Nuclear Safeguards Policy Issues Jan.8 Na Young Lee Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control
Outlines 1 Introduction 2 Evolution of IAEA safeguards 3 Safeguards policy in ROK
4 Background THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS( NPT ) Article 3 para2 Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article. Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement
5 Introduction of safeguards What is safeguards? By definition, the safeguards system comprises an extensive set of technical measures by which the IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States about their nuclear material and activities. What is the objectives of the safeguards? The timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection
6 Elements of safeguards Significant quantity Material Direct-use nuclear material Pu U with 235 U > 20% Indirect-use nuclear material U with 235 U < 20% Th Significant Quantities 8 kg 25 kg of 235 U 75 kg 235 U or 10 t natural U or 20 t depleted U 20 t element
Elements of safeguards Detection time Maximum time that may elapse between diversion and its detection by Agency safeguards Corresponds in order of magnitude to conversion time Important in determining frequency of inspections Timeliness Material Un-irradiated direct-use Irradiated direct use Indirect use Detection time 1 month 3 months 12 months * Timeliness goal may vary depending on types of safeguards arrangements 7
8 Introduction of evolution of safeguards Why safeguards need to change? Broader target, not to miss hidden activities of the states without discrimination Level up the effectiveness and efficiency because of the limited resource What is the response of the IAEA and states? Weapon states try to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system Non-weapon states with advanced nuclear fuel cycle implement safeguards more thoroughly which requires more IAEA activities Pursue effective and efficient way of implementation to credible states
10 Need to change the IAEA safeguards Scope of the safeguards implementation has been increased Resource-budget and inspectors- is limited Board always request the IAEA to innovate-efficient implementation- to save budget Development of new fuel cycle facilities Developed to prepare the Department for future safeguards implementation challenges and responsibilities Based on structured analysis to determine strategic activities to be conducted (completed in 2010) Identified to further evolve the IAEA safeguards system
11 Drivers for the change Much more relevant information available need to take full advantage Increasing safeguards workload with static budget need to focus efforts Recent cases of undeclared activities not detected by routine inspection activities need a new risk assessment framework
12 Evolving safeguards implementation Evolving safeguards implementation to be more: Objectives As opposed to criteria driven; allows for based: customized State-level approaches to meet State-specific objectives Information Use of all information, including State driven: factors, to determine objectives and safeguards activities Focused: At the State level and on issues of concern; directing resources to identified risks Adaptable: Responsive to changes in information and analysis Unpredictable: The timing and nature of verification activities varies
13 State Level Concept A holistic approach to safeguards implementation Applicable to all States with SG agreements Based on a comprehensive and continuous State evaluation and a State-level approach, including a specific combination of safeguards measures for an individual State Executed through an annual implementation plan Considering the State as a whole provides the opportunity to take State-specific factors into consideration during all stages of safeguards implementation Implementation of the State-level concept is responsive to changes in the analysis, ensuring that safeguards conclusions remain soundly based and up-to-date
14 Advancing the State Level Concept Further development of the Agency s State-level concept requires: An expanded use of State-specific factors and a structured acquisition path analysis to establish and prioritize Statespecific technical objectives State-level approaches (SLAs) that specify and provide options for Headquarters and in-field measures required to meet the technical objectives Identification and selection of activities in the annual implementation plan (AIP) Linkage of the State evaluation process with development and implementation of SLAs and AIPs
Processes for Safeguards Implementation that is Objectives-Based and Information-Driven 15 Safeguards conclusions State-level approach Annual implementation plan
16 ntegrating Inspection and Evaluation Activities Use of all information Availability of information through an integrated information management system Enhanced feedback from in-field and headquart ers activities Collaborative analysis with restructured State evaluation groups Training courses for State evaluation Security procedures Protection of information but enhanced availability for analysis and evaluation
17 Principles of Safeguards Implementation Differentiation without discrimination common State-level objectives and uniform processes with use of State-specific factors and technical objectives to develop customized SLAs Effectiveness as a priority Full use of Agency s legal authority Risk management Full consideration and coverage of acquisition paths
18 Principles of Safeguards Implementation Nuclear material accountancy as basis for deriving a conclusion on non-diversion of declared nuclear material Comprehensive information analysis and continuous State evaluation Security and availability of information Transparency of processes Quality management
20 Enhanced Cooperation under TS 1 Enhanced cooperation with SSAC at LWRs in Korea After long discussion through working group, it introduce Remote Monitoring Based Cooperation (May 2000) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the IAEA and the MOST of the ROK for an Enhanced Cooperation on Safeguards Implementation at Light Water Reactors in the ROK Implementation of Enhanced Cooperation Scheme for all LWRs (Feb. 2002 June 2008)
Enhanced Cooperation under TS 2 21 Safeguards implementation RM based Inspection Others Benefits inspection Annual PIV, RII under TS Continuous C/S measures Data transmitted to IAEA & KINAC Monthly report Independent conclusions by ROK and IAEA Cost & data sharing IAEA : save 60 ~ 100 PDIs/y ROK : Less IAEA inspections
PDI excluding T.C. 22
23 Discussion on the new EC under IS Establish task force group for EC in 2007 Further discussion on the Cost and Equipment sharing Discussion on the specification on the Transparency policy Further discussion on the MOU for the data sharing Drafted arrangement pursuing ENHANCED COOPERATION
New MOU-EC in the implementation of IS 24
25 Establish Coordination Group for Enhanced Cooperation Joint Review Meeting (JRM) IAEA ECWG Co-Coordinator ROK ECWG Co-Coordinator SGOA SGCP SGTS OLA SGIM DDGO-SG ROK ROK ROK ROK ROK ROK
26 Main activities of CGEC-1 1. Safeguards activities Specific safeguards-relevant activities to be implemented by the ROK(NSSC/ KINAC/facility operators) as appropriate 2. Training Safeguards activities performed by SSAC Capacity building of the SSAC Collaboration for the INSA *SSAC : State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
27 Main activities of CGEC-2 3. Joint Use of Equipment Data sharing from the joint use equipment Based on the Data sharing policy 4. Modalities of Reporting Relevant to safeguards activities 5. New Technologies Collaboration on development and application of new technologies
28 International cooperation Develop safeguards technology; accountancy, verification Exchange of information, experts ROK-US Cooperation Will to support nuclear nonproliferation regime International cooperation ROK-IAEA cooperation Others Exchange of information Support training and technical meetings on safeguards Implementation of safeguards (with SGOA3) Support to training/outreach
29 National Inspection SCAV OFPS SCAI ULBS RMS SF Neutron Fingerprint System DNAA Researches for the domestic needs Remote Monitoring Gamma Ray and Neutron Remote Interrogation OFPS certification Canister reverification MSSP 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Low Background Gamma Spectrometry Neutron Fingerprinting DNAA SINRD PWR spent fuel verifier Environmental Sample Analysis DUPIC SG system Remote Monitoring Safeguards System for ACP PCG
30 Multilateral cooperation APSN, NGSI More focused on the outreach to the regional states Cooperation with UAE Support various SSAC activities including Training, consultation etc.
31 Sector 1. Mock-up Facilities of Conventional PPsystem Sector 4. Simulation and Destructive test facility Sector 2. Radiation Portal Monitoring and Entry Control System Sector 3. Green area Test-Field for Advanced PP system 180 Parking lot Landscaping Landscaping
32 In Summary Evolution of IAEA safeguards Strengthen SSAC(State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material) through Enhanced cooperation with IAEA International cooperation/outreach to promote nuclear nonproliferation
Thank you!