EconS Micro Theory I 1 Recitation #9 - Monopoly

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EconS 50 - Micro Theory I Recitation #9 - Monopoly Exercise A monopolist faces a market demand curve given by: Q = 70 p. (a) If the monopolist can produce at constant average and marginal costs of AC = MC = 6, what output level will the monopolist choose in order to maximize pro ts? What is the price at this output level? What are the monopolist s pro ts? (b) Assume instead that the monopolist has a cost structure where the total costs are described by: C(Q) = 0:25Q 2 5Q + 300 With the monopolist facing the same market demand and marginal revenue, what pricequantity combination will be chosen now to maximize pro ts? What will pro ts be? (c) Assume now that a third cost structure explains the monopolist s position, with total costs given by: C(Q) = 0:033Q 3 5Q + 250 Again, calculate the monopolist s price-quantity combination that maximizes pro ts. What will pro t be? Hint: Set MC = MR as usual and use the quadratic formula to solve the second order equation for Q. (d) Graph the market demand curve, the MR curve, and the three marginal cost curves from parts a, b and c. Notice that the monopolist s pro t-making ability is constrained by () the demand curve (along with its associated MR curve) and (2) the cost structure underlying production. Solution: (a) We have that the demand is given by Q = 70 p or p = 70 Q thus the total revenue is T R = p Q = (70 Q)Q, then the marginal revenue for the monopolist is MR = 70 2Q. We know that the monopolist pro t maximization condition is MR = MC and by the information we know that MC = 6 then we can set 70 2Q = 6 and solving for the Felix Munoz-Garcia, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University, Pullman, WA, 9964-620, fmunoz@wsu.edu.

quantities we have that Q = 32, P = 38 and = (p MC)Q = (38 6)32 = 024. Figure (b) If the total costs are described by C(Q) = 0:25Q 2 5Q + 300 then the marginal costs are MC = 0:5Q 5. Thus, equalizing again MR = MC we have that 70 2Q = 0:5Q 5. In this case Q = 30, P = 40 and = pq T C = (40 30) (0:25(30) 2 5(30) + 300) = 825. As we can see, the change in the costs structure reduces the total production, increases the price and reduce the pro ts of the rm. Figure 2 (c) If the total costs are described by C(Q) = 0:033Q 3 5Q + 250 then the marginal costs are MC = 0:0399Q 2 5. Thus, equalizing again MR = MC we have that 70 2Q = 2

0:0399Q 2 5. In this case the positive solution of the quadratic equation is Q = 25, P = 45 and = pq T C = (45 25) (0:033(25) 3 5(25) + 250) = 792:2. The new change in the costs structure reduces the total production, increases the price and reduce the pro ts of the rm. Figure 3 Exercise 2. [Alternative PMP] The monopolist can also be thought of as choosing the price and letting the market determine how much is sold. Write down the pro t maximization problem and verify that p + " = c 0 (q) also holds when the monopolist chooses a pro t-maximizing price rather than a pro t-maximizing output. The monopolist maximization problem is max p pq (p) c (q (p)). Di erentiating, we have This can also be written as pq 0 (p) + q (p) c 0 (q) q 0 (p) = 0. or p + q (p) q 0 (p) c 0 (q) = 0, p + = c 0 (q). " which coincides with the inverse elasticity pricing rule (IEPR) we found in class. 3

Exercise 3 [Monopoly subsidies] Suppose a government wishes to combat the undesirable allocational e ects of a monopoly through the use of a subsidy. (a) Why would a lump-sum subsidy not achieve the government s goal? (b) Use a graphical proof to show how a per-unit-of-output subsidy might achieve the government s goal. (c) Suppose the government wants its subsidy to maximize the di erence between the total value of the good to consumers and the good s total cost. Show that, in order to achieve this goal, the government should set: t P = e Q; P, where t is the per-unit subsidy and P is the competitive price. Explain your result intuitively. Solution: (a) The government wishes the monopoly to expand output toward P = MC. A lump-sum subsidy (T ) will have no e ect on the monopolist s pro t maximizing choice, so this will not achieve the goal. If the monopoly maximizes = pq T C +T then the pro t maximization condition is MR = MC. (b) A subsidy per unit of output (t) will e ectively shift the MC curve downward. If the monopoly maximizes = p Q (T C t Q) then the pro t maximization condition is MR = MC t, thus if the marginal cost curve shifts to the right (or downward if the monopoly has constant marginal costs), then the monopoly will produce more units at a lower price. Figure 4 (c) A subsidy (t) must be chosen so that the monopoly chooses the socially optimal quantity, given t. Since the social optimality requires P = MC and pro t maximization requires that 4

MR = MC t. On one hand, MC t = P t since P = MC. On the other hand, note that marginal revenues are MR = P + Q P 0 (Q) = P + Q P 0 = P + ; P e substituting this result into MR = MC t. yields P t = P + e. Rearranging, we nd t = + which can be more compactly expressed as t = as was to be shown. P e P e Intuitively, the monopoly creates a gap between price and marginal cost and the optimal subsidy is chosen to equal that gap expressed as a ratio to price. Figure 5 Exercise 4 [Taxing a monopoly] The taxation of monopoly can sometimes produce results di erent from those that arise in the competitive case. This problem looks at some of those cases. Most of these can be analyzed by using the inverse elasticity rule. (a) Consider rst an ad valorem tax on the price of a monopoly s good. This tax reduces the net price received by the monopoly from P to P ( t) where t is the proportional tax rate. Show that, with a linear demand curve and constant marginal cost, the imposition of such a tax causes price to rise by less than the full extent of the tax. That is, if p B is the initial price and p A is the nal price, p A p B < t p A. (b) Suppose that the demand curve in part (a) were a constant elasticity curve. Show that the price would now increase by precisely the full extent of the tax. [That is, if p B is the initial price and p A is the nal price, p A p B = t p A, or p A p B p A = t.] Explain the di erence between your results in part (a) and (b). (c) Describe a case where the imposition of an ad valorem tax on a monopoly would cause the price to rise by more than the tax [That is, p A p B > t p A ]. 5

(d) A speci c tax is a xed amount per unit of output. If the tax rate is per unit, total tax collections are Q. Show that the imposition of a speci c tax on a monopoly will reduce output more (and increase price more) than will the imposition of an ad valorem tax that collects the same tax revenue. Solution: (a) Recall that the Inverse Elasticity Rule is P = MC when the monopoly is subject to an + e ad valorem tax of t, this becomes P ( t) = MC, or P = MC. + ( t) + e e With linear demand, e falls (becomes more elastic) as prices rises 2 Hence, the increase in the price of the good, P aftertax P pretax is smaller than the extent of the tax, t P aftertax, i.e., P aftertax P pretax < t P aftertax, or alternatively, ( t)p aftertax < P pretax if and only if P aftertax = MC < MC ( t) + e pretax ( t) + e aftertax <, + + e aftertax e pretax = Ppretax, that is ( t) or if e aftertax < e pretax, which is true since, for a constant marginal cost, the introduction of the tax forces the monopolist to charge a higher price (located at a point of the linear demand curve with a more negative elasticity). (b) With a constant elasticity demand q(p) = Ap e, we have that e aftertax = e pretax = e. Thus the inequality in part (a) becomes an equality so P aftertax = Ppretax, or P ( t) aftertax P pretax = t P aftertax : (c) For the price to raise more than the extent of the tax, we need P aftertax P pretax > t P aftertax, or alternatively that ( t)p aftertax > P pretax. This occurs when MC ( t) > MC + e aftertax ( t) + e pretax A case in which this inequality holds is that in which the monopolist: () faces a constant elasticity demand curve q(p) = Ap e as in part (b) so that e aftertax = e pretax = e; and (2) the monopoly exhibits a positively sloped marginal cost curve, so MC aftertax > MC pretax. In this setting, the above inequality MC ( t) > MC becomes + ( t) + e pretax e aftertax P aftertax = MC aftertax ( t) + e which holds, given that MC aftertax > MC pretax. > MCpretax ( t) + e = Ppretax ( t) (d) The key part of this question is the requirement of equal tax revenues. That is tp a Q a = Q s where the subscripts refer to the monopoly s choices under the two tax regimes, and subscript a (s) denotes an ad-valorem tax (speci c tax, respectively). Suppose that the tax rates were chosen so as to raise the same revenue for a given output level, Q. For 2 Recall the standard gure in intermediate micro textbooks whereby the linear demand curve is described in terms of its price elasticity of demand, satisfying " = at the vertical intercept, " = at the midpoint of the demand line, and " = 0 at the horizontal intercept. 6

compactness, let = tp a, thus implying that = tp a > tmr a ; given that P a > MR a, i.e., the demand curve lies above the marginal revenue curve regardless of the demand function we are considering. Generally, under an ad valorem tax, total revenues are reduced to R = ( t)p Q, entailing a marginal revenue of MR a = ( t)mr = MR tmr; whereas under a speci c tax, total revenues are R = P Q revenue of MR s = MR Q, which entail a marginal Therefore, MR s < MR a, which implies that, for a given output Q, the speci c tax reduces marginal revenue by more than does the ad valorem tax (as long as both taxes raise the same total revenue). With a constant (or upward sloping) marginal cost curve, less would be produced under the speci c tax, i.e., Q s < Q a (see gure below), thereby dictating an even higher tax rate. In all, a lower output would be produced, at a higher price than under the ad valorem tax, i.e., Q s < Q a and P s > P a. Under perfect competition, the two equal-revenue taxes would have equivalent e ects. Figure 6 Exercise 5 [Pricing with discontinuous demand] Consider the market for the G-Jeans (the latest fashion among people in their late thirties). G-Jeans are sold by a single rm that carries the patent for the design. On the demand side, there are n H = 200 high-income consumers who are willing to pay a maximum amount of V H = $20 for a pair of G-Jeans, and n L = 300 low-income consumers who are willing to pay a maximum amount of V L = $0 for a pair of G-Jeans. Each consumer chooses whether to buy one pair of jeans or not to buy at all. 7

(a) Draw the market aggregate-demand curve facing the monopoly. The aggregate demand curve should be drawn according to the following formula: 8 < 0 if p > $20 Q (p) = 200 if $0 < p $20 : 200 + 300 if p $0. Figure 7 (b) The monopoly can produce each unit at a cost of c = $5. Suppose that the G- Jeans monopoly cannot price discriminate and is therefore constrained to set a uniform market price. Find the pro t-maximizing price set by G-Jeans, and the pro t earned by this monopoly. Setting a high price, p = $20 generates Q = 200 consumers and a pro t of H = (20 5) 200 = $3000: Setting a low price, p = $0 generates Q = 200 + 300 consumers and a pro t of H = (0 5) 500 = $2500 < $3000. Hence, p = $20 is the pro t-maximizing price. Type L consumers will not buy under these prices. (c) Compute the pro t level made by this monopoly assuming now that this monopoly can price discriminate between the two consumer populations. Does the monopoly bene t from price discrimination. Prove your result! The monopoly will change p = $20 in market H and p = $0 in market L: Hence, total pro t is given by = H + L = (20 5) 200 + (0 5) 300 = 3000 + 500 = $4500 > $3000. Clearly, the ability to price discriminate cannot reduce the monopoly pro t since even with this ability, the monopoly can always set equal prices in both markets. The fact that the monopoly chooses di erent prices implies that pro t 8

can only increase beyond the pro t earned when the monopoly is unable to price discriminate. Exercise 6 [Third-degree price discrimination] The demand function for concert tickets to be played by the Pittsburgh symphony orchestra varies between nonstudents (N) and students (S). Formally, the two demand functions of the two consumer groups are given by q N = 240 p 2 N and q S = 540. p 3 S Assume that the orchestra s total cost function is C (Q) = 2Q where Q = q N + q S is to total number of tickets sold. Compute the concert ticket prices set by this monopoly orchestra, and the resulting ticket sales, assuming that the orchestra can price discriminate between the two consumer groups. The demand price elasticity is 2 in the nonstudents market, and 3 in the students market. In the nonstudents market, the monopoly sets p N to solve p N + = $2 yielding p N = $4 and hence q N = 240 = 5. 2 4 2 In the students market, the monopoly sets p S to solve p S + = $2 yielding p S = $3 and hence q S = 540 = 20. 3 3 3 Figure 8 9

Exercise 7. [Comparative statics] Suppose that the inverse demand curve facing a monopolist is given by p (q; t), where t is an exogenous parameter that shifts the demand curve, e.g., a new fad making that product attractive for more customers. For simplicity, assume that the monopolist has a technology that exhibits constant marginal costs. (a) Derive an expression showing how output responds, q, to a change in t: The monopolist s pro t maximization problem becomes max y p (q; t) q cq. where the monopolist s choice variable is now the price he charges, p. The rst-order condition for this problem is (q; t) = p (q; t) + @p (q; t) q c = 0. @q Using the implicit function therorem, we obtain dq dt = @ @t @ @q = p t + p qt q 2p q + p qq q (b) How does this expression simplify if the inverse demand function takes the special form p (y; t) = a (q) + b (t)? For the special case p (q; t) = a (q) + b (t), dq dt = p0 t + p 00 2p 0 q + p 00 qtq qqq = @b @t 2 @a @q + @2 a @q 2 q since in this case @( @a @q ) @t = 0. 0