Greenpeace Copenhagen Outcome Assessment

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Greenpeace Copenhagen Assessment STATUS OF THIS DOCUMENT: THIS IS AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD, AS AT 14.45 CET, Saturday 19 December 2009 IT IS INTENDED FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL USE FURTHER UPDATED VERSIONS MAY BE POSTED AS THE IMPLICATIONS OF LAST-MINUTE DECISIONS AT THE CLIMATE SUMMIT BECOME CLEAR Contents 1. Description of the process in Copenhagen 2. of the process 3. Assessment of the main issues in the Copenhagen Accord A. SUBSTANCE (of the Copenhagen Accord) A1. Greenpeace demand: emission reductions by Annex 1 countries of at least 40% by 2020 A2. Greenpeace demand: Real emissions reductions with limited offsets A3. Greenpeace demand: Annex 1 countries to provide US$ 140 billion a year to developing countries for mitigation, adaptation and reduced deforestation A4. Greenpeace demand: A financial mechanism that is transparent and inclusive A5. Greenpeace demand: Developing countries to reduce BAU emissions by 15-30% by 2020. These actions will be measured, reported and verified and they will be partially supported by developed countries. A6. Greenpeace demand: Zero deforestation by 2020 A7. Greenpeace demand: Forest protection in addition to 40% reduction in Annex 1 emissions (no offsets) B. THE FORM (of the Copenhagen Accord) B.1. Greenpeace demand: Legally binding C. THE PROCESS (in the COP and CMP decisions still under discussion) C.1. Greenpeace demand: Objective of agreeing on a legally binding deal C.2. Greenpeace demand: Timeline and work programme C.3. Greenpeace demand: The vision: Where are we heading to in the long-term? (in the Copenhagen Accord) 4. Overall Assessment - comments by Kumi Naidoo APPENDIX 1: Road to Copenhagen 1

1. Description of the process in Copenhagen During the first week of the Copenhagen summit, diplomats and experts widely discussed a whole series of new texts without really making progress, and by the time Ministers from 150+ countries joined the discussion, nothing more could be presented than two series of texts (one in the Kyoto Protocol track (KP track) and one in the Long-Term Co-operative Action track (LCA track). These were full of brackets and did not address some of the crunch issues: specific emission reduction targets for developed countries, specific numbers for financial support for action in developing countries, and the legal nature of the agreement. At the eve of the start of the High Level segment, on Wednesday, talks collapsed and came to a standstill. Negotiators became confused over their role and the role of Ministers. The Danish Presidency was unable to manage the process in a way that negotiators from the different blocs could understand and agree to. Negotiations resumed on Thursday but again came to a standstill during the evening, with Heads of State taking over and drafting a short Ministerial Declaration/Copenhagen Accord on which discussions subsequently took place. These involved Heads of State, Ministers and delegation leaders during the whole of Friday at the same time as the more than 120 Heads of State made statements to the Plenary. Late Friday night, a Copenhagen Accord was agreed between a number of world leaders. It was linked to a draft Conference of the Parties (COP) decision and a draft COP/MOP (Conference of the Parties acting as the Meeting of the Parties) decision. At the time of writing, neither of these decisions had been approved and the Copenhagen Accord had been clearly rejected by several governments including Tuvalu, Venezuela and Bolivia. Discussions on the COP and COP/MOP decision lasted through the night. 2. of the process The Copenhagen Summit has produced a number of agreements, including 1/COP.15 (within the UNFCCC framework) and 1/CMP.5 (within the Kyoto Protocol framework) decisions, which at the time of writing have not been accepted. Both draft decisions deal with procedural issues, including the further programme of work of the negotiations. Furthermore, the three-page Copenhagen Accord, agreed by some countries was presented for approval to the COP and COP/MOP. This was clearly rejected by a number of countries. The status of the Accord is therefore extremely unclear. The Accord contains substance, which is discussed below. 3. Assessment of the main issues in the Copenhagen Accord A. SUBSTANCE (of the Copenhagen Accord) A1. Greenpeace demand: emission reductions by Annex 1 countries of at least 40% by 2020 Industrialised countries commit to implement economy-wide emissions targets by 2020 on the basis of pledges of individual countries (no aggregate). As the total amount of pledges will probably result in emissions reductions far below 20%, we are on track for more than 3 C temperature rise (compar ed to pre-industrial), while at the same time the document itself recognises the scientific view that temperature increase should be kept below 2 C. 2

This weak ambition is unacceptable. Industrialised countries are clearly refusing to accept responsibility for their role in causing climate change. Combined with existing loopholes, emissions reductions in industrialised countries would be little below a business-as-usual approach. However, given that the final deal is not yet done, these figures are potentially still open to improvement. A2. Greenpeace demand: Real emissions reductions with limited offsets The agreement does not mention the issue of flexible mechanisms, nor does it refer to the Kyoto Protocol s rules. It is unclear whether and how issues such as banking of 'hot air', Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) and offsets will be dealt with. A lack of rules will create a similar situation to that of the Kyoto Protocol where targets were undermined by the adoption of rules after targets had been set. However, it also leaves open the option of strengthening the rules and limiting the use of loopholes. Setting emissions reduction targets without agreeing on the rules first risks the targets being strongly reduced. At the same time, this leaves open the option for strengthening rules and limiting the use of loopholes. A3. Greenpeace demand: Annex 1 countries to provide US$ 140 billion a year to developing countries for mitigation, adaptation and reduced deforestation Governments agreed to provide scaled-up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding to developing countries to finance action on mitigation, deforestation, adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building. The agreement commits developed countries to providing US$ 30 billion for 2010-2012, with funding prioritised for the most vulnerable countries. Furthermore, developed countries support a goal of mobilising jointly US$ 100 billion per year for emission reduction, forest protection and adaptation in developing countries by 2020. It remains unclear where and how this money would come from (except that it would come from all possible sources, without anyone committing to anything). Part of this amount will be private finance, potentially including financing received through the carbon market. While short-term funding is highly welcome, and would provide necessary support for planning and capacity building, more clarity and security is needed with regard to long-term financing. The current formulation of support-a-goal is not a real financing commitment, will not provide the necessary certainty that the funding will be delivered, nor provide the needed stability to drive investments in low-carbon pathways in developing countries. Secure long term financing is needed, both for adaptation as well for ensuring developing countries move onto a low-emissions pathway. The level of money available for adaptation will decide the survival of vulnerable peoples and species. 3

While welcome, fast-track finance only is not sufficient. We will need more clarity on how the longterm financing goal will be achieved. Further development of new sources of finance is absolutely necessary to rebuild trust between developed and developing countries. A4. Greenpeace demand: A financial mechanism that is transparent and inclusive To assess the contribution of the potential sources of revenue, including alternative sources of finance, a high level panel will be established under the guidance of, and accountable to, the COP. Governments also agreed to establish a Copenhagen Climate Fund to support projects, programmes, policies and activities in developing countries, on mitigation, deforestation, capacitybuilding, and technology development and transfer. The establishment of these new institutions might help ensure that the investments will take place where they are most needed. It is uncertain how these institutions will operate in practice, and whether the COP will actually have the full authority over the fund. Greenpeace advocated for the establishment of new mechanisms, and while there have been some steps forward, this new mechanism does not fully meet our demands. A5. Greenpeace demand: Developing countries to reduce business-as-usual emissions by 15-30% by 2020. These actions will be measured, reported and verified and they will be partially supported by developed countries. Developing countries will implement nationally-appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), voluntary and with support, with a view to achieving a significant deviation below business-as-usual (BAU). There is no aggregate aim for the ambition of developing country actions, but their pledges are listed in an Annex. Governments agreed to submit national communications every two years but the agreement does not make reference to more frequent and improved greenhouse gas inventories. NAMAs should be registered in a registry and should be supported and enabled by finance and technology development. Furthermore, all supported actions will be subject to international measurement. What does this mean in the real world? Developing countries will take action to prevent dangerous climate change but there will be no transparent measurement of their emissions. It remains unclear whether their actions will reflect their full potential for 'no-regrets' and emission reduction efforts at very low cost. It is good if developing countries commit to take action and commit to have these actions better and regularly reported. But without technological and financial support from industrialised countries, there is the risk that the actions taken by developing countries will be insufficient to prevent dangerous climate change. 4

A6. Greenpeace demand: Zero deforestation by 2020 There is no zero deforestation target in the agreement. The lack of a deforestation reduction target affects the integrity of efforts to reduce deforestation, as national activities to this end might still lead to international 'leakage'. Greenpeace strongly regrets the lack of a deforestation reduction target and considers this a missed opportunity both for forests and the climate. A7. Greenpeace demand: Forest protection in addition to the 40% reduction in emissions from Annex 1 countries as described above (no offsets) Governments agree to provide positive incentives to actions to protect forests through the immediate establishment of a Copenhagen Climate Fund that will enable the mobilisation of financial resources from developed countries to forest protection. Unclear, given that rules will have to be further developed. The establishment of a Fund could overcome the use of carbon projects and offsetting, avoiding further reduction of the targets of industrialised countries and increase the chances of dangerous climate change. Greenpeace clearly would have preferred the rules for forest protection to be clearly established in Copenhagen. Greenpeace will now continue to campaign to ensure they are clear. However, the establishment of a mechanism is a good first step. B. THE FORM (of the Copenhagen Accord) B.1. Greenpeace demand: Legally binding The High Level declaration is called The Copenhagen Accord but it is only a political declaration. The Accord has no legal status, is supported by a limited number of countries and there is no guarantee that it will be implemented. 5

Greenpeace has been calling for a legally binding agreement to be adopted in Copenhagen, or at least by the end of 2010. There is no guarantee that this will happen as the reference to accomplish a legally binding instrument by 2010 was dropped from 1/COP.15 at the very last moment. We urgently need an agreement that keeps the Kyoto Protocol elements alive, but also leads the Bali Action Plan elements into another legally binding treaty in order to establish a strong legal architecture. C. THE PROCESS (in the COP and CMP decisions still under discussion) C.1. Greenpeace demand: Objective of agreeing on a legally binding deal No definition of the further process. It is only stated that the mandates of both negotiation groups (AWG-KP and AWG-LCA) would continue. This depends much more on the content than on the process. We need a legally binding deal for all countries, preferably in the form of two protocols. We did not get this in Copenhagen, nor was it formally agreed as a mandate. But we do need to achieve it. The late-night deletion of the reference to a legally binding outcome is deplorable. However, it will not prevent millions of people in the world who want a legally binding global climate agreement to call upon world leaders to take their responsibility and agree on such an agreement by COP 16. C.2. Greenpeace demand: Timeline and work programme See above While theoretically the door is open for two legally binding treaties, there is no deadline in the COP decision, nor a detailed work programme. C.3. Greenpeace demand: The vision: Where are we heading to in the long-term? (in the Copenhagen Accord) The agreement states that governments recognise the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be kept below 2 C. (Late-night c hanges were reported but that new document was not distributed. There are claims that this new document does not refer to a 2 C target.) Furthermore, governments should co-operate in ensuring that global and national emissions peak as soon as possible, recognising that the time frame for this will be longer in developing countries. What this means according to science? A 2 C rise in temperature would already have seriou s impacts on the climate system as well as on 6

vulnerable peoples and ecosystems. Therefore, stronger language on the certainty of staying well below 2 C is needed. Implementing this target with good certainty requires, inter alia, that global emissions peak within 5-6 years. While Greenpeace advocates limiting temperature rise to well below 2 C, the formulation in the Copenhagen Accord has unfortunately little meaning. It is not formulated in a strong way, and most importantly, the commitments of industrialised countries and actions of developing countries are currently consistent with temperature increases of 3 C, or more. The targets and actions of countries must be derived from this global goal and not pledged bottom-up, as suggested in this political declaration. Deleting the reference to 2 C would be completely u nacceptable and would make the whole Copenhagen Accord utterly useless. 4. Overall Assessment Commenting on the Copenhagen outcome, Greenpeace International Executive Director, Kumi Naidoo, said: "Not fair, not ambitious and not legally binding. The job of world leaders is not done. Today they failed to avert catastrophic climate change. "The city of Copenhagen is a climate crime scene tonight, with the guilty men and women fleeing to the airport in shame. World leaders could have changed the world for good and averted catastrophic climate change. In the end, they produced a poor deal full of loopholes big enough to fly Air Force One through." "We have seen a year of crises, but today it is clear that the biggest one facing humanity is a leadership crisis. "During the year a number of developing countries showed a willingness to accept their share of the burden to avert climate chaos. But in the end, the blame for failure lies mostly with the rich industrialised countries which have the largest historic responsibility for causing the problem. In particular, the US failed to take any real leadership and dragged the talks down. "Climate science says we have only a few years left to halt the rise in emissions before making the kind of rapid reductions that would give us the best chance of avoiding dangerous climate change. We cannot change the science, so instead we will have to change the politics - and we may well have to change the politicians. "This is not over, people everywhere demanded a real deal before the Summit began and they are still demanding it. We can still save hundreds of millions of people from the devastation of a warming world, but it has just become a whole lot harder. "Civil society, the bulk of which was locked out of the final days of this Climate Summit, now needs to redouble its efforts. Each and every one of us must hold our leaders to account. We must take the struggle to avert climate catastrophe into every level of politics, local, regional, national and international. We also need to take it into the board room and onto the high streets. We can either work for a fundamental change in our society or we can suffer the consequences of one." 7

APPENDIX 1: Road to Copenhagen With the launch of the Bali Road Map, in December 2007, formal negotiations on a post-2012 climate regime started, in two separate tracks: one Kyoto Protocol track (AWG-KP) looking at continuation of (an amended) Kyoto Protocol in a second commitment period (post-2012); and one global track (AWG-LCA: Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Co-operative Action) dealing with the elements as defined in the Bali Action Plan: mitigation, adaptation, finance and technological cooperation. Intensive negotiations took place during 2008 and 2009 on both tracks culminating in the Climate Summit in Copenhagen. Little progress was made before Copenhagen. The Summit started with 170 pages of negotiating text full of brackets in the LCA track, and 70 pages of text full of brackets in the KP track. _ ENDS 8