CLIENT ADVISORY: THE OLIGARCH REPORT

Similar documents
CLIENT ALERT: U.S. STRIKES AT RUSSIAN OLIGARCHS, OFFICIALS AND ENTITIES, WITH POTENTIAL IMPACT ON NON-U.S. PERSONS

Senate Adopts New Sanctions Targeting Russia and Iran

Ep. 4: Sanctions and Transactions

WORKING PAPER OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES ON THE HANDLING OF ACCOUNTS LINKED TO POLITICALLY EXPOSED PERSONS PEPs

Volume 87 December 2017

Russia Sanctions United States by Swedish Club and Leigh Hansson, Partner, Reed Smith LLP, Reed Smith Shipping Sanctions 16 April 2018

Anti-Money Laundering and U.S. Compliance

PUNISH RUSSIA US CONGRESS HITS THE RUSSIAN ENERGY SECTOR

October Sponsors/Co-Sponsors:

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Reports of Foreign Financial Accounts

MONEY LAUNDERING (JERSEY) ORDER 2008

Developments in Anti-Money Laundering Regulation for Investment Advisers and Funding Portals. May 2016

New Coordinates. Boards of Directors Face Growing AML Accountability By Saverio Mirarchi

Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Bill [B ]

Treasury Designates Russian Oligarchs, Officials, and Entities in Response to Worldwide Malign Activity

CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRITY, COMPLIANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY PILLAR II COMPLIANCE POLICY

185 Money Laundering (Prevention) (Guidance Notes) (Amendment) Regulations SAINT LUCIA. STATUTORY INSTRUMENT, 2012, No. 82

SUMMARY: The Department of the Treasury s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is

SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS. No. 46 of 2011

Anti-Money Laundering and U.S. Compliance

Updated Russia Sanctions Bill Is Introduced to the U.S. Congress

U.S. Government Takes Steps Toward Implementation of Sanctions on Russia

JOINT RESOLUTION OF THE GOVERNOR OF BANK OF MONGOLIA AND CHAIR OF THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY COMMISSION

1. ENTITY & OWNERSHIP 1 Full Legal Name

American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law 2008 Annual Spring Symposia May 1-2, Washington, D.C.

January 12, 2016 by Peter Quinter, Attorney GrayRobinson law firm Mobile (954)

Cross-Border Regulatory and National Security Client Alert:

CAYMAN ISLANDS. Supplement No. 2 published with Extraordinary Gazette No. 22 of 16th March, THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME LAW.

LAW OFFICE OF JAMES A. NOFI, LLC WHITE PAPER

Unique Markets, Responsible Investing

Sanctions Risk Management Symposium

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

31 USC NB: This unofficial compilation of the U.S. Code is current as of Jan. 4, 2012 (see

ANTI -MONEYLAUNDERING

AML/CTF and Sanctions Policy

Lawyer Insights. AML and Sanctions Compliance Issues Facing Cryptocurrency Companies. June 4, by Richard S. Garabedian and Shaswat K.

Millicom Third Party Management Policy

Risk Management and Regulatory Examination/Compliance Seminar

Policy of Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing. 20 July Legislation and Compliance

a. Domestic money laundering statutes and laws i. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970

U.S. Sanctions Relief: Good for Russian Companies but Bad for Policy? By Richard Nephew January 11, 2019

HANDBOOK FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES BUSINESSES ON COUNTERING FINANCIAL CRIME AND TERRORIST FINANCING

AMF Position-recommendation

NOTICE. Proposed Amendments to the Guidelines on the Prevention of Money Laundering & Countering the Financing of Terrorism

Better Compliance Adapting to the shifting landscape of AML compliance

Contents. Practices when identifying unusual or suspicious activities...6 Monitoring...7.

Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing to Terrorist (AML/CFT) Workshop Series: AML Compliance Policies / Programme within a company

Ethics in Indian Business- The Qualifying Factor

PUBLIC LAW AUG. 2, 2017

MOBILE TELESYSTEMS PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY ANTI-CORRUPTION LAWS COMPLIANCE POLICY

TITLE IX INVESTOR PROTECTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS TO THE REGU- LATION OF SECURITIES. Subtitle A Increasing Investor Protection

ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTER-TERRORIST FINANCING POLICY AND PRINCIPLES

Conducting KYC of Third Parties: Best Practices for Conducting Due Diligence

Implementing an Effective Sanctions and Export Compliance Program

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA LAW ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

Republic of Panama Superintendency of Banks

AML/ KYC Policy & Procedures AML/ KYC POLICY & PROCEDURES. For Prevention of Money Laundering HABIB BANK LIMITED

CHIEF PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS, LOCAL UNITED WAYS OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, UNITED WAY OF AMERICA

A Federal Prosecutor s Perspective on Politically Exposed Persons. Jon Muschenheim Assistant U.S. Attorney Southern District of Texas

1. ENTITY & OWNERSHIP 1 Full Legal name

1. ENTITY & OWNERSHIP 1 Full Legal name

FCPA. Due Diligence. The REPORT. The Importance of Pre-Merger Due Diligence

Recent Developments on AML/CFT Rules and Enforcement Actions. Oliver Muñoz Esquivel Legal Advisor (CNV)

MONEY LAUNDERING (JERSEY) ORDER 2008

Know Your Customer - How to Avoid Dealing with Bad Actors

CONTINENTAL REINSURANCE ( C Re ) ANTI-MONEY LAUDERING/COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT) POLICY

Corruption and Compliance Programs: Comparison of French and U.S. Approaches

Anti-Corruption Compliance Policy

7 ENHANCED CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCEAND SIMPLIFIED CDD MEASURES

STEP response to the consultation: Tackling offshore tax evasion: a requirement to notify HMRC of offshore structures, published 5 December 2016

SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.

Anti-Money Laundering & Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) - Deirdre. Lowry/Suzanne Geraghty/Orna McNamara

Banco General, S.A. Panama, Republic of Panama. Banco General, S.A.

1. ENTITY & OWNERSHIP 1 Full Legal Name

Are your business partners real or a Trojan Horse? Detecting and preventing anonymous shell companies

ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING/ COUNTER FINANCING OF TERRORISM GUIDELINES FOR REGISTERED FILING AGENTS

1. ENTITY & OWNERSHIP 1 Full Legal name

Eric H. Cottrell Partner

Investec Bank (Channel Islands) Limited General Introducer Certificate

Preamble. The purpose of this Policy is to protect NIB s reputation and promote a transparent business practice.

Real Estate in the Crosshairs: Congressional Calls to Step Up Scrutiny of Foreign Investment

Anti-corruption and compliance in Russia

AIBA. 14 September 2010

Responding Properly To OFAC Obligations

ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING TRAINING FOR AGENTS TRANSAMERICA LIFE & PROTECTION

WikiLeaks Document Release

SECURITIES LITIGATION & REGULATION

Effective screening controls for sanctions and AML risk management

Purpose and operation of Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules (AML/CTF Rules) amending Chapters 1, 4, 8, 9, 30 and 36.

Unofficial Translation

2.0 Scope: This policy applies to all Board members, officers and employees of the Company and its subsidiaries in all global locations.

AML & KYC QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

To : MUFG Bank, Ltd. Yangon Branch

How are legal arrangements (express trusts and trust-like agreements) formed in the United States?

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF IRAN (EDBI)

F. EFFECTIVE DATE AND

AUSTRAC Guidance Note. Risk management and AML/CTF programs

New Bank Secrecy Act Beneficial Owners Rule May 2017

Central Bank of The Bahamas PUBLIC CONSULTATION

1. ENTITY & OWNERSHIP 1 Full Legal Name Sparkasse Ulm

Transcription:

CLIENT ADVISORY: THE OLIGARCH REPORT Review, Analysis and Recommendations related to Section 241 of the Countering America s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act Not later than January 29, 2018, the Secretary of the United States Treasury, currently Steven Mnuchin, will submit to the United States Congress a detailed report on oligarchs and parastatal entities in the Russian Federation. The requirement that the Secretary submit his report comes from Section 241 of the Countering America s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (hereinafter CAATSA or the Act), signed into law on August 2, 2017. That portion of the report which will focus specifically on senior foreign political figures and oligarchs, as called for in CAATSA Section 241(a)(1), has become a source of increased inquiry and speculation. Neither the Treasury Department nor the State Department has yet to issue guidance specific to Section 241 and any such guidance might not come until after delivery of the report. In this Wolf Global client advisory, we examine Section 241(a)(1) and provide our analysis, expectations and recommendations. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND ANNOTATION OF CAATSA SECTION 241 CAATSA Section 241 provides in pertinent part that: (a) [N]ot later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report on the following: 200 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 360, Miami, FL 33131 USA Tel 1-305-377-8006 Fax 1-786-472-7228 wolfglobal.com

Page 2 of 11 (1) Senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, including the following: (A) An identification of the most significant senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined by their closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth. (B) An assessment of the relationship between individuals identified under subparagraph (A) and President Vladimir Putin or other members of the Russian ruling elite. (C) An identification of any indices of corruption with respect to those individuals. (D) The estimated net worth and known sources of income of those individuals and their family members (including spouses, children, parents, and siblings), including assets, investments, other business interests, and relevant beneficial ownership information. (E) An identification of the non-russian business affiliations of those individuals. We expect the report will be prepared by attorneys, investigators and analysts from the Department of the Treasury, which includes, but is not limited to, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). We believe the attorneys, investigators and analysts from the Department of the Treasury will have the benefit of information and intelligence developed by the State Department, which would include, but which would not be limited to, information and intelligence

Page 3 of 11 contained in cables written and transmitted by U.S. Embassies to the State Department in Washington; as well as information and intelligence from throughout the Intelligence Community, of which the Treasury Department and State Department are members, but which also includes, but is not limited to, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), among others, all of which are coordinated by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. We believe the volume of information and intelligence available to the attorneys, investigators and analysts preparing the report should increase the accuracy of the report and reduce the likelihood of false positives. The Act identifies the appropriate congressional committees to which the report shall be submitted as the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. Senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, including the following: We read the use of and in 241(a)(1) to reflect a view by the drafters of CAATSA that senior foreign political figures and oligarchs are not necessarily the same; that in Russia, not all senior foreign political figures are oligarchs and not all oligarchs are senior foreign political figures.

Page 4 of 11 Senior Foreign Political Figures U.S. law uses the term senior foreign political figures to refer to those individuals referred to internationally as politically exposed persons (PEPs). The term is most regularly used in the context of banking regulations, which require heightened scrutiny, or enhanced due diligence, of persons who, by nature of their particular political status or their relationship to a person of particular political status, are in a position to engage in bribery, corruption and kleptocracy and, therefore, could utilize a private banking account to launder the proceeds of that activity. U.S. law provides the following definition. (1) The term senior foreign political figure means: (i) A current or former: (A) Senior official in the executive, legislative, administrative, military, or judicial branches of a foreign government (whether elected or not); (B) Senior official of a major foreign political party; or (C) Senior executive of a foreign government-owned commercial enterprise; (ii) A corporation, business, or other entity that has been formed by, or for the benefit of, any such individual; (iii) An immediate family member of any such individual; and (iv) A person who is widely and publicly known (or is actually known by the relevant covered financial institution) to be a close associate of such individual. (2) For purposes of this definition:

Page 5 of 11 (i) (ii) Senior official or executive means an individual with substantial authority over policy, operations, or the use of government-owned resources; and Immediate family member means spouses, parents, siblings, children and a spouse's parents and siblings. 31 CFR 1010.605(p). Indeed, Section 241 goes on to define senior foreign political figure to have the meaning given that term in section 1010.605 of title 31 or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling. It is not illegal to be a politically exposed person and it is not illegal for a bank to open or maintain a banking relationship with a politically exposed person. It is, however, illegal to engage in bribery, corruption, kleptocracy and money laundering. Therefore, to prevent the use of the global financial system to launder money or finance terrorism, banks are required to conduct enhanced due diligence when opening and maintaining banking relationships with politically exposed persons. Oligarchs U.S. law, to include CAATSA, does not define oligarch and dictionary definitions are vague. Merriam-Webster offers the following definitions: Oligarch: a member or supporter of an oligarchy. 1 Oligarchy: 1. government by the few. 2. a government in which a small group exercises control especially for corrupt and selfish purposes. 2

Page 6 of 11 Oxford Dictionaries offers the following definitions: Oligarch: 1. a ruler in an oligarchy. 3 2. (especially in Russia) a very rich business leader with a great deal of political influence. Oligarchy: 1. a small group of people having control of a country or organization. 4 We observe that the term oligarch, particularly Russian oligarch, has become almost synonymous with Russian billionaire or wealthy Russian businessman, and we believe it may be in that spirit that CAATSA refers to oligarchs. An identification of the most significant senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined by their closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth. We believe that the use of and in the first clause of 241(a)(1)(A) requires identification of the most senior foreign political figures in the Russian Federation and the most significant oligarchs in the Russian Federation, thereby further reflecting the view, alluded to above, that not all senior foreign political figures in Russia are oligarchs, and not all oligarchs in Russia are senior foreign political figures. We believe the insertion of a comma after the first clause of 241(a)(1)(A) and the use of and in the second clause should mean that the significance of a PEP or oligarch will be determined based on both his closeness to the Russian regime and his net worth. Although surprising considering the climate in which the Act was written, by using and as opposed to or in the second clause of 241(a)(1)(A), technically, a Russian PEP without wealth would not be considered significant for purposes of the report called for by CAATSA, and a wealthy Russian businessman with no political influence would not be considered significant for purposes of CAATSA.

Page 7 of 11 An alternative reading of 241(a)(1)(A) focuses attention on the use of the plural and looks at the universe of senior foreign political figures and oligarchs and evaluates them against two criteria their closeness to the regime and their net worth. Construction notwithstanding, we believe either reading may be used to support a decision to determine that a particular individual is significant. An assessment of the relationship between individuals identified under subparagraph (A) and President Vladimir Putin or other members of the Russian ruling elite. Section 241(a)(1)(B) requires that, once an individual has been identified as either a significant senior foreign political figure in the Russian Federation or a significant oligarch in the Russian Federation, an assessment shall be conducted in order to determine his relationship to Russian President Vladimir Putin or other members of the Russian ruling elite. An identification of any indices of corruption with respect to those individuals. Section 241(a)(1)(C) will lead to some of the most actionable intelligence contained in the report. As explained above, it is not illegal to be a senior foreign political figure and it is not illegal to be a wealthy businessman. It is illegal to engage in, among other things, corruption. The estimated net worth and known sources of income of those individuals and their family members (including spouses, children, parents, and siblings), including assets, investments, other business interests, and relevant beneficial ownership information. We believe Section 241(a)(1)(D) is self-explanatory and we do not expect the information required pursuant to 241(a)(1)(D) to be treated as if it is for human interest purposes or mere dramatic effect. Rather, we believe net worth and known sources of income will be relevant to how the information contained in the report can be utilized.

Page 8 of 11 An identification of the non-russian business affiliations of those individuals. We also believe Section 241(a)(1)(E) is self-explanatory and will identify the global business activities and global reach of, particularly, Russian oligarchs. These could include joint ventures with non-russian companies, relationships with non-russian partners, projects outside of Russia, and even investments in U.S. real estate. HOW THE REPORT WILL BE USED Section 241 of CAATSA, calling for the report on senior foreign political figures and oligarchs, does not create a new criminal offense. It is not against the law to be a senior foreign political figure or politically exposed person. It is not against the law to be a Russian billionaire. It is against the law to engage in bribery, corruption, kleptocracy, money laundering or to violate any other provision of an interested jurisdiction s criminal code. Government We believe the report will probably provide a helpful overview, background and explanation on the state of affairs in Russian politics and business, and perhaps any interrelatedness. We also believe the report could be used to identify companies and persons for imposition of sanctions. We also believe the report could be used for other legal, law enforcement, and intelligence purposes. Banks Because the report will be unclassified, we expect it to be public and, therefore, we expect it to be used worldwide by banks which, since the imposition of Ukraine-related sanctions in 2014, have exercised caution when interacting with wealthy Russian clients. This does not mean the report will require banks to begin closing the accounts of anyone named in the

Page 9 of 11 report, nor should it unless the Secretary of the Treasury uses the report as a basis to block or sanction persons named therein. Individuals named in the report should, however, be prepared for the fact that they might have to address issues that are raised in the report and might have to answer new questions from their banks in the wake of the report. It is also important to note that there is no official PEP list and we do not believe the report called for by CAATSA creates an official list of PEPs. We simply believe that the report will be an additional source that will be checked and considered by banks in order to identify politically exposed persons. Commercial Partners We believe the report could be used by prospective commercial partners conducting due diligence. Media Finally, we believe the report will likely be used by the media to help the public better understand Russian politics and business, and perhaps any interrelatedness, and to provide background information on persons named in the report. RECOMMENDATIONS The United States Government does not act arbitrarily or capriciously and there are means by which to seek redress or provide additional information. Even in the case of individuals who are blocked or sanctioned by the United States Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, there are means by which to file a petition for removal from an OFAC list.

Page 10 of 11 For Banks, Commercial Partners and the Media We believe the report is being prepared by attorneys, investigators and analysts who will have had access to information and intelligence not necessarily available to the general public, and who will have had the opportunity to carefully evaluate and consider that information and intelligence in developing their report. For banks, commercial partners and the media, we recommend a professional, responsible approach to the report. Banks and commercial partners, in particular, may wish to consider enhanced due diligence of individuals or companies named in the report. In the case of individuals identified as senior foreign political figures, the law already requires that banks conduct enhanced due diligence. In the case of individuals identified as oligarchs, enhanced due diligence might help mitigate some of the concerns associated with Russian clients and partners since the imposition of Ukraine-related sanctions in 2014. Enhanced due diligence will lead to more information. The availability of more information will allow for more informed decisions. For Individuals Named in the Report Regardless of whether an individual or his company is added to an OFAC list, the report will likely have legal, commercial, political, geopolitical and reputational consequences. Persons who believe they may be impacted by the report, rightly or wrongly, may wish to consider an independent due diligence investigation, also referred to as self due diligence or reverse due diligence, in order to identify or address those issues, accusations or allegations that could cause concern on the part of the attorneys, investigators and analysts

Page 11 of 11 who will be preparing the report called for by Section 241, or that could cause concern on the part of banks or commercial partners, or that could become a subject of media interest. Importantly, an independent due diligence investigation and the report it produces is not intended, nor should it be used, to cover up or whitewash issues, accusations or allegations. Rather, an independent due diligence investigation and the report it produces is simply intended to identify issues, accusations or allegations relevant to the due diligence process and, where necessary, compile and provide information and evidence of which third parties might not have been previously aware or to which third parties might not have previously had access. Beyond that, the independent due diligence investigation and the report it produces may be used to identify areas for improvement or change and to develop a strategic communications plan that allows honest, transparent, effective communications while navigating legal, commercial, political, geopolitical and reputational risks. To be certain, however, independent due diligence can only reveal the truth; it cannot change it. If it is believed that the attorneys, investigators or analysts preparing the report called for by CAATSA would benefit from additional information or evidence, or if it is believed that banks, commercial partners or the media would benefit from additional information or evidence, then an independent due diligence report is an appropriate vehicle by which to deliver that additional information. This client advisory is intended to highlight certain issues and is not intended to be comprehensive or to provide legal or other professional advice. If you have questions, you should contact your counsel or other advisors and, on matters related to our work, we welcome you or them contacting us. 1 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oligarch 2 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oligarchy 3 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/oligarch 4 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/oligarchy