Interpreting factor models

Similar documents
UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER. Home work Assignment #4 Due: May 24, 2012

Hedging Factor Risk Preliminary Version

Interpreting factor models

Size Matters, if You Control Your Junk

Applied Macro Finance

Momentum Crashes. Kent Daniel. Columbia University Graduate School of Business. Columbia University Quantitative Trading & Asset Management Conference

Problem Set 4 Solutions

MULTI FACTOR PRICING MODEL: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO CAPM

The Cross-Section of Risk and Return

The Cross-Section of Risk and Return

The Cross-Section of Risk and Return.

Interpreting factor models

Asset Pricing and Excess Returns over the Market Return

Long-Term Rewarded Equity Factors What Can Investors Learn from Academic Research? Felix Goltz

An Extrapolative Model of House Price Dynamics

FIN512 Professor Lars A. Lochstoer Page 1

The Cross-Section of Risk and Return

Interpreting the Value Effect Through the Q-theory: An Empirical Investigation 1

Variation in Liquidity, Costly Arbitrage, and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

Betting against Beta or Demand for Lottery

An analysis of momentum and contrarian strategies using an optimal orthogonal portfolio approach

Betting Against Correlation:

An Online Appendix of Technical Trading: A Trend Factor

Empirical Evidence. r Mt r ft e i. now do second-pass regression (cross-sectional with N 100): r i r f γ 0 γ 1 b i u i

Factor Momentum and the Momentum Factor

Economics of Behavioral Finance. Lecture 3

A Lottery Demand-Based Explanation of the Beta Anomaly. Online Appendix

High Idiosyncratic Volatility and Low Returns. Andrew Ang Columbia University and NBER. Q Group October 2007, Scottsdale AZ

Exploiting Factor Autocorrelation to Improve Risk Adjusted Returns

FF hoped momentum would go away, but it didn t, so the standard factor model became the four-factor model, = ( )= + ( )+ ( )+ ( )+ ( )

Empirical Study on Market Value Balance Sheet (MVBS)

Using Maximum Drawdowns to Capture Tail Risk*

University of California Berkeley

The last several decades have witnessed a shift away from a fully rational

Risk-Based Investing & Asset Management Final Examination

Unpublished Appendices to Market Reactions to Tangible and Intangible Information. Market Reactions to Different Types of Information

Another Look at Market Responses to Tangible and Intangible Information

Module 3: Factor Models

Improving Withdrawal Rates in a Low-Yield World

Conditional dynamics and the multi-horizon risk-return trade-off

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES EXPLAINING THE CROSS-SECTION OF STOCK RETURNS IN JAPAN: FACTORS OR CHARACTERISTICS?

Discussion of: Carry. by: Ralph Koijen, Toby Moskowitz, Lasse Pedersen, and Evert Vrugt. Kent Daniel. Columbia University, Graduate School of Business

Momentum Crashes. Kent Daniel and Tobias Moskowitz. - Abstract -

Momentum Crashes. Kent Daniel and Tobias Moskowitz. - Abstract -

Supplementary Appendix to Financial Intermediaries and the Cross Section of Asset Returns

in-depth Invesco Actively Managed Low Volatility Strategies The Case for

Momentum Crashes. The Q -GROUP: FALL SEMINAR. 17 October Kent Daniel & Tobias Moskowitz. Columbia Business School & Chicago-Booth

Arbitrage Asymmetry and the Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle

Comparing Cross-Section and Time-Series Factor Models. Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French * Abstract

Monotonicity in Asset Returns: New Tests with Applications to the Term Structure, the CAPM and Portfolio Sorts

Short- and Long-Horizon Behavioral Factors

Structured Portfolio Enhancements

Economic Fundamentals, Risk, and Momentum Profits

Personal Asset Pricing and the Premium Investment Framework

Factor Risk Premiums and Invested Capital: Calculations with Stochastic Discount Factors

Short and Long Horizon Behavioral Factors

Debt/Equity Ratio and Asset Pricing Analysis

Do Limits to Arbitrage Explain the Benefits of Volatility-Managed Portfolios?

OPTIMAL CONCENTRATION FOR VALUE AND MOMENTUM PORTFOLIOS

Active portfolios: diversification across trading strategies

Short and Long Horizon Behavioral Factors

B35150 Winter 2014 Quiz Solutions

LECTURE NOTES 3 ARIEL M. VIALE

An Analysis of Theories on Stock Returns

Discussion of: Asset Prices with Fading Memory

Liquidity as risk factor

B Asset Pricing II Spring 2006 Course Outline and Syllabus

Systematic liquidity risk and stock price reaction to shocks: Evidence from London Stock Exchange

The Securities-Correlation Risks and the Volatility Effects in the Japanese Stock Market *

Do Investors Overvalue Firms With Bloated Balance Sheets?

Short and Long Horizon Behavioral Factors

The Tangible Risk of Intangible Capital. Abstract

A Test of the Role of Behavioral Factors for Asset Pricing

Decomposing Momentum Spread

Betting Against Alpha

ECON FINANCIAL ECONOMICS

Journal of Financial Economics

Predictability of Stock Returns

ECON FINANCIAL ECONOMICS

Institutional Finance Financial Crises, Risk Management and Liquidity

AN ALTERNATIVE THREE-FACTOR MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION

Internet Appendix Arbitrage Trading: the Long and the Short of It

Lasse Heje Pedersen. Copenhagen Business School, NYU, CEPR, AQR Capital Management

Variation in Liquidity and Costly Arbitrage

Is Economic Uncertainty Priced in the Cross-Section of Stock Returns?

Note on The Cross-Section of Foreign Currency Risk Premia and Consumption Growth Risk

Understanding defensive equity

Syllabus for Dyanamic Asset Pricing. Fall 2015 Christopher G. Lamoureux

Short- and Long-Horizon Behavioral Factors

Do Limits to Arbitrage Explain the Benefits of Volatility-Managed Portfolios?

Momentum Crashes. Society of Quantitative Analysts SQA Fall Seminar 16 October Kent Daniel & Tobias Moskowitz

An Efficient Factor from Basis Anomalies

Asset Pricing Anomalies and Financial Distress

Active Institutional Investors and Stock Return Anomalies

CHAPTER 2. Contrarian/Momentum Strategy and Different Segments across Indian Stock Market

Risk-managed 52-week high industry momentum, momentum crashes, and hedging macroeconomic risk

HOW TO GENERATE ABNORMAL RETURNS.

Short- and Long-Horizon Behavioral Factors

Lecture 2: Stochastic Discount Factor

Liquidity Creation as Volatility Risk

Transcription:

Discussion of: Interpreting factor models by: Serhiy Kozak, Stefan Nagel and Shrihari Santosh Kent Daniel Columbia University, Graduate School of Business 2015 AFA Meetings 4 January, 2015

Paper Outline Introduction & Review Success of a factor/characteristic model tells you nothing about whether the underlying economy is rational/behavioral. Model showing that sentiment sentiment factor. Asset return premia are described well by a factor model based on the first few principal components from a PCA. Factor structure & premia are unstable.

Discussion Outline Introduction & Review This is a good and interesting analysis. It is an important contribution: The economic meaning of the rejection of a factor/characteristics model is often misinterpreted in the finance literature. I will have a few quibbles with some of the analysis, but agree with most everything in this paper.

Discussion Outline Introduction & Review I m going to talk about the following issues: Factor vs. characteristic models. Review of Daniel and Titman (1997, 2012) analysis. PCA analysis What can we say about behavioral vs. rational models?

Factors Versus Characteristics interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) Given the absence of arbitrage (or LOP): 1 There exists a factor model that prices all assets perfectly. 2 There exists a characteristics model that prices all assets perfectly. Thus, the rejection of a particular factor model (e.g., the FF(1993) model) doesn t prove that prices are set by rational or irrational agents. It just demonstrates that the mean variance efficient portfolio isn t spanned by the factors of the particular factor model considered.

Factor Model Existence interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) In the absence of arbitrage or, equivalently, assuming the law of one price holds: E[ m R i ] = 0 where R is any excess return (i.e. on a Long-Short portfolio). Then the LS portfolio which is maximizes the correlation with m is the highest possible Sharpe-ratio portfolio: E[ R] σ m = ρ m,r σ R E[ m] This portfolio is therefore MVE, and prices all LS portfolios. If the MVE portfolio is spanned by the factors of the factor model, then the factor model will price all assets.

Characteristics Model Existence interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) Similarly, given no-arbitrage (or LOP), and therefore the existence of an MVE portfolio: E[ R i ] = β i,mve E[ R MVE ] If we define the vector of asset characteristics θ i appropriately, a linear combination of the characteristics will also perfectly explain the excess returns of all assets.

Characteristics Model Existence interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) Similarly, given no-arbitrage (or LOP), and therefore the existence of an MVE portfolio: E[ R i ] = β i,mve }{{} b θ i E[ RMVE] If we define the vector of asset characteristics θ i appropriately, a linear combination of the characteristics will also perfectly explain the excess returns of all assets.

interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) What can factor/characteristic models tell us? What can we conclude? Nothing, other than that the LOP holds! To saw more we need a model of preferences/state-prices. From Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), E[ m R i ] = 0 : ( E[ R] ) ( ) σm = ρ m,r σ R E[m] even without a precise model of preferences, we can conclude that: A really high Sharpe-ratio implies a really high σ m The MVE portfolio should be highly correlated with proxies for marginal utility.

interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) What can factor/characteristic models tell us? What can we conclude? Nothing, other than that the LOP holds! To saw more we need a model of preferences/state-prices. From Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), E[ m R i ] = 0 : ( E[ R] ) ( ) σm = ρ m,r σ R E[m] }{{} SR R even without a precise model of preferences, we can conclude that: A really high Sharpe-ratio implies a really high σ m The MVE portfolio should be highly correlated with proxies for marginal utility.

interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) What can factor/characteristic models tell us? What can we conclude? Nothing, other than that the LOP holds! To saw more we need a model of preferences/state-prices. From Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), E[ m R i ] = 0 : ( E[ R] ) ( ) σm = ρ m,r σ R E[m] }{{} SR R So even without specifying a precise model, it is worthwhile seeing how high a Sharpe-ratio is possible using information that we think investors might not process properly.

interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors See Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001). What if we have both behavioral and overconfident/sentiment investors? In a CARA-Normal setting with agents with different beliefs, prices will reflect a weighted average of the discounted expected payoff of the assets. If the measure of rational agents is 1: Prices will be almost exactly what they would be were all agents rational Overconfident agents (incorrectly) will expect high Sharpe-ratios.

interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors See Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001). What if we have both behavioral and overconfident/sentiment investors? In a CARA-Normal setting with agents with different beliefs, prices will reflect a weighted average of the discounted expected payoff of the assets. If the measure of overconfident agents is 1: Prices will be almost exactly what they would be were all agents overconfident rational agents will (correctly) expect high Sharpe-ratios.

Fama and French (1993) interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) The Daniel and Titman (1997) characteristics model was very much a response to Fama and French (1993). FF (1993) tests were interpreted as evidence that the three-factor model (MKT, HML, and SMB) provided a good summary of equity returns. This was based on their empirical tests showing that the three factors(mkt, HML, and SMB) priced the (now famous) FF 25 Sz-BM sorted portfolios.

Fama and French (1993) interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) We argued that their tests had low statistical power against interesting alternatives. To assess power, you need an alternative hypothesis so we propose three return generating processes: 1 A time-invariant factor model 2 A factor model with time varying factor loadings 3 A pure characteristics model (with asymptotic arbitrage) We argued that under any of these three models you would get the FF(93) empirical results.

Fama and French (1993) interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) We further argued that the problem with the FF 93 tests was the low dimensionality of the asset return space. if you sort into portfolios on the basis of size and BM, you eliminate a lot of the underlying factor structure. For example, if the RGP is the characteristics model, you will come up with three factors (a level or market factor, a size factor and a bm factor), even when the set of equities is governed by a far richer factor structure. The R 2 s for time-series regressions of the FF-25 portfolios on the 3 factors are mostly > 90%. See Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010) and Daniel and Titman (2012).

Fama and French (1993) interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) For example, if the RGP is the characteristics model, you will come up with three factors (a level or market factor, a size factor and a bm factor), even when the set of equities is governed by a far richer factor structure. The R 2 s for time-series regressions of the FF-25 portfolios on the 3 factors are mostly > 90%. See Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010) and Daniel and Titman (2012). However, if you expand the asset space, you find that you can pretty easily reject the FF (3-factor) model. We note that this doesn t mean that you can reject all factor models. It does mean that the MVE portfolio has a higher SR than just a combination of Mkt, HML and SMB.

PCA Analysis Introduction & Review interpretation of tests results Model with Behavioral and Rational Investors DT (1997) This paper does principal components analysis and shows that a low-order principal components model explains returns well. this is the one part of their analysis that I really don t like. The problem is that any time you sort on the basis of some characteristic into portfolios you eliminate the factor structure that is not directly associated with that characteristic. They do their tests with the FF 25 portfolios or the Novy-Marx and Velikov (2014) portfolios. When this is done with the FF 25 portfolios, the results are logically equivalent to the original Fama French findings and are wrong. If the authors are going to do this test they should use a different set of portfolios.

Strategy Sharpe Ratios Below are the ex-post Sharpe Ratios (1963:01-2014:05) tangency portfolios based on: The Fama and French (1993) portfolios (Mkt, SMB, HML) The Carhart (1997) price momentum portfolio UMD. Daniel and Titman (2006) Issuance & Accrual portfolios. Two low-volatility factor portfolios: Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) and Ang, et. al. (2006). Portfolio Weights (%) Sharpe Mkt-Rf SMB HML UMD ISU ACR BAB IVOL Ratio 100.0 0.40 35.1 19.7 47.2 0.78 26.0 10.3 33.2 30.5 1.09 8.6 4.5 34.2 17.8 26.3 8.7 1.38 7.6 12.2 14.2 4.7 17.7 9.9 9.5 23.7 1.78

Strategy Sharpe Ratios Below are the ex-post Sharpe Ratios (1963:01-2014:05) tangency portfolios based on: The Fama and French (1993) portfolios (Mkt, SMB, HML) The Carhart (1997) price momentum portfolio UMD. Daniel and Titman (2006) Issuance & Accrual portfolios. Two low-volatility factor portfolios: Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) and Ang, et. al. (2006). Portfolio Weights (%) Sharpe Mkt-Rf SMB HML UMD ISU ACR BAB IVOL Ratio 100.0 0.40 35.1 19.7 47.2 0.78 26.0 10.3 33.2 30.5 1.09 8.6 4.5 34.2 17.8 26.3 8.7 1.38 7.6 12.2 14.2 4.7 17.7 9.9 9.5 23.7 1.78

Strategy Sharpe Ratios Below are the ex-post Sharpe Ratios (1963:01-2014:05) tangency portfolios based on: The Fama and French (1993) portfolios (Mkt, SMB, HML) The Carhart (1997) price momentum portfolio UMD. Daniel and Titman (2006) Issuance & Accrual portfolios. Two low-volatility factor portfolios: Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) and Ang, et. al. (2006). Portfolio Weights (%) Sharpe Mkt-Rf SMB HML UMD ISU ACR BAB IVOL Ratio 100.0 0.40 35.1 19.7 47.2 0.78 26.0 10.3 33.2 30.5 1.09 8.6 4.5 34.2 17.8 26.3 8.7 1.38 7.6 12.2 14.2 4.7 17.7 9.9 9.5 23.7 1.78

Strategy Sharpe Ratios Below are the ex-post Sharpe Ratios (1963:01-2014:05) tangency portfolios based on: The Fama and French (1993) portfolios (Mkt, SMB, HML) The Carhart (1997) price momentum portfolio UMD. Daniel and Titman (2006) Issuance & Accrual portfolios. Two low-volatility factor portfolios: Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) and Ang, et. al. (2006). Portfolio Weights (%) Sharpe Mkt-Rf SMB HML UMD ISU ACR BAB IVOL Ratio 100.0 0.40 35.1 19.7 47.2 0.78 26.0 10.3 33.2 30.5 1.09 8.6 4.5 34.2 17.8 26.3 8.7 1.38 7.6 12.2 14.2 4.7 17.7 9.9 9.5 23.7 1.78

Strategy Sharpe Ratios Below are the ex-post Sharpe Ratios (1963:01-2014:05) tangency portfolios based on: The Fama and French (1993) portfolios (Mkt, SMB, HML) The Carhart (1997) price momentum portfolio UMD. Daniel and Titman (2006) Issuance & Accrual portfolios. Two low-volatility factor portfolios: Frazzini and Pedersen (2013) and Ang, et. al. (2006). Portfolio Weights (%) Sharpe Mkt-Rf SMB HML UMD ISU ACR BAB IVOL Ratio 100.0 0.40 35.1 19.7 47.2 0.78 26.0 10.3 33.2 30.5 1.09 8.6 4.5 34.2 17.8 26.3 8.7 1.38 7.6 12.2 14.2 4.7 17.7 9.9 9.5 23.7 1.78

Caveats Introduction & Review 1 The SRs on the last page are ex-post optimal portfolios. 2 IVOL (and BAB) are potentially faster/harder to trade than the other factors other factors are VW; all (ex. UMD) are rebalanced annually 3 These factors weren t know in 1963, and as a result of competition strategy performance will likely decile over time. Start Date Factors Weighting SR 1963:01 All Opt. 1.78 All EW 1.54 No Vol EW 1.05 2000:01 No Vol EW 0.76 2007:01 No Vol EW 0.87 All sample periods end in 2014:05. EW SR s for all factors: 1.30 post 00; 1.04 post 07.

Caveats Introduction & Review 1 The SRs on the last page are ex-post optimal portfolios. 2 IVOL (and BAB) are potentially faster/harder to trade than the other factors other factors are VW; all (ex. UMD) are rebalanced annually 3 These factors weren t know in 1963, and as a result of competition strategy performance will likely decile over time. Start Date Factors Weighting SR 1963:01 All Opt. 1.78 All EW 1.54 No Vol EW 1.05 2000:01 No Vol EW 0.76 2007:01 No Vol EW 0.87 All sample periods end in 2014:05. EW SR s for all factors: 1.30 post 00; 1.04 post 07.

Caveats Introduction & Review 1 The SRs on the last page are ex-post optimal portfolios. 2 IVOL (and BAB) are potentially faster/harder to trade than the other factors other factors are VW; all (ex. UMD) are rebalanced annually 3 These factors weren t know in 1963, and as a result of competition strategy performance will likely decile over time. Start Date Factors Weighting SR 1963:01 All Opt. 1.78 All EW 1.54 No Vol EW 1.05 2000:01 No Vol EW 0.76 2007:01 No Vol EW 0.87 All sample periods end in 2014:05. EW SR s for all factors: 1.30 post 00; 1.04 post 07.

Caveats Introduction & Review 1 The SRs on the last page are ex-post optimal portfolios. 2 IVOL (and BAB) are potentially faster/harder to trade than the other factors other factors are VW; all (ex. UMD) are rebalanced annually 3 These factors weren t know in 1963, and as a result of competition strategy performance will likely decile over time. Start Date Factors Weighting SR 1963:01 All Opt. 1.78 All EW 1.54 No Vol EW 1.05 2000:01 No Vol EW 0.76 2007:01 No Vol EW 0.87 All sample periods end in 2014:05. EW SR s for all factors: 1.30 post 00; 1.04 post 07.

Caveats Introduction & Review 1 The SRs on the last page are ex-post optimal portfolios. 2 IVOL (and BAB) are potentially faster/harder to trade than the other factors other factors are VW; all (ex. UMD) are rebalanced annually 3 These factors weren t know in 1963, and as a result of competition strategy performance will likely decile over time. Start Date Factors Weighting SR 1963:01 All Opt. 1.78 All EW 1.54 No Vol EW 1.05 2000:01 No Vol EW 0.76 2007:01 No Vol EW 0.87 All sample periods end in 2014:05. EW SR s for all factors: 1.30 post 00; 1.04 post 07.

Caveats Introduction & Review 1 The SRs on the last page are ex-post optimal portfolios. 2 IVOL (and BAB) are potentially faster/harder to trade than the other factors other factors are VW; all (ex. UMD) are rebalanced annually 3 These factors weren t know in 1963, and as a result of competition strategy performance will likely decile over time. Start Date Factors Weighting SR 1963:01 All Opt. 1.78 All EW 1.54 No Vol EW 1.05 2000:01 No Vol EW 0.76 2007:01 No Vol EW 0.87 All sample periods end in 2014:05. EW SR s for all factors: 1.30 post 00; 1.04 post 07.

Caveats Introduction & Review 1 The SRs on the last page are ex-post optimal portfolios. 2 IVOL (and BAB) are potentially faster/harder to trade than the other factors other factors are VW; all (ex. UMD) are rebalanced annually 3 These factors weren t know in 1963, and as a result of competition strategy performance will likely decile over time. Start Date Factors Weighting SR 1963:01 All Opt. 1.78 All EW 1.54 No Vol EW 1.05 2000:01 No Vol EW 0.76 2007:01 No Vol EW 0.87 All sample periods end in 2014:05. EW SR s for all factors: 1.30 post 00; 1.04 post 07.

Caveats Introduction & Review 1 The SRs on the last page are ex-post optimal portfolios. 2 IVOL (and BAB) are potentially faster/harder to trade than the other factors other factors are VW; all (ex. UMD) are rebalanced annually 3 These factors weren t know in 1963, and as a result of competition strategy performance will likely decile over time. Start Date Factors Weighting SR 1963:01 All Opt. 1.78 All EW 1.54 No Vol EW 1.05 2000:01 No Vol EW 0.76 2007:01 No Vol EW 0.87 2000:01 Mkt 0.23 2007:01 Mkt 0.43 All sample periods end in 2014:05. EW SR s for all factors: 1.30 post 00; 1.04 post 07.

References I Introduction & Review Ang, Andrew, Robert J. Hodrick, Yuhang Xing, and Xioayan Zhang, 2006, The cross-section of volatility and expected returns, The Journal of Finance 61, 259 299. Carhart, Mark M., 1997, On persistence in mutual fund performance, Journal of Finance 52, 57 82. Daniel, Kent D., David Hirshleifer, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 2001, Overconfidence, arbitrage, and equilibrium asset pricing, Journal of Finance 56, 921 965. Daniel, Kent D., and Sheridan Titman, 1997, Evidence on the characteristics of cross-sectional variation in common stock returns, Journal of Finance 52, 1 33., 2006, Market reactions to tangible and intangible information, Journal of Finance 61, 1605 1643., 2012, Testing factor-model explanations of market anomalies, Critical Finance Review 1, 103 139. Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1993, Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds, Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3 56. Frazzini, Andrea, and Lasse H. Pedersen, 2013, Betting against beta, Journal of Financial Economics 111, 1 25. Hansen, Lars P., and Ravi Jagannathan, 1991, Implications of security market data for models of dynamic economies, Journal of Political Economy 99, 225 262. Lewellen, Jonathan, Stefan Nagel, and Jay Shanken, 2010, A skeptical appraisal of asset pricing tests, Journal of Financial Economics 96, 175 194.

References II Introduction & Review Novy-Marx, Robert, and Mihail Velikov, 2014, A taxonomy of anomalies and their trading costs, Simon-School Rochester working paper.