China s Sloping Land Conversion Program: Institutional Innovation or Business as Usual?

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China s Sloping Land Conversion Program: Institutional Innovation or Business as Usual? Michael Bennett & Jintao Xu Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP), Chinese Academy of Sciences

Sloping Land Conversion Program Largest land conversion program in the developing world. Budget of RMB 337 billion (> US$40 billion), over RMB 50 billion of which has been spent so far. Plans to convert around 14.67 million ha of cropland to forests by 2010 (4.4 million of which is on land with slopes > 25 o ), and has a soft goal of afforesting a roughly equal area of barren mountainous wasteland. Has already converted 7.2 million ha of cropland by 2003 end, and afforested 4.92 million ha of barren wasteland.

Sloping Land Conversion Program Began in 1999. 15 million farmers entered the program in the first 4 years alone. Leaders estimate it will affect some 40-60 million rural households upon completion. Currently being implemented in more than 2000 counties across 25 provinces. Significant local variation in implementation.

Actors Central government is the buyer (a public scheme). Rural households are sellers. Local government (County, township and village) serve as the mediators, and bear the onus of actual implementation. Do buyer and beneficiaries fully overlap?

Environmental Services Targeted Stated environmental goals: reducing water and soil erosion and increasing China s forest cover and area by retiring steeply sloping and marginal lands from agricultural production. Soil erosion a major problem in China: 2 to 4 million tons of silt released into Yangtze and Yellow Rivers each year, 65% estimated to come from sloping cropland, 70% of this sloping cropland is estimated to be in west China. SLCP has stated emphasis on west China.

Yellow and Yangtze River Basins

Additional Objectives Stated Additional Objectives: Alleviating rural poverty and helping rural households to shift to more sustainable means of production. Implicit subsidy to the State Grain Bureau. -- Large grain subsidy standard. -- Program grain purchased from SGB at RMB 0.4/kg above market prices. 24.55 million ton draw-down of stocks & RMB 9.8 billion (~US$ 1.2 billion) subsidy.

Selection of Participants Based on whether land is within program targeted area. Generally non-voluntary. Targeting of areas, and determination of SLCP quotas is top-down. Townships and villages: prefer slope & land quality targeting, prefer retiring contiguous swaths. Some showcasing has occurred. Xu et al. (2005) finds targeting generally in terms of slope and land quality.

Table 1 SLCP Implementation in 2003 Survey Sample Villages Question to Village Leader Total (n=36) Shaanxi (n=12) Gansu (n=12) Sichuan (n=12) Who decides how much land area should be retired? Province 0% 0% 0% 0% County 25% 25% 25% 25% Township 50% 8.3% 58.3% 83.3% Village 13.9% 16.7% 25% 0% Village Small Groups 0% 0% 0% 0% Households 22.2% 50% 8.3% 8.3% Other 0% 0% 0% 0% Who decides which plots to retire? Province 0% 0% 0% 0% County 16.7% 16.7% 0% 33.3% Township 52.8% 16.7% 58.3% 83.3% Village 36.1% 33.3% 58.3% 16.7% Village Small Groups 2.8% 0% 8.3% 0% Households 16.7% 41.7% 8.3% 0% Other 0% 0% 0% 0% Who decides what to plant on retired land? Province 0% 0% 0% 0% County 66.7% 41.7% 58.3% 100% Township 19.4% 16.7% 41.7% 0% Village 5.6% 8.3% 8.3% 0% Village Small Groups 0% 0% 0% 0% Households 11.1% 33.3% 0% 0% Other 2.8% 0% 8.3% 0% Who conducts inspections and verifications? County 100% 100% 100% 100% Township 100% 100% 100% 100% Village 2.8% 8.3% 0% 0% Other 97.2% 91.7% 100% 100% Share of villages that distribute SLCP quotas to households. 61.1% 25% 58.3% 100% distribute SLCP quotas to village small groups. 60% 27.3% 50% 100%...are allocated SLCP quotas by township government. 75% 41.7% 83.3% 100%

Table 5 Farmer autonomy in SLCP participation (n=348) GROUP PARTICIPANTS (n=264) MEASURE OF AUTONOMY Were the villagers asked their opinion about the project and how it could be best designed prior to the time that the project was implemented? When you village began SLCP, did your household have autonomy to choose whether or not to participate? Did you have autonomy in choosing the types of trees to plant? Did you have autonomy in choosing which areas to retire? Did you have autonomy in choosing which plots to retire? ALL % THAT SAID "YES" Shaanxi (n=103) Gansu (n=85) Sichuan (n=76) 42.8% 41.7% 41.2% 46.1% 61.7% 72.8% 43.5% 67.1% 36.0% 47.6% 34.1% 22.4% 34.5% 53.4% 15.3% 30.3% 29.9% 40.8% 12.9% 34.2% NON- PARTICIPANTS (n=81) ALL Shaanxi (n=11) Gansu (n=34) Sichuan (n=36) Could you participate in SLCP if you wanted to? 25.9% 45.5% 29.4% 16.7% Source: Xu et al., 2005.

Targeting of Disadvantaged Groups Land distribution in rural China relatively equitable. Evidence from previous work that poor households are not being predominantly targeted within program areas (Uchida et al, 2004; Xu et al., 2005). Generally, the poorer households in China live in areas with highly sloping, marginal cropland.

Payments Cash: RMB 300/ha (~US$36) per year Grain: Yangtze River Basin: 2250 kg/ha per year Yellow River Basin: 1500 kg/ha per year. Seedlings provided: RMB 750/ha (including wasteland) Income from forests/grasses planted is tax exempt. However, since last year, payments fully in cash (Yangtze: ~RMB 3,450/ha, Yellow: ~RMB 2,400/ha)

Payments 2 years if grasses are planted. 5 years if economic forests (defined as orchards or plantations with medical value). 8 years if ecological forests (defined as timber stands)

Compliance Based on retirement of land from agricultural use, and afforestation of wasteland. Survival rates of trees/grasses planted on the retired land (no stipulations for wasteland). During pilot phase, these survival rates were generally 70% for the northwest of China, and 85% for the Southeast of China. From informal discussions with SFA officials These have changed to 75% for all of China. (Conflict with Depts of Silviculture & of Forest Resources)

Conditionality Weak conditionality. The program s dual goals of environmental amelioration & poverty alleviation create a dilemma for local leaders: Enforce compliance reduce enthusiasm, harm welfare. OR Do not enforce encourage shoddy implementation.

Table 2: Average Survival Rate of Trees Planted Under SLCP (%), 2003 Survey. Province County Township Govt. Standard 1 st Inspections 2 nd 3 rd Yanshuiguan 94.2% 93.6% 98% Yanchuan Majiahe 72.9% 95.8% 96.4% Shaanxi Yuju Yanxia 70% 79% 56.3% 83.2% 86.8% 95% 81.1% Liquan Jianling 78.8% 47.9% 39.4% Chigan 100% 46.7% 52.1% Zhigan 70% 69% 66% Jingning Gangou 80% 76.6% 71% Gansu Lingzhi Zhangzigou 70% - 56.3% 75.7% 46.7% 77.7% 65% Linxia Tiezhai 90% 61.1% 75.8% Hexi 87.5% 69.5% 64% Sichuan Chaotian Area Datan Zhongzi Shahe Shangmeng 85% 82% 70% 92.5% 100% 61.5% 48.7% 74.1% 79.6% 67.3% 77% 40.4% 76.1% Li Puxi 74.9% 80.7% 84.8% Guergo 70% 74.1% 77% Source: 2003 Survey Data.

Additionality SLCP definitely has additionality in terms of carbon sequestration, biodiversity and watershed services. Farmers would not have retired land otherwise.

Impact on participants Both Uchida et al. (2004) and Xu et al. (2005) find insignificant impact on total per capita household income. Both find evidence of shift from cropping to husbandry, but impact is small. Uchida et al. (2004) finds evidence of increase in housing and livestock assets of participants associated with program participation.

Problems in Implementation & Design Lack of participant autonomy. Program does not budget for local implementation costs. Fast pace of expansion. Pilot phase (1999-2001): 402,000 ha/year. 2002-2003: 3 million ha/year, a sixfold increase. Shortfalls in subsidies, delays in inspection.

TABLE 3 Participant 1999 Net Income from Enrolled Land Versus SLCP Compensation Standards Net Losing Households Net Gaining Households All Participants Shaanxi (n = 103) Gansu (n = 85) Sichuan (n = 76) Number of Households 7 96 103 Total 1999 Net Income from Enrolled Land (RMB) 322 12 34 Total Converted Land Area (Ha) 5.13 68.13 73.27 Compensation Standard - 1999 Net Income (RMB) -14,778 120,478 105,700 Average Net Gain as % of Total Compensation -120% 74% 60% Number of Households 40 45 85 Total 1999 Net Income from Enrolled Land (RMB) 239 65 135 Total Converted Land Area (Ha) 8.07 11.93 20 Compensation - 1999 Net Income (RMB) -13,139 11,614-1,525 Average Net Gain as % of Total Compensation -68% 41% -3% Number of Households 22 54 76 Total 1999 Net Income from Enrolled Land (RMB) 364 70 164 Total Converted Land Area (Ha) 7.27 15.47 22.73 Compensation - 1999 Net Income (RMB) -19,439 26,657 7,218 Average Net Gain as % of Total Compensation -85% 55% 10% Source: Xu et al., 2005.

TABLE 4 Average Shortfalls in Grain and Cash Compensation in Surveyed Areas, 2002 Province County Grain (kg / ha) SLCP Standard Actual Delivery Cash (RMB / ha) SLCP Standard Actual Delivery Total Shortfall (RMB / ha) Shaanxi Gansu Sichuan Average: Yanchuan 1500 232.5 300 60 1507.5 Liquan 1500 1215 300 90 495 Jingning 1500 810 300 255 735 Linxia 1500 322.5 300 30 1447.5 Chaotian 2250 2025 300 45 480 Lixian 2250 1927.5 300 195 427.5 1763 810 300 105 1148 Source: Xu et al., 2005. This is a sum of corn, wheat and rise subsidies. This values grain at the national price of RMB 1/kg.

Permanence, Accounting, Leakage No mechanism to prevent leakage. The tax break is the only mechanism encouraging permanence. Subsidy period too short!

Table 6: Pariticipants' Viewpoints on their Post-SLCP Activities. Question: "If program subsidies stop after 5-8 years, what do you most likely intend to do?" Promising Allow timber trees / orchard trees to reach maturity for harvesting. Can maintain livelihood with revenue from current activities [non-farm business / aquaculture / livestock / orchards]. % of Participants / % of Retired Area All Shaanxi Gansu Sichuan ( n=264, ( n=103, ( n=85, ( n=76, 115.94 ha ) 73.24 ha ) 19.97 ha ) 22.73 ha ) 57.6% / 54.2% 51.5% / 52.0% 76.5% / 76.9% 44.7% / 41.3% 20.8% / 23.7% 24.3% / 26.3% 21.2% / 22.1% 15.8% / 16.8% 36.7% / 30.5% 27.2% / 25.8% 55.3% / 54.8% 29.0% / 24.4% Ambiguous 20.1% / 25.7% 27.2% / 29.7% 14.1% / 12.2% 17.1% / 24.4% Continue farming. 0.8% / 0.2% 0.0% / 0.0% 2.4% / 1.1% 0.0% / 0.0% Find work in the city. 12.5% / 17.0% 17.5% / 18.5% 10.6% / 10.7% 7.9% / 18.0% Start a new non-agricultural activity. 5.3% / 6.9% 6.8% / 8.9% 1.2% / 0.3% 7.9% / 6.1% Other (no clarification given). 1.5% / 1.5% 2.9% / 2.3% 0.0% / 0.0% 1.3% / 0.3% Problematic 22.4% / 20.1% 21.4% / 18.2% 9.4% / 11.0% 38.2% / 34.3% Don't know. 14.8% / 13.8% 9.7% / 10.4% 8.2% / 10.9% 29.0% / 27.5% Assume/hope subsidies, of some type, will continue. 1.5% / 0.8% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% 5.3% / 4.1% If not making adequate income, will return plots to cultivation. 1.5% / 0.5% 3.9% / 0.9% 0.0% / 0.0% 0.0% / 0.0% Return currently retired plots to cultivation. 4.6% / 5.0% 7.8% / 7.0% 1.2% / 0.1% 4.0% / 2.8% Source: 2003 Survey Data

Shaanxi Province Sample Counties

Gansu Province Survey Counties

Sichuan Province