Flash Economics. Euro zone and France: No one can now deny that it is supply-side policies that are needed.

Similar documents
Flash Economics. 13 September

Flash Economics. The common characteristics of countries where labour force skills are weak. 25 October

Flash Economics. What can be done if total factor productivity diverges between euro-zone countries? 01 December

Flash Economics. Measured GDP and true GDP. 14 September

Flash Economics. Will the euro zone s structural unemployment fall before unemployment catches up with it?

Flash Economics. The discount rate of supply-side policies. 16 May

Flash Economics. Euro zone, France: Potential risk of a "scissor effect" in March

Flash Economics. What to expect from the rise in oil prices for growth in the euro zone and France? 16 January

Flash Economics. Because the structural unemployment rate is high in the euro zone, its growth phases are shorter than in the United States

Flash Economics. The acceleration in global trade is very good for the euro zone; what accounts for it?

Flash Economics. Growing heterogeneity in living standards between euro-zone countries: A temporary or permanent feature?

Flash Economics. The end of quantitative easing in the euro zone: Will banks step in for the ECB to buy government bonds?

CORPORATE & INVESTMENT BANKING

Flash Economics. What adjustments are possible when unemployment returns to the structural unemployment level?

Flash Economics. Two very important structural differences between Germany and the rest of the euro zone: How can the euro zone function?

Flash Economics. Why has the euro zone s current-account balance improved? 25 August

Flash Economics. Should governments in the euro zone make additional public investments? 10 October

Flash Economics. 11 January

Flash Economics. What is the ECB s real objective? 05 December

Flash Economics. What is the direction of the causality between real interest rates and total factor productivity growth?

Flash Economics. What difference does it make having a stable oil price at 50 dollars a barrel or an oil price rising by 10 dollars per year?

Flash Economics. The more Germany accumulates external assets, the more unlikely a break-up of the euro zone and the more a strong euro hurts Germany

Flash Economics. What will happen when long-term interest rates rise in the United States and the euro zone?

Flash Economics. What happens when the Federal Reserve starts raising its interest rates? 14 September

Flash Economics. Over-expansionary monetary policies: A real estate bubble always appears in the end. 16 January

Flash Economics. Does monetary policy have an effect on structural unemployment? 16 January

Flash Economics. Does fiscal policy change course when the long-term interest rate goes above or below the growth rate?

Negatively to labour force skills; Negatively to R&D spending;

Flash Economics. International monetary system: Return to Bretton Woods September

Flash Economics. One concern in the United States: Commercial real estate. 07 October

Has no impact on growth; Leads to a rise in interest rates;

Flash Economics. Gradually less expansionary monetary policy in the United States: Could it trigger a rise in long-term interest rates?

Flash Economics. Is an increase in euro-zone inflation plausible? 27 February

Flash Economics. A euro-zone budget: How, why, when? 19 January

Flash Economics. What must we assume if we do not believe long-term interest rates will rise sharply in the peripheral eurozone

Flash Economics. The three types of capitalism. 21 December

We seek to determine whether:

Flash Economics. Four serious new threats for the euro zone. 12 December

Flash Economics. US monetary policy: What matters more: The Fed Funds rate or the size of the Federal Reserve s balance sheet?

In particular, we want to see whether: We find: The causes appear to be:

Flash Economics. A simple dollar/euro exchange-rate determination model. 20 February

Flash Economics. France: Is it possible to return to full employment without increasing inequalities? 08 December

Flash Economics. Are Asian countries now managing their exchange rates based on movements in the Chinese RMB?

On public finances; On financial asset prices; The risks seem to come from:

Flash Economics. The attempts to save Keynesianism in the euro zone are tiresome. 25 January

Flash Economics. Could there no longer be any credible reserve currency? 22 March

Flash Economics. Can France afford its legitimate economic policy objectives? 06 April

Flash Economics. Are the elites unaware that there is a problem? 05 September

Flash Economics. Potential black swans. 16 June

NAVIGATING THROUGH THE MIST: INTRODUCING NATIXIS CHINA CAPITAL FLOW TRACKER CHINA HOT TOPICS.

Flash Economics. How should retail banks manage risk? The only reasonable solution is to apply sufficient risk premia (interest rate margins) on loans

The oil price; US tax policy; US inflation and monetary policy; The Italian economy and banks;

China and Hong Kong Forex Market Developments One-way appreciation carrying into the new year

China and Hong Kong Forex Market Developments RMB made the nine-month peak and FX reserves further expanded

Equity Markets PRIVATE PLACEMENT ONLY

A new world order: Key issues for Asia, ASEAN and Thailand

NATIXIS WORKSHOP F How to optimize the liquidity portfolio with covered bonds. 15/09/2011 The Euromoney / ECBC Covered Bond Congress

The end of the Infrastructure congestion in Europe?

Intraday Liquidity Management

Chart 1 Total assets of banking institutions (% of total)

Flash Economics. What would a European capitalism require to be able to exist? 17 April

The rise and fall of gold. December 2013

Approach to Employment Injury (EI) compensation benefits in the EU and OECD

CASH MANAGEMENT. Secure and efficient solutions to manage your payments.

Corrigendum. OECD Pensions Outlook 2012 DOI: ISBN (print) ISBN (PDF) OECD 2012

Seventh City of London Biennial Meeting 2013

Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2016

FINAL TERMS DATED 29 SEPTEMBER 2011

STAT/12/ October Household saving rate fell in the euro area and remained stable in the EU27. Household saving rate (seasonally adjusted)

EMPLOYMENT RATE IN EU-COUNTRIES 2000 Employed/Working age population (15-64 years)

Switzerland and Germany top the PwC Young Workers Index in developing younger people

US Upstream in Focus

Recommendation of the Council on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle

UBS Economics Day The Australian Budget

Euro Medium Term Note Callable Zero Coupon Non Linear TRADED TERMSHEET. Terms and Conditions (the Term Sheet )

Economic Imbalances in the post-maastricht Treaty World A Look at Global and European Implications and Investment Conclusions

Growth in OECD Unit Labour Costs slows to 0.4% in the third quarter of 2016

Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2018

Recommendation of the Council on Tax Avoidance and Evasion

Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2014

PENSIONS IN OECD COUNTRIES: INDICATORS AND DEVELOPMENTS

COUNTRY COST INDEX JUNE 2013

Statistics Brief. Investment in Inland Transport Infrastructure at Record Low. Infrastructure Investment. July

Pricing Guidelines for Listed Products and OTC Derivatives Clearing Services offered by UBS EMIR Articles 38(1) and 39(7)

FINAL TERMS DATED 10 FEBRUARY 2012

Sources of Government Revenue in the OECD, 2017

EMPLOYABILITY AND LABOUR MARKET

Reporting practices for domestic and total debt securities

Move to T+2 settlement cycle: Singapore market

Ways to increase employment

Israel through the Global Crisis: Do Innovations Help?

Sources of Government Revenue across the OECD, 2015

Statistical annex. Sources and definitions

Table 1: Foreign exchange turnover: Summary of surveys Billions of U.S. dollars. Number of business days

Low employment among the 50+ population in Hungary

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS. S.I. No. 208 of 2016 COMPANIES ACT 2014 (PRESCRIBED PERSONS) REGULATIONS 2016

Transcription:

November - and : No one can now deny that it is supply-side policies that are needed There is still a debate in the euro zone and about the alleged need to continue to conduct demand-stimulating policies: maintaining an expansionary monetary policy, large fiscal deficits; larger increases in real wages. But it has to be realised that in, euro-zone growth is. percentage point higher than potential growth, French growth is percentage point higher than potential growth, and the unemployment rate is approaching the structural unemployment rate. This shows clearly that the single problem at present is to restore potential growth and to reduce the structural unemployment rate, and therefore to conduct supply-side policies: taxes, innovation, training, incentive to modernise capital. Patrick Artus Tel. ( ) patrick.artus@natixis.com @PatrickArtus www.research.natixis.com CORPORATE & INVESTMENT BANKING INVESTMENT SOLUTIONS & INSURANCE SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL SERVICES Distribution of this report in the United States. See important disclosures at the end of this report..

There are still some proponents of demand-stimulating policies We look at the situations of the euro zone and. There are still some proponents of implementing demand-stimulating policies in these countries. This can include: - Maintaining an expansionary monetary policy (Charts A and B); - Maintaining large fiscal deficits (Chart ); - Larger real wage increases (Chart ). Chart A : Nominal GDP, interest rate on -year government bonds and euro repo rate Nominal GDP (Y/Y as %) excl. Greece: -year govt. interest rate (as %) Euro repo rate (as %) Chart B : Nominal GDP, euro repo rate, interest rate on -year government bonds Nominal GDP (Y/Y as %) Euro repo rate -year govt. interest rate - - - - - - - - Chart Fiscal deficit (as % of nominal GDP) Chart Real per capita wage (deflated by consumer price deflator, Y/Y as %) - - - - - - - - - - - - Sources: Datastream, Natixis forecasts - - - Sources: Datastream, Eurostat, INSEE, Natixis - - - This proposal to implement demand-stimulating policies is based on the observation that the unemployment rate is still high (Chart ) and that the euro zone (but not ) has an external surplus (Chart ).

Chart Unemployment rate (as %) Chart Current-account balance (as % of nominal GDP) - - - - Sources: Datastream, Eurostat, INSEE, Natixis But we believe that in the present situation, the real issue is supply-side policies and not demand-side policies. Why are supply-side policies needed in the euro zone and at present? - The first observation is that growth is markedly higher than potential growth in the euro zone as in (Charts A and B): potential growth is low because of low productivity gains (Charts A and B). Chart A : Real GDP and potential growth Chart B : Real GDP and potential growth Real GDP (Y/Y as %) Potential growth* Real GDP (Y/Y as %) Potential growth* - - Sources: Datastream, (*) Per capita productivity smoothed over the past years + labour force (Y/Y as %) - - - - (*) Labour force* + per capita productivity smoothed over the past years (Y/Y as %) - - - - - - Chart A : Per capita productivity (Y/Y as %) Chart B : Per capita productivity (Y/Y as %) Y/Y as % Y/Y as %, smoothed over the past years Y/Y as % Y/Y as %, smoothed over the past years - - - - - - - - Sources: Datastream, ECB, Natixis - -

If growth is quite strong and potential growth is low, the objective is to restore potential growth, which requires supply-side and not demand-side policies. - The second observation is that wages are starting to accelerate (Chart ) and production is barely responding to the growth in demand (Charts A and B), which seems to indicate that the unemployment rate (Chart above) is approaching the structural unemployment rate. Chart Nominal per capita wage (Y/Y as %) Sources: Datastream, INSEE, ECB, Natixis Chart A : Total demand*, real GDP and imports (: = ) Chart B : Total demand*, real GDP and imports (: = ) Total demand Real GDP Imports Total demand Real GDP Imports (*) Domestic demand + exports in volume terms (*) Domestic demand + exports in volume terms Mar- Mar- Mar Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar Mar- Mar- If it is around % in the euro zone and.% in, at the current pace of employment growth (Chart ) the unemployment rate should hit the level of the structural unemployment rate towards the beginning of in the euro zone as in. Chart Employment (Y/Y as %) - - - - Sources: Datastream, ECB, INSEE, Natixis - - The second economic policy objective in the zone euro and is therefore to reduce the structural unemployment rate, which also requires supply-side policies.

Conclusion: What supply-side policies? The two logical economic policy objectives in the euro zone and in are therefore currently to increase potential growth and to reduce the structural unemployment rate. This means the following measures are called for: - More efficient vocational training that can increase the level of labour force skills, which is too low (Table ); - A reduction in the type of taxes that create distortions that drive up the structural unemployment rate, such as companies social contributions, particularly in (Chart ); - Tax incentives that drive companies to innovate more (Table ), and to modernise their capital more (Table, Chart ). Table : PIAAC survey OECD, overall score by decreasing score () Country Score Japan. Finland. Netherlands. Sweden. Norway. Australia. Flanders (Belgium). Czech Republic. Denmark. Slovakia. Austria. New Zealand. Estonia. Germany. Canada. South Korea. United Kingdom. countries as a whole. Poland. Ireland. United States.. Slovenia. Israel. Greece. Italy. Spain. Turkey. Chile. Sources: OECD, Natixis

Chart Companies social contributions (as % of nominal GDP) Chart NICT* investment excl. software (as % of real GDP) United States Sweden Japan South Korea (*) New information and communication technologies Sources: Datastream, OECD, Eurostat, Natixis Table : Private-sector R&D spending (as % of nominal GDP) Country countries as a whole............................ United States.............. Sweden.............. Japan.............. South Korea.............. Sources: Eurostat, OECD, Natixis Table : Stock of industrial robots (per jobs in the manufacturing sector) United States Sweden Japan South Korea,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Sources: IFR International Federation of Robotics, Natixis

Disclaimer The information contained in this publication and any attachment thereto is exclusively intended for a client base consisting of professionals and qualified investors. This document and any attachment thereto are strictly confidential and cannot be divulgated to a third party without the prior written consent of Natixis. If you are not the intended recipient of this document and/or the attachments, please delete them and immediately notify the sender. Distribution, possession or delivery of this document in, to or from certain jurisdictions may be restricted or prohibited by law. Recipients of this document are required to inform themselves of and comply with all such restrictions or prohibitions. Neither Natixis, nor any of its affiliates, directors, employees, agents or advisers or any other person accepts any liability to any person in relation to the distribution, possession or delivery of this document in, to or from any jurisdiction. This document has been developed by our economists. It does not constitute a financial analysis and has not been developed in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research. Accordingly, there are no prohibitions on dealing ahead of its dissemination. This document and all attachments are communicated to each recipient for information purposes only and do not constitute a personalized investment recommendation. They are intended for general distribution and the products or services described herein do not take into account any specific investment objective, financial situation or particular need of any recipient. This document and any attachment thereto shall not be construed as an offer nor a solicitation for any purchase, sale or subscription. Under no circumstances should this document be considered as an official confirmation of a transaction to any person or entity and no undertaking is given that the transaction will be entered into under the terms and conditions set out herein or under any other terms and conditions. This document and any attachment thereto are based on public information and shall not be used nor considered as an undertaking from Natixis. All undertakings require the formal approval of Natixis according to its prevailing internal procedures. Natixis has neither verified nor carried out independent analysis of the information contained in this document. Accordingly, no representation, warranty or undertaking, either express or implied, is made to the recipients of this document as to or in relation to the relevance, accuracy or completeness of this document or as to the reasonableness of any assumption contained in this document. Information does not take into account specific tax rules or accounting methods applicable to counterparties, clients or potential clients of Natixis. Therefore, Natixis shall not be liable for differences, if any, between its own valuations and those valuations provided by third parties; as such differences may arise as a result of the application and implementation of alternative accounting methods, tax rules or valuation models. The statements, assumptions and opinions contained in this document may be changed or may be withdrawn by Natixis at any time without notice. Prices and margins are indicative only and are subject to change at any time without notice depending on, inter alia, market conditions. Past performances and simulations of past performances are not a reliable indicator and therefore do not anticipate any future results. The information contained in this document may include results of analyses from a quantitative model, which represent potential future events that may or may not be realised, and is not a complete analysis of every material fact representing any product. Information may be changed or may be withdrawn by Natixis at any time without notice. More generally, no responsibility is accepted by Natixis, nor any of its holding companies, subsidiaries, associated undertakings or controlling persons, nor any of their respective directors, officers, partners, employees, agents, representatives or advisers as to or in relation to the characteristics of this information. The statements, assumptions and forecasts contained in this document reflect the judgment of its author(s), unless otherwise specified, and do not reflect the judgment of any other person or of Natixis. The information contained in this document should not be assumed to have been updated at any time subsequent to the date shown on the first page of this document and the delivery of this document does not constitute a representation by any person that such information will be updated at any time after the date of this document. Natixis shall not be liable for any financial loss or any decision taken on the basis of the information disclosed in this presentation and Natixis does not provide any advice, including in case of investment services. In any event, you should request for any internal and/or external advice that you consider necessary or desirable to obtain, including from any financial, legal, tax or accounting adviser, or any other specialist, in order to verify in particular that the transaction described in this document complies with your objectives and constraints and to obtain an independent valuation of the transaction, its risk factors and rewards. Natixis is supervised by the European Central bank (ECB). Natixis is authorized in by the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Régulation (ACPR) as a Bank -Investment Services Provider and subject to its supervision. Natixis is regulated by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers in respect of its investment services activities. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR in and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority in the United Kingdom. Details on the extent of regulation by the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority are available from Natixis branch in London upon request. In Germany, NATIXIS is authorized by the ACPR as a bank investment services provider and is subject to its supervision. NATIXIS Zweigniederlassung Deutschland is subject to a limited form of regulation by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) with regards to the conduct of its business in Germany under the right of establishment there. The transfer / distribution of this document in Germany is performed by / under the responsibility of NATIXIS Zweigniederlassung Deutschland. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by Bank of Spain and the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores) for the conduct of its business under the right of establishment in Spain. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by Bank of Italy and the CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa) for the conduct of its business under the right of establishment in Italy. Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) for the conduct of its business in and from the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). The document is being made available to the recipient with the understanding that it meets the DFSA definition of a Professional Client; the recipient is otherwise required to inform Natixis if this is not the case and return the document. The recipient also acknowledges and understands that neither the document nor its contents have been approved, licensed by or registered with any regulatory body or governmental agency in the GCC or Lebanon. All of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect the author s personal views regarding any and all of the subject securities or issuers. No part of author compensation was, is or will be, directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report. I(WE), AUTHOR(S), WHO WROTE THIS REPORT HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS REPORT ACCURATELY REFLECT OUR(MY) PERSONAL VIEWS ABOUT THE SUBJECT COMPANY OR COMPANIES AND ITS OR THEIR SECURITIES, AND THAT NO PART OF OUR COMPENSATION WAS, IS OR WILL BE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, RELATED TO THE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS OR VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS REPORT. The personal views of authors may differ from one another. Natixis, its subsidiaries and affiliates may have issued or may issue reports that are inconsistent with, and/or reach different conclusions from, the information presented herein. Natixis, a foreign bank and broker-dealer, makes this report available solely for distribution in the United States to major U.S. institutional investors as defined in Rule a under the U.S. securities Exchange Act of. This document shall not be distributed to any other persons in the United States. All major U.S. institutional investors receiving this document shall not distribute the original nor a copy thereof to any other person in the United States. Natixis Securities Americas LLC, a U.S. registered broker-dealer and member of FINRA, is a subsidiary of Natixis. Natixis Securities Americas LLC did not participate in the preparation of this report and as such assumes no responsibility for its content. This report has been prepared and reviewed by authors employed by Natixis, who are not associated persons of Natixis Securities Americas LLC and are not registered or qualified as research analysts with FINRA, and are not subject to the rules of the FINRA. In order to receive any additional information about or to effect a transaction in any security or financial instrument mentioned herein, please contact your usual registered representative at Natixis Securities Americas LLC, by email or by mail at Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY. The stocks mentioned might be subject to specific disclaimers. Please click on the following link to consult them: http://research.intranet/globalresearchweb/main/globalresearch/disclaimersspecifiques