Otaviano Canuto Vice President & Head of Network Poverty Reduction and Economic Management The World Bank The 11th International Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development April 6-8, 2010 Moscow
Main Messages Aggressive counter-cyclical policies minimized the impact of the crisis on the Brazilian economy The use of foreign reserves, monetary, fiscal and quasifiscal policies was made possible because of policy space previously acquired Looking forward, a main challenge will be to increase the role of knowledge in competitiveness Poverty reduction may help growth by strenghtening domestic demand as a growth driver 2
Brazil: From Decoupling to Derailing to Decoupling again? Mechanisms of Transmission of the Crisis Weak global demand and lower prices of exports The Systemic Sudden Stop and foreign capital flows Effects on exchange rates Lines of Defense Uses of international reserves Easing of monetary policy Uses of fiscal and para-fiscal policies 3
The Brazilian Economy seemed to be decoupling at high speed until it came to a sudden stop Domestic Demand and Supply GDP growth IIIQ08 Source: IBGE Source: Itau (presentation by Tomas Malaga) 4
Trade, Credit Sudden Stop and Inventory Adjustments were the main channels of transmission Industrial Production, Retail Sales and Exports (index: September 2008=100) 110 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 5 Source: IBGE, Secex e Funcex. Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 100 80.6 104.4 96.8 Industrial Production 92.4 69.6 Retail Sales Exports of Manufactured goods 82.5 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09
Back to the long-term growth path Real GDP Source: JPMorgan, GDW 03/12/10 6
Unemployment Rate Dropped despite the initial shock from 9.3% in Jan 07 to 7.2% in Jan 10 and Wages Increased Average unemployment rate (%) - IBGE REAL WAGES - Average for the last 12 months R$ Billion 30 29.56 29 29.36 2007 9.3 28 27 26.68 28.66 26 8.2 2009 2008 8.0 2010 7.2 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 6.8 25 24 23 22 21 Aug-04 21.93 Dec-04 Apr-05 Aug-05 Dec-05 23.61 Apr-06 Aug-06 Dec-06 25.13 Apr-07 Aug-07 Dec-07 Apr-08 Aug-08 Source: IBGE Dec-08 Apr-09 Aug-09 Dec-09 Source: IBGE 7
Investments strongly rebounding Domestic-led Sectors Have Already Recovered Investment in Industry Forecast of Investment Ratio 2009-2012 (% of GDP) US$ billion Sectors Growth 2005-2008 2010-2013 Oil and Gas 112 171 8.8 22.0 21.0 20.0 Forecast 20.2 21.2 Mining 29 25 (3.1) Steel 15 20 5.7 Petrochemical 5 17 28.9 19.0 18.0 17.6 19.0 18.6 Vehicles 12 17 7.3 17.0 16.4 16.9 Electronics 8 12 6.7 16.0 Pulp & Paper 10 10 0.5 Industry 191 271 7.3 15.0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Source: BNDES 8
Crisis Response (1): Injection of Liquidity in Foreign Currency Market o Sales of USD in spot market; o Sales of USD in repurchase agreement auctions; o Reduction of reserve requirements for banks acquiring USD with repurchase agreement; o Sales of USD swap contracts; o Export financing; o Authorization for BCB to engage in currency swap transactions with other central banks (US$ 30 billion swap line with Federal Reserve); o Loans to rollover external debt of Brazilian companies. 9
Crisis Response (2) Injection of Liquidity in Domestic Credit Market o Reduction in reserve requirements o Incentives for banks (including public banks) and the deposit insurance fund (FGC) to acquire portfolios of small and medium size banks o Increase of funding to BNDES (Development Bank) and rural credit; o Guarantees for Certificates of Bank Deposits issues by small and medium size banks 10
Interventions by the Central Bank in the FX Market and International Reserves 11
Credit/GDP Ratio Grew Even After the Shock Evolution of Credit/GPD ratio (%) 50 Source: Brazilian Central Bank 45 45.0 44.6 41.3 40 35 34.2 30 28.1 30.2 25 22.0 24.0 24.5 20 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 12 *Up to January
State-owned Banks Sustained Credit after the Crisis Credit Growth (Index: Sept. 2008 = 100) Contribution to Credit Growth (Sept. 08-Jan 10) 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 Sep-08 100 Nov-08 109.0 Public Banks Private Banks 102.6 Jan-09 113.9 102.9 118.3 121.2 102.4 Mar-09 May-09 103.3 132.9 103.2 Jul-09 Sep-09 150.1 141.2 144.6 138.8 109.5 106.9 105.6 Nov-09 Jan-10 Other Stateowned Banks 36% BNDES 37% Private Banks 27% Source: Bacen BNDES alone was responsible for 37% of the increase in credit from Sept 08 to Jan 10 13
Crisis Response (3): Fiscal Policy (with low impact on public debt) 120.0 110.0 100.0 Public Sector Net Debt (%GDP) 101.3 Forecast 117.0 Italy 115.0 Japan 90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 56.9 80.4 76.2 Germany 75.1 UK 72.9 France 66.8 US 50.0 40.0 30.0 54.1 43.9 42.3 43.4 42.0 Brazil 38.3 38.8 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Source: IMF and Brazilian Central Bank. 14
Brazil s Growth Drivers Brazil as a natural resource-rich economy Role of knowledge in economic competitiveness and the structure of global trade Business environment, renewable energy, and modern agriculture as Brazil s economic strengths Domestic demand as an important growth driver 15
1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 Developing Countries in the Global Economy: Is There a Trend Decoupling? 10.0 8.0 6.0 World Output Growth (%) 1961-2011 Advanced Developing Countries 4.0 2.0 0.0-2.0-4.0-6.0 Real GDP Growth. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators and staff estimates and forecasts. 16
Frequency Unexpected Growth Resilience in Developing Countries not just China and India 40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% Frequency Distribution of GDP Growth in 2009 - Developed and Developing High Income countries (38). Median growth: -3%. Developing countries (113). Median growth: 1.3%. 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% -5.0% < -6% -6 to -4-4 to -2-2 to 0 0 to 2 2 to 4 4 to 6 > 6% GDP Growth in 2009 (%) Source: World Bank DEC Prospects Group 17
Brazil and Russia s Export Structure, 2008 Brazil s Exports by aggregated factor Semimanuf actured products 14% Special operations 2% Primary products 37% Russia s principal exports (share of total) Machinery, equipment and transport means 5% Other 6% Manufactured products 47% Metals, precious stones 13% Brazil s exports -main products (26% of total exports) Airplanes 3% Meat 3% Iron ore and concentrates 8% Chemicals 6% Source: Federal State Statistics Service, Russia Mineral products 70% Soybeans 6% Source: MDIC/Secex Petroleum oils, crude 7% 18
Global Trends in Commodity Prices 120 Crude Oil Price: 1900-2011 (constant 2008 $/bbl) Forecasts 100 80 60 40 20 0 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Source: Through 1900-2009: BP Statistical Review of World Energy and through 2010-2011: World Bank estimates 19
Increasing Role of Knowledge in Competitiveness and the Structure of Global Trade Knowledge-based economies grow faster Differences between Brazil and the Republic of Korea, 1956 90 Product diversification, adding value to commodities, and improving competitiveness in manufacturing and service exports are pivotal for Brazil s global competitiveness and long-term growth 20
Brazil: Current-account Balance 21
Competitiveness in Business Environment Brazil s competitive advantage in business environment, incl. sophistication of firms production processes, capacity for innovation, and marketing and consumer orientation Global Competitiveness Index of 134 countries: Innovation and sophistication factors 2008 2009: Brazil and selected comparators 22
Competitiveness in Renewable Energy Brazil s potential to create opportunities for energy- and water-intensive industries 23
Competitiveness in Modern Agriculture Successful application of innovation by investing in agricultural R&D (increase in wheat and soy productivity that helped boost exports) and personnel education Genetic improvement and more efficient production systems contributed to a revolution in the production of meat in Brazil Strong performance in agro-energy Annual growth rate of productivity 24
Brazil s Long-term Challenges Resume and strengthen long-term planning (energy, logistics, environment, IT infrastructure,...) Promote and stimulate domestic savings in order to provide long-term funds for investment (banks and capital market) Develop capacity for innovation and competitiveness in manufacturing, and promote global presence of Brazilian companies (vs. significant challenges due to exchange rate appreciation Dutch Disease) Increase opportunities for social mobility (job expansion, development/improvement in education) and reduction of the inequality in income distribution Promote innovation and development of renewable energy sources. 25
Concluding Remarks this crisis has returned fiscal policy to center stage as a macroeconomic stabilization tool. most of the pre-crisis consensus on macroeconomic policy still holds, but the crisis has shown that policy makers should adopt a broader macro-prudential view of the financial sector. the social impact of a sharp slowdown in GDP during the crisis in emerging countries was transmitted mainly through lower employment and wages, hence the importance of targeted social safety nets and automatic stabilizers. the post-crisis world will likely require countries to do more to improve their investment climates. in Russia, as elsewhere the crisis has provided an opportunity for reform and impetus to rethink and accelerate public sector, financial sector, and diversification reforms; it is important to see to it that the opportunity is not wasted in the complacency and return to business-as-usual after the crisis 26