Government Consumption Spending Inhibits Economic Growth in the OECD Countries

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Government Consumption Spending Inhibits Economic Growth in the OECD Countries Michael Connolly,* University of Miami Cheng Li, University of Miami July 2014 Abstract Robert Mundell is the widely acknowledged founder of modern supply-side economics, in addition to being the intellectual father of the euro. This paper tests the Mundellian hypothesis that too much government spending reduces economic growth. Using panel data from 1999 to 2011 for 31 OECD countries, we find that government consumption spending significantly reduces economic growth. A one percentage point increase in government consumption, net of health, education, and housing services, as a percent of GDP is associated with a 0.86 percentage lower growth rate in GDP. We also find that public investment spending increases growth. The lack of good instruments makes it infeasible to isolate the direction of causation between public social spending and GDP growth. Higher growth reduces entitlement spending as an automatic stabilizer, while entitlements may directly reduce growth, so we have an endogeneity problem in estimation. Our results are consistent with Barro (1991) s finding that non-productive government spending reduces growth in a 98 country crosssectional regression on the Summers and Heston database. Keywords: Government consumption spending, public social spending, economic growth. JEL: O43; O47. Corresponding author: Connolly: University of Miami, mconnolly@miami.edu.

1 INTRODUCTION Robert Mundell is the widely acknowledged founder of modern supply-side economics, in addition to being the intellectual father of the euro. This paper tests the Mundellian hypothesis that too much government spending reduces economic growth, as illustrated by tax rates above t*. Basically, there are three main categories of government spending: 1. Public investment-gross capital formation of plant, property, and equipment, including public hospitals, schools and housing. 2. Public consumption spending-spending to produce non-market goods, such as defense, justice, police, fire and military payroll for collective consumption, as well as market goods and services provided as individual social goods, such as health care, housing and education 2. 3. Public social spending-old age pensions, survivors and disability benefits, unemployment compensation mostly in cash and health, health services and housing mostly services in kind (see Appendix 2, i.e. not any capital expenditure). In this paper, we analyze annual panel data from 1999 to 2011 for 31 OECD countries to examine the role of government spending in determining economic growth. In particular, we will focus our attention on government consumption spending on non-market goods such as defense and justice for collective consumption and its effect on growth in real GDP growth. Consequently, we deduct expenditure on market goods such as health, education, and housing to measure government consumption of non-market goods. We find that government 1 1 A Barro model of growth with government as an input is basically y Ak g where y is GDP per worker, A is total factor productivity, k is physical capital per worker, and g is government spending per worker. The budget is balanced, so t, taxes as a percent of GDP, are equal to g. The tax rate that maximizes economic growth is τ, the inverse of the elasticity of GDP with respect to government spending. 2 This does not include government investment spending in hospitals, schools or housing, which are categorized as public investment. 2

consumption spending on non-market goods significantly reduces economic growth. A one percentage point increase in government consumption of non-market goods as a percent of GDP is associated with a 0.86 percentage lower growth rate in GDP. We also find that public investment spending increases growth. A one percentage point increase in public investment as a percent of GDP is associated with a 0.82 percentage higher growth rate in GDP. We lack reliable estimates of marginal effect of public social spending on growth because the lack of good instruments makes it infeasible to isolate the direction of causation between these purchases and GDP growth. 2 DATA The data are gathered from the OECD ilibrary (2013), the online library of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD ilibrary provides economic data bases for OECD countries, including real GDP growth, public social spending, government consumption spending and public investment. This allows us to investigate the relationship between public social spending, government consumption spending, public investment and economic growth. In the OECD ilibrary, public social spending is defined as cash and in kind benefits provided for social purposes, while public consumption spending is broken down into spending on collective goods such as defense and justice, and in kind market goods such as education, health, and housing. The OECD ilibrary also provides data for other important explanatory variables of economic growth, such as human capital, initial level of per capita GDP and private investment. This allows us to control for these variables in the regression to test the robustness of our results. To avoid double counting, we deduct market goods provided as in kind social benefits from government consumption spending since these expenditures are also included in public social spending. For the empirical results reported in Table 1, we exclude market goods provided as in kind social benefitseducation, health, and housingfrom government consumption spending to capture non-productive government consumption spending. The sample consists of 31 OECD countries from 1999-2011. We drop 18 observations because of missing infomation on college or secondary enrollment. Table 6 provides summary statistics for the sample of 385 observations. The mean annual real growth rate in GDP is 2%, and mean public social spending is 20% of GDP, 12% cash transfers and 8% in kind, while government consumption averages 20% of income including in kind benefits and services, and 11% excluding health, education and housing. The mean total investment is 22% of GDP-3% public investment and 19% private investment. 3

3 METHODOLOGY When examing the relationship between non-productive government consumption spending and economic growth, we estimate a fixed-effect model: y it = αg it + X it β + µ i + δ t + ε it (1) where the dependent variable y it is the real GDP growth rate of country i at year t. Our regressor of interest is g it, country i s non-productive government consumption spending as a percent of GDP at year t. In the regression, we also control for X it, a vector of other variables that might affect country i s real GDP growth rate at year t. Barro (1991), Barro and Salai-Martin (1992) and Grier and Tullock (1989) find that a country s growth rate is negatively related with a country s initial level of per capita GDP. In this paper, we use country i s real per capita GDP at year t-1 to test covergence in country growth rates. We also include three measures of human capital in X it. The first two measures are consistent with Barro (1991). They are country i s secondary and primary education enrollment as a percent of total population at year t. We also include a third measure of human capital in X it. It is defined as country i s college education enrollment as a percent of total population at year t. We believe this is an important measure of human capital as college education becomes very common in the last few decades. These measures allow us to capture the cross-country differences in human capital. Barro (1991) finds that investment spending has positive effect on growth. To capture the effect of investment spending on growth, we include country i s total, public and private investment as a percent of GDP at year t in X it. In addition, we include both country and year fixed effects in equation (1). µ i represents country fixed effect and is used to pick up other time-invariant explanatory variables of country i. Since the period of estimation includes the expansion of 2003-06, and the recession period 2008-12, we include year fixed effect in the regression. δ t represents year fixed effect and is used to control for the boom and the bust. When examing the relationship between public social spending and economic growth, we estimate a fixed-effect model: y it = αs it + X it β + µ i + δ t + ε it (2) where the dependent variable y it is the real GDP growth rate of country i at year t and our regressor of interest, s it, is country i s public social spending as a percent of GDP at year t. In X it, we have three measures of human capital, lagged per capita GDP, public, private and total investment and government consumption spending excluding health, education 4

and housing. Country and year fixed effects are also included in equation (2). They are represented by µ i and δ t respectively. 4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS Table 1 reports the regression results regressing growth on final government consumption net of government spending on health, housing and education. The latter can be considered investment in human capital, so that the result is that non-productive government consumption reduces growth significantly. An increase in government consumption expenditure net of in kind spending on market goods and services of one percent of GDP, reduces growth by 0.86 percentage points. This result is compatible with Barro (1990) s finding for the Summers and Heston database, but suggests a stronger negative effect of government consumption on economic growth. Our result is also consistent with Barro and Redlick (2011), who estimate multipliers for defense spending using US annual data. They find the multipliers are all significantly less than one, suggesting greater spending crowds out other components of GDP. Table 1 here In column (2), we include college education enrollment as a measure of human capital in the regression. We find that the coefficient of college education is not significant. In column (3), the coefficient of secondary education enrollment is also not significant, 3 but that of primary school enrollment in column (4) is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with most studies on the relationship between growth and education. For example, (Krueger and Lindahl 2001, p. 1130) finds that education was statistically significantly and positively associated with subsequent growth only for the countries with the lowest level of education. For countries in the middle of the education distribution, growth was typically unrelated or inversely related to education, and for countries with a high level of education growth was typically inversely related to the level of education. In column (6), the estimated coefficient of lagged GDP per capita is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and provides evidence consistent with convergence in economic growth. In column (7), the coefficient on public investment spending is positive and significant. In column (8) the private investment coefficient is positive and significant and in column (9), the coefficient of total investment is positive and significant. 3 Using Summers and Heston database, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) find secondary education enrollment have a positive and significant effect on growth, while our results do not. 5

This result suggests that government non-productive spending is negatively related to economic growth, but government investment spending is positively related to growth. A policy of diverting consumption spending to investment spending would surely increase growth. Parenthetically, the 2009 American Reinvestment and Recovery Act envisaged less than 5% spending on public investment, and over 95% on consumption smoothing. Table 2 here Table 2 reports the regression results regressing growth on public social spending. It would be tempting to argue further that entitlement spending also inhibits growth, as suggested in Table 2. However, we can only confirm association, but not direction of causation. That is, both there is a problem of endogeneity. In particular, lower economic growth causes higher social spending on unemployment compensation, welfare payments, and the like. Since the rise in these is financed by new debt (Barro 1974, Ricardo 1888), we may not expect any rise in growth. It may also be true that more entitlements causes lower economic growth, but it is hard to find good instrumental variables that bear this hypothesis out. Consider Table 3 which uses the old dependence ratio, the population aged greater than 65 divided by those aged from 15 to 64, as the instrumental variable in a two-stage least square regression of economic growth on instrumented public social spending. The coefficient of public social spending, when instrumented, is not significant. It should be pointed out that the old dependence ratio is a weak instrument. 4 Table 3 here 5 CONCLUSION Government final consumption expenditure consists of expenditure incurred by government in its production of non-market final goods and services (except gross fixed capital formation) and market goods and services provided as social transfers in kind. The first category of government final consumption reflects expenditures for collective consumption (defence, justice, etc.) which benefit society as a whole, or large parts of society, and are often known as public goods and services. The second reflects expenditures for individual consumption (health care, housing, education, etc.), that reflect expenditures incurred by government on behalf of an individual household. (OECD ilibrary) At some point, increased government spending, particularly on non-productive consumption: defense, justice, police, fire, and military payroll, reduces economic growth (Barro 4 The F-statistic on the excluded instrument in the first stage is less than 10. 6

1990). In this study, we focus on the impact of government consumption spending net of health, education and housing service. We find that a one percent increase in net government consumption spending relative to GDP reduces economic growth by nearly one percent per annum. While increased public social spending and lower growth are associated, it is not possible to robustly conclude that social spending reduces growth. A timid policy conclusion would be that for a given level of public spending, more spending on investment goods and less on consumption goods should increase growth significantly. 7

REFERENCES Barro, Robert J. 1974. Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? Journal of Political Economy, 82(6): 1095 1117. Barro, Robert J. 1990. Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5): S103 S105. Barro, Robert J. 1991. Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106: 407 443. Barro, Robert J., and Charles J. Redlick. 2011. Macroeconomic Effects of Government Purchases and Taxes. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1): 51 102. Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1992. Convergence. Journal of Political Economy, 100: 223 251. Grier, Kevin B., and Gordon Tullock. 1989. An Empirical Analysis of Cross-national Economic Growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 24: 259 276. Krueger, Alan B., and Mikael Lindahl. 2001. Education for Growth: Why and For Whom? Journal of Economic Literature, 39(4): 1101 1136. Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David N. Weil. 1992. A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2): 407 437. OECD. 2007. The Social Expenditure database: An Interpretive Guide SOCX 1980-2003. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD/Eurostat. 2012. Component expenditures of GDP. In Eurostat-OECD Methodological Manual on Purchasing Power Parities. OECD Publishing. Ricardo, David. 1888. Essay On the Funding System. The Works of David Ricardo. With a Notice of the Life and Writings of the Author. J.R. McCulloch ed. London: John Murray. Rolle, Michael. 1690. Traité d Algèbre. Académie Royale des Sciences, Paris. 8

Figure 1: Government spending and the growth rate (Barro 1990) 9

Table 1: Regression of economic growth on government final consumption (excluding spending on market goods and services) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Government Final Consumption -0.86*** -0.83*** -0.89*** -0.83*** -0.84*** -0.87*** -0.95*** -0.88*** -0.86** (% of GDP) (-3.49) (-3.50) (-3.56) (-3.35) (-3.44) (-3.21) (-3.40) (-3.11) (-2.68) College Education Enrollment 0.34 0.19-0.09 0.13 0.43 0.39 (% of total population) (1.25) (0.78) (-0.35) (0.45) (0.87) (0.81) Secondary Education Enrollment 0.32 0.30 0.12 0.17-0.09-0.19 (% of total population) (1.46) (1.27) (0.71) (1.00) (-0.56) (-1.05) Primary Education Enrollment -0.66*** -0.58** -1.29*** -1.21*** -1.39*** -1.21** (% of total population) (-2.84) (-2.29) (-3.09) (-2.90) (-3.06) (-2.45) Lagged GDP Per Capita -0.55*** -0.65*** -0.69*** -0.59*** (1,000 USD) (-5.25) (-5.97) (-5.14) (-3.26) Public Investment 0.82** (% of GDP) (2.57) Private Investment 0.23* (% of GDP) (1.92) Total Investment 0.22* (% of GDP) (1.88) Constant 13.57*** 12.26*** 11.08*** 18.58*** 14.93*** 38.18*** 37.79*** 39.04*** 35.36*** (4.71) (4.61) (4.04) (6.50) (4.89) (5.27) (5.33) (5.19) (3.78) Number of Observations 385 385 385 385 385 345 301 212 220 R 2 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.70 0.76 0.75 Note: The dependent variable is the real GDP growth rate. Government final consumption excludes in kind benefits. t-ratios based on robust standard errors are in the parentheses. All regressions control for country and year fixed effects. The significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are noted by ***, ** and * respectively. 10

Table 2: Regression of economic growth on public social spending (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Public Social Spending -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.56*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.48*** -0.38*** -0.36*** -0.24** -0.26** (% of GDP) (-3.63) (-3.55) (-3.67) (-3.47) (-3.50) (-3.22) (-2.85) (-2.81) (-2.54) (-2.67) College Education Enrollment 0.22 0.18-0.01-0.14 0.10 0.40 0.36 (% of total population) (1.09) (0.95) (-0.02) (-0.55) (0.33) (0.83) (0.77) Secondary Education Enrollment 0.28 0.27 0.07 0.12 0.16-0.06-0.13 (% of total population) (1.42) (1.32) (0.49) (0.75) (0.97) (-0.36) (-0.75) Primary Education Enrollment -0.33-0.26-0.90** -0.94** -0.91** -1.36** -1.22** (% of total population) (-1.36) (-0.99) (-2.21) (-2.36) (-2.12) (-2.71) (-2.38) Lagged GDP Per Capita -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.63*** -0.64*** -0.55*** (1,000 USD) (-6.51) (-5.78) (-6.21) (-5.28) (-3.65) Government Final Consumption -0.54* -0.61** -0.64** -0.62* (% of GDP) (-1.97) (-2.19) (-2.27) (-1.99) Public Investment 0.73** (% of GDP) (2.26) Private Investment 0.22* (% of GDP) (2.01) Total Investment 0.21* (% of GDP) (2.07) Constant 14.72*** 13.89*** 12.39*** 16.91*** 13.45*** 33.64*** 38.52*** 38.51*** 39.23*** 36.33*** (4.73) (3.99) (3.92) (6.28) (3.66) (6.40) (6.32) (6.41) (5.40) (4.27) Number of Observations 385 385 385 385 385 345 345 301 212 220 R 2 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.70 0.73 0.77 0.76 Note: The dependent variable is the real GDP growth rate. Public social spending includes cash transfers and in kind benefits. t-ratios based on robust standard errors are in the parentheses. All regressions control for country and year fixed effects. The significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are noted by ***, ** and * respectively. 11

Table 3: 2SLS estimation of economic growth on public social spending (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) Public Social Spending -0.67-0.69-0.76-0.73-0.79-0.15 0.07-0.37-0.41-0.57 (% of GDP) (-0.90) (-0.98) (-1.02) (-1.38) (-1.49) (-0.36) (0.13) (-0.32) (-0.50) (-1.10) College Education Enrollment 0.15 0.10 0.14-0.10 0.09 0.26 0.30 (% of total population) (0.35) (0.42) (0.59) (-0.44) (0.31) (0.57) (0.62) Secondary Education Enrollment 0.25 0.26 0.03 0.11 0.15-0.05-0.08 (% of total population) (1.37) (1.34) (0.16) (0.65) (0.98) (-0.26) (-0.36) Primary Education Enrollment -0.14-0.04-1.17* -1.26* -0.84-1.24*** -1.14** (% of total population) (-0.24) (-0.07) (-1.90) (-1.68) (-0.88) (-2.66) (-2.06) Lagged GDP Per Capita -0.53*** -0.55*** -0.62*** -0.61** -0.49*** (1,000 USD) (-6.39) (-4.46) (-3.94) (-2.21) (-3.20) Government Final Consumption -0.98* -0.63-0.53-0.39 (% of GDP) (-1.94) (-0.55) (-0.55) (-0.61) Public Investment 0.79 (% of GDP) (1.43) Private Investment 0.26** (% of GDP) (2.21) Total Investment 0.23*** (% of GDP) (2.59) Constant 15.56 15.46 15.07 17.91*** 15.67*** 33.97*** 40.12*** 40.47*** 39.86*** 36.33*** (1.24) (1.20) (1.24) (4.52) (3.23) (4.89) (4.93) (6.48) (5.92) (4.87) Number of Observations 372 372 372 372 372 333 333 289 202 210 R 2 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.71 0.76 0.82 0.81 Note: The dependent variable is real GDP growth rate. Public social spending is instrumented by old dependence ratio (population aged above 65 divided by population aged from 15-64). t-ratios based on robust standard errors are in the parentheses. All regressions control for country and year fixed effects. The significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are noted by ***, ** and * respectively. 12

Appendix 1: Summary statistics (OECD data from 1999 to 2011) Variable Name Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Number of Deviation Observations Real GDP Growth Rate (% per annum) 1 2.47 2.81-8.54 11.05 385 Real GDP Per Capita (1,000 USD) 2 28.65 9.54 10.33 68.60 385 Public Social Spending (% of GDP) 3 20.38 5.92 4.82 32.20 385 Government Final Consumption (including in kind benefits, % of GDP) 4 19.58 4.28 10.00 29.79 385 Government Final Consumption (excluding in kind benefits, % of GDP) 11.28 3.00 1.11 21.19 385 Total Investment (% of GDP) 21.91 3.44 15.95 30.72 245 Public Investment (% of GDP) 2.97 1.04 0.73 6.58 336 Private Investment (% of GDP) 18.90 3.10 13.56 26.94 235 College Education Enrollment (% of total population) 3.23 1.04 0.56 6.74 385 Secondary Education Enrollment (% of total population) 8.60 1.40 4.30 12.52 385 Primary Education Enrollment (% of total population) 7.60 2.41 3.65 15.13 385 Old Dependence Ratio (100%) 5 21.53 5.44 8.34 36.58 372 Note: The data source is OECD ilibrary. The sample includes panel data of 31 OECD countries from 1999-2011. 2005 is the base year for prices. It is worth noting that government spending is high in OECD countries. In 2011, total government spending (i.e. public investment, public social spending and government consumption spending) in France is equivalent to 47.09 % of its own GDP. This number is 31.14% for the United States in 2011. 1. The lowerst real GDP growth rate (-8.54 %) occurs in Iceland in 2009. 2. Real GDP per capita is real GDP per person in 1,000 US Dollars (adjusted by PPP exchange rates). 3. Public social spending includes both cash transfers and in kind benefits. It is provided in the following social policy areas: old age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labor market programmes, unemployment, housing, and other social policy areas. The highest public social spending (32.20 % of GDP) occurs in France in 2010. 4. Government final consumption expenditure consists of expenditure incurred by government in its production of non-market final goods and services (except gross fixed capital formation) and market goods and services provided as social transfers in kind. The first category of government final consumption reflects expenditures for collective consumption (defence, justice, etc.) which benefit society as a whole, or large parts of society, and are often known as public goods and services. The second reflects expenditures for individual consumption (health services, housing, education, etc.), that reflect expenditures incurred by government on behalf of an individual household. 5. Old dependence ratio is defined as population aged above 65 as a percent of population aged from 15-64. 13

Appendix 2: Components of public social spending Source: OECD (2007). 14

Appendix 3: Components of government consumption spending Source: OECD/Eurostat (2012). 15