Cash-in-Advance Model

Similar documents
Cash in Advance Models

Overlapping Generations Model: Dynamic Efficiency and Social Security

The Neoclassical Growth Model

Money in a Neoclassical Framework

Money in an RBC framework

Transactions and Money Demand Walsh Chapter 3

Lecture 2: The Neoclassical Growth Model

Money in OLG Models. Econ602, Spring The central question of monetary economics: Why and when is money valued in equilibrium?

Ramsey s Growth Model (Solution Ex. 2.1 (f) and (g))

The Ramsey Model. Lectures 11 to 14. Topics in Macroeconomics. November 10, 11, 24 & 25, 2008

Macroeconomics 2. Lecture 5 - Money February. Sciences Po

Department of Economics The Ohio State University Final Exam Answers Econ 8712

Monetary/Fiscal Interactions: Cash in Advance

1 A tax on capital income in a neoclassical growth model

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics. Ph. D. Comprehensive Examination: Macroeconomics Fall, 2010

Topic 6. Introducing money

MACROECONOMICS. Prelim Exam

Problem Set 3. Thomas Philippon. April 19, Human Wealth, Financial Wealth and Consumption

(Incomplete) summary of the course so far

Fluctuations. Shocks, Uncertainty, and the Consumption/Saving Choice

Macroeconomics Qualifying Examination

Question 1 Consider an economy populated by a continuum of measure one of consumers whose preferences are defined by the utility function:

Chapter 6. Endogenous Growth I: AK, H, and G

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics. Ph. D. Comprehensive Examination: Macroeconomics Fall, 2016

Dynamic Contracts. Prof. Lutz Hendricks. December 5, Econ720

A 2 period dynamic general equilibrium model

Notes on Macroeconomic Theory II

(Incomplete) summary of the course

1 Continuous Time Optimization

Midterm Exam. Monday, March hour, 30 minutes. Name:

Linear Capital Taxation and Tax Smoothing

Lecture Notes. Macroeconomics - ECON 510a, Fall 2010, Yale University. Fiscal Policy. Ramsey Taxation. Guillermo Ordoñez Yale University

Final Exam II (Solutions) ECON 4310, Fall 2014

Government debt. Lecture 9, ECON Tord Krogh. September 10, Tord Krogh () ECON 4310 September 10, / 55

Advanced Macroeconomics Tutorial #2: Solutions

Optimal Credit Market Policy. CEF 2018, Milan

ECOM 009 Macroeconomics B. Lecture 7

Topic 4. Introducing investment (and saving) decisions

Problem set Fall 2012.

Principles of Optimal Taxation

AK and reduced-form AK models. Consumption taxation.

SDP Macroeconomics Final exam, 2014 Professor Ricardo Reis

Lastrapes Fall y t = ỹ + a 1 (p t p t ) y t = d 0 + d 1 (m t p t ).

Econ 3029 Advanced Macro. Lecture 2: The Liquidity Trap

Part II Money and Public Finance Lecture 7 Selected Issues from a Positive Perspective

Final Exam II ECON 4310, Fall 2014

Problem set 5. Asset pricing. Markus Roth. Chair for Macroeconomics Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz. Juli 5, 2010

Eco504 Fall 2010 C. Sims CAPITAL TAXES

1 Dynamic programming

1 Two Period Exchange Economy

Lecture 1: Lucas Model and Asset Pricing

Macroeconomic Implications of Size-Dependent Policies

In the Name of God. Macroeconomics. Sharif University of Technology Problem Bank

Problem set 1 ECON 4330

1 No capital mobility

Public budget accounting and seigniorage. 1. Public budget accounting, inflation and debt. 2. Equilibrium seigniorage

A Model of a Vehicle Currency with Fixed Costs of Trading

Equilibrium with Production and Endogenous Labor Supply

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics. Ph. D. Comprehensive Examination: Macroeconomics Spring, 2016

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Imperfect Information and Market Segmentation Walsh Chapter 5

1. Cash-in-Advance models a. Basic model under certainty b. Extended model in stochastic case. recommended)

Linear Capital Taxation and Tax Smoothing

Slides III - Complete Markets

The science of monetary policy

Final Exam (Solutions) ECON 4310, Fall 2014

Inflation and Unemployment

Macroeconomics. Lecture 5: Consumption. Hernán D. Seoane. Spring, 2016 MEDEG, UC3M UC3M

An Entrepreneur s Problem Under Perfect Foresight

ECON 6022B Problem Set 2 Suggested Solutions Fall 2011

Topic 7. Nominal rigidities

Intertemporal choice: Consumption and Savings

Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm Questions and Answers Econ 8712

Suggested Solutions to Homework #5 Econ 511b (Part I), Spring 2004

A MODEL OF SECULAR STAGNATION

Ramsey Asset Taxation Under Asymmetric Information

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ECONOMICS NOTE 8b

Macro (8701) & Micro (8703) option

AK and reduced-form AK models. Consumption taxation. Distributive politics

Dynamic Macroeconomics: Problem Set 2

Economics 8106 Macroeconomic Theory Recitation 2

GOVERNMENT AND FISCAL POLICY IN JUNE 16, 2010 THE CONSUMPTION-SAVINGS MODEL (CONTINUED) ADYNAMIC MODEL OF THE GOVERNMENT

Growth Theory: Review

Dynamic Macroeconomics

The Real Business Cycle Model

Growth and Distributional Effects of Inflation with Progressive Taxation

ECON 4325 Monetary Policy and Business Fluctuations

Topic 2: Consumption

Inflation & Welfare 1

The Joint and Several Effects of Liquidity Constraints, Financing Constraints, and Financial Intermediation on the Welfare Cost of Inflation

Theory of Fixed Investment and Employment Dynamics

14.05 Lecture Notes. Endogenous Growth

Master 2 Macro I. Lecture 3 : The Ramsey Growth Model

Graduate Macro Theory II: Fiscal Policy in the RBC Model

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics. Ph. D. Preliminary Examination: Macroeconomics Fall, 2009

Open Economy Macroeconomics: Theory, methods and applications

ECON385: A note on the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH). In this note, we will try to understand the permanent income hypothesis (PIH).

Final Exam Solutions

GMM Estimation. 1 Introduction. 2 Consumption-CAPM

I. The Solow model. Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. September 2015

Transcription:

Cash-in-Advance Model Prof. Lutz Hendricks Econ720 September 19, 2017 1 / 35

Cash-in-advance Models We study a second model of money. Models where money is a bubble (such as the OLG model we studied) have 2 shortcomings: 1. They fail to explain rate of return dominance. 2. Money has no transaction value. CIA models focus on transactions demand for money. 2 / 35

Environment Demographics: a representative household of mass 1 no firms; households operate the technology Preferences: t=1 β t u(c t ) Endowments at t = 1: m d t 1 units of money; k 1 units of the good Technologies: f (k t ) + (1 δ)k t = c t + k t+1 3 / 35

Environment Transactions technology requires that some goods are purchased with money. m t /p t c t + k t+1 (1 δ)k t Government costlessly prints τ t units of money and hands it to households (lump-sum) Markets: goods: price p t money: price 1 4 / 35

Household: Budget constraint The household enters the period with k t and m d t 1. He receives money transfer τ t and now holds m t = m d t 1 + τ t He produces output and buys consumption. Savings are taken into the next period in the form of capital and money k t+1 + c t + m d t /p t = f (k t ) + (1 δ)k t + m t /p t Note that money earned in period t cannot be used until t + 1. 5 / 35

Household problem We simply add one constraint to the household problem: the CIA constraint. The household solves subject to the budget constraint max t=1 β t u(c t ) and the CIA constraint k t+1 + c t + m d t /p t = f (k t ) + (1 δ)k t + m t /p t and the law of motion m t /p t c t + k t+1 (1 δ)k t m t+1 = m d t + τ t+1 6 / 35

Household problem Remarks Exactly what kinds of goods have to be bought with cash is arbitrary. The CIA constraint holds with equality if the rate of return on money is less than that on capital (the nominal interest rate is positive). 7 / 35

Houshold: Dynamic Program Individual state variables: m, k. Bellman equation: V(m,k) = maxu(c) + βv(m,k ) +λ(bc) + γ(cia) We need to impose m t = m d t 1 + τ t Then we can use m t+1 as a control (this would not work under uncertainty). 8 / 35

Bellman Equation V(m,k) = maxu(c) + βv(m,k ) +λ[f (k) + (1 δ)k + m/p c k (m τ )/p] +γ[m/p c k + (1 δ)k] λ > 0 : multiplier on budget constraint γ : multiplier on CIA constraint - could be 0. 9 / 35

First-order conditions u (c) = λ + γ βv m ( ) = λ/p βv k ( ) = λ + γ Envelope conditions: V m = (λ + γ)/p V k = λ[f (k) + 1 δ] + γ[1 δ] 10 / 35

Simplify Simplify (eliminate V s and λ +γ s): u (c)/β = λ f (k ) + [1 δ]u ( c ) βu (c )p/p = λ u (c) = λ + γ Kuhn Tucker: γ[m/p c k + (1 δ)k] = 0 γ 0 11 / 35

Household: Solution A solution to the household problem: {c t,m t+1,k t+1,λ t,γ t } that solve 1. 3 FOCs 2. budget constraint 3. either CIA constraint or γ = 0 4. transversality conditions lim u (c t ) k t t = 0 lim u (c t ) m t /p t t = 0 12 / 35

Household: CIA does not bind With γ = 0: βλ /p = λ/p λ/β = λ [f (k ) + 1 δ] u (c) = λ Standard Euler equation: u (c) = βu ( c ) [ f ( k ) + 1 δ ] (1) "No arbitrage" condition: f ( k ) + 1 δ = p/p (2) 13 / 35

When does the CIA constraint bind? No arbitrage: 1 + i = (1 + r)(1 + π) = [f (k) + 1 δ] p /p = 1 The CIA constraint binds unless the return on money equals that on capital i.e. the nominal interest rate is zero. Holding money has no opportunity cost. The presence of money does not distort the intertemporal allocation. We have the standard Euler equation. 14 / 35

Household solution Sequences {c t,m t,k t } that satisfy 1. Euler equation 2. budget constraint 3. no arbitrage Plus boundary conditions 15 / 35

Binding CIA constraint Euler equation: u (c) = β 2 u (c )(p /p )f (k ) + (1 δ)βu (c ) (3) Today: Give up dc = ε. Tomorrow: dk = ε. Eat the undepreciated capital: dc = (1 δ)ε. Produce additional output f (k )ε. Save it as money: dm = f (k )ε p. The day after: Eat an additional dm /p. 16 / 35

Household Problem Why isn t there a simple Euler equation for the perturbation: 1. dc = ε. dm = pε. 2. dc = ε p/p. The Euler equation for this perturbation is: u (c) = λ + γ = βu ( c ) p/p + γ 17 / 35

Household Solution Sequences {c t,m t,k t } that satisfy: 1. Euler equation 2. budget constraint 3. CIA constraint Plus boundary conditions 18 / 35

Equilibrium 19 / 35

Government The government s only role is to hand out lump-sum transfers of money. The money growth rule is τ t = g m t 1 g > 0 is a parameter Money holdings in period t are m t = m t 1 + τ t = (1 + g)m t 1 20 / 35

Market clearing Goods: c + k = f (k) + (1 δ)k. Money market: implicit in notation 21 / 35

Equilibrium An equilibrium is a sequence that satisfies 22 / 35

Steady State

Steady State: CIA does not bind f (k) + 1 δ = (1 + g) 1 (4) = 1/β (5) f (k) δk = c (6) Result: A steady state only exists if β = 1 + g. Intuition: Then: The steady state coincides with the (Pareto optimal) non-monetary economy. 24 / 35

Binding CIA constraint In steady state all real, per capita variables are constant (c,k,m/p). This requires π = g to hold real money balances constant. The Euler equation implies 1 = β 2 (1 + π) 1 f (k ) + (1 δ)β Using 1 + π = 1 + g this can be solved for the capital stock: f (k ss ) = (1 + g)[1 β(1 δ)]/β 2 (7) 25 / 35

When does CIA constraint bind? Steady state return on money: (1 + g) 1 If (1 + g) = β: return on money equals return on capital (equals discount factor) CIA does not bind Higher g reduces k ss and increases return on capital Therefore: CIA binds when (1 + g) > β 26 / 35

Properties: Binding CIA CIA implies: f (k) = m/p (8) Goods market clearing with constant k implies c = f (k) δk (9) A steady state is a vector (c,k,m/p) that satisfies (7) through (9). 27 / 35

Properties: Binding CIA Definition Money is called neutral if changing the level of M does not affect the real allocation. It is called super neutral if changing the growth rate of M does not affect the real allocation. Money is not super neutral Higher inflation (g) implies a lower k. Inflation increases the cost of holding money, which is required for investment (inflation tax). 28 / 35

Properties: Binding CIA Exercise: Show that super-neutrality would be restored, if the CIA constraint applied only to consumption (m/p c). What is the intuition for this finding? 29 / 35

Properties: Binding CIA The velocity of money is one Higher inflation reduces money demand only be reducing output. This is a direct consequence of the rigid CIA constraint and probably an undesirable result. Obviously, this would not be a good model of hyperinflation. This limitation can be avoided by changing the transactions technology (see RQ). 30 / 35

What if (1 + g) < β There is no steady state with 1 + g < β The reason: money would offer a rate of return above the discount rate the household would choose unbounded consumption. Cf. the Euler equation u (c) = βr u ( c ) (10) with R = (1 + g) 1 for holding money. What would the equilibrium look like? 31 / 35

Optimal Monetary Policy The Friedman rule maximizes steady state welfare. Friedman Rule: Set nominal interest rate to 0. Proof: Under the Friedman rule, the steady state conditions of the CE coincides with the non-monetary economy s. Intuition: It is optimal to make holding money costless b/c money can be costlessly produced. This requires that the rate of return on money 1 1+π equal that on capital. 32 / 35

Is this a good theory of money? Recall the central questions of monetary theory: 1. Why do people hold money, an asset that does not pay interest (rate of return dominance)? 2. Why is money valued in equilibrium? 3. What are the effects of monetary policy: one time increases in the money supply or changes in the money growth rate? 33 / 35

Is this a good theory of money? Positive features: 1. Rate of return dominance. 2. Money plays a liquidity role. Drawbacks: 1. The reason why money is needed for transactions is not modeled. 2. The form of the CIA constraint is arbitrary (and important for the results). 3. The velocity of money is fixed. 34 / 35

Reading Blanchard & Fischer (1989), 4.2. 35 / 35