Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy

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Transcription:

Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy Ben Keys University of Chicago Harris Tomasz Piskorski Columbia Business School and NBER Amit Seru Chicago Booth and NBER Vincent Yao Fannie Mae

Motivation Long-standing debate on real effects of monetary policy Extraordinary recent actions to keep rates low Residential mortgage market believed to play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy Homes and mortgage debt as key household asset and liability Empirical evidence on the impact of lower mortgage rates on households/broader economy fairly limited Data limitations Identification challenges 2

This Paper Provide novel evidence on the impact of lower rates on households and broader economy during the crisis Micro: Household balance sheet and (inferred) consumption Credit card debt, auto financing Regional: Broader economy House prices, durable consumption, employment Speak to policies on mortgage market rules/regulations Significant debate regarding the relative magnitudes Does debt deleveraging limit consumption response? (Agarwal et al. 2012, Mian and Sufi 2013) Mortgage modification programs, programs facilitating refinancing Remove institutional frictions in implementation of policies [HAMP/HARP] since all eligible households receive rate reduction 3

Empirical Challenges Hard to empirically assess impact of lower interest rates Rates endogenous with either borrower characteristics and/or macroeconomic environment Our approach At micro level: Exploit variation in ARM contract types across borrowers to generate variation in rates faced by similar households Similar identification as in Tracy and Wright (2012) and Fuster and Willen (2013) in their studies of impact of rates on default At regional level: Exploit variation in distribution of contract types (ARM share) across similar regions Propensity score approach to make comparisons across regions (also IV approach for robustness) 4

Outline Data Micro Evidence Heterogeneity Regional Analysis Conclusions 5

Micro Data Proprietary data from a secondary market participant Detailed monthly loan-level panel data Mortgage performance data Loan balances, current interest rate, mortgage type, payments, delinquency status, location (zip code), etc. Consumer credit records Credit card balances, auto loans, student loans, credit inquiries, payment status, current credit score (FICO), etc. Records matched using borrower SSN Dataset representative of most U.S. mortgage borrowers More than 350,000 agency borrowers 6

Micro Evidence

Micro Evidence (Summary) Both Papers (Di Maggio et al. 2014 and Keys et al. 2014): Find similar results on key outcome variables Sizeable increase in car spending following rate reduction Larger response among less wealthy (e.g., high CLTV) Consistent with standard models of MPC Significant portion of the stimulus used to repay debt Jointly shows external validity of the estimates Similar relative effects in agency and non-agency data Similar relative effects across various treatment strength Similar results in diff-in-diff setting exploiting variation between ARM contract types as well as in the setting exploiting the timing of reset within the same contract type 8

Rate Resets and Interest Rates Control (7/1) Treatment (5/1) 9

Rate Resets and Mortgage Payments Control (7/1) Treatment (5/1) Mortgage Payments are reduced by $1,500 (on average) in the first year, and by $3,434 over two years 10

Impact on Change in Probability of Auto Financing 0.8% 0.6% +10% relative increase 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% -0.2% -0.4% -0.6% -Q3 -Q2 -Q1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 11

Impact on Revolving Debt Balance Treatment (5/1) Control (7/1) 19% of extra liquidity from lower mortgage payments allocated to revolving (credit card) debt repayment over two years 12

Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity 13

Debt Deleveraging: Liquidity Constrained Top Quartile Credit Utilization Change in Revolving Debt -$1284.9 (321.4) Bottom Quartile Credit Score -$1206.4 (280.7) As % of Mortgage Payment Reduction 70.6% 65.1% Very significant debt repayment (deleveraging) in the bottom quarter of liquidity-constrained borrowers Key target of many interventions MPC often viewed as high in this group But upper bound MPC of 0.35 0.31 Not surprising that marginal dollar allocated to high cost credit card debt (average credit card interest rate +14%) 14

Credit Utilization and CLTV (One Year Out) Auto Financing and Durable Consumption Durable spending sees heterogeneous response High utilization group sees much less increase in auto balance / new cars (especially at 1 year horizon) High CLTV group sees significant increase in balance / new cars 15

Heterogeneity across Wealth/Liquidity Constraints Wealth constrained show: Bigger improvement in mortgage delinquency Significantly larger increase in new auto debt financing Liquidity constrained (with costly debt burden) show: Larger reduction in credit card debt Much less increase in new auto debt financing New evidence of complex interaction across measures of wealth and liquidity constraints Traditional response: Lower-wealth households are more responsive to income shock, but less so if they have a large credit card debt burden 16

Regional Analysis 17

Empirical Strategy Exploit regional variation in share of ARMs Regions with more ARMs more exposed to lower rates Similar to Mian and Sufi (2011) and Agarwal et al. (2012) in the context of Cash-for-clunkers and HAMP programs Ex-ante measure of exposure to interest rate declines Zip code ARM share as of Q2 2007 predicts treatment intensity Construct sample of similar zip codes Matched on observables (FICO, LTV, interest rate, etc.) Similar results in IV framework (using all zips w/state FEs) Investigate impact on economic outcomes Difference-in-differences methodology Outcomes: mortgage defaults, house prices, durable consumption (autos), and employment 18

Geographic Distribution of ZIP Codes 19

Geographic Distribution of ZIP Codes 20

Summary Statistics High Exposure Zip Codes Low Exposure Zip Codes Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) FICO 714.8 (23.2) 716.0 (18.9) LTV 64.5 (7.29) 68.1 (7.00) Interest Rate 6.64 (0.57) 6.68 (0.48) Mortgage Delinquency Rate 2.81 (3.09) 2.23 (1.83) Unemployment Rate 6.04 (1.55) 5.91 (1.47) Median Income 58.42 (14.13) 52.77 (14.38) Percentage with College Degree 31.4 (10.1) 29.5 (9.42) Percentage Married with Children 21.9 (5.13) 21.6 (5.13) Consumer Credit Score 3.37 (0.41) 3.35 (0.35) ARM Share 35.2 (7.62) 17.3 (4.51) Range in zip code ARM share: 5.8% to 63% 21

2006q2 2006q3 2006q4 2007q1 2007q2 2007q3 2007q4 2008q1 2008q2 2008q3 2008q4 2009q1 2009q2 2009q3 2009q4 2010q1 2010q2 2010q3 2010q4 2011q1 2011q2 2011q3 2011q4 2012q1 2012q2 2012q3 2012q4 Time Series of Interest Rate Indices 8.0 7.5 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 Six Month LIBOR 1yr Treasury 22

2006q2 2006q3 2006q4 2007q1 2007q2 2007q3 2007q4 2008q1 2008q2 2008q3 2008q4 2009q1 2009q2 2009q3 2009q4 2010q1 2010q2 2010q3 2010q4 2011q1 2011q2 2011q3 2011q4 2012q1 2012q2 2012q3 2012q4 Mortgage Rate: High & Low Exposure ZIP Codes 8.0 7.5 7.0 6.5 Control 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 Treatment 4.0 Interpreting size of first stage: - 100% ARM share would lead to a decrease of 175 bp in mortgage rate 23

ZIP ARM Share & Change in Interest Rate ARM Share -0.0198 (0.0005) (1) (2) (3) -0.0176 (0.0006) -0.0174 (0.0008) Zip Code Controls No Yes Yes State FE No No Yes Number of Zip Codes 1000 902 902 R-Squared 0.568 0.759 0.800 Interpreting size of first stage: 100% ARM share would lead to a decrease of 175 bp in the zip code mean mortgage rate 24

Auto Growth: High & Low Exposure ZIP Codes 30% 20% 10% 0% Control -10% -20% Treatment -30% 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 25

ZIP ARM Share & Change in Auto Growth (1) (2) (3) ARM Share 0.085 (0.008) 0.088 (0.013) 0.037 (0.018) Zip Code Controls No Yes Yes State FE No No Yes Number of Zip Codes 1000 902 902 R-Squared 0.089 0.154 0.282 26

County Level Evidence (DiMaggio et al.) Use county-level data on auto sales and within-county changes in ARM share to show relationship between exposure to monetary policy and auto consumption Include county fixed effects, time-varying county-level controls, state-specific time trends Find that a 10 percentage point decline in mortgage payments is associated with a 10% increase in car sales Differences in identifying variation, in specification (levels vs. changes, but robust results across both papers for car sales at zip and county levels based on relative intensity of exposure to declining interest rates 27

2006q2 2006q3 2006q4 2007q1 2007q2 2007q3 2007q4 2008q1 2008q2 2008q3 2008q4 2009q1 2009q2 2009q3 2009q4 2010q1 2010q2 2010q3 2010q4 2011q1 2011q2 2011q3 2011q4 2012q1 2012q2 2012q3 2012q4 HP Growth: High & Low Exposure ZIP Codes 4 3 2 1 0-1 -2-3 -4-5 -6 Control Treatment 28

ZIP ARM Share & Change in HP Growth (1) (2) (3) ARM Share 0.0319 (0.0053) 0.0251 (0.0068) 0.0258 (0.0058) Zip Code Controls No Yes Yes State FE No No Yes Number of Zip Codes 1000 902 902 R-Squared 0.035 0.313 0.497 29

Employment Growth: High & Low Exposure ZIP Codes 3 2 1 0-1 -2-3 -4-5 Control Treatment -6 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 All of the employment response comes from non-tradable sector e.g. restaurants and grocery stores 30

ZIP ARM Share & Change in Employment Growth All Industries (1) All Industries (2) All Industries (3) Restaurant and Groceries (4) Tradable Sector (5) ARM Share -0.0557 (0.0131) -0.0873 (0.0166) -0.00559 (0.0219) 0.00643 (0.0425) 0.0693 (0.304) ARM Share (09-12) 0.0902 (0.0185) 0.0891 (0.0186) 0.0891 (0.0183) 0.0711 (0.0351) -0.0018 (0.253) Zip Code Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes State FE No No Yes Yes Yes Number of Zip Codes 1000 902 902 829 878 R-Squared 0.0999 0.123 0.173 0.0648 0.0555 31

ZIP Code ARM Share & Change in Mortgage Rate (IV 1 st Stage) ARM Share -0.0209 (0.0002) (1) (2) (3) -0.0201 (0.0002) -0.0198 (0.0003) Zip Code Controls No Yes Yes State FE No No Yes Number of Zip Codes 8084 7488 7488 R-Squared 0.571 0.711 0.728 Interpreting size of first stage: 100% ARM share would lead to a decrease of 200 bp in the zip code mean mortgage rate 32

Change in Delinquency, House Price & Auto Sales Growth on ZIP Code Change in Mortgage Rate (IV 2nd Stage) Mortgage Delinquency Growth House Price Growth Auto Sales Growth (1) (3) (4) (6) (7) (9) Mortgage Rate Change 28.93 18.08-0.39-0.79-2.70-1.26 (0.82) (1.31) (0.07) (0.10) (0.15) (0.27) Zip Code Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes State FE No Yes No Yes No Yes Number of Zip Codes 8082 7487 8000 7487 8084 7488 Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.341 0.05 0.429 0.020 0.185 33

Discussion (DiMaggio et al and Keys et al) Low interest rate policies have had meaningful impact on household spending and broader economy Supports view that shocks to household balance sheets important factor affecting employment Will we see reversal when stimulus withdrawn? Partial estimates suggest that 20% relative reduction in average mortgage rates in a region results in: +3.5% increase in the annual house price growth rate +5% increase in the annual auto purchase growth rate +3% increase in the non-tradable employment growth rate Caveats: Cannot quantify overall impact (GE effects) Generic limitation of diff-in-diffs regional analyses 34

Conclusions Household debt deleveraging can significantly limit the ability to simulate household consumption Significant part of stimulus due to lower rates transferred to the banking sector Target polices to alleviate high cost of credit card debt? ARM contracts facilitate quick transmission of low interest rate policy Avoid institutional frictions impacting HARP and HAMP Circumvent inability to refinance E.g. due to negative equity, borrower inertia etc. 35