The Irish Crisis Philip R. Lane IIIS, Trinity College Dublin and CEPR Oslo, January 12th 2010 Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 1 / 17
Introduction Economic Crisis: GDP decline of 15 percent between 2007-2010 Fiscal Crisis: Surplus in 2007; -11.5 percent in 2009 (-17 percent if no correction) Banking Crisis: Heavy losses of Irish banking system Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 2 / 17
The Celtic Tiger Years: 1994-2001 Rapid productivity-driven output growth Long-delayed Catch Up Process Major expansion in inward FDI: European integration; the weightless hi-tech sectors Little in ation: large over-hang of surplus labour Start of housing boom: entry to EMU 1999-2001: very weak euro against $/ 1999-2001: big tax cuts rising incomes, lower interest rate under Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 3 / 17
Temporary Deceleration 2001-2003 Global recession in Hi-Tech Sector Post-election scal retrenchment in 2002 Rapid euro appreciation against dollar in 2002 Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 4 / 17
The 2003-2007 Bubble Period Rapid credit growth: land development; households; SMEs Rapid growth in property prices Major expansion in construction activity: large proportion of male workforce Tax breaks for property investment Substantial inward migration (New Member States etc) Associated revenue windfall and rapid growth in public spending Expansion in current account de cit Real exchange rate appreciation Relative contraction of tradables sector 2008/2009: Bursting of the bubble, compounded by the global crisis Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 5 / 17
GDP Growth Rate GDP Growth 18 14 GDP Growth 10 6 2 2 6 10 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Year Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 6 / 17
2 Ratio of Private Credit to GDP 1.75 (Private Credit / GDP) 1.5 1.25 1 0.75 0.5 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Year Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 7 / 17
6 Current Account Balance (Ratio to GDP) 4 2 CA/GDP 0 2 4 6 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Year Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 8 / 17
Net Foreign Liabilities of Main Irish Banks 80 75 70 65 60 55 NFL/GNP 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 9 / 17
The Economic Crisis Shuddering Halt in Construction Sector Approx 50% decline in housing prices; 90% for some development land Collapse in Investment Hike in private savings rate Jump in unemployment but also signi cant exit Fiscal tightening adding to demand slump Credit crunch for SMEs, households In ation currently minus 5.7% (terms of trade gain from Sterling decline) Aggregate exports holding up but driven by FDI-dominated sectors (2009 GDP -7%; GNP -10.5%) Some level of downward pay exibility in private sector Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 10 / 17
The Banking Crisis Traditional property-driven crisis Extensive guarantee: September 2008 Preference Shares in AIB / Bank of Ireland Nationalisation of Anglo-Irish Bank (early 2009) Severe funding pressures in Q1 2009 Heavy reliance on ECB liquidity National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) plan announced April 2009; legislation December 2009 NAMA to acquire property development loan books (transfer value about 30% of GDP) Transfer values at a steep discount to face value of loans (average 30%): but 15% uplift relative to market value ( long-term economic value concept) Also prospect of more bad debts (mortgages, HH, SMEs) Post-transfer: recapitalisation of banks Likely scenario: large government ownership stakes in the main banks Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 11 / 17
The Fiscal Crisis Summer 2008: brake applied October 2008: early announcement of 2009 budget; de cit mostly structural ; signi cant tax increases (levies) Q1 2009: jump in sovereign spread; funding risk [interaction with bank funding] April 2009 emergency budget 2009: ongoing decline in tax revenue; 2009-2014 scal adjustment schedule December 2009: tough budget for 2010, cuts of 2.5% of GDP in order to stabilise de cit at about 11 percent of GDP Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 12 / 17
Features of the 2008/2009 Fiscal Adjustment De facto 7.5 percent pay cut [ pension levy ] in public sector in January 2009 Further 5%-12% cuts in public sector pay announced for 2010 Major increase in top marginal tax rate: 45% to 54% (kicks in at e37k) Large fraction of workers pay no income tax Narrow tax base Further scal adjustment required over 2011-2014 2012 next election Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 13 / 17
Regrets Failure of macro-prudential banking regulation Excellent new CB governor and bank regulator now appointed Failure to run large scal surpluses during good times Exception: National Pension Reserve Fund Exception: Special Savings Incentive Account (2001/2002 to 2006/2007) Counterexamples: Sweden/Finland; Chile Rainy Day Fund (Lane, 1998) De cient Tax System Over-reliance on asset-driven revenues Unsustainable cuts in income taxes Inappropriate tax incentives for property investment Excessively narrow tax base Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 14 / 17
Ireland and the Euro Bubble period: not exclusive to euro area; limited role for interest rate mechanism High euro debt: in e ect, foreign-currency debt but with access to liquidity provider (ECB) Disciplinary impact of discriminating sovereign debt market Adjustment process contrast to own-currency economies (di erent types, depending on reliance on foreign-currency debt and policy stability) Key issue: interplay between scal crisis and banking crisis Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 15 / 17
Lessons for Members of the Euro Area Importance of long-term scal anchor (SGP inadequate): new institutional arrangements Costs of banking crises inside a monetary union Costs of real over-valuation (limits to wage exibility) Big gain: Liquidity support (but requires scal backstop to ensure bank solvency) Hypothetical alternative: no euro membership? Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 16 / 17
Future Prospects for the Irish Economy Shift in composition of economic activity: more tradables activity, less construction Internal devaluation: slow adjustment process but faster in Ireland than in some other locations Overhang of high debt levels: tepid recovery in domestic spending Growth expected in 2010 H2; moderate pace for 2011 onwards Institutional reforms required: never again Stay informed: www.irisheconomy.ie Lane () The Irish Crisis Oslo, January 12th 2010 17 / 17