Differences between NPV, Decision Trees, and Real Options. ACTEX 2010 Section I - 29

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Differences between NPV, Decision Trees, and Real Options ACTEX 2010 Section I - 29

1. NPV is flawed because it systematically undervalues everything due to simplifying assumptions a. Ignores options to expand, extend, contract, abandon and defer projects i. All expected cash flows are pre-committed b. Real option analysis uses decision trees to model optimal actions in the future given the resolution of uncertainty 2. NPV and ROA also deal with mutually exclusive options differently NPV forces pre-commitment to one of many false mutually exclusive decisions, say the decision to defer for one year or two years ROA works backward to arrive at the optimal deferral decision 3. Decision trees make state-contingent future decisions but with a constant discount rate, while ROA changes the discount rate at each branch if necessary Replicating portfolio made up of default-free bonds and a twin security are used to hedge the option Source: Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, Chapter 9 ACTEX 2010 Section I - 30

Risk Measures Quantile ACTEX 2010 Section I - 99

Definition: α-quantile risk measure is the ( Nα values Confidence Interval: ( L0( Nα A), L0( Nα A) ) ) th value of the projected liability 1 1+ β +, where A ( ) k =Φ Nα(1 α). 2 For GMMB, assume Fk = Sk(1 m) and stock returns follow lognormal process, then log( GS / 0 ) n( µ + log(1 m ) ) Pr( G < F ) = ξ = 1 Φ σ n n ( σ n ) rn zα σ n + n[ µ + log(1 m)] and V = e ( G F e ) : quantile risk measure α Quantile Negatives: 0 not bounded below by mean loss not subadditive determined by only one point on loss distribution sampling volatility Source: Investment Guarantees, Chapter 9, pages 159-160, 162, 168-169 ACTEX 2010 Section I - 100

The Positive Announcement Effect of Tender Offers on Share Price: Five Separate Hypotheses ACTEX 2010 Section II - 17

Hypothesis Information or signaling Leverage tax shield Dividend tax avoidance Bondholder expropriation Wealth transfer among shareholders Positive signal: Firm is expected to have increased future cash flows. Negative signal: Firm has exhausted profitable investment opportunities. If financed via a debt offering, firm leverage increases and so too does the tax shield. If more than 20% of a shareholder s holdings are sold back to the firm, the gains from repurchase are treated as capital gains rather than a dividend. If repurchase reduces asset base of firm, bondholders are worse off because they have less collateral. Some shareholders will decide not to tender their shares due to different constraints, costs and/or information. Source: Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, Chapter 16 ACTEX 2010 Section II - 18

Shareholder Rule ACTEX 2010 Section II - 91

V N R ( F) = Value of firm s assets after loss before repair V ( F) = Value of firm s assets after loss AFTER repair C = Cost of repair, Assumed < V ( F) V ( F) P P N R = Value Default put option with NO asset repair = Value Default put option WITH asset repair R n Shareholder implements repair if: ( V ( F) + P ) ( V ( F) + P ) C i.. e NPV P + P C R R N N N R Source: FET-108-07, Integrated Risk Management page 494 ACTEX 2010 Section II - 92

Characteristics of Corporate Debt Markets ACTEX 2010 Section II - 117

Key Liability Characteristics 1. maturity 2. priority 3. covenants Issuer Type corporations governments individuals Maturity commercial paper intermediate term long-term bonds Multinational Issues Eurobonds foreign bonds syndicated loans Covenants default triggers cash flow controls operating controls strategy controls Source: FET-160-08, Corporate Finance Theory, Chapter 9, pages 402-408 ACTEX 2010 Section II - 118

Currency Swap ACTEX 2010 Section III - 19

US Co. 4% $ interest + 15 million $ principal 7% sterling interest + 10 million Sterling Principal British Co. Exchange of currency principal is important Source: Hull, Chapter 7 ACTEX 2010 Section III - 20

Analytic Calibration of RSLN ACTEX 2010 Section IV - 15

1. Conditional on R n, the accumulation factor is lognormal with µ *( Rn) Rnµ 1 ( n Rn) µ 2 = + and σ* ( R ) = R σ 2 + ( n R ) σ 2 n n 1 n 2 2. The unconditional distribution function F ( x ) is n log x µ *( r) FS () x = p () n ϕ * n r r= 0 σ () r 3. Then input MLE parameters into this analytic distribution function and calculate the resulting quantiles in order to compare them to the calibration points ACTEX 2010 Section IV - 16 S n Source: Investment Guarantees, Chapter 4, pages 65-75

Nash Equilibrium (NE) vs. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) ACTEX 2010 Section V - 37

NE BNE Assumptions Simultaneous-move game with complete information Simultaneous-move game with incomplete information Payoffs ui( ai, ai) = ui( ai, ai; ti) uchris( SteakChris, Red WinePat = uchris( SteakChris, Red WinePat, tchris = Chris s additional private utility for steak and red wine) Def of Strategy Def of Equilibrium Action rule; ex: in the incomplete Dating game, Chris s strategy was a rule specifying his action for each possible value of t c. Pair of strategies such that each player s strategy is the best response to the other player s strategy where strategy is defined above for NE. Action; ex: in the complete Dating game, Chris s strategy was simply to choose steak or chicken. Pair of strategies such that each player s strategy is the best response to the other player s strategy where strategy is defined above for BNE. Source: FET-156-08: An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory ACTEX 2010 Section V - 38