Preparing for the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB)

Similar documents
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Explanatory note on the minimum capital requirements for market risk

Fundamental Review Trading Books

Fundamental Review of the Trading Book

Expected shortfall s redeeming impact

Subject: NVB reaction to BCBS265 on the Fundamental Review of the trading book 2 nd consultative document

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III counterparty credit risk - Frequently asked questions

Consultative Document on reducing variation in credit risk-weighted assets constraints on the use of internal model approaches

The Basel Committee s December 2009 Proposals on Counterparty Risk

BASEL II & III IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK. Gift Chirozva Chief Bank Examiner Bank Licensing, Supervision & Surveillance Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

Deutsche Bank s response to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision consultative document on the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book.

The Fundamental Review of the Trading Book - Tackling a new approach for market risk

EBF response to the EBA consultation on prudent valuation

Basel III Pillar 3 disclosures

Basel III Pillar 3 disclosures 2014

FINANCIAL SERVICES FLASH REPORT

The Fundamental Review of the Trading Book and Emerging Markets

FRTB: an industry perspective on the IT changes needed October 2015

Fundamental Review of the Trading Book

24 June Dear Sir/Madam

EACB Comments on the Consultative Document of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Fundamental review of the trading book: outstanding issues

Actuary in Banking. 1st Seminar on Finance & Investment 18th May 2018

Pillar 3 Regulatory Disclosure (UK) As at 31 December 2012

FRTB. (fundamental review of the trading book) January kpmg.co.za

Bringing your business closer together

Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms

Minimum capital requirements for market risk

Market Risk Disclosures For the Quarterly Period Ended September 30, 2014

Market Risk Capital Disclosures Report. For the Quarterly Period Ended June 30, 2014

COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. Bank executives are in a difficult position. On the one hand their shareholders require an attractive

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Minimum capital requirements for market risk

Counterparty Credit Risk under Basel III

Razor Risk Market Risk Overview

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

Standardised Risk under Basel 3. Pardha Viswanadha, Product Management Calypso

CONSULTATION DOCUMENT EXPLORATORY CONSULTATION ON THE FINALISATION OF BASEL III

June 20, Japanese Bankers Association

Regulatory Disclosures 30 June 2017

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Frequently asked questions on Basel III monitoring ad hoc exercise

Traded Risk & Regulation

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Frequently asked questions on market risk capital requirements

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

Regulation and Public Policies Basel III End Game

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. High-level summary of Basel III reforms

Responses to the EU Commissions exploratory consultation on the finalisation of Basel III

Regulatory treatment of accounting provisions

Basel III Pillar 3 disclosures

<<General Comments>> 1. Disclosure requirements should be considered once the review of Pillar 1 framework has been finalised.

Basel II to Basel III The Way forward

FS PERSPE PER C SPE TIVES C

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Instructions: Impact study on the proposed frameworks for market risk and CVA risk

Risk e-learning. Modules Overview.

FSRR Hot Topic. CRD 5 FRTB Sizing up the trading book. Stand out for the right reasons Financial Services Risk and Regulation. 1.

CUMULATIVE IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE BASEL REFORM PACKAGE DATA AS OF DECEMBER 2015

Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB)

Capital Management in commercial and investment banking Back to the drawing board? Rolf van den Heever. ABSA Capital

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative document. Guidelines for Computing Capital for Incremental Risk in the Trading Book

Basel III: Comparison of Standardized and Advanced Approaches

Guidelines. on changes to IRBA systems and other borrower-related internal risk measurement systems. 19 December 2008

ICS Consultation Document - Responses to Comments on Asset Concentration & Credit Risks (Sections )

Citigroup Inc. Basel II.5 Market Risk Disclosures As of and For the Period Ended December 31, 2013

Internal Trading Book Models Under Threat

RunnING Risk on GPUs. Answering The Computational Challenges of a New Environment. Tim Wood Market Risk Management Trading - ING Bank

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

Pillar 3 Disclosure (UK)

Market Risk Disclosures For the Quarter Ended March 31, 2013

Basel III Pillar 3 Disclosures Report. For the Quarterly Period Ended December 31, 2015

In various tables, use of - indicates not meaningful or not applicable.

Morgan Stanley International Limited Group

Market Risk and the FRTB (R)-Evolution Review and Open Issues. Verona, 21 gennaio 2015 Michele Bonollo

Traded Risk & Regulation

Disclosure Report. Investec Limited Basel Pillar III semi-annual disclosure report

Synergies and challenges in the implementation of Basel IV regulations

Supervisory Formula Method (SFM) and Significant Risk Transfer (SRT)

Supervisory Views on Bank Economic Capital Systems: What are Regulators Looking For?

BERMUDA MONETARY AUTHORITY

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Consultative Document. Revisions to the minimum capital requirements for market risk

Public consultation on the Capital Requirements Directive ('CRD IV')

Basel II: Application requirements for New Zealand banks seeking accreditation to implement the Basel II internal models approaches from January 2008

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Frequently asked questions on Basel III monitoring ad hoc exercise

Comparative analysis of the Regulatory Capital calculation across major European jurisdictions. April 2013

Assessing the modelling impacts of addressing Pillar 1 Ciclycality

The market risk framework

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Frequently asked questions on Basel III monitoring

The Different Guises of CVA. December SOLUM FINANCIAL financial.com

Basel II Pillar 3 disclosures

Regulatory Disclosures 30 June 2017

Research Paper Series. aaaaa. The Effects of FRTB in the CVA Risk Framework. Gianbattista Aresi Luca Olivo

The International Swaps and Derivatives Association ( ISDA ), and. The Association of Financial Markets in Europe ( AFME )

Basel II and Financial Stability: Singapore s Experience

IRC / stressed VaR : feedback from on-site examination

Strategic Integration of xva, Margining and Regulatory Risk Platforms

UniCredit reply to Basel Committee second consultation on Fundamental review of the trading book

Basel III Pillar 3 Disclosures Report. For the Quarterly Period Ended June 30, 2016

African Bank Holdings Limited and African Bank Limited. Annual Public Pillar III Disclosures

Credit Valuation Adjustment

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Frequently asked questions on Basel III monitoring

Standard Chartered PLC Pillar 3 Disclosures 30 September 2017

Basel III Pillar 3 Disclosures Report. For the Quarterly Period Ended June 30, 2017

Basel 2.5 Model Approval in Germany

Transcription:

Regulatory Update Preparing for the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) With the final set of definitions soon to be released by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Misys experts discuss which progress has been made so far in defining the new market risk regulatory capital framework and its likely business implications. Michel Dorval Regulatory Architect, Misys Thierry Truche Global Head of Product Management, FusionRisk, Misys What are the intended objectives of FRTB? The Fundamental Review of the Trading Book s key objectives are to define the capital requirements for the trading book and aim to contribute to a more resilient banking sector by strengthening capital standards for market risks,* as a further response to the financial crisis. The Basel Committee is also trying to achieve a regulatory framework with FRTB that can be consistently implemented by supervisors across jurisdictions and include the variability of market riskweighted assets. What are the key changes recommended by the Committee? The Committee is changing the computation and reporting in five key areas: Expected shortfall (ES) will need to be calculated across various horizons with high granularity in terms of risk factor classification. This could have been a totally unrealistic computing problem were it not for some recent clarifications in the allowed procedures. Replacing VaR by liquidity-adjusted expected shortfall as the measure of market risk used to compute the capital charge * BCBS document: www.bis.org/publ/bcbs265.pdf 1

Imposing more stringent requirements regarding the consistency of risk measures with front office P&L data at trading desk level. Updating the Standardized Approach (SA) significantly, to align it more closely with the new Internal Model Approach (IMA). Both methods will now have to be reported at trading desk level, the former acting as a fall back to the latter whenever the front office risk consistency requirements are not met. Revising the rules for determining the segregation of instruments belonging to the trading and banking books Defining a framework to compute the CVA capital charge as a specific category within market risk, as well as a basic framework derived from SA-CCR (BCBS 279) for banks unable to comply with the pricing performance challenges implied by the market risk treatment. What will be the implications on a bank s infrastructure? Banks will need to review their current infrastructure carefully to determine if it can accommodate the following requirements: In addition to the continued calculation of VaR for some purposes, expected shortfall (ES) will need to be calculated across various horizons with high granularity in terms of risk factor classification. This could have been a totally unrealistic computing problem were it not for some recent clarifications in the allowed procedures. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to calculate 10-day expected shortfall on a transaction level basis with full revaluation. Where a transaction is driven by one or more risk factors with a liquidity horizon longer than 10 days, one or more additional calculations (depending on the liquidity horizon) will be required involving shocks to just those risk factors. In virtually all instances, this will require a considerable increase in computing power. In addition to requiring significantly greater computing capacity, this treatment of illiquid instruments will cause a significant increase in required capital. The desks most affected will be those that are trading complex and structured products where limited liquidity is of greatest concern. To be able to use the Internal Model Method, banks need to investigate and assess the current level of consistency between their front office P&L and their risk management P&L. Inability to demonstrate consistency will force banks to use the standard approach, which would result in higher capital requirements and reduced margins. Time to market of new instruments will need to take into account the need to reconcile front office and risk P&L values, with potential delays or lower margins because of the higher capital charges from the application of the standard approach. What are the implications of moving away from VaR to Expected Shortfall (ES)? The ES is deemed to be a more accurate measure of risk as it covers the whole tail. Banks will be required to incorporate a series of liquidity horizons specified by supervisors, varying from 10 days to one year, into their ES models. These horizons are to be based on the type of risk factor being modelled. This is designed to address regulatory concerns that the existing framework was not sensitive enough and that the pre-existing VaR multiplier of 3.0 was not conservative enough for illiquid assets. 2

In order to calculate ES, specific required liquidity horizons need to be assigned to every relevant risk factor. Banks then must assure that these risk factors are treated consistently with this assignment in all expected shortfall calculations. In addition to requiring significantly greater computing capacity, this treatment of illiquid instruments will cause a significant increase in required capital. The desks most affected will be those that are trading complex and structured products where limited liquidity is of greatest concern. Speaking to our customers, it has become clear that addressing these new requirements will demand early testing and a review of how more speed can be introduced. Banks that implement a single pricing engine across the front office and risk management systems will be at a distinct advantage, since consistency is thereby assured automatically. How can the risk measures achieve consistency between front office P&L and risk management? Assuring consistency between the front office P&L and risk system calculations, without continuing reconciliation and verification headaches, requires convergence of the technology stack that has traditionally been split between risk management and trading. The demand for a more integrated view of risk will only increase. Satisfying this demand will require This will be especially complicated in many firms where the standardised market risk capital models are owned by finance while internal models tend to be owned by risk. BCBS 265 requires banks to run both calculation methods in parallel. common sources for both trade details and market data, shared pricing engines, uniform risk data aggregation and reporting schemas and identical classification of risk factors across all trading and risk management systems. A high speed and massively parallel IT architecture will be required for brute force batch calculations because of the high granularity in risk factor classification that will impose more revaluations. Fully consistent intraday updates will require the ability to incorporate new, amended and cancelled trades into the stored simulation results followed by rapid re-aggregation of ES results. Absent such a capability, it would be necessary to use approximations to estimate the impact of new trades and shifting market conditions on both market risk and credit related measures using add-ons or similar methods. Considerably more data will be required, including current market data, time series histories and simulation results at the individual trade level. All these must be collected and staged appropriately. In terms of data distribution, banks need to decide which output format to use. They also should investigate whether any drill-down or shared tools are already available that can be reused. 3

A single shared valuation engine significantly strengthens the case that a bank has taken the necessary steps to satisfy the new IMM requirements. Apart from having access to the same information at greater speed, time-to-market for new products would be reduced. FusionCapital and FusionRisk can use one common pricing engine across the two systems, either by using the native front office pricing engine and/ or the Misys FusionCapital Pricing engine. Misys Capital Pricing is a common fast valuation engine that leverages GPU parallel processing and provides seamless connectivity between the front office and risk management. This valuation engine can utilise models from multiple sources: Misys standard out of the box pricing models, Misys custom built models or 3rd party or bank in-house models A high speed and massively parallel IT architecture will be required for brute force batch calculations because of the high granularity in risk factor classification that will impose more revaluations. with efficient integration of external pricing libraries. What are the implications of the new Standardised Approach and the requirement to run both the Standardised Approach (SA) and the Internal Model Method (IMM) in parallel? IMM compliance will allow banks to optimise the required capital charges, thereby improving their margins overall. The current standard rules allow very little recognition of hedging or diversification benefits, resulting in grossly overstated capital requirements for the trading book. The purpose of the new standardised approach is to close the gap relative to the internal model approach by introducing more granular segmentation of risk weighting and several correlation matrices to account for diversification effects. The changes will require these two sometimes fractious neighbours to work hand in hand. This will be especially complicated in many firms where the standardised market risk capital models are owned by finance while internal models tend to be owned by risk. BCBS 265 requires banks to run both calculation methods in parallel. Misys FusionRisk Advanced Measures can accommodate both calculation methods. What needs to be considered for the move to Stress Expected Shortfall (SES)? The current double counting of risk by using both VaR and stress VaR is eliminated, now only the stress metric is used. This arose because regulators are generally pleased with how calibration to stress periods operates, giving a risk sensitive but also conservative and non-pro-cyclical estimate of market risk capital. 4

Once again, considerable additional data will be required, which will need to be collected and staged appropriately. The SES data will need to be calibrated to a period of market stress. Misys has experience with both calculations. They are available in FusionRisk Advanced Measures and Fusion Risk Regulation v. 1.5 What are the implications of moving from Incremental Default Risk (and towards the new proposal of the Default Risk Charge)? The Basel Committee felt that migration risk reflected in the Incremental Risk Charge (IRC) and spread risk in the market risk capital charge involved considerable double counting. On this basis, the IRC has been eliminated. There is no longer a requirement to model migration risk for nonsecuritisation credit positions. Similarly, the constant level of risk assumption in IRC will be abandoned due to complexity and lack of comparability. There is no longer a requirement to model migration risk for non-securitisation credit positions. Similarly, the constant level of risk assumption in IRC will be abandoned due to complexity and lack of comparability. More stringent requirements are imposed regarding the estimation of Probability of Default (PD) and Loss Given Default (LGD) parameters. They now have to be estimated as consistently as possible with the Internal Rating Based (IRB) prescribed methodology. FusionRisk is compliant with Incremental Default Risk following the latest recommendation of December 2014. And in parallel, Misys is following the latest discussions around the Default Risk Charge to be ready for implementation of the new required features. As of July 2015, CVA is now becoming officially part of market risk and thus fully enters the FRTB framework (although as its own distinct risk category). The current proposed treatment for CVA focuses only on the volatility credit spreads with no consideration of exposure variability driven by daily changes in market factors. Accordingly it only recognises certain hedges that pertain to credit spreads. The proposed revision is intended to achieve the following: Broaden the treatment to capture all CVA risks and recognise related hedges. Align the regulatory treatment more closely with accounting treatment of CVA Align the treatment of CVA with proposed changes to the market risk framework 5

Two main frameworks are proposed for computing the CVA Capital Charge: The Basic CVA (or BA-CVA) and FRTB-CVA. Consistently with the market risk framework, FRTB-CVA proposes two possible methodologies: a standardized approach (SA-CVA) and a more advanced computation called Internal Model Approach (IMA-CVA). FRTB-CVA is broadly analogous to the internal model method for market risk capital.it requires requires a bank to demonstrate the ability to calculate price sensitivities of traded instruments to all relevant risk factors, including CVA. Calculating the sensitivity of CVA, on the other hand, scales up the computational requirements dramatically. It implies new numerical methods and a parallel computing platform. Banks unable to derive the sensitivity of their CVA to all relevant market factors and which are not actively trading CVA, will need to compute their exposures through the BA-CVA framework.. IMM for market risk requires a bank to demonstrate the ability to calculate price sensitivities of traded instruments to all relevant risk factors. This allows them to estimate counterparty exposure paths using dynamic simulation as the basis for deriving their current CVA.. Either version of FRTB-CVA requires banks to derive the sensitivity of their CVA to changes in the major market drivers that affect it. This demands significantly greater computational power than simply deriving the current CVA estimate. The speed and massive parallel-processing potential of the Misys Capital Pricing offers a powerful way to accommodate these calculations. The basic CVA approach is available in FusionRisk: the calculation relies on the current EAD estimates for each netting set and is configured with regulatory parameters and the relevant counterparty details for each. Clear segregation of instruments belonging to the trading/banking book The Basel II rules encourage firms to push many credit sensitive positions into the trading book where they attract lower regulatory capital charges based on their presumed greater liquidity and easier sale if markets turn sour. The imposition of stricter rules will limit regulatory arbitrage in which banks could shift positions into the classifications that provided the most favourable capital outcome. Banks are likely to face higher capital charges as it becomes more difficult to move assets between the trading and banking book. Calculating the sensitivity of CVA, on the other hand, scales up the computational requirements dramatically. As a result, many banks that trade derivatives do not have the resources to derive the sensitivity of their CVA to all the relevant market factors. Desk level reporting for the Internal Model Method (IMM). Under Basel II, banks generally sought approval for their Internal Model Approach for calculation of market risk capital at the enterprise level. Once granted, withdrawing such approval would have a major impact on a bank s entire trading operation. Increasingly it was felt that IMA approvals needed to be more granular. The solution in Basel III is to define trading desks as a group of traders operating with a clearly defined business strategy and in a recognised risk management structure. Definition of such organisational entities is up to individual banks but this is to be subject to supervisory approval. 6

IMA approvals will be granted on a desk-by-desk basis, and therefore will be easier for regulators to withdraw if deemed necessary without institution-wide repercussions. In line with this, Basel III demands that enterprise-wide market risk estimates be capable of being disaggregated down to, and reconciled with, desk level results. Banks need to demonstrate their ability to obtain and report on desk level risk. This task is further complicated by the move from VaR to Expected Shortfall, with differential liquidity features, as the required measure. This will require trade level simulations with full valuation and enough replications to obtain reasonable stability for the average in the 2.5% tail of the resulting distributions. Taken together, these will demand a significant increase in both the computation and memory storage requirements to meet the Basel III market risk specifications. About FusionRisk Misys FusionRisk addresses the strategic regulatory and risk management requirements of a bank across the trading, lending and banking books. It is helping risk managers to see risk where it happens, and delivers stringent risk governance and compliance with the ability to monitor risk and exposures across asset classes and trading systems. FusionRisk - if you can t see risk you can t manage it. Contact us at fusionrisk@misys.com Spreading calculations across massive numbers of processors is the only plausible means of harnessing the required computing power necessary to meet this challenge. TheMisys Capital pricing platform is a highly efficient pricing engine that leverages multiple hardware options (grid computer farms, GPU cards and cloud computing installations) to achieve this kind of massive parallel processing. Telephone +44 203 320 5000 In addition, the Misys Column Storage Module (CSM) is a highly efficient way to re-aggregate massive numbers of simulation results to derive updated expected shortfall values at multiple levels from individual trading desks to the full enterprise. For more information visit www.misys.com/fusionrisk Issued: October 2015 About Misys Misys is at the forefront of the financial software industry, providing the broadest portfolio of banking, capital markets, investment management and risk solutions available on the market. With more than 2,000 customers in 130 countries our team of domain experts, combined with our partner eco-system, have an unparalleled ability to address industry requirements at both a global and local level. We connect systems, collect data and create intelligent information to drive smarter business decisions. To learn more about how our Fusion software portfolio can deliver a holistic view of your operations, and help you to solve your most complex challenges, please visit misys.com and follow us @MisysFS on Twitter. Corporate headquarters One Kingdom Street Paddington London W2 6B United Kingdom T +44 20 3320 5000 Misys and the Misys globe mark are trade marks of the Misys group companies. 2015 Misys. All rights reserved. 295 / 0915