Reviewing the evidence: How well does the EDF perform? Mikaela Gavas, ODI, m.gavas@odi.org.uk 31 January 2013
Contents 1. How is the Cotonou Agreement different to other agreements? 2. What are the proposals for future EDF finances? 3. How does the EDF perform in evaluations? 4. Are the critiques valid? - The EDF targets Middle Income Countries (at the expense of a focus on poverty) - The EDF is inflexible in its procedures and unable to adapt quickly to changing circumstances - The EDF suffers from weak forecasting and slow disbursement 5. So, what can we conclude? 2
How is the Cotonou Agreement different to other agreements?
A unique agreement EDF: 90% + of funding in the form of grants IDA: 20% of funding in the form of grants CA: Contractual mutual accountability Paris Declaration: Signatories but not contractual CA: Political dialogue and arbitration procedures Africa Partnership Forum (MRDE): No enforcement mechanism CA: Recipient country representation (ACP Secretariat) with joint institutions overseeing cooperation 4
What are the proposals for future EDF finances?
The finances: EC and HVR proposals for the 11 th EDF Herman van Rompuy (HvR) and EC proposals for the 11 th EDF compared in 2011 prices ( billion) 6
7 Source: EC data & author s calculations The finances: selected Member State contributions
How does the EDF perform in evaluations?
9 Source: DFID The EDF in the UK s Multilateral Aid Review
10 Source: QuODA 2011 The EDF (and other EU) in QuODA
11 Source: QuODA 2011 & MAR 2011 EDF + and in QuODA and MAR
Are the critiques valid?
Testing Critique 1: The EDF targets middle-income countries at the expense of poor countries 13 Source: EC data
Differentiation: Eligibility for grantbased aid Graduating UMICs from bilateral assistance could affect 21 ACP countries 1. Namibia 2. Jamaica 3. Dominican Rep. 4. Suriname 5. St. Vincent & the Grenadines 6. Palau 7. St. Lucia 8. Dominica 14 9. Botswana 10. Grenada 11. Gabon 12. Mauritius 13. Seychelles 14. St. Kitts & Nevis 15. Barbados 16. Antigua & Barbuda 17. Trinidad & Tobago 18. Bahamas 19. Cook Islands 20. Nauru 21. Niue But this would release only 5% of the geographical envelope 17 out of the 21 score high on the Environmental Vulnerability Index
Testing Critique 2: The EDF is inflexible in its procedures and unable The Envelopes: to adapt quickly to changing circumstances Envelope A Programmable funds 10 th EDF allocation - 13.5 billion Envelope B Unforeseen needs 10 th EDF allocation - 1.8 billion 15
16 Testing Critique 3: The EDF suffers from weak forecasting and slow disbursement Reasons for delays in 2011: Delayed calls for proposals / tenders Delayed contract signatures Countries not meeting budget support eligibility criteria New policy and new guidelines Weak staff capacity Possible solutions: Increase administrative support expenditure Increase use of joint programming Rebalance staffing arrangements to boost levels in priority sectors and countries
So what can we conclude?
Three alternative assertions on the EDF 1. The EDF has a strong focus on poor countries which will become even stronger with further differentiation in aid allocation. Its aid allocation model goes beyond income taking other important criteria into account. 2. The EDF has flexibility mechanisms and has proven capable of responding to changing political and economic situations. But, it continues to face the challenge of being flexible enough to re-programme funds and to respond to crises, whilst at the same time ensuring long-term funding to strengthen security, development and humanitarian linkages. 3. The EDF has had problems with disbursement, albeit with some valid reasons faced by all donors. Staffing constraints and a low ceiling for administrative expenditure underlie the problems. Some measures have been put in place which may help remedy disbursement problems. 18
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