Respondent s retirement fund, and once she retired she began receiving retirement

Similar documents
2014 CO 31. No. 12SC911, Western Logistics, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office Colorado Employment Security Act Employment Law.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE June 28, 2010

2013 CO 33. The supreme court holds that under section , C.R.S., 2012, an LLC s members

Petitioner USAA Casualty Insurance Company seeks review of a. court of appeals decision that its automobile policy is ambiguous

2017 CO 104. No. 16SC51, OXY USA Inc. v. Mesa County Board of Commissioners Taxation Abatement Overvaluation

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Division of Unemployment Insurance, Benefit Payment Control,

2018 CO 42. No. 15SC934, Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barriga Unreasonable Delay and Denial of Insurance Benefits Damages.

2017 CO 11. No. 16SC283, Youngquist v. Miner Workers Compensation Personal Jurisdiction Specific Jurisdiction.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

No. 07SA50, In re Stephen Compton v. Safeway, Inc. - Motion to compel discovery - Insurance claim investigation - Self-insured corporation

ORDER AFFIRMED. Division VI Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE Loeb and Lichtenstein, JJ., concur. Announced November 25, 2009

2013 CO 10. No. 10SC709, Yale v. AC Excavating, Inc. Construction Mechanics Liens Statutory Trusts

2018 CO 11. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act ( ERISA ) allows plaintiffs to

Wayne W. Williams, in his official capacity as the Colorado Secretary of State; Colorado Department of State; and the State of Colorado,

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. Division IV Opinion by JUDGE CONNELLY Webb and Terry, JJ., concur. Announced February 18, 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. SC THIRD DISTRICT CASE NO. 3D COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CENTER, INC., a/a/o ERLA TELUSNOR,

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF COLORADO 101 West Colfax Ave., Suite 800 Denver, Colorado 80202

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. Division I Opinion by JUDGE KAPELKE* Taubman and Bernard, JJ., concur. Announced February 3, 2011

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT RULED THAT SEVERANCE PAYMENTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO FICA TAXES

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY. Submitted: May 14, 2012 Decided: July 23, 2012

2016 Colorado Case Law Update

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

Court of Appeals No.: 05CA1774 Colorado State Board of Assessment Appeals Nos & 44023

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM. PACITA AGUON, individually, and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Petitioner-Appellant,

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

2018 CO 76. No. 17SC241, Lewis v. Taylor Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act Ponzi Schemes Reasonably Equivalent Value.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A K & R Landholdings, LLC, d/b/a High Banks Resort, Appellant, vs. Auto-Owners Insurance, Respondent.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

386 October 25, 2017 No. 507 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA. v. CASE NO. SC ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals. Kimberly M. Morrow, Respondent,

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

Appellant, Lower Court Case No.: CC O

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Does a Taxpayer Have the Burden of Showing Intent to Divert Corporate Funds as Return of Capital?

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2012 COA 78

OPINION. FILED July 9, 2015 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N SUPREME COURT. JAMES GARDNER and SUSAN GARDNER, Petitioners-Appellants, v No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No ALTRUA HEALTHSHARE, INC., ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON JURISDICTION

v No Court of Claims v No Court of Claims v No Court of Claims

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS. Colorado Union of Taxpayers Foundation, a Colorado non-profit corporation,

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2012 COA 160. Kyle W. Larson Enterprises, Inc., Roofing Experts, d/b/a The Roofing Experts,

Pegram v. Herdrich, 90 days later By Jeffrey Isaac Ehrlich

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT. No Non-Argument Calendar. D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv GRJ.

2016 CO 18. No. 14SC931, Klingsheim v. Cordell Tax Liens Tax Sales Diligent Inquiry.

Leamington Co., petitioner, Appellant, vs. Nonprofits' Ins. Association, an Interinsurance C STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT

Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No V UNREPORTED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

2017 CO 101. This attorney disciplinary proceeding requires the supreme court to determine

I. Introduction. Appeals this year was Fisher v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 2015 COA

No. 10SC77 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reyher: Class Actions Class Certification Burden of Proof Colorado Automobile Accident Reparations Act.

Powers Electric, Inc. and Gary J. Powers, d/b/a Powers Electric, Inc., JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Hemphill v. Department of Revenue, Thurston County Superior Court Cause No Washington Estate Tax

2018COA19. No. 17CA0322, Montoya v. ICAO Labor and Industry Workers Compensation Temporary Partial Disability

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

In this original proceeding, the Colorado Supreme Court. affirms the trial court s order compelling arbitration of an

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals Cases

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE. APPEAL OF WILLIAM STEWART (New Hampshire Department of Employment Security)

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS COUNTY OF LENOIR 11 DST ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

ARIZONA TAX COURT TX /19/2006 HONORABLE MARK W. ARMSTRONG

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Philip Dix v. Total Petrochemicals USA Inc Pension Plan

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

The supreme court reverses the judgment of the court of. appeals and holds that statewide voter approval is not required

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE NO.: SC SERVICE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, vs. OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION AND

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA. CASE NO. SC d DCA CASE NO. 3D05-951

2018COA174. Defendants-Appellants assert that the 2015 foreclosure and. the resulting judgment of possession cannot be legally enforced

District Court, Adams County, State of Colorado. Adams County Justice Center 1100 Judicial Center Drive Brighton, Colorado (303)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, KELLY and O BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

v No Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 USC 1001 et seq., precludes a

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2014 COA 101

2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

2018COA56. No. 17CA0098, Peña v. American Family Insurance Motor Vehicles Uninsured/Underinsured

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT JANUARY TERM v. Case No. 5D CORRECTED

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

In the Supreme Court of Florida

S17G1256. NEW CINGULAR WIRELESS PCS, LLC et al. v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE et al.

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

THOMAS M. STONE OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON v. Record No December 16, 1996

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

2016 CO 22. Travelers petitioned for review of the court of appeals judgment affirming the

Commonwealth Of Kentucky. Court of Appeals

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2013 COA 43

Commonwealth Of Kentucky. Court of Appeals

SLIP OPINION NO OHIO-1481 BUREAU OF WORKERS COMPENSATION, APPELLANT,

CASE NO. 1D Kimberly J. Fernandes of Kelley Kronenberg, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellants.

2016 CO 60M. The supreme court holds that, to exercise personal jurisdiction over a

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT. NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY & others 1. vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE.

Transcription:

Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court are available to the public and can be accessed through the Court s homepage at http://www.courts.state.co.us Opinions are also posted on the Colorado Bar Association homepage at www.cobar.org ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE July 1, 2013 2013 CO 52 No. 12SC49, Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Colorado Department of Labor and Employment and Kathleen A. Hopkins [Unemployment Benefits Retirement Contributions Offset Provision] Respondent worked for the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment for a number of years, and then retired. The Department made contributions to Respondent s retirement fund, and once she retired she began receiving retirement payments from that fund. When she was involuntarily separated from her job with the Department during a second period of employment, she applied for and was awarded unemployment benefits. Respondent s benefits were discontinued when a panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office reasoned that Respondent was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits under section 8-73-110(3)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. (2012) (the offset provision ), which provides that an individual s weekly benefit amount shall be reduced (but not below zero) by... [t]he prorated weekly amount of a pension, retirement or retired pay, or annuity that has been contributed to by a base period employer. (Emphasis added.) The court of appeals reversed. It held that the offset provision applies only when the employer has contributed to the claimant s retirement fund during the base period employment that made her eligible for unemployment benefits. See Hopkins v. Indus.

Claim Appeals Office & Colo. Dept. of Labor & Emp., No. 11CA0239, slip op. at 6 (Colo. App. Dec. 22, 2011). The supreme court reverses the judgment of the court of appeals. The offset provision applies when a claimant is receiving payments from a retirement fund that has been contributed to by a base period employer. In contrast to the definition of employer, which specifically includes a time frame during which the employing unit must pay wages, and in contrast to the definition of base period, which describes the time frame for determining eligibility for benefits, the offset provision contains no temporal limitation. Therefore, it applies any time the employer has contributed to the retirement fund from which the claimant is receiving payments, regardless of when the contributions were made. Accordingly, the supreme court holds that Respondent s unemployment benefits can be offset by the retirement benefits she is receiving from a base period employer. 2

Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14 th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 2013 CO 52 Supreme Court Case No. 12SC49 Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 11CA239 Petitioner: Industrial Claim Appeals Office, v. Respondents: Colorado Department of Labor and Employment and Kathleen A. Hopkins. Judgment Reversed en banc July 1, 2013 Attorneys for Petitioner: John Suthers, Attorney General Tricia A. Leakey, Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Respondent Kathleen A. Hopkins: University of Denver Student Law Office Raja Raghunath Kate Miller, Student Attorney Kathryn Thomas, Student Attorney Collin Zundel, Student Attorney Denver, Colorado No appearance by or on behalf of Colorado Department of Labor and Employment JUSTICE EID delivered the Opinion of the Court.

1 Kathleen Hopkins ( Hopkins ) worked for the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment (the Department ) for a number of years, and then retired. During her period of employment, the Department made contributions to her retirement fund, and once she retired, she began receiving retirement payments from that fund. Later, she went to work for the Department again. When she was involuntarily separated from her job with the Department during this second period of employment, she applied for and was awarded unemployment benefits. Eventually, Hopkins unemployment benefits were discontinued and she was issued a notice of overpayment. She appealed the notice and a hearing officer restored her benefits. 2 The Department appealed, and a panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office ( ICAO ) reversed the hearing officer s decision. It reasoned that Hopkins was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits under section 8-73-110(3)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. (2012) (the offset provision ), which states that an individual s weekly benefit amount shall be reduced (but not below zero) by... [t]he prorated weekly amount of a pension, retirement or retired pay, or annuity that has been contributed to by a base period employer. (Emphasis added). The ICAO concluded that the offset provision applied because the Department had contributed to her retirement fund during the previous period of employment, and the retirement payments she was receiving from that fund exceeded her weekly unemployment benefit amount. 3 Hopkins appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. It held that the offset provision applies only when the employer has contributed to the claimant s retirement fund during the base period of employment that made her eligible for unemployment 2

benefits. See Hopkins v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office & Colo. Dept. of Labor & Emp., No. 11CA0239, slip op. at 6 (Colo. App. Dec. 22, 2011). 4 We granted certiorari and now reverse. The offset provision of section 8-73-110(3)(a)(I)(B), which applies when a claimant is receiving payments from a retirement fund that has been contributed to by a base period employer, contains no temporal limitation. Therefore, it applies any time the employer has contributed to the retirement fund from which the claimant is receiving payments, regardless of when the contributions were made. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. 5 Hopkins worked for the Department from June 1986 until she retired on July 31, 2001. During this time, the Department made contributions to her retirement fund. In August 2001, Hopkins began receiving a monthly retirement distribution of $3,000.00. She began working for the Department again from April 2009 to August 2009. During this time, neither the Department nor Hopkins contributed to a retirement fund for her. After her employment terminated, Hopkins filed a claim for and was awarded unemployment benefits of $443.00 per week. At the time she was also receiving roughly $580.00 per week from her retirement fund. After some time, Hopkins unemployment benefits were discontinued and she was issued a notice of overpayment. She appealed the notice and a hearing officer found that because the Department had not made payments to Hopkins retirement fund during the base period of employment, her unemployment benefits could not be reduced under the offset provision. 3

6 The Department filed an appeal. Upon review, the ICAO reversed the hearing officer s decision. The ICAO held that Hopkins unemployment benefits had to be reduced because she was receiving payments from a retirement fund to which the Department had contributed prior to her base period of employment. It noted that the purpose of the offset provision was to avoid double-dipping by retirees who are receiving both retirement distributions and unemployment benefits. 7 Hopkins appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals held that in order for the offset provision to apply, an employer must contribute to an employee s retirement plan during the base period of employment. We granted certiorari 1 and now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. II. 8 The offset provision of section 8-73-110(3)(a)(I)(B) states that an individual s weekly benefit amount shall be reduced (but not below zero) by... [t]he prorated weekly amount of a pension, retirement or retired pay, or annuity that has been contributed to by a base period employer. (Emphasis added). The court of appeals held that the offset provision is limited to cases where the employer has contributed to the retirement fund during the base period of employment. We disagree. Because the offset provision contains no temporal limitation, it applies any time the employer has 1 We granted certiorari on the following issue: Whether under section 8-73-110(3)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2012), a claimant s weekly unemployment benefits must be reduced when she is also receiving a pension, retirement or retired pay, or annuity that has been contributed to at any time by a base period employer. 4

contributed to the retirement fund from which the claimant is receiving payments, regardless of when the contributions were made. 9 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Clyncke v. Waneka, 157 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Colo. 2007). This case involves the intersection of several statutory definitions. An employer is defined as [a]ny employing unit that... [p]aid wages of one thousand five hundred dollars or more during any calendar quarter in the calendar year or the preceding calendar year. 8-70-113(a)(II)(A), C.R.S. (2012). Base period is defined as the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of the individual s benefit year. 8-70-103(2), C.R.S. (2012). The base period is the period used to determine eligibility for unemployment benefits. 8-73-102, C.R.S. (2012). A base period employer, then, is an employer that has paid wages to the claimant during the relevant eligibility period. Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 891 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983). 10 In this case, no one disputes that the Department is a base period employer because it paid wages to Hopkins during the relevant period that made her eligible for unemployment benefits. The only question is whether the offset provision is similarly limited only to cases in which the base period employer has made retirement contributions during the relevant period. We conclude that it is not. 11 Section 8-73-110(3)(a)(I)(B) states that an offset shall be made when the claimant is receiving payments from a retirement fund that has been contributed to by a base period employer. The phrase that has been contributed to by a base period employer specifies who has to have made the contributions the base period 5

employer but not when they had to have been made. Indeed, the phrase does not suggest that the contributions had to have been made during any particular time, just that they had to have been made at some time in the past. Therefore, in contrast to the definition of employer, which specifically includes a time frame during which the employing unit must pay wages, and in contrast to the definition of base period, which describes the time frame for determining eligibility for benefits, the offset provision contains no temporal limitation. 12 Hopkins argues that the court of appeals correctly interpreted the phrase contributed to by a base period employer to necessarily refe[r] to the employer s actions during the employee s base period, including pension contributions. Hopkins, No. 11CA0239, slip op. at 6. But this interpretation is contrary to the language of the statute. Under this interpretation, the statute would have been written as applying to any pension contributed to by the base period employer during the base period. But, as noted above, there is no such temporal limitation contained in the offset provision. The phrase base period employer simply identifies which employer contributed to the retirement fund (that is, the one that paid wages to the claimant during the relevant eligibility period); it does not import a temporal limitation into the offset provision. 13 Hopkins also argues that the court of appeals was correct to suggest that the federal counterpart to the offset provision supports finding a temporal limitation in the Colorado offset provision, section 8-73-110(3)(a)(I)(B). Hopkins notes that Colorado s offset provision is patterned after the Federal Unemployment Tax Act ( FUTA ), 26 U.S.C. 3304(a)-(d) (2012), and that, because FUTA does not require unemployment 6

benefits to be offset unless the retirement contributions were made during the base period, the Colorado offset provision should be read in a similar fashion. While it is true that the offset provision is patterned after and [is] complementary to FUTA, see Cericalo v. ICAO, 114 P.3d 100, 102 (Colo. App. 2005), FUTA contains additional language in its offset provision that expressly limits the offset to instances in which retirement contributions have been made during the base period. 26 U.S.C. 3304(a)(15) (limiting offset to instances in which contributions were made after the beginning of the base period ). Because the Colorado offset provision does not contain similar limiting language, we decline to interpret it as if it did. 14 The court of appeals also determined that the interpretation we adopt today leads to the anomalous result in which Hopkins, had she worked for another employer, would not have been subject to the offset provision. Hopkins, No. 11CA0239, slip op. at 8. But there is no anomaly here. The offset provision was meant to prevent double-dipping by retirees who had withdrawn from the work force and were receiving unemployment benefits and pension benefits from the same employer. Redin v. Empire Oldsmobile, Inc., 746 P.2d 52, 54 (Colo. App. 1987). Had Hopkins worked for another employer during the base period, there would have been no double-dipping problem to be addressed, as the base period employer paying unemployment benefits would be different from the entity paying the retirement benefit. 15 Finally, Hopkins, echoing the court of appeals, contends that her interpretation should prevail in order to effectuate the General Assembly s stated intent to award unemployment benefits to claimants who are unemployed through no fault of their 7

own. Hopkins, No. 11CA0239, slip op. at 7. Yet the offset provision plainly expresses the legislature s intent that those benefits be offset when the base period employer has contributed to the claimant s retirement fund. Because the offset provision contains no temporal limitation, we decline Hopkins invitation to read one into the statute. III. 16 For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 8