Does a Currency Union Need a Capital Market Union?

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Transcription:

Does a Currency Union Need a Capital Market Union? Joseba Martinez and Thomas Philippon NYU November 24, IMF ARC

Differing views on the Eurozone crisis Hans Werner Sinn (2) The lesson to be learned from the crisis is that a currency union needs ironclad budget discipline to avert a boom-and-bust cycle in the first place Paul Krugman (22) On the eve of the crisis (Spain) had low debt and a budget surplus. Unfortunately, it also had an enormous housing bubble, a bubble made possible in large part by huge loans from German banks to their Spanish counterparts Paul de Grauwe (22) The situation of Spain is reminiscent of the situation of emerging economies that have to borrow in a foreign currency...they can suddenly be confronted with a sudden stop when capital inflows suddenly stop leading to a liquidity crisis

Why so much disagreement?. Because it s complicated 2. Because there was no model to think about these issues together Martin-Philippon (24) build a model and propose an identification strategy. fiscal imbalances 2. private debt imbalances 3. sudden stop

Why is it complicated?

Using U.S. States as Control Group.4.6.8.2 Deleveraging in Ireland 2 25 2 25.8.6.4.2.2 Employment 2 24 28 22 Actual Predicted using USA Ireland Arizona

Martin-Philippon: Counterfactual Spreads ESP GRE.6.5.4.3.2.. 2 24 28 22.6.5.4.3.2.. 2 24 28 22 IRL PRT.6.5.4.3.2...6.5.4.3.2.. data no sudden stop 2 24 28 22 2 24 28 22

Next Step: Spillover Martin-Philippon provides: But identification strategy and a model that broadly fits all the cross-sectional facts counter-factual (fiscal, macropru, sudden stop): large effects SOE paper: no spillover, no monetary policy capital markets limited to short term debt General equilibrium effects of deleveraging and other shocks? Compare three versions of a two-country economy with fixed nominal exchange rate Banking union: cost of debt equalized across regions Capital markets union: diversified equity ownership Complete markets

Preferences and Demographics Two types of households i = b,s, borrowerandsaver,β b < β s, fraction χ of borrowers E t t= Gali-Monacelli framework β t i [log C i,t ν (N i,t )], for i = b,s C i,t =( α)log ( ) ( ) Ch,i,t Cf,i,t + α log α α Borrowing constraint: B t+ < B t+ Sticky Wages W t

Pricing and Profits [ Final good C h = ε c (j) ε ] ε ε dj Markup µ ε/(ε ) > Profits Different economies Π t = ( P h,t W t ) Nt =(µ )W t N t Bond economy Capital markets union: domestic savers have claim to fraction ϕ of foreign profits

Budget Constraints and Market Clearing Borrowers Savers P t C b,t = B t+ R t + W t N t T t B t Π t S t + W t N t T t +( ϕ ) χ + ϕ Π t χ = P tc s,t + S t+ Clearing bond markets R t ( χ)s t+ +( χ )S t+ = χb t+ + χ B t+

Taylor Rule Taylor rule R t = R ss ( ( Yt Y ss ) Nss ( Y ) ) N φy ( ss ( ) Nss ( t πt π ) ) N φπ ss t Yss π ss πss

Experiments Deleveraging experiment: permanent 5% reduction in domestic borrowing limit This shock may be large enough to make ZLB bind: changes aggregate outcome but not comparison between bond/capital/complete Quality shock: persistent % increase in α TFP shocks as well Default and debt restructuring

Impulse response to home deleveraging shock 5 B n n * % 5 5 n+n * pc s p * c s * % pc b 2 p * c b * R %.5 2 capital union banking union complete markets

Take Away : Deleveraging Shocks Banking union (or anything that guarantees equal cost of funds across regions) is enough to deal with leveraging and deleveraging shocks Why? in SOE savers spending does not react because NFA does not change in GE, interest rate responds but with BU, interest rates remain the same everywhere QED true even if ZLB binding

Impulse response to quality shock α * 4 n n * % 9.5 2 2 9 4 n+n * 4 pc s p * c s * % 2 2 4 6 pc b 2 p * c b * R % 4 4 2 6 capital union banking union complete markets

Take Away 2: Productivity Shocks Banking union is not enough to smooth productivity/quality/tot shocks Why? relative wealth shocks > savers s spending go in opposite direction foreign equity ownership soften the shock

Debt Restructuring Now supose that borrowers can default η =amountofdeleveragingachievedbydefault Ex-post efficient: need to cut spending less But who bears the cost of default? domestic savers? foreign savers? fraction ω Example: banks make loans to households, bank equity is held by foreign savers capital market integration of bank equity

Impulse response with default, ω =.5 5 B 5 def n % 5 5 5 n * n+n * pc s % p * c s * pc b 2 p * c b * % 2 η= η=.5 η=

Conclusions Banking union achieves complete markets allocation with respect to deleveraging shocks BU helps smooth all kinds of shocks but for demand shocks it replicates complete market Sharing of other types of shocks requires more capital markets integration Capital union improves on banking union in case of productivity shocks Debt restructuring can be ex-post efficient Integration of bank equity ownership

Extra: US vs EZ, 27-2 Change Emp/Pop 27 29.6.4.2.2 DEU TX OH NLD AUT BEL FRA NY ITA FIN PRT PA NJ IL USA MI GRE ESP FL AZ CA IRL...3.5 Change Household Debt/GDP 23 27 NV

Extra: Martin-Philippon, Fiscal counterfactual: public debt.8 ESP.8 GRE.6.6.4.4.2.2.8.8.6.6.4.4.2.2 2 24 28 22 2 24 28 22.8 IRL.8 PRT.6.4.2.6.4.2 data fiscal counterfactual.8.8.6.6.4.4.2.2 2 24 28 22 2 24 28 22

Extra: Martin-Philippon, Fiscal counterfactual: employment ESP GRE...5.5.95.95.9.9 2 24 28 22 2 24 28 22 IRL PRT..5..5 data fiscal counterfactual.95.95.9.9 2 24 28 22 2 24 28 22