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) CAPX/Total Asset 1.611 1.677 1.604 (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) Rated 0.667 0.645 0.638 (0.203) (0.205) (0.205) Senior Unsecured Debt 0.375 0.377 0.375 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) Lender Size 0.369 0.378 0.385 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) Lender Credit Derivatives 1.006 1.013 1.019 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) Lender FX Usage 8.979 9.104 (0.788) (0.789) Lender Tier 1 Capital 3.865 4.000 (0.756) (0.757) F-statistic (instruments) 129.89 26.13 159.74 p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Credit Rating Controls Time Fixed Effect Industry Fixed Effect Clustered Standard Error Pseudo R 2 38.96% 38.79% 38.99% N 690111 690111 690111 2

Panel B: Comparison between CDS and Propensity Score-Matched Firms CDS Firm Matching Firm Difference 0.076 0.080 0.004 Leverage 0.193 0.177 0.016 ln(asset) 8.597 8.492 0.105 B/M 0.600 0.849 0.249 ROE 0.012 0.172 0.161 Distance-to-Default 2.734 2.681 0.053 Propensity Score 0.561 0.556 0.005 3

Table A2 Effect of CDS on Holdings: Robustness Checks This table presents robustness checks for the effect of CDS trading on cash holdings. In Panel A, Model 1 is based on the sample of all Compustat firms. Model 2 is based on the sample of all Compustat firms, for firm-years with at least 100 million in assets. Model 3 is the cash-holding analysis conducted on the sample of all Compustat firms, excluding financial firms. Model 4 is the cash-holding analysis conducted on the sample of all Compustat firms with firm-years with at least 100 million in assets, excluding financial firms. Panel B investigates the CDS effect in the propensity-score-matched sample, excluding financial firms. Panel C conducts a placebo test on the propensity-score-matched sample. We use data from the 1980s, when there was no CDS trading, and perform the cash-holding analysis using pseudo-cds firms and their control groups. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.) Panel A: All Compustat Firms As Control Group All Firms Non-Financial Firms (1) (2) (3) (4) CDS Trading 0.020 0.024 0.020 0.023 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Industry Sigma 0.076 0.071 0.073 0.074 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) Flow/Assets 0.066 0.016 0.062 0.013 (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) Market to Book 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Size 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.011 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Net Working Capital/Assets 0.046 0.063 0.046 0.061 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) Capital Expenditure 0.211 0.146 0.212 0.148 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) Leverage 0.084 0.073 0.084 0.075 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) R&D/Sales 0.195 0.161 0.196 0.152 (0.015) (0.032) (0.015) (0.033) Dividend Dummy 0.007 0.001 0.008 0.001 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Acquisition Activity 0.197 0.164 0.191 0.161 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) Foreign Pretax Income 0.004 0.108 0.004 0.101 (0.002) (0.028) (0.002) (0.027) Time Fixed Effect Firm Fixed Effect Clustered Standard Error N 308510 167492 294893 160998 R 2 74.94% 83.38% 75.05% 83.35% 4

Panel B: Propensity-score-matched Firms as Control Group, Excluding Financial Firms Single Equation Simultaneous Equations (1) (2) Leverage CDS Trading 0.025 0.039 0.017 (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) Leverage 0.046 0.195 (0.039) (0.101) Industry 0.405 (0.031) 0.574 (0.071) Industry Leverage 0.143 (0.018) Industry Sigma 0.067 0.002 0.036 (0.044) (0.013) (0.009) Flow/Assets 0.008 0.222 0.052 (0.070) (0.021) (0.027) Market to Book 0.001 0.014 0.003 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) Size 0.026 0.028 0.024 (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) Net Working Capital/Assets 0.057 0.051 0.033 (0.056) (0.007) (0.005) Capital Expenditure 0.167 0.190 0.124 (0.025) (0.021) (0.016) R&D/Sales 0.245 0.005 0.275 (0.110) (0.031) (0.022) Dividend Dummy 0.017 0.023 0.012 (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) Acquisition Activity 0.181 0.075 0.212 (0.058) (0.019) (0.020) Foreign Pretax Income 0.223 0.045 0.236 (0.058) (0.023) (0.021) Time Fixed Effect Firm Fixed Effect Clustered Standard Error N 40018 39652 39652 R 2 75.01% 71.47% 67.68% 5

Panel C: Placebo Test Placebo CDS Trading 0.007 (0.004) Industry Sigma 0.001 (0.001) Flow/Assets 0.085 (0.036) Market to Book 0.027 (0.003) Size 0.010 (0.002) Net Working Capital/Assets 0.229 (0.018) Capital Expenditure 0.273 (0.030) Leverage 0.201 (0.015) R&D/Sales 0.031 (0.028) Dividend Dummy 0.058 (0.007) Acquisition Activity 0.104 (0.013) Time Fixed Effect Firm Fixed Effect Clustered Standard Error N 10333 R 2 56.11% 6

Table A3 CDS outstanding and cash holdings This table presents the estimates of the effect of CDS on corporate cash holdings in the sample of CDS firms. The overall sample of firms is taken from Compustat. The CDS data are taken from CreditTrade and the GFI Group. CDS Outstanding/Total Debt is the ratio of total notional CDS outstanding to the book value of the total debt. The coefficient of interest is that of CDS Outstanding/Total Debt, which captures the impact of the inception of CDS trading on cash holdings. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.) CDS Outstanding/Total Debt 0.005 (0.003) Industry Sigma 0.040 (0.029) Flow/Assets 0.039 (0.026) Market to Book 0.000 (0.002) Size Net Working Capital/Assets Capital Expenditure Leverage R&D/Sales 0.007 (0.002) 0.056 (0.012) 0.116 (0.022) 0.050 (0.013) 0.143 (0.063) Dividend Dummy 0.004 (0.005) Acquisition Activity 0.082 (0.024) Foreign Pretax Income 0.164 (0.037) Time Fixed Effect Firm Fixed Effect Clustered Standard Error N 29120 R 2 71.87% 7

Table A4 Effect of CDS on Corporate Finance: Corporate Governance Control This table presents the estimates of the simultaneous effect of CDS on corporate leverage and cash holdings in a sample including firms with CDS and non-cds propensity-score-matched firms. The leverage and cash equations are estimated simultaneously by two-stage least squares procedures. E-index is the entrenchment index, which is a measure of the quality of firms governance provisions. The coefficients of interest are those of CDS Trading and CDS Trading E-index, which capture the impact of the inception of CDS trading on cash holdings and leverage. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on quarterly observations. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.) Leverage CDS Trading 0.064 0.032 (0.003) (0.004) CDS Trading E-index 0.008 0.004 (0.001) (0.001) E-index 0.004 0.002 (0.001) (0.001) 0.582 (0.072) Industry Leverage 0.164 (0.019) Leverage 0.000 (0.077) Industry 0.376 (0.028) Industry Sigma 0.044 0.059 (0.015) (0.009) Flow/Assets 0.345 0.005 (0.023) (0.031) Market to Book 0.014 0.002 (0.001) (0.001) Size 0.031 0.022 (0.002) (0.002) Net Working Capital/Assets 0.052 0.010 (0.007) (0.006) Capital Expenditure 0.200 0.139 (0.023) (0.016) R&D/Sales 0.043 0.239 (0.031) (0.021) Dividend Dummy 0.016 0.035 (0.005) (0.004) Acquisition Activity 0.101 0.168 (0.019) (0.018) Time Fixed Effect Firm Fixed Effect Clustered Standard Error N 34516 34516 R 2 72.06% 73.17% 8

Table A5 Simultaneous Effect of CDS on Leverage, and Lines of Credit This table presents the estimates of the simultaneous effect of CDS on corporate leverage, cash holdings and lines of credit in a sample including firms with CDS and non-cds propensity-score-matched firms. Lines of credit data are drawn from Dealscan. The leverage, cash, and lines of credit equations are estimated simultaneously. (*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.) Leverage Lines of Credit CDS Trading 0.040 0.019 0.127 (0.002) (0.003) (0.129) Lines of Credit 0.009 0.004 (0.001) (0.001) Industry Leverage 0.150 (0.018) 0.501 5.210 (0.069) (2.319) Industry Lines of Credit 0.931 (0.025) Industry 0.385 (0.026) Leverage 0.119 5.976 (0.087) (2.794) Industry Sigma 0.022 0.046 0.388 (0.013) (0.009) (0.295) Flow/Assets 0.214 0.044 2.987 (0.021) (0.024) (0.788) Market to Book 0.014 0.002 0.026 (0.001) (0.001) (0.040) Size 0.025 0.025 0.266 (0.002) (0.001) (0.092) Net Working Capital/Assets 0.036 0.040 1.324 (0.007) (0.005) (0.210) Capital Expenditure 0.160 0.146 3.125 (0.021) (0.014) (0.712) R&D/Sales 0.010 0.231 0.763 (0.029) (0.019) (0.641) Dividend Dummy 0.022 0.012 0.152 (0.002) (0.002) (0.085) Acquisition Activity 0.095 0.200 0.334 (0.019) (0.018) (0.444) Time Fixed Effect Firm Fixed Effect Clustered Standard Error N 40293 40293 40293 R 2 72.23% 70.34% 53.03% 9